

THINKERS ON EDUCATION

Editor: Zaghoul Morsy

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FREIRE
FREUD
FRÖBEL
FUKUZAWA
GANDHI
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GINER DE LOS
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GOODMAN
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HEGEL
HERBART
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HUSÉN
HUSSEIN
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JOVELLANOS
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KANDEL
KANT
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KEY

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Preface

This is the second volume (Freire to Key) of our four-volume series of Prospects containing a total of 100 monographs on 'thinkers on education'. The whole series will cover the issues of Prospects scheduled for 1993 and 1994 in the form of four double issues, namely: Nos. 85/86, 87/88, 89/90 and 91/92.

For a thorough analysis of the reasons for this series, the selection of famous educators, the order of presentation and the intended readership, readers are referred to the general introduction covering the four volumes written by Zaghloul Morsy, and entitled 'The Paideia Galaxy', which appeared in No. 85/86.

A complete list of the thinkers on education appearing in this series, together with the names of the contributors, is given at the end of this issue.

The editorial preparation of this issue has been undertaken by the staff of the International Bureau of Education, Geneva, Switzerland.

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PAULO FREIRE

(1921-)

Heinz-Peter Gerhardt

Paulo Reglus Neves Freire was born in Recife, the capital of Brazil's Northeast province, one of the most impoverished parts of this large Latin American nation. Although raised in a middle-class family, Freire became interested in the education of the poor people of his region. He qualified as a lawyer and developed a teaching 'system' for all levels of education. He was imprisoned twice in his own country and became famous outside it. Today, Paulo Freire must be considered as the best known educator of our time.

The fundamentals of his 'system' point to an educational process that focuses on the student's environment. Freire assumes that learners must understand their own reality as part of their learning activity. It is not enough to assume a student can read the phrase: 'Eve saw a grape'. The student should learn to understand Eve in her social context, find out who worked to produce the grape and who profited from this type of work.

This 'system' brought about Freire's exile in 1964, following seventy-five days in prison, after having been accused of being a 'revolutionary and an ignorant'. He then spent four years in Chile and one year in the United States. In 1970 he moved to Geneva where he worked for the World Council of Churches. In 1980 he returned to Brazil to 're-learn' about his country.

Paulo Freire has published a vast collection of books which have been translated into a total of eighteen languages. More than twenty universities throughout the world have conferred on him the title of Doctor *honoris causa*. His most popular publication, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is dedicated to the wretched of this world and to those who identify with, suffer with and fight for the impoverished.

In 1989, he became Secretary of Education in São Paulo, the most populous state in Brazil. During his mandate he made a great effort to implement his ideas, to review the curriculum, and to increase the salaries of Brazilian educators.

Paulo Freire is a man with a great sense of humour yet, at the same time, a man disgusted with all types of injustice. He is father of five children by his first wife, Elza. After her death, he married his former student, Ana Maria.

This profile is designed to show in more detail the making of Paulo Freire – a sort of archaeological reconstruction of the man and his work.

Early impressions and influences

Paulo Freire was born on 19 September 1921 in Recife, into the household of a military police officer. Freire and his brothers and sisters were educated in the traditional Catholic way by their mother. His father was in close contact with the spiritual circles in the town.

Looking back to the strong position of the father in Brazilian middle-class families, Freire often remarked that his own father was always ready to talk with his family and that he brought up his children with authority, but also with understanding (Freire, 1978c). Was this the early introduction to a certain outlook about communication?

By taking a piece of wood and drawing words in the sand from the child's cultural universe, his father taught Paulo the alphabet even before the boy went to school. He then broke these words down into syllables and reunited them into new words. Was this the foreshadow of a future 'method' of literacy training?

During the world economic crisis of 1928–32, the Freires tried to uphold the standards of middle-class life, but their mother had at times great difficulty in providing for the family. They moved to the provinces, to the neighbouring city of Jaboatão, where life was less expensive. As a result, Freire lost two years of secondary schooling. Until he graduated from high school, he was considered a mediocre student. At the age of 20 he began to study law, but his studies were interrupted several times for economic reasons, since he had to earn his living and contribute to the family's finances from an early age.

According to Freire's own information (Freire, 1985a, p. 9), he was at that time strongly influenced by the lawyer and philosopher Rui Barbosa and the physician Carneiro Ribeiro. Both were great Brazilian intellectuals who transcended the frontiers of their own disciplines. Completion of his law degree qualified Freire to teach in Brazil's secondary schools. He taught Portuguese language from 1944 to 1945. In addition, he worked as a trade-union lawyer and gave lectures on legal matters for trade-union members in the suburbs of Recife.

In 1944 Freire married Elza Maria Oliveira, a primary-school teacher. In his autobiographical notes he remarks that she was Catholic like him (Freire and Bondy, 1975, p. 12). She encouraged him in his systematic discussions of pedagogical questions. Until her sudden death in 1986, her influence on his practical and scholarly work can hardly be underestimated.

Freire's contacts with the state-run trade unions helped him receive an appointment in the Serviço Social da Indústria (Social Service for Industry – SESI) as the chief of the Department of Education and Culture (Freire, 1959, pp. 14, 17). He became director of this institution in 1954 but resigned after criticism of his democratic, open and free style of administration.

In SESI's kindergartens and schools Freire tried to involve students and parents in discussions about educational and social matters. For him, working with

children meant taking into consideration their social and family environment as well. Problems, such as malnutrition and child labour, could only be solved with the involvement of the parents.

In the framework of the so-called 'workers' clubs', Freire and his colleagues tried to encourage the industrial labour force to 'discuss their individual problems and also general topics' (Freire, 1959, p. 15). He was trying to tell the workers that they should not leave the responsibility for solving their problems entirely to SESI. They should themselves try to overcome difficulties and hindrances. The aim of such work was to 'integrate the worker into the historical process' and to 'stimulate him to the individual organization of his life in the community' (Freire, 1959, p. 17).

In spite of the restricted nature of SESI's institutional environment, Freire showed that the principles of dialogue, 'parliamentarization' and self-government could be partially achieved inside these institutional boundaries. These three principles should be exercised to reach 'real democratization in Brazil' (Freire, 1959, p. 15). In addition to his work with SESI, Freire was working in other contexts to participate in the 'democratic awakening' of Brazil. Influenced by the Catholic thinker Alceu de Amoroso Lima and the 'new school' teacher Anísio Teixeira, he worked in several parishes of Recife on mainly Catholic-influenced, grass-roots initiatives. In this context we may note, for example, the project that he organized with priests and lay persons in the 'Casa Amarela' parish in Recife. In this project, seven educational units of the parish, from kindergarten to adult education, worked together in curriculum development and teacher education. The results of this project were to be shared with other groups who would be encouraged to work together on organization and content. Freire called this kind of union 'parliamentarization of the participants' (Freire, 1959, p. 129). Techniques such as study groups, action groups, round-table discussions, debates and the distribution of themed flash cards were typical in this kind of work.

In this way, Freire and his collaborators began to talk of a 'system' of educational techniques, the 'Paulo Freire System', which could be applied to all levels of formal and non-formal education (Maciel, 1963). Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, his technique for literacy work, one element in the system, was labelled the 'Paulo Freire Method', while *conscientização* became a *passé-partout* to revolution. For this reason he stopped mentioning these terms, emphasizing the political character of education and its necessary 'reinvention' in different historical circumstances (e.g. Freire, 1985b, p. 171).

At university

Paulo Freire's efforts at reforming education, as well as his activities in SESI and in the lay movement of his Catholic church, earned him a part-time teaching appointment for pedagogics at the Universidade de Recife (Freire, 1971b, p. 499). The university authorities wanted someone with experience and a reformist approach, so that these ideas could become better known in other places, for example at the university or at the School of Fine Arts (1955).

Brazilian political life in the 1950s and early 1960s was labelled 'the appearance of the people' by the defenders of an authentic development model for the country. This group of intellectuals, including Hélió Jaguaribe, Anísio Teixeira, Roland Corbisier and Alvaro Vieira Pinto, based their ideas on European sociologists and philosophers like Karl Mannheim, Karl Jaspers, Gunnar Myrdal and Gabriel Marcel, and gathered around the Higher Institute for Brazilian Studies (ISEB) in Rio de Janeiro. At the university, Freire had more contact with this and other contemporary political trends. Following his activities in the Catholic lay movement, he also began to read increasingly the authors of the Catholic left, like Jacques Maritain, Thomas Cardonnel, Emmanuel Mounier and their radical Brazilian interpreters, Alceu de Amoroso Lima, Henrique Lima Vaz, Herbert José de Souza and others.

The Catholic Students' Club (JUC) was one of the most radical organizations during that period of social and political upheaval. The university students demanded fundamental reforms in health and social services, and in housing (de Kadt, 1970, p. 62). Contrary to former times, when students had limited themselves to proposing resolutions, they now took to visiting the slums to discuss problems with the inhabitants and started campaigns to tackle the miserable circumstances of daily life there (Paiva, 1973).

During his time at the university, Freire became more and more familiar with the ideas of the radical Catholic student movement, expanded his studies of Catholic and nationalist classics, and systematized his way of thinking and acting (Freire, 1985a, p. 11).

In his essays of that time, the typical writing style of Paulo Freire can already be discerned. Against his vast background of practical work, he weighs up the most diverse theories and writers, intertwining them in a way that matches with his own experience, but generates controversies (e.g. Saviani, 1990; Jarris, 1987; Allman, 1987). Yet, he never denied being an eclectic who quoted specifically selected parts of the premises of, for example, Jaspers and, later on, Marx. He was not willing to adhere to Marxism or Existentialism because of some questionable points he found in the writings of these two authors (Freire, 1978c, p. 12).

This eclecticism, and – in my judgement – the 'theory' requirements imposed upon him by the then dominant culture at his home university, may explain the Freirean tendency to obfuscate his practical work through 'leadens philosophical prose' (Boston, 1972, p. 87). His writing style thus creates confusion among his readers. His influence is greatest whenever he appears personally and gives lectures and courses, thus gaining a dedicated group of followers willing to experiment and continue the spirit of his work. In this way his prestige is similar to that of many other great educators of our century, such as Montessori (Röhrs, 1982, p. 528). At their various epochs, they 'reinvented' education as art, science and policy (Freire, 1981d).

In contrast to many of his colleagues, Freire regarded the students' political activities inside and outside the university as a necessary and important part of the Brazilian phase of transition to a democratic society. He considered it important to discuss national problems at the university. Instead of trying to restore law and

order by disciplinary measures, Freire looked for solutions to the country's most pressing problem, i.e. 'the education of the people', together with the students (Freire, 1961a, p. 23).

Freire dealt with his concept of education in detail in his doctoral dissertation (Freire, 1959) which did not receive the approval of the university committee. Considering Freire's criticisms of the undeveloped state of Brazilian university structures, which failed to measure up to the expectations of the 'transition' phase, the committee's decision was somewhat logical.

Nevertheless, Freire got the opportunity to continue his work at the university because of his friendship with João Alfredo Gonçalves da Costa Lima, who had been first vice-chancellor and then, in 1962, chancellor of the University of Recife. Freire became special counsellor for student relations and later, in 1962, director of the university's extension services.

As in his time with SESI, Freire did not restrict himself to the framework of his professional occupation to promote the Brazilian transition. When, in 1960, the administration of the city of Recife, under the left-wing leadership of Arraes, started the Popular Culture Movement (MCP), Freire was on the side of the MCP's most eager advocates and co-founders.

Paulo Freire worked in the education department as the co-ordinator for adult education projects. He enthusiastically supported the initiative for the founding of MCP and glorified the 'movement' euphemistically as an 'action of the people'. It turned out, however, that the Catholic, Protestant and Communist militants inside MCP interpreted their educational and organizational tasks in different ways. A primer for literacy work with adults caused a conflict in Freire's department concerning the process of instruction and cultural-awareness raising (Gerhardt, 1978, p. 65).

The authors of the primer (Godoy and Coelho, 1962) had chosen a direct political approach with five 'generative' words: *povo* (people), *voto* (vote), *vida* (life), *saúde* (health) and *pão* (bread). Using the syllables of these words, sentences, such as 'The vote belongs to the people', 'People without houses live in slums', 'In the Northeast there will only be peace when the grievances are remedied at their roots' and 'Peace emerges on the basis of justice', were created. They were meant to inspire political discussion and form its structure and content (Gerhardt, 1978, p. 68).

Freire strongly opposed giving messages to illiterate persons. Messages would always have 'domesticating effects', no matter whether they came from the left or the right. Both sides would demand the uncritical acceptance of doctrines. Manipulation would start.

In 1961, to avoid manipulation meant two things for Freire: the convictions and opinions (i.e. the curriculum) must come directly from the people and must be prepared by them, yet the convictions and opinions should correspond to the 'transition' phase, which along with the analysis of ISEB and the Catholic radicals, Brazil was experiencing at that time (Freire, 1961a, p. 24).

However, Freire did not succeed in conveying his message. Parts of the MCP started to work with the direct approach, basing themselves on Leninist party doc-

trine. Thirty years later, Freire was to experience a similar conflict. As a consequence, Freire reduced his collaboration within the MCP and began to elaborate his own ideas with the help of his staff at the University Extension Office. Taking for granted the people's inborn talent to be able to reason, he had already experimented with his pupils' visual and auditory sensory domains while they were learning to read and to write. In one of his first experiments, he talked to his illiterate housemaid about a slide that projected a picture of a boy and the Portuguese word for boy (*menino*) onto the wall. Going over again and again the individual syllables of the word and then repeating the word *menino*, Freire observed that Maria noticed that the word itself was not broken up into syllables and thus 'learned' that the word was composed of syllables (Freire, 1970b, p. 9).

Yet, the stimulus was still missing which would enable Freire to arouse an interest in words and syllables in an illiterate person. The 'presentation' of the individual terms was missing. In his work with SESI and the MCP, however, he had learned about the interest of many workers in 'political' questions when they related directly to their needs and difficulties, and were presented in what we today call the media (films, slides, etc.). Furthermore, he could remember well his own first contact with the world of words. It was necessary to show pictures that referred to people's actual problems, and to read and write words that expressed these problems.

Experience had also shown him that it was not sufficient to begin with an intensive discussion of reality. Illiterate people are strongly influenced by their failures at school and in other learning environments. In order to lessen these hindrances and set in motion a motivational impetus, Freire experimented with the distinction between the abilities of human beings and animals in their particular environments. This distinction was also demonstrated by the new appreciation of folk art (pottery, weaving, wood-carving, singing, amateur theatre, etc.) and was originally put forward and theoretically described by the German sociologist Max Scheler: man as creator of culture.

Freire began to experiment with his new approach to literacy training in a cultural circle which he himself co-ordinated as monitor and whose members he knew personally. In his publications, interviews and lectures, Freire only speaks sporadically, quoting single members' sayings, about the first application of this literacy method in the Centro de Cultura Dona Alegarina, one of the MCP's 'cultural circles' for the discussion of everyday problems in the borough of Poço da Panela in Recife (Gerhardt, 1978).

Success

Freire reports that after only twenty-one hours of literacy training, one participant was able to read simple newspaper articles and write short sentences. The slides, particularly, aroused great interest and contributed to the participants' motivation. After thirty hours (at one hour per day for five days per week) the experiment was brought to an end. Three participants had learned how to read and write. They could read short texts and newspapers and write letters. Two participants had quit

(Freire, 1963a, p. 19, 1974b, p. 58). Thus, Freire's 'method' of literacy training was born.

Up to its applications in the city of Diadema (state of São Paulo) in the years 1983–86 (Werner, 1991, p. 136) and, partly, within the much disputed MOVA framework (Torres, 1991; Freire, 1991a, p. 129) in the city of São Paulo (1989–92) during the 'Freire administration', the various steps of the method remained the same, although there would be changes in order and content due to the socio-economic situation at the various training sites (Gerhardt, 1983, 1989). These steps might best be summarized in the following way:

The educators observe the participants in order to 'tune in' to the universe of their vocabulary.

An arduous search for generative words and themes takes place at two levels: syllabic richness and a high degree of experiential involvement.

A first codification of these words into visual images, which stimulated people 'submerged' in the culture of silence to 'emerge' as conscious makers of their own culture.

Introduction of the 'anthropological concept of culture' with its differentiation between man and animal.

The decodification of the generative words and themes by a 'culture circle' under the self-effacing stimuli of a co-ordinator who is not a 'teacher' in the conventional sense, but who has become an educator-educatee in dialogue with educatees-educators.

A creative new codification, which is explicitly critical and aimed at action, wherein those who were formerly illiterate now begin to reject their role as mere 'objects' in nature and social history. They undertake to become 'subjects' of their own destiny.

The 'method' had an overwhelming success all over Brazil. It would now be possible to make the illiterate population – at that time 40 million – literate (as literates they were allowed to vote) and conscious of the nation's problems. Reformists and leftist forces invested in Freire and his team, which was soon entrusted with the task of implementing a National Plan of Literacy Training (1963). Money poured in from all sides, including the regional office of the Alliance of Progress in Recife, the reformist governments in the Northeast and the populist Brazilian federal government of João Goulart (Manfredi, 1976).

Although already national co-ordinator of the literacy tide within the rapidly spreading Popular Education Movement in his country, Freire was well aware of the pitfalls the national implementation of his and other grassroots approaches to literacy could cause. The meagre outcomes of a pilot campaign in Brasília (Gerhardt, 1978) clearly pointed towards the dilemma of the now nationally famous educator whose 'cultural action for freedom' was difficult to implement within the state-run education system.

The overthrow of the federal government by the Brazilian military in March 1964 stopped the great experiment (Skidmore, 1967). Freire's second chance to assume a high administrative post would not arrive until twenty-five years later, and it would pose the same dilemma to him and his collaborators.

Exile

Imprisoned twice by the military for his 'subversive method', the Bolivian embassy was the only one that would provide Paulo Freire with haven as a political refugee. The Bolivian Government itself contracted his services as an educational consultant for the Ministry of Education. Yet, twenty days after his arrival in La Paz, he was to witness his second coup d'état, this time against the reformist government of Paz Estensoro.

CHILE

Freire decided to seek asylum in Chile where, through the victory of a populist Christian-Democrat alliance, Eduardo Frei had just taken office. Freire stayed in Chile for four-and-a-half years working with a governmental institute called ICIRA (Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform) and with the governmental Special Bureau for Adult Education under Waldemar Cortéz. He became a professor at the Catholic University of Santiago and worked as a special consultant to UNESCO's regional office in Santiago.

In his second country of exile, Freire dedicated himself primarily to the field of adult education for peasants. The process of capitalistic modernization of Chilean agriculture had brought new machines and knowledge to the countryside, but the property and wage structures had remained the same. For this reason, Freire proposed an educational project which would highlight the contradiction and promote discussions on how to overcome it. Freire began to understand that the reforms undertaken under the American title 'Alliance for Progress' were a façade for a subtle, modern, technical-scientific domination of the South by the North. The technology exported to South America under the slogan 'technical assistance' was used as a tool to maintain political and economic dependence. This explains the emphasis given by Freire to his concept of 'cultural invasion' in his first publications after he left Brazil (Sanders, 1968).

In this period Freire analysed the question of 'rural extension'. The outcome was the book *Extensión o comunicación?* (Freire, 1969b) about communication between the technician and the peasant in a developing agrarian society. He opposed the concept of extension of culture and the concept of communication about culture. For him the first one was 'invading' while the second promoted awareness. He pointed out that the interaction between the peasant and the agronomist should promote dialogue. One cannot learn if the new knowledge contradicts one's context. The educator-agronomist who is not familiar with the world of the peasant cannot attempt to change the latter's attitude. The incidental intention was to emphasize the principles and fundamentals of an education promoting the practice of liberty. This practice should not be reduced to simple technical support but includes people's effort to decipher themselves and others (Freire, 1969b).

In 1967 Freire went to the United States for the first time as an invited speaker at seminars conducted in the universities of various states. It was the period when his first, and until then only, book (published in 1968 in Chile), *Education: The*

Practice of Freedom, had already been well received in intellectual circles in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Mexico City and New York. In 1969 he received a letter of invitation to lecture for two years at Harvard University in Massachusetts. Eight days later he received an invitation from the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Switzerland – an organization which at that time played an important role in the liberation process of former African colonies – to become a full-time consultant.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paulo Freire was eager 'to experiment' with North American culture, to discover the Third World (ghettos and slums) in the First World (Freire, 1985b, p. 188). Yet he would regret losing contact with some kind of concrete pedagogical experience in developing countries. He considered it unsatisfactory to leave South America only to study inside libraries. He therefore suggested to Harvard University that he would stay for only six months.

At Harvard he worked as a professor at the Center for the Study of Development and Social Change. There he gave definite shape to his book *Cultural Action for Freedom* (Freire, 1970a) in which he contrasted sharply his idea of cultural action with cultural imperialism, a theme that he was able to study concretely in the United States. Half a year later he became consultant to the newly installed Sub-unit on Education of the World Council of Churches where, among his functions, he served as educational adviser to Third World governments.

Only after 1970 did Freire's pedagogical theory and practice become recognized throughout the world. In exile, Paulo Freire wrote his most famous books, *Education: The Practice of Freedom* (Freire, 1974a) and *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire, 1970d). The first is a compilation of ideas previously published in various articles and in his doctoral thesis (Freire, 1959). He advances a pedagogical proposal for Brazil in the transition phase from the colonial agrarian society to an independent and industrialized one. The three main problems of this phase – industrialization, urbanization and illiteracy among the rural and urban masses – have to be overcome through the construction of this new society. Democracy has to be learned by practising it (Freire, 1974b).

Ten years later, in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Portuguese manuscript from 1968, first published in English and Spanish in 1970), he advocated a revolutionary pedagogy which has its goal in the conscious, creative action and reflection of the oppressed masses about their liberation (Oliveira et al., 1975, p. 24; Freire, 1970d).

In *Education: The Practice of Freedom*, science and education appear to be relatively neutral, whereas in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* they become tactical weapons in the midst of the class struggle. From an emphasis on the relationship and confrontation nature/culture, human being/animal (the educational goal being cultural liberation as a means of social liberation), Freire moved on to focus on liberation from the oppressive mechanisms within the social structure in the service of the dominant classes. The educational goal is now to facilitate radical transformation of the social structure.

There are several epistemological claims in Freire's first Brazilian phase until 1964, particularly in connection with the concept of critical transitivity: (a) the development and exercise of a critical consciousness is the product of 'critical educational work'; (b) the task of education as an instrument in the process of development of consciousness depends on two basic attitudes and activities – criticism and dialogue; and (c) a critical consciousness is typical of societies with a truly democratic structure. These claims depend on the assumption according to which 'human reason' is perfectly capable of discovering 'the truth'. With this assumption, he had been successful in developing his own approach to literacy training.

Freire in exile emphasizes more the Hegelian motif of the incorporated oppressor (rather than a mere 'culture of silence') within capitalist socio-economic structures (rather than the ideal of liberty in terms of Western democracy). He also highlights the political character of science and education (Freire, 1970d).

In Brazil prior to 1964, Freire was well aware of the political costs and difficulties involved in his pedagogical programme. However, his epistemological postulates led him to interpret such resistance as something rather accidental and bound to be removed by means of tactical opposition to a given dictatorship and its allied interests. With the explicit adoption of a new political perspective, his theoretical postulates regarding ideology and knowledge changed. From 'tactics', Freire shifted to 'strategy'. The 'conscientization process' became a synonym for class struggle. Cultural integration changed into political revolution. This is once again particularly reflected in Freire's concept of critical transitivity: in the early writings, it has much in common with the notion of the scientific attitude (Dewey). Later, critical transitive consciousness became revolutionary consciousness (Freire, 1974b, 1970d; cf. Schipani, 1984).

The shift in epistemological claims is also reflected in the change of authorities and bibliographical sources from *Education: The Practice of Freedom* (Scheler, Ortega y Gasset, Mannheim, Wright Mills, Whitehead, etc.) to *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Marx, Lenin, Mao, Marcuse, etc.), although this does not yet necessarily mean that the former book has become irrelevant. This change had significant implications in regard to the understanding and ramifications of some key concepts. The concept of transformation in *Education: The Practice of Freedom* means participation and integration within a democratic system, that is, a kind of liberal approach. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and subsequent essays, transformation includes the possibility of subversion and revolution, that is, a 'radical' political option and practice. With *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, the following three major themes are found at the centre of Freire's concerns: conscientization, revolution, and the dialogue and co-operation between vanguard and masses in order to maintain the spirit of the revolution (Freire, 1970d).

Parallel to this change towards revolutionary radicalism in Freire's thought, a shift also took place in regard to the meaning and implications of the very concept of conscientization. The educational praxis became more revolutionary, and a greater emphasis was placed on the subject of commitment for and with the oppressed. In his letter of acceptance to the World Council of Churches, Freire, in line with his new thinking, stated emphatically: 'You must know that I have taken a decision.

My case is the case of the wretched of the earth. You should know that I opted for revolution' (Simpfendorfer, 1989, p. 153).

GENEVA - AFRICA

In Geneva a group of Brazilians in exile, among them Freire, founded the Institute of Cultural Action (IDAC). This institute aimed to offer educational services, especially to Third World countries struggling for their full independence. This struggle was to be based on the process of consciousness-raising as a tendentially revolutionary factor inside education systems. Freire was elected president of IDAC (Freire et al., 1980).

In the following years, IDAC reached such a level of popularity, with requests for collaboration becoming so numerous, that it almost became an institute organizing seminars and workshops to disseminate the idea of *conscientização* worldwide. Freire was not happy about gradually becoming the 'guru' of an international community of followers who saw in his work the new evangelism of liberation and who did not try to reinvent his ideas in their own context. At this time Paulo Freire even stopped using the term '*conscientização*' because he did not want to contribute to the misleading conception that it would be sufficient to interpret the world critically and not to transform concomitantly the social structures conceived as oppressive (Freire, 1985a, p. 23).

Freire was very pleased when, in 1975, he and the IDAC team received an invitation from Mário Cabral, then minister of education in Guinea-Bissau, to contribute to the development of a national literacy programme. As a result of this collaboration, a great amount of learning occurred among the IDAC team, the teachers, the learners and the administrators of the education system in this small African country. The deficiency of the material resources, the low performance of certain teachers and vestiges of the old ideology intervening in the development process of the country were all well recorded and examined (Gerhardt, 1981). Africa gave back to Paulo Freire and his collaborators the practical terrain for new experiences they had longed for (Freire, 1977a).

In exile Freire experienced thoroughly the dialectics between patience and impatience. It is necessary to be patient, impatiently, he once said, and it is necessary to be impatient, patiently. A banished person who is not able to learn this lesson could be considered as really lost. If one breaks this relationship, if one tends to be only patient, this characteristic is transformed into an 'anaesthetic' leading to unfulfilled dreams. If, on the other hand, one tends to be only impatient, there is a risk of falling into activism, voluntarism and disaster. The only path is the one towards 'a contradictory harmony' (Gadotti, 1989, p. 63).

Between 1975 and 1980, Freire also worked in Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique, Angola and Nicaragua (Assmann, 1980). Wherever he worked, he was not only a technician but also a militant who combined his commitment to the cause of liberation with a love for formerly oppressed peoples.

The African state of Sao Tome and Principe, newly freed from Portuguese colonization, entrusted Freire with a programme to promote literacy. The results of

this programme went beyond expectations. Four years later, Freire received a letter from the education minister stating that 55 per cent of students enrolled in schools were no longer illiterate, as well as the 72 per cent who had already graduated (Gadotti, 1989). These results are very similar to those obtained in the small cultural circle at Poço de Panela mentioned earlier.

In August 1979, Freire visited Brazil for one month. After this visit he returned to Geneva to discuss with his family, IDAC and the World Council of Churches his definitive return to Brazil, which took place in March 1980.

Back in Brazil

Freire arrived in Brazil when the Popular Education Movement, which he had helped to establish in the early 1960s, was entering its second period of influence at a time of economic crisis and when the military rulers were consequently willing to relinquish power. Freire had to 'relearn' his country. But soon he was able to discover the same social actors as in the 1960s, yet with different political influences.

Brazil's working class, which during military rule (1964–84) had to bear the main burden of the 'Brazilian miracle' and which is still suffering from the 'Brazilian debt crisis', now seemed to be better organized and was involved in its own political projects. Included among them was the foundation of a new political party, the Worker's Party (PT). Paulo Freire became in 1980 one of its founding members.

The middle class (staggering from considerable losses in income) once again radicalized, joined forces with the working class, and turned out to be the most active proponent in the process of returning the country to democracy (1978–84).

The national bourgeoisie, in its majority, had collaborated with the military government, a collaboration that had already begun before 1964 because of the overly vigorous advancement of the popular movement. Once again it tried to play an important and more independent role in the economy and in politics; yet always with a fearful eye towards its international counterparts, especially the United States. As in the 1950s and early 1960s, the national bourgeoisie normally did not take part in the educational enterprise. Its support consisted mainly of political and financial backing. Today, all three social strata contribute in their own way to Brazil's Popular Education Movement, moulding once again its form and defining its goals (Gerhardt, 1986).

Freire was invited by the Catholic University of São Paulo and by the State University of São Paulo in Campinas to become a professor in their respective educational departments. His academic activities soon developed in parallel to more political ones as, for example, he became president of the Wilson Pinheiro Foundation sponsored by the PT. He also associated himself with a small organization of dedicated educationists, called 'Varela', on the same lines as the early IDAC days. Through these institutions and organizations Freire achieved once more the linkage between theoretical and practical work which he defends in his writings. The ecclesiastical base communities, neighbourhood association, the feminist movement and ecological associations, along with Freire's analysis, are the cornerstones in Brazil's present transition phase. Although he would soon once again assume po-

litical responsibility on a PT ticket and, as before, counsel the secretariats of education in numerous cities of Brazil, he maintained his scepticism about overcoming tendentially sectarian party structures on both the right and the left. Political parties seem not to be able to collaborate closely with the abovementioned social movements in tackling the impact of unemployment, lack of housing, limited health coverage or educational infrastructures. Once again he advocated 'education as the practice of freedom' with educators and politicians who were prepared to say 'yes' to risk-taking and to adventure, who said 'yes' to the future and to the present, and who dealt critically with the present (Freire, 1991a, p. 32).

In the municipal election of 1988, the Workers' Party won the majority of the votes in the city of São Paulo. The new mayor, Luiza Erundina de Sousa, appointed Paulo Freire as Secretary of Education on 3 January 1989 (Freire, 1991a). Freire resigned two years later, on 27 May 1991, in order to resume his academic activities, and his lecturing and writing. His former Chief of Cabinet, Mário Sérgio Cortella, succeeded him. The Workers' Party administration lost the November 1992 municipal election. A former military-appointed mayor of São Paulo won, in free elections, the majority of the votes of a population that consisted mainly of workers, a quarter of them unemployed, and middle-class people. What went wrong with the *conscientização* process in the few years of an educational administration *à la* Freire?

In his evaluation, Torres (1991, p. 36) analyses the situation somewhat cryptically:

Very often, technical competence in the context of politically feasible and eventually workable educational reforms is at odds with ethical principles upholding beliefs in social justice and fairness for everyone in the context of political and economic democracies. Sometimes, politically feasible reform projects based on an ethic of democratic compassion lack technical expertise, rendering failure inevitable. Finally, technically competent and ethically correct democratic projects may not be politically feasible or workable, remaining in the realm of illusions, dreams or the unconscious of practitioners, teachers and policy makers.

As thirty years before, in Recife, popular education within the boundaries of state-run institutions did not arrive at a fruitful outcome. Different ideologies within the ruling party, difficult working relationships between public sectors and social movements, the unresolved relationship between an unchanged superstructure and educational reform (Secretaria Municipal de Educação, 1989) and the necessary 'reinvention of power' (Freire, 1975, p. 179) had been the key problems to be dealt with. Other radical educators will have to continue where Freire and his team in São Paulo left off.

Conclusion

Primarily, Freire devised and tested an education system, as well as a philosophy of education, over several years of active involvement in Latin America. His work was further developed in the United States, in Switzerland, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Nicaragua and other countries in the Third and First Worlds.

Freire's educational thrust centres on the human potential for creativity and freedom in the midst of politico-economic and culturally oppressive structures. It aims at discovering and implementing liberating alternatives through social interaction and transformation via the 'conscientization' process. 'Conscientization' was defined as the process by which people achieve a deepened awareness, both of the sociocultural reality that shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality. It involves praxis, understood as the dialectic relationship of action and reflection. Freire proposes a praxis approach to education in the sense of critically reflective action and critical reflection based on practice.

Freire's system of education and philosophy of education have their origins in a myriad of philosophical currents, such as phenomenology, existentialism, Christian personalism, humanist Marxism and Hegelianism, a detailed delineation of which would have exceeded the frame of this profile. He participated in the import of European doctrines and ideas into Brazil, assimilated them to the needs of a specific socio-economic situation, and thus expanded and refocused them in a thought-provoking way, even for the intellectuals and educational thinkers of Europe and North America.

To the anger of many more traditional academics in the First World (Berger, 1974, p. 136; Boston, 1972, p. 87; London, 1973, p. 56) his philosophy and 'system' became so current and universal that the 'generative themes' he advanced have remained at the centre of educational debates on critical pedagogy for the last three decades (Torres, 1991, p. 5). Ever since he found himself in exile the scope of his work has transcended the boundaries of the Third World (Schulze and Schulze, 1989; Dabisch and Schulze, 1991), a limitation which Giroux, who was in general sympathetic to Freire's approach, still suggested in 1981 (Giroux, 1981, p. 139).

Because Freire has worked in and written about specific educational cultures, there is a sense that he has developed only those parts of his theory that are relevant to the social situation in which he was working; consequently there is 'only' a synthesis of perspectives on education that relate to those areas of concern rather than a fully developed sociology, or philosophy, of education. What he has written is related to his convictions, rather than always being carefully argued within the confines of the more traditional academic framework (Jarris, 1987, p. 278).

His individual fate (exile, imprisonment) surely contributed to the air of mystique surrounding his work. Yet it neither possesses a solid theoretical framework nor was it ever carried out and evaluated in a way that would allow for objective confirmation. Freire is a very charismatic personality with a very personal and unique talent for understanding, dealing with and interpreting educational situations and processes. He has exercised this approach to education since his return from exile through a myriad of interviews, published in a multitude of journals and books (cf. Freire, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1985b, 1987; Freire and Guimarães, 1982, 1986, 1987).

A systematic delineation of his theory by himself is missing from this period. The question of whether radical educational work can take place within state institutions or state-founded projects has still to be tackled more thoroughly. Freire has experienced various expressions of oppression. He should use them to formulate

his institutional critique and analysis of the ways in which dominant and oppressive ideologies are embedded in the rules, procedures and traditions of institutions and systems. In so doing, he should remain the utopian he is, maintaining his faith in people's ability to have their say and thus to re-create the social world leading to a more just society.

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S I G M U N D F R E U D *

(1856-1939)

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In an essay published in 1925 entitled *Selbstdarstellung*¹ Sigmund Freud explicitly informs us that we must never dissociate his life, his work and the way they were treated if we are to understand his discovery of psychoanalysis, both as a therapeutic practice and as a metapsychological theory. In this close association, however, one element finally predominated, to the point where it eventually became the true purpose or ambition of his existence: the will to understand the only thing that ultimately matters, namely the human being.

My 'Autobiographical Study' shows how psychoanalysis came to be the substance of my life and subsequently follows the soundly based principle that nothing that has happened to me personally, as opposed to my relations with scientific knowledge, deserves to arouse interest.²

In this close interlinking of existence, scientific ambition and relations with the world the dominant element is therefore the intellectual project that led to the discovery of psychoanalysis as both a therapeutic practice and a hypothetical model for understanding human behaviour, indissolubly bound together. What path did Freud's life take?

Life and work

To paint a faithful portrait the best course may well be simply to follow Freud's own autobiographical account, which might be entitled, to borrow Alain's expression, 'the history of my ideas'. So many major scientific discoveries; so many essential stages in the course of a life.

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- Ed.

The first major period is made up of the years of learning. Freud was born on 6 May 1856 in Freiberg, Moravia (today in the Czech Republic), and he had acquired from his Jewish origins three qualities that greatly helped him in his struggles: (a) veneration for knowledge in general and, above all, scientific knowledge; (b) an extremely free and critical mind; and (c) great resistance to hostility. As regards his family background, it already seems to foreshadow the Oedipus complex: a father who married again, taking as his second wife a young woman scarcely older than the eldest child of his first marriage.

The young Freud's thirst for knowledge first steered him towards medicine, botany, chemistry, zoology and pathological anatomy; also towards philosophy and history. As M. Robert rightly says:

Freud, a materialist and a positivist . . . firmly convinced that the causes of diseases are to be sought in the organism and that any opinion to the contrary was but an illusion or a prejudice, might doubtless have become, had he not discovered psychoanalysis, one of those eminent researchers who make a name for themselves in the narrow circle of their speciality, more or less unknown to the public at large.³

A novel medical experiment introduced a change of focus and marked the beginning of a new period that Freud jocularly called the 'cathartic prehistory of psychoanalysis'.⁴ Faced with patients unfairly branded 'malingerers' or 'neurotics', he began to devote himself to the delicate question of hysteria. Thanks to his meetings with Charcot in Paris, with Liebau and Bernheim in Nancy, and later with Janet, he discovered through hypnosis and medical suggestion that there might exist 'powerful psychic processes of which a person is nevertheless not consciously aware'⁵ and which, without his or her realizing it, impel the person to act. Freud very rapidly came to the conclusion that hysterical symptoms were linked to forgotten earlier experiences. The cathartic crisis showed that the symptom resulted from the retention of an affect, and that affect was frequently rooted in sexuality. Contrary to what Janet believed, the hysteric did not suffer from a constitutional weakness leading to a psychic split; what was involved was a veritable 'unconscious psychic conflict',⁶ monstrous as such an expression may appear. Breuer's misadventure with Anna O. confirmed that in the cathartic experience the hysteric is a sick person who is not shamming but seeking to express something to which he or she does not usually have access.

As Freud himself acknowledged, the historic era of psychoanalysis began with the recognition that abreaction was not sufficient to cure the patient. There were resistances and repressions that had to be brought to light so that they could be replaced by 'acts of judgement culminating in the acceptance or rejection'⁷ of what had earlier been repressed. The patient's ability freely to express himself or herself would in the long run prevent relapses, something that mere catharsis did not permit.

There then began the specifically theoretical period of psychoanalysis, which must be understood as the 'attempt to picture the psychic apparatus on the basis of a number of functions or systems, and to identify the relations they maintain with one another'.⁸ 'The doctrines of resistance and repression, the unconscious, the

aetiological significance of a person's sex life and the importance of childhood experiences are the main building blocks of the theoretical edifice of psychoanalysis'.⁹

From that period on Freud ceased to be alone; his colleagues and his students acquired increasing importance, at the risk of distorting and misrepresenting the very inspiration of his research. There seems little point in dwelling here on the doctrinal disputes that cast their shadow over the declining years of the father of psychoanalysis. His work focused increasingly on exploration and generalization of the results obtained in other fields of knowledge (topical remedies, anthropology, history, religion, dreams, jokes, art, etc.). Fame came to Freud at the same time as distress at the rise of Nazism in Germany.

It was in 1929 that Thomas Mann, one of the authors most clearly cut out to be the spokesman of the German people, assigned to me a place in the intellectual history of the modern era, in words as eloquent as they were kind. Shortly afterwards my daughter Anna was fêted at the Town Hall in Frankfurt am Main when she received on my behalf the Goethe Prize awarded to me in 1930. That was the high point of my social life; shortly afterwards our homeland had withdrawn into narrow-mindedness, and the nation no longer wished to have anything to do with us.¹⁰

In 1938, a year before his death, Freud was forced by the arrival of the Nazis to leave Vienna, where he had spent virtually his entire life, and go into exile.

Education

Regarding the application of psychoanalysis to education, Freud said that he himself had made no contribution, leaving to Melanie Klein and his daughter Anna the task of applying the metapsychological model to education.¹¹

Nevertheless, childhood is an omnipresent topic in Freud's writings. Few analytical notes fail to make some reference to it. From the theory of stages to the concept of 'childhood seduction', from the notion of infantile sexuality to the central concept of the Oedipus complex, the entire corpus is predicated on a theory of childhood and the child's development. Childhood is seen as a decisive period for the development of the human being.

Hence, Freud's influence on educational thinking in the twentieth century has been decisive, and few contemporary authors writing on the subject have failed to make direct or indirect reference to him. Some base themselves explicitly on his doctrine in order to justify a particular approach, others are content to borrow certain of his concepts. This undoubted success may quite possibly be bound up with a certain fuzziness of interpretation. Enlisted in support of non-directiveness by those who see in him the denouncer of assimilation (education-authority-neurosis), called upon by others to the rescue of adult authority, Freud continues to be tugged this way and that by his interpreters torn between contradictory visions of the role and limits of education.

This may possibly be due to the fact that he left no treatise specifically on education. This did not prevent him throughout his career from inquiring into,

scrutinizing and if necessary criticizing the role of teachers and parents, that is, of adult authority over the child. Indeed, there is not one of Freud's works that, at one moment or another of his development, does not tackle some educational matter. From the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) to *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) he makes constant references to education. That both conservatives and revolutionaries invoke him may be because these scattered considerations, following such different lines of inquiry as that of *Totem and Taboo* and the case of 'little Hans' in the *Five Psychoanalyses*, are crucial. The superficial reader might then find his thinking on the question ambiguous. In point of fact, Freud's meditations on education, that is, as we shall see, on the question of the child's adjustment to both natural and social realities, are imbued with an indisputable unity, continuity and firmness of purpose. Their coherence doubtless derives from the fact that psychoanalysis is not a mere therapeutic method but reflects an overall view of existence, of which childhood is a first, founding moment.

The starting-point of Freud's thinking on education is at the confluence of two lines of inquiry: the biological and the historical. Biology, Freud's first branch of study, gave him an insight into the radical immaturity of the child at birth. Compared with the other animal species, the infant human appears incomplete: not only is it born naked, incapable of feeding itself, but this state is long-lasting. This innate vulnerability condemns the infant to live for longer and to a great extent under the protection, and hence under the influence, of adults. The child's individual history marks him or her for life, its traces remaining indelible in the grown man or woman. This primary intuition was systematized by Freud in his first writings, when he successively rejected the explanation of mental disturbances as being of nervous origin¹² and refused to attribute neurosis to hereditary factors.¹³ Freud saw the trials and tribulations of childhood as the source of the adult's distresses and disturbances. How then could the issue of education not be seen as crucial? If the child is indeed 'father of the man', then clearly the question of the child's education cannot be overlooked.

Freud's own culture led him to perceive – transcending historical differences, cultural disparities and the sheer diversity of civilizations and their phenomena – a single issue: that of our condition as cultural beings. Nature is omnipresent, to be sure, with all her biological and instinctual force, but everywhere the humanness of humankind derives from the transmutation of instinct by the discipline of culture. It is this transmutation, this transition, of which the Oedipus complex came to be regarded by him as the prototype, that defines the human estate. The encounter between natural desire and culture occurs initially at the level of the prohibition on incest, whatever form it may take. This primary law of development, analysed from the phylogenetic standpoint in *Totem and Taboo* and from the ontogenetic standpoint in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, distinguishes the model whereby culture establishes itself in us. The rule cuts across the natural biological order and marks the locus of education.

It is understandable then that, starting from these two standpoints, Freud should have been led from the very beginning of his research into hysteria and the aetiology of neuroses to ponder the meaning and values of a process whose sole

goal is to steer the child from the immediacy of desire to the restraint of social reality. Education is defined as the adult's action or impact upon the child, facilitating the transition from pleasure to reality, the passage from desire in the raw to socialized desire, integrated into a regulated universe of interpersonal relations. How is this integration brought about?

It should be noted that, in order to elucidate the process of socialization of the individual, Freud does not resort to hypotheses such as maturation, which presupposes a sort of latent aptitude that social customs would gradually harness, a void waiting to be filled. He eschews the nature-versus-nurture debate. To account for the fact that the child becomes socialized, Freud adduces rather the necessity of repressive action. Education begins with the act of preventing certain spontaneous urges or drives from expressing themselves freely. For Freud, therefore, education's repressive function is not a subsidiary, parasitic function that could be dispensed with: the essence of the socializing process resides in prohibition.

It is during the period of total or partial latency that are built up the psychic forces (disgust, modesty, moral and aesthetic aspirations) that will later inhibit sexual impulses and will, like dykes, limit and compress their course. When considering the child born into a civilized society, one has the feeling that such dykes are the work of education.¹⁴

Freud's psychoanalysis of 'little Hans' confirms this conception. In the conclusion to his commentary, Freud reminds the reader¹⁵ that the task of education has to date been seen as one of 'dominating, or more properly repressing, instincts'. He adds at once that, in even the gentlest forms of education, which seek to prevent such prohibitions from degenerating into a morbid condition, there remains a necessary minimum element of prohibition. To render an individual 'capable of culture', to make of him or her a 'socially serviceable' being, a minimum sacrifice of his or her own immediate instinctual activity is always required.

Are we to infer from this that the work of education is to replace desire by social rules, to install a new principle of psychic regulation to replace desire? The reality principle would then substitute for the pleasure principle; Freud would become the inspirer of totalitarian educational doctrines. If 'unpleasure' (*die Unlust*) is the sole effective means of education, then the pleasure principle and the reality principle appear to be radically irreconcilable. The individual's entire psychical apparatus would obey either the one principle or the other, without any possibility of combination. If education is a matter of replacing pleasure by reality, instinct by society and desire by rules and regulations, then socialization is purely and simply a process of substitution. Inner obedience to the pleasure stemming from the immediate release of energy is replaced by obedience to the rule imposed from without, be it by the natural world (the intransigence of reality) or by cultural dictates (laws, moral precepts, customs that exist for society before the child enters the world).

Education would then be the practice (techniques, procedures, methods and content) whereby adults compel children, more or less strictly, to forgo the immediacy of instinctual pleasure and replace it with a readiness to toe the line of reality. This substitution would involve a form of corrective suffering that it would simply be necessary to take care not to allow to degenerate into a morbid condition.

In point of fact, although Freud never appears to renounce the idea that a minimum repression of the instincts is necessary if children are to be educated, he is much less categorical about the alternative it seems to imply.

In fact, it very rapidly becomes apparent that, if education's ultimate goal is indeed to establish the reality principle as the principle whereby individual behaviour is regulated, its establishment in no way implies a process of substitution. In reality, it is not pleasure that must be forgone, but the immediacy of pleasure. Likewise, it is not a matter of rejecting the instinctual side of life, of denying the instincts (Freud knew better than anyone that such rejection amounted to a wholly ineffectual denial), but rather of adapting it and adjusting it to a natural and social reality that cannot be circumvented and in which it must find expression.

It is thus perhaps becoming clearer that, for Freud, education is not aimed at securing a naïve, illusory substitution, but seeks to effect a sort of adaptation serving to preserve within the context of the reality principle, in a modified form acceptable to it, all or part of the regulatory pleasure necessary to the psychical apparatus. If we wish to understand how reality and pleasure can be reconciled, it is these two principles that we must now attempt to define more closely.

The pleasure principle is a principle in so far as it regulates from the outset all individual activity 'in the raw', at the instinctual level. It might be defined by saying that it provides a primary rule to the effect that our actions, feelings and thoughts in general are all governed by the quest for pleasure and the avoidance of 'unpleasure': 'It seems most probable that the purpose of our entire psychical apparatus is to procure pleasure for us and to cause us to avoid unpleasure; it is automatically driven by the pleasure principle.'¹⁶ 'People wish to be happy and to remain so. There are two sides to this aspiration, a negative goal and a positive goal: on the one hand, to shun pain, on the other, to seek intense pleasure.'¹⁷

Freud immediately adds that this pleasure principle not only determines the purpose of existence but governs from the outset all the operations of the psychical apparatus.

One might be tempted to stop there and aver that neurosis stems in its entirety from prohibition, from what is forbidden. According to such reasoning, the institution of education is in essence pathological, since it inhibits the expression of a natural principle: true education must consist on the contrary in reinstating this pleasure principle as the regulator. Education without frustration or repression would then be possible within a sort of spontaneous concord of interpersonal pleasures and desires.

Reality

Why did Freud not adopt this hypothesis? Did he not himself write that 'primitive men and women had the best of it, since no restriction was placed upon their instincts'.¹⁸ We can discern occasional traces of nostalgia for a lost innocence when Freud ventures to criticize the immoderately repressive education of his time. But why is it impossible to conceive of a form of education that is not repressive? The reasons are many and various.

First, the pleasure principle cannot be a goal in its own right. Pleasure exists essentially in a state of disequilibrium. And this disequilibrium necessarily conflicts with the minimum stability that all civilization requires. Progressive tension cannot be conjoined with stability. Moreover, while the pleasure principle does indeed account for human conduct, its goal of infinite, everlasting, perfect happiness can never be attained. This criticism focuses on the intrinsic inadequacy of the pleasure principle:

What is termed happiness in the strictest sense stems from a relatively sudden satisfaction of needs that have reached a high tension, and by its very nature can be achieved only in the form of an episodic phenomenon. Any persistence of that state sought by the pleasure principle generates only a somewhat lukewarm well-being. . . . Thus our capacity for happiness is already limited by our constitution.¹⁹

In itself, therefore, pleasure is not enough to define a goal, since it spends its time shunning itself.

Moreover, it is indissolubly and structurally linked to pain. 'Unpleasure' is far more familiar to us than pleasure, and experiencing it provokes anxiety. As it degenerates and deteriorates, our own body urges us to reduce our aspiration to absolute happiness. The outside world, with its inexorable natural forces, works towards our annihilation – and our fellow humans do not always wish us well either. All these factors prompt us to limit our ambition to raise the pleasure principle to the status of an educational archetype.

However, the impossibility of developing a non-repressive form of education is not rooted solely in this internal analysis of the mechanisms of pleasure. Freud links the necessity of education to a harsh criticism of the condition of 'primitive man', that of a being given over exclusively to the unfettered satisfaction of his instincts. To be sure, 'primitive man' possesses his quota of basic instincts, but the absence of interpersonal regulation means that, even though he can indulge those instincts, sensual enjoyment is neither guaranteed nor even desirable.

Instinctual desires are the same from both the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic standpoints. Identical in the history of the race and in the individual's history, they reappear with every new-born child: 'The instinctual desires upon which [culture] takes its inevitable toll are reborn with each child. . . . These primitive desires are those of incest, cannibalism and murder.'²⁰

Just as civilization began to withdraw from the 'primitive state' as a result of 'frustration', 'privation', 'prohibition' or taboo, individual education, as a constraint, is a necessity, whereby the child can be steered from a state of primitive desire to one of controlled desire.

This necessity derives from the genuine impossibility of gratifying these instincts freely and fully in a primitive state. Freedom in that state is experienced as freedom to no purpose, freedom that cannot be exercised, because of nature's intransigence and the unpredictable violence of interpersonal relations that are not regulated. The aggressive, conflict-fraught and destructive instincts and impulses become self-destructive for lack of any norms.

This aggressive trend, 'which we can discern in ourselves, and which we rightly

suppose to exist in others',²¹ is the driving force behind the transition to a possible state of coexistence. Desire, instinct in whatever spontaneous form it may be expressed, offers no guarantee of leading to possible pleasure if it is content to act solely on immediate impulse. Infinite freedom is tantamount to the negation of freedom.

'Primitive man' in fact had the best of the bargain, since he experienced no restriction upon his instincts. On the other hand, his certainty of enjoying such happiness for long was minimal indeed. 'Civilized man' has exchanged a measure of happiness for a measure of security. More precise information on the *mores* of present-day 'savage' peoples have taught us that there are no grounds at all for envying them the freedom of their instinctual life. They are in fact subject to restrictions of another order, ones that are possibly more severe than those imposed upon the modern, civilized individual. If we quite properly tax our present-day civilization with falling so far short of creating a vital order calculated to make us happy – which is what we nevertheless expect of civilization – and with allowing to persist so much suffering that could probably be avoided, and if, moreover, we endeavour, through ruthless criticism, to discover the sources of its imperfection, we surely do no more than exercise our rights, and in doing so we do not declare ourselves to be its enemies. It is also our right to expect from it gradual changes that will enable it better to satisfy our needs and so put it beyond the reach of such criticism. Nevertheless, we may well become familiar with the idea that certain pre-existing difficulties are intimately bound up with its essence and are proof against all attempts at reform'.²²

This essence is the minimum amount of repression imposed by the disciplining of the instincts, and its instrument is education. Education accordingly begins with the 'unpleasure' caused by authority. Prohibition pertains to culture, that is to 'that whereby humankind has raised itself above the animal kingdom'.²³ It is through it that we manage to curb certain instincts that would lead us to certain death. To adapt to the reality principle is to become capable of such self-mastery.

The question then arises as to what this reality is. If, as has been seen, the ultimate goal of education is indeed to install the reality principle, in order to establish it as the source of the process that guides our intellectual, moral and psychical behaviour patterns, in what does this reality consist?

The sphere of reality is everything that goes to make up the external world, both natural and cultural. To remain in the educational field, it is for Freud everything that occurs to the child once it emerges from the initial state of dependence upon its benevolent mother. In other words, it is what happens once the confusion has to cease between objective satisfaction and the hallucinatory representation of satisfaction. Reality is then made up of all the natural or cultural factors that resist the child by introducing a hiatus between desire and its satisfaction. Space, time and otherness subsume in their general frameworks all the particular cases in which reality confronts immediate desire.

Thus defined, reality appears indeed to be the enemy of desire, and the reality principle must be seen as the necessity of yielding to unavoidable coercion. Pleasure and reality appear therefore to be irreconcilable. However – and herein lies the great force of Freud's analysis – these two principles are not contradictory but complementary.

As has been seen, the pleasure principle does not, by itself, render human existence possible, qua human existence, nor even the reality of pleasure. It cannot succeed, in fact, unless the reality principle is combined with it. The pleasure principle already contains within itself its own real limits. Reality is therefore already within it, if not as regulatory principle, at least as an inner obstacle.

Each individual is a virtual enemy of civilization, which itself, however, is in the interests of humankind in general. It is strange that people, who find it so difficult to live in isolation, nevertheless feel sorely oppressed by the sacrifices that civilization expects of them in order to make life together possible for them. Civilization must therefore be defended against the individual, and its organization, its institutions and its laws all serve to accomplish this task.²⁴

The opposition is therefore no more than 'virtual', and it is indeed the process of socialization, that is of adjusting to reality, that makes life together, and hence the attainment of pleasure, possible. The task of education is therefore not only to prohibit, to frustrate, but also to discover a sort of balance between the search for pleasure that continues to govern psychical equilibrium after the process of socialization has been completed and the constraints that the natural and social realities impose upon our primitive instincts. Education's task is to tame instinctual nature, but it can succeed in this task only by allowing legitimate pleasure its rightful place. At best, it takes the edge off conflicts, but it does not suppress them. Freud reminds us of this task:

The main aim of all education is to teach the child to control its instincts. It is indeed impossible to allow it total freedom, to authorize it to follow its every impulse, without constraint. . . . Education must therefore inhibit, forbid and repress, and it is to that task that it has at all times applied itself to the full. However, analysis has shown us that it is in fact such repression of the instincts that causes neuroses. Education must therefore navigate its way between the Scylla of the *laissez-faire* approach and the Charybdis of prohibition. While the problem is not insoluble, the aim must be to strike an optimal balance, that is to work out how such education will be most beneficial and least dangerous. It will be a matter of deciding what must be forbidden, and then at what moment and by what means the prohibition must be enforced. . . .

Observation shows that to date education has been very deficient in fulfilling its mission and has harmed children greatly. If its 'optimum' can be discovered, if it succeeds in doing its work to the full, then and then only may it hope to succeed in nullifying the effect of one of the factors of disease: the action of the accidental traumata of childhood. With regard to the other factor, education will never ever manage to suppress the demands of an unruly instinctual make-up'.²⁵

This lengthy quotation enables us to situate the place and role of education fairly precisely in Freud's thinking. The educator must tread a wary path between two stumbling blocks: on the one hand, maintaining the child in its original brute state as a result of the absence of adult resistance; on the other, the neurosis that may be caused by excessive repression. It should never be forgotten, moreover, that education remains, at best, an art; even were it to attain an ideal theoretical and practical

level, there remains a 'natural constitution' that ensures that it cannot achieve everything. Certain individual spirits remain impervious to its discipline.

The problem, then, is how to reconcile the pleasure principle and the reality principle. How can the search for maximum immediate and untrammelled sensual enjoyment find common ground with the reality principle, which forbids, inhibits and raises barriers? How is it that the psychical apparatus consents to knuckle under to reality? Upon what *Instanz* or agency of the subject does reality have a hold?

Educability

In order for it to be effective, the prohibition must be internalized. The existence of individual morality shows that the rule imposed by reality does not remain external to the subject but is taken over and integrated by the subject in an affective form. Its efficacy depends upon its being internalized. This is possible only if the subject possesses an agency of his or her own that is capable of integrating the social imperative counteracting the impact of the instincts. The Freudian system accordingly postulates the existence in the subject of an intrinsic energy, a sort of self-preservation and survival instinct that counterbalances the primitive instinctual drives. It is self-love that lies at the root of moral obligation and hence of educability. 'Repression, we have said, derives from the self, the ego; or, to be more precise, from the ego's self-esteem (*Selbstachtung*).'²⁶

External prohibition and frustration correspond to an internal mechanism that remains the precondition itself of educability and means that the individual is not trained to behave automatically but is indeed educated, that is, capable of self-regulation.

It is therefore the ego, with its instinct for self-preservation and its self-ideal, that enters into conflict with those instincts whose energy is characterized by the libido,²⁷ and with the primitive instincts of the id. Education can manage those aspects of nature that represent a threat to culture only on the firm condition that the subject finds the sacrifice required of it by culture to be in its own interest. It is the ego that sees in its survival and its self-respect a counterweight to frustration.

Moreover, it is not a matter of absolute sacrifice, but rather one of displacement. For the ego brings into play the mechanisms whereby psychic energy is diverted, dramatized, sublimated, in order for it to find an outlet in reality. It is therefore within the subject that the counterweight to the primitive instincts is located. It is there, too, finally, that are forged the defence mechanisms that enable that primitive drive to achieve a partial or symbolic fulfilment in reality.

We see, then, what it is that gives Freud's thinking on education its great originality and coherence, in comparison with that of Reich, Neill or Marcuse. Instead of presenting education in Manichaeian terms as the training of the personality to obey by an outside trainer, Freud shows that education is possible because there exists within the individual, within his or her psychical apparatus, tendencies requiring that individual to be amenable to education. In other words the reason the reality principle can, in the course of individual development, channel those

spontaneous impulses originally operating at the dictate of the pleasure principle is that there exists within us not only the capacity to internalize prohibitions but also certain forces, no less primitive than those of the id, that counterbalance the latter's influence, namely self-preservation instincts or drives, such as the narcissistic image of the self. It is by this medium that the libido's inner energy, translated into self-love, emerges as the very foundation of moral obligation, that is of education. It is this narcissism that subtends the fear of the withdrawal of love, the primary factor motivating the child's receptiveness to education and one that is doubtless more powerful than direct violence. It is also because it is the conscious part of the ego that is involved in the setting up of these various mechanisms that education may be considered to be the process of moulding the individual's intellectual faculties. The reality principle has its source within us: alike in the very limits of the pleasure principle and in the instigation (*Instanz*) of the person responsible for its preservation. Its externality is no more than apparent. This internality that renders education possible appears consciously in the form of 'ambition', the desire to 'grow up', to 'appear adult', in which pleasure and reality are closely bound up with one another.²⁸

Freud's strength was avoidance of the pitfall into which so many authors representing themselves as following in his footsteps have stumbled: that simplistic dualism that contrasts the individual – spontaneous, natural and asking no more than to satisfy unmotivated instincts – with society, a cultural, artificial and disabling device which for some unknown, perverse, ultimate goal denies the instinctual energy expression. Freud shows that morality and intellect are contained in embryo in the structure of the psychical apparatus. Sociability makes socialization possible, the latter being real only because in the final analysis it is in the individual's interest that it should be: the individual exchanges a freedom that is infinite but precarious for one that is regulated but real, being guaranteed. There is such a thing as natural educability, and it is this that makes education possible.

We come back to the biological dimension that served as our starting-point. The individual cannot remain eternally a child, he or she must one day enter the hostile environment of the outside world. The child might be defined as a being driven by immediate instincts, who lives protected by kind, benevolent adults, sheltered from both the harshness of the external world and from all inner conflicts. Education consists solely in leading it from that precarious state of sheltered dependence towards a state of responsibility. If, from a superficial standpoint, the role of education is to manage those forces of nature that are liable to prove dangerous for culture, from a more considered perspective it becomes clear that, by enabling the pleasure principle to be tamed, such education at the same time enables the human being to be humanized. Unlike the child, who lives in a sheltered state of pleasure, unlike the animal, who is under the sway of immediate pleasure, the adult must be regarded as the being of mediate, emancipated pleasure.

No doubt this Freudian conception of education is in itself a fertile and clearly focused one. Nevertheless, the analysis of it needs to be pursued to its ultimate consequences, if it is not to give the impression of being inadequate. Indeed, were the analysis to be taken no further, Freud might be reduced to the level of any mere

theoretician of adaptation. In the final analysis, educating amounts in fact to socializing, and the reality principle generally matches the set of rules accepted by all societies, however tyrannical or unjust. It is a principle that allows no distinction to be made between social models. According to such a view, education boils down to inculcating the moral precepts and knowledge that are essential to any given society, such knowledge and precepts enabling it to pursue from generation to generation the exigencies imposed by its own structures. In this sense, Freud could be said to have been pursuing the same objects as Skinner and might be seen as an advocate of the pedagogy of 'adjustment'.

Ultimate goals

This would be grievously to misunderstand Freud, who is neither a relativist nor a cynic. *Realpädagogie* and educational moralism were repugnant to him. His theory of education is based on an explicit ideal that is both human and interpersonal, one that can serve as the ultimate goal of action. This ideal is that of the progress of science seen as the progress of reason as it acquires self-awareness through the successive shedding of its illusions. The goal that Freud assigns to education is that of an autonomy that is both intellectual and moral and that can be attained only through scientific knowledge.

A cursory interpretation of psychoanalysis all too frequently glosses over the fact that, as a science, it presupposes the primacy of intelligence over instinctive behaviour. Far from seeking to glorify occult mechanisms and the illusions of the instinct, psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline leads to the intellect being given undisputed pre-eminence. Indeed, the religious critics quoted in *The Future of an Illusion*²⁹ knew what they were talking about when they presented psychoanalysis as a force tending to destroy the comforting illusions of religion.

In Freud's thinking, education has no other purpose than to bring about the same demystification, the same removal of illusions as that effected by psychoanalysis:

The time when the primacy of the intellect will become established is no doubt still immensely remote from us, but the distance separating us from it is undoubtedly not infinite. And as the intellect, once it has won primacy, will probably pursue the same goals as those your God is to enable us to attain – human fraternity and the diminution of suffering – we are entitled to say that our antagonism is but temporary and in no way insurmountable.³⁰

It is reason and experience that, in Freud's view, will elucidate the illusory consolations of religion. In the process, we may well forfeit a measure of relief. At the very least, it would be 'an illusion to think that we can find elsewhere what [science] cannot give us'.³¹ True education, therefore, according to Freud, is education that leads, through science and experience, to reason. Hamlet in his doubt and his disquiet is ultimately, in Freud's eyes, a better educational and human model³² than any mystic hero, ensconced in the easy certainties of an easy conscience and the poor illusions of faith.

It might be objected that rational science itself is but a figment, an illusory construction, a sort of palliative enabling us to bear up under the sufferings, disappointments and frustrations that life inflicts upon us.

It may be, Freud replies, that science and the pursuit of reason are no more than ersatz gratifications that distract us from thoughts of death.³³ But even if the satisfactions they bring us are substitute satisfactions the body of knowledge they provide has the virtue of not being illusory. Such objective demystification can be measured by three factors: human powers are increased by the progress of science; the picture of the universe that it proposes is more coherent and more precise;³⁴ and the models that it furnishes are universal, being recognized as necessary.³⁵

In the light of such a goal, what in practical terms must education actually do?

From the moral standpoint, schooling must train us to give up our infantile desires, must teach us to exchange boundless but illusory bliss for the assurance of enjoyment, and prepare us to bear certain frustrations that living together in society makes necessary. The aim must be to enable us to shed our illusions about ourselves and attain a greater degree of lucidity.

From the standpoint of knowledge, that is, of instruction, education's task is to enable the adult within the child to achieve fulfilment, that is, to develop the intellect, in order to pave the way leading from servitude to freedom.

In political terms, education's duty remains to bring about more 'fraternity among human beings, by reducing their sufferings'.³⁶

By virtue of his intellectual and critical approach, Freud therefore fits squarely into the humanistic tradition. According to the tenets of psychoanalysis, education consists not in freeing the fantasy-generating power of the instincts from social constraints but rather in 'teaching the child to control his or her instincts'.³⁷ Far from promoting any naïve hedonism, or a mystical harmony between self and self or between self and others, Freud assigns to education the task of seeking to manage, within a state of equilibrium acceptable to everyone, the sacrifices and rewards that reality imposes upon the immediacy of pleasure; this through and for reason and science, that is the intellect's work of disabusal. Education may be equated with an ascesis of the intellect that calls its own beliefs into question and works unceasingly upon itself in order to understand that reality of which it is part, transcending childhood's necessary illusions.

Notes

1. English translation: S. Freud, *An Autobiographical Study*, London, 1959.
2. 'Postscriptum' (1935), *ibid.*
3. M. Robert, 'Sigmund Freud', *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, Vol. 7, p. 384, Paris, 1980.
4. Freud, *An Autobiographical Study*, *op. cit.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. S. Freud and J. Breuer, *Studies in Hysteria*, 1955.
13. S. Freud, *Neurosis, Psychoses and Perversion*, in which Freud refutes Charcot's hypothesis based on heredity.
14. S. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, 1953.
15. S. Freud, *Analyses of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy*.
16. S. Freud, *Essais de psychanalyse appliquée*, p. 13, Paris, Gallimard, 1933.
17. S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, London, 1961.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, London, 1961.
21. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, op. cit.
22. Ibid.
23. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, op. cit.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. S. Freud, *New Introductory Lecture on Psychoanalysis*, London, 1964.
26. S. Freud, 'Pour introduire le narcissisme', *La vie sexuelle*, p. 92, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1972.
27. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, op. cit.
28. S. Freud, *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming*.
29. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, op. cit., in which he indirectly addresses a series of questions to himself, and answers them.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. S. Freud, 'Deuil et mélancolie', *Métapsychologie*, pp. 189-222, Paris, Gallimard, 1952.
33. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, op. cit.
34. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, op. cit.
35. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, op. cit.
36. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, op. cit.
37. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, op. cit.

FRIEDRICH FRÖBEL

(1782–1852)

Helmut Heiland

In his main work entitled *Die Menschenerziehung* [On the Education of Man, 1826], Fröbel defined his pedagogical principles, which owe much to neo-humanist educational theory, in the following words:

The divine, God, is omnipresent; His influence governs all things . . . which have their being only by reason of the divine principle active in them. The divine principle active in all things constitutes their very essence. The purpose and vocation of all things is to develop their essence which is their divine nature and the divine principle *per se*, in such a way that God is proclaimed and revealed through their external and transient manifestations. The special purpose and particular vocation of man as a sentient and reasoning being is to bring his own essence, his divine nature and through it God, His intended purpose and vocation, to complete consciousness that they may become a clearly perceived living reality which is exercised and proclaimed through the life of the individual. The purpose of education is to encourage and guide man as a conscious, thinking and perceiving being in such a way that he becomes a pure and perfect representation of that divine inner law through his own personal choice; education must show him the ways and means of attaining that goal [Fröbel, 1826, pp. 2 et seq.].

This educational theory is also the foundation of Fröbel's 'kindergarten' which has gained worldwide recognition and lies at the heart of his international reputation. However, Fröbel also applied his concept of education to schools and put his ideas into practice in his own private school, the General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau near Rudolstadt in the environs of Weimar. Fröbel's kindergarten pedagogics are still the subject of intense discussion today, especially in the United Kingdom and Japan. His play materials, 'gifts' and 'occupations' spread throughout the world in the nineteenth century. Alongside Montessori's didactic materials for young children, they represent the most effective and comprehensive programme for teaching 3- to 6-year-old children through play.

Childhood and youth

Friedrich Wilhelm August Fröbel was born on 21 April 1782 at Oberweissbach in the Thuringian principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt as the sixth child of a pastor. His mother died six months later from the secondary effects of this difficult childbirth. Little Friedrich was left to his own devices. His stepmother – his father married again in 1785 – took no interest in him. Fröbel was to speak later of the 'awful dawn of my early life' (Lange, 1862, p. 37). The neglect he suffered was later reflected in his defiant and egocentric attitudes. His father formed the impression that little Fritz was a 'wicked' child with limited intellectual abilities. His father obliged him to attend church services, but always on his own, locked up in the sacristy. And so Friedrich Fröbel, who pondered on the meaning of the words of the Bible and the riddles of nature as he wandered through the forests and meadows of his native region, went on to adopt the attitudes of a self-taught adult: 'Unlimited self-observation, self-contemplation and self-education were the basic features of my life from an early age' (Lange, 1862, p. 38). He acquired an observant and analysing relationship with nature:

Memories from my youth: gazing at tulips with unutterable delight. Intense pleasure in their regular forms. The striking pattern of the six petals and the three-edged seed pods. . . . Joyful contemplation of the hazel catkin with its delightful colours; pleasure in lime blossom. All their caring and loving traits filled me with awe. Dissecting beans at Oberweissbach in the hope of finding an explanation [Kuntze, 1952, p. 13].

Fröbel's childhood and early youth were marked by the loss of his mother, his love of nature and the Christian faith. These aspects went on to influence the rest of his life: his educational theory has a Christian, but undogmatic, foundation; the games that are part of his pedagogical theory for kindergarten stress the togetherness of adults and children at play, but also the self-educating function of materials or 'natural objects' whose structures and laws are revealed. Throughout his life, Friedrich Fröbel, the educationist, took a sustained interest in natural scientific knowledge, especially in the disciplines of mineralogy and crystallography.

After attending the elementary school in Oberweissbach, his uncle, estate superintendent Hoffmann, took him into his home at Stadtilm. Here Fröbel attended the municipal elementary school. His formal education ended with his confirmation in 1796, which left a very deep impression on him and strengthened his religious conviction. Fröbel did not go on to a course of higher education. His father still believed him to be unintelligent and felt that a practical career would be preferable. He began training as a surveyor with a forester, but gave up after only two years (1799). Fröbel was given an 'altogether unsatisfactory report' (Lange, 1862, p. 53). But his interest in mathematics and the natural sciences had now been aroused. In 1799 he began to study natural sciences at Jena University, but had to abandon the course for financial reasons in the summer semester of 1801 and went on to assist his seriously ill father in his official duties until the latter died in February 1802.

Years of apprenticeship and travel

After the suffering of his childhood and youth, Fröbel now embarked upon his search for a profession which suited him. He was certainly not a 'born educator'. He hit upon his true vocation by a roundabout route. In 1807, he commented on these early years:

I wanted to live in the open air, in the fields, meadows and woods. . . . I wanted to find in myself all those attributes which I saw in people who worked in the country (in the fields, meadows and woods): peasants, estate managers, hunters, foresters, surveyors. . . . That was my ideal of the countryman which took shape within me when I was about fifteen years old [Lange, 1862, pp. 526 et seq.].

His understanding of nature acquired in his childhood and expressed in the first instance through an interest in the mathematical theory of surveying was deepened further by his fragmentary studies in Jena. In 1802, Fröbel became a surveyor (forestry office actuary) in the estates, forests and tithes office at Baunach near Bamberg and later in Bamberg itself. This was the time when he came across the writings of Schelling and read *Von der Weltseele* [On the Soul of the World] (1798) and *Bruno oder über das natürliche und göttliche Prinzip der Dinge* [Bruno, or on the Natural and Divine Principle of Things] (1802). He had by now acquired his first philosophical concepts of nature. The writings of Novalis (Hardenberg) published in 1802 and Arndt's *Germanen und Europa* [Germans and Europe] gave Fröbel his essential notions of idealistic subjectivity (Novalis) and of the historicity of the German nation (Arndt).

In 1803, Fröbel put an advertisement seeking employment in the newspaper *Allgemeine Anzeiger der Deutschen*. He decided in favour of a post as private secretary on the Gross-Miltzow estate near Neubrandenburg. He attached to his application a geometrical and architectural study (the plan of a small rural castle). He wanted to become an architect. After employment at Gross-Miltzow (1804-05), Fröbel moved to Frankfurt-am-Main where he took up a job in the building trade, but this experience was to prove a failure. In June 1805, however, Fröbel found employment in the local 'model school' in Frankfurt which was run on Pestalozzi's principles of education. Fröbel felt that he had now found his true vocation. He wrote to his brother, Christoph:

I must tell you quite honestly that it is extraordinary how at home I feel in my employment. . . . It is as though I had been a teacher for a long time and was born for this profession; it seems to me that I have never wanted to live in any other circumstances than these [Lange, 1862, p. 533].

Contacts with the influential patrician family of the von Holzhausens in Frankfurt led Fröbel to travel to Yverdon in Switzerland in the autumn of 1806 to familiarize himself with Pestalozzi's educational establishment. (The von Holzhausen family paid his travel costs.) Caroline von Holzhausen arranged to recruit Fröbel as the private tutor to her children. Between 1808 and 1810, Fröbel lived with his three

young charges in Yverdon where he acquired further training in Pestalozzi's elementary method and also endeavoured to give the von Holzhausen children the best possible training and education.

At this time, through his brother Christoph, who in his capacity as a pastor had some influence on the elementary-school system in Fröbel's home district, he attempted to introduce Pestalozzi's concepts of elementary education into the Thuringian principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, but this attempt failed. However, these endeavours played a very important part in Fröbel's life and work. Here Fröbel wrote his first major publication: *Kurze Darstellung Pestalozzis Grundsätze der Erziehung und des Unterrichtes (Nach Pestalozzi selbst)* [A Brief Outline of Pestalozzi's Principles of Education and Training Based on Pestalozzi Himself] (Lange, 1862, p. 154–213). This comprehensive essay on Pestalozzi's theory of elementary education shows just how influenced Fröbel was by Pestalozzi. At every phase of his later life and work, Fröbel's pedagogics always remained within the orbit of Pestalozzi's elementary education which he interpreted and developed further in his own independent manner.

Pestalozzi sought to bring about an improvement in the living conditions of the 'lower classes' of the population through the pedagogical stimulation of the 'forces' (elements) and 'nature' of each individual, especially the members of the most disadvantaged population groups. Man must acquire independence through his own 'independent activity' (Fichte). He must unfold all his forces of his own accord. This corresponds to the approach of the neo-humanist educational theory (Wilhelm von Humboldt). This development of the forces takes place 'by categories'. The particular force must be tied to contents that are fully understood in such a way that basic concepts and categories of cognition and understanding of reality are built up in man. Thus, Pestalozzi's elementary education, as the training of human forces (elements), also represents the development of categories because the (inner) force of man is developed in confrontation with the (outer) context. This development of categories is methodically stimulated and guided by education. Pestalozzi believed that education by categories – elementary education – could best be imparted by exerting a methodical influence on the child. He believed that three basic forces are present in every human being, that is, in every child: the force of 'perception' and 'cognition' (linguistic cognitive abilities); the force of 'skills' (control of the body, manual aptitudes); and 'the moral or religious' force (social and moral attitudes). These three basic forces constitute the 'nature' of man. They are the 'elementary' categories, yet cannot develop optimally on their own; they require stimulating support through education, tuition and the 'method'. This stimulating support for the development of the forces present in the child itself must already begin in early childhood.

In 1805, in his *Buch der Mütter* [Book for Mothers], Pestalozzi designed a programme of education by categories which cautiously suggested drawing on the mother's love for the infant and pre-school child to impart an understanding of the structure of the child's environment and so awaken and encourage the basic forces, the elements of human existence present in the child. Pestalozzi's *Book for Mothers* is the focal point of Fröbel's 1809 publication on Pestalozzi and remained a deci-

sive reference for Fröbel – until his own theory of educational games and his book *Songs of Endearment for Mothers* published in 1844, making direct reference to the earlier *Book for Mothers* and setting out a programme of elementary education guided by scenes of the rural world during childhood.

When Fröbel came to Yverdon in 1808, Pestalozzi's institute was at the height of its international fame. However, in 1809–10 tension between Niederer and Schmid (Pestalozzi's principal colleagues) heightened and caused his institute to fade increasingly into the shadows of public attention. Pestalozzi involved Fröbel in this conflict. He escaped from this confrontation, in which he had taken the side of Schmid against Niederer and Pestalozzi, by leaving with the children under his care in the autumn of 1810. Fröbel continued to look after his three charges in Frankfurt-am-Main until June 1811 when he moved to Göttingen in order to resume the study of natural sciences which he had been obliged to abandon in Jena.

Fröbel believed that the outcome of his years in Frankfurt and Yverdon had been unsatisfactory. He did not as yet possess his own independent philosophy of education. He was of the opinion that Pestalozzi's theory of elementary education needed further development and a more solid foundation. What is more, he lacked sufficient specialized knowledge.

Fröbel now wished to embark on a broad course of study to acquire qualifications both as an educationist and as a specialized subject teacher. He wanted his studies to take in 'the philosophical disciplines, anthropology, physiology, ethics and theoretical pedagogics' for use in teaching, as well as the 'language knowledge (the mother tongue), history, geography and method'. He explained the reasons for this broad course of studies as follows: 'There is admittedly an empirical approach to education which stems from a correct feeling and sense of things, as though born naturally, but in this case, too, learning will lead to a much deeper scientific culture' (Lange, 1862, p. 536). Fröbel wrote to his brother, Christoph, from Göttingen that he was 'engaged in the study of Asian languages, chemistry and physics, mathematics, might take up astronomy and some branches of medicine and was already following courses in the natural sciences and classical languages' (Halfter, 1931, p. 312). This 'general field of study' with an encyclopedic tendency was, however, narrowed down at the expense of language studies, first in Göttingen and, above all, later on in Berlin, to the natural scientific subjects of chemistry, mineralogy, physics and geography.

However, Fröbel did not leave Frankfurt simply in order to pursue his professional training but also for personal reasons. His relationship with Caroline von Holzhausen, the mother of his charges and his own patron on many occasions, had become so intense that Fröbel preferred to escape from this tie. It is impossible to determine how close Caroline was to him. Perhaps she was more than just an intimate 'soul-mate' between September 1810 and June 1811. Fröbel repeatedly sent fragments of his educational philosophy to Caroline in the years that followed in letters carried by third parties; this suggests that they were very close. The fact that this relationship proved a shattering experience to Fröbel is confirmed by entries in his diaries for 1811 and 1816. In 1831, Fröbel still spoke of this relationship as

the most dangerous fight that I have ever had to wage in my life. . . . A battle in which the heart and spirit, isolated from any intellectual attitudes, must be left to themselves. . . . Just as life is created out of death, so salvation comes from denial. . . . This struggle was sometimes truly terrible and ruinous to my life, leading me to the brink of moral destruction [Gumlich, 1936, pp. 55, 60].

Whatever may have been the motives for this conflict of June 1811, it proved the decisive reason that brought Fröbel to Göttingen where he set down his educational philosophy, the philosophy of the 'sphere' which is at one and the same time his scientific theory and his metaphysic. In Frankfurt, he had already become familiar with Fichte's writings, but Schelling's speculative philosophy of identity and objective idealism appealed even more to him. Strictly speaking, Fröbel's philosophy of the sphere was therefore not a transcendental philosophy. Fröbel did not start out from reason as the source of categories and meanings as did Kant and Fichte; on the contrary, he viewed the human conscience, or man himself, as a part of the divine reality of creation. God is unity manifested in the contrasts of the world. Reality is always contradictory but strives towards unity. God, the creator, lies beyond this world but still remains a part of His creation (pantheism). Everything, every living being, is a creature of God and is determined by a divine force (His *telos*) which is represented in contrasts that in turn manifest an underlying unity:

The sphere (i.e. the constant, universally living and creating force which rests within itself) is the basic law of the universe, of the physical and mental (moral) world, of the moral and intellectual world, the sentient and thinking world [Gumlich, 1936, p. 62].

The spherical form is the representation of manifold variety in unity and of unity in variety; the sphere is the representation of the variety which develops out of unity and rests within it. It is the representation of the reference back from all variety to unity; the sphere is the representation of the origin and emergence of all variety from unity. . . . However, each thing develops only an imperfect spherical nature in that it seeks to represent its essence in itself and through itself in a single unit, in its unique individuality and variety and succeeds in that representation. . . . The purpose of man is primarily to develop his own spherical nature and then the nature of spherical being as such, to train and represent that nature. . . . The spherical law is the basic law of all true and sufficient human education [Zimmermann, 1914, pp. 150 et seq.].

While inanimate objects and other living beings simply live according to the spherical law manifested in them, man alone is consciously aware of that law. For him the spherical law means grasping his living potential in conceptual terms and acting according to this knowledge. When man understands his living potential through thought, he practises self-reflection and makes this potential conceptually accessible within himself through the process of thought. If he acts according to his insight into the spherical law, he gives expression to this relationship which is understood within him and so brings together the 'inner' and 'outer' factors of his life. But man must not merely reflect and act according to the insight acquired. He must also grasp external reality, that is, understand and internalize the 'external' and grasp this reality in its fundamental laws and structure: 'Internalizing the external and

externalizing the internal means seeking the unity of both in the general external form through which the purpose of man is manifested' (Fröbel, 1826, p. 60). Fröbel understands education and teaching (tuition) as a stimulus and support for this dialectic process of the formation of categories: external reality must be understood in its internal laws and structure, but at the same time in such a way that this understanding is itself understood: the internal factor in man and the potential of his forces which must be unfolded and externalized. Thus, this process of the formation of categories embraces the areas of reality in their specific structure as relationships and at the same time the force of discovery present in man is made visible: nature in its mathematical structure refers to the anthropological premise of mathematical thinking. Both are mutually conditioning and one cannot exist without the other. For Fröbel, nature is 'identity in contrast' of the spirit (of human conscience) but the spirit can only be understood in nature or in externals by itself being externalized.

Fröbel's philosophy of the sphere is therefore at one and the same time a scientific theory and a doctrine of education which lays the basis for the relationship between subjective cognition and the scientific object, while also providing the foundations for teaching which seeks to bring about education. Education is the analytical penetration of external reality in order to grasp its structures and understand the ability of the human mind to create these structures. This education by categories, which is at the same time elementary education in Pestalozzi's sense, is Fröbel's aim both in school education and in educational games for small children. For Fröbel, education and games do not involve either the projective self-presentation of the individual nor yet the random concern with alien contents, objects and themes. He is always interested in integration and mutual discovery of the self and objects, of the child and playthings, the pupil and the subject matter of teaching, in order to gain an insight into the reciprocal foundation – that is to say without an object there can be no subject and without man no (structured) external world.

However, in Göttingen Fröbel only set down the first drafts of his philosophy of the sphere (see Hoffmann and Wächter, 1986, pp. 309–81). He did not write his planned summary treatise on the sphere. Further central statements on his philosophy of the sphere can be found in the six Keilhau publicity pamphlets which were published in 1820–23 and, in particular, in the second such document of 1821, entitled *All-round Education which Fully Satisfies the Needs of the German Character is the Basic Requirement of the German People* (Zimmermann, 1914, p. 147–75).

Nevertheless, it is Fröbel's main work *Die Menschenerziehung*, referred to above, which deals in detail with the central concepts of the internal and the external and with his philosophy of the sphere. The notion of the sphere also reflects Fröbel's endeavour to master his turmoil over Caroline von Holzhausen and his interest in crystallography. The scientific law that explains the genesis of individual crystalline forms from one basic form is seen by Fröbel as the natural scientific evidence, the concrete natural scientific reflection of his idea of the sphere, his educational theory, concept and philosophy of life.

In the 1830s, Fröbel ceased to speak, as he had done between 1811 and 1823, of the 'law of the sphere' or the 'law of the internal and external' and of their integration, and referred instead to the law of the 'unification of life'. In his later work on educational games, the sphere is replaced by the 'intermediary law'. However, despite the use of different concepts, Fröbel always refers to the same process of idealistic access to the world by the individual through self-recognition of the human forces that create the world and, at the same time, remain bound by religious and metaphysical roots in the Christian idea of creation.

Fröbel's years of travel included a move to Berlin in November 1812 to follow lectures on crystallography given by Professor Christian Samuel Weiss (1780–1856), the founder of crystallography. In Berlin Fröbel also attended lectures by Fichte. The war against Napoleon began in March 1813. Fröbel volunteered to serve in the Lützow rifles and took part in the war until May 1814. During the war he met two students of theology who had attended lectures by Schleiermacher and were later to become his colleagues: Wilhelm Middendorff (1793–1853) and Heinrich Langenthal (1792–1879). Fröbel fought at the battles of Gross-Görschen and Lützen in May 1813. In June 1814, he resigned from his voluntary military service and took over an assistantship in August of the same year at the Mineralogical Institute of Berlin University under Professor Weiss. In December 1813 Fröbel's brother Christoph, with whom he had been very close, died of cholera. Fröbel felt an obligation to his late brother and in April 1816 left his university position to take over the education of his three nephews, first at their parental home at Griesheim and then, after 1817, at Keilhau. He named his private school the General German Educational Establishment.

Keilhau: a model of spherical education

Fröbel's first Keilhau publicity pamphlet entitled *To Our German People* (1820) begins with these words:

From an unknown place, from a remote little valley of our common fatherland, a small band of men who are members of just a few families, all of them German, are speaking to you. They are bound by many ties: they are fathers, mothers, parents; they are brothers, sisters, relatives and friends. . . . They are united by love, love of their fellow men, love of education and representation of all that is human, of humanity in man [Zimmermann, 1914, p. 123].

Keilhau therefore centred on the educating family. Here teaching took place in a family atmosphere, raising and educating old and young pupils alike. The atmosphere of trust and 'intimacy' determined both aspects (i.e. the family and the school) in which the growing human being develops and lives.

The Keilhau practice of raising and educating children addresses itself to the whole being on a scientific basis. It is all-embracing because it combines cognitive intellectual aspects with the physical and the manual, the social and the religious, that is, in Pestalozzi's sense it integrates the elementary forces of the head and the heart to provide all-round education. At Keilhau, teaching did not take the straight-

forward form of the pupils receiving instruction from the teacher (the pupils themselves might become 'teaching' monitors). On the contrary, education was intended to mould the individual; it was moral and religious because the pupil was always emotionally integrated into the group, into the circle of his fellow pupils and into the 'whole family'. What is more, education does not stop at training and the creation of insight in the pupil but also covers the physical side of the human being, that is, learning areas that have features resembling training for work are part of the programme. They include periods of educational games, sports and building work. Relationships understood in cognitive and rational terms are represented in the text by a drawing, as a model. Moreover, pupils were also able to work on the Keilhau farm. The Keilhau private school was not only a boarding establishment but also included a small farm whose produce covered the most urgent material needs of the large Keilhau family.

However, the practice of educational tuition at Keilhau was not only comprehensive, covering all the facets and forces of the individual pupils. It was also scientific, purporting to reflect the spherical condition of unity between 'nature' and 'spirit', 'science' and 'education'. Fröbel tried to establish a single root for education and science. The emotional framework of the family already serves as a way of penetrating and understanding the structure of reality. However, the family only supplies this transparency indirectly and in a situational manner. School education as 'conscious' education therefore goes beyond education provided within the family because the functionality of family life is taken further and deepened, rationally and continuously, by teaching and analysis of the structure of things. Thus Fröbel is able to define his educational practice as a 'conscious' family life.

Man is only educated if he practises science. Science and education are mutually conditioning and are transmitted through tuition. But man practises science when he is aware of the fact that the human conscience is the point at which man and external reality meet and are understood. Man practises science when he penetrates his own living world and the practice of his everyday existence, the wealth of phenomena in the living world, to arrive at their underlying structures and laws. Clearly the structure of a thing, its law, its characteristics and its spirit or inner being, as Fröbel calls it, are something that can only be understood through the human conscience (the existence of the mind). By recognizing the characteristics of an object, one also comes to understand that man is the being, the only being, capable of knowing those characteristics. Science, as knowledge of the structure of (external) things, is also that which defines man's ability to know. To that extent science and education fuse in Fröbel's thinking. The educated man is a scientist and science brings forth education. The caring tuition given at Keilhau was therefore, in Fröbel's view, the medium for combining elementary education and science. This can be done if tuition is caring, covering all the aspects (forces) of man and, at the same time, appealing to the pupil's self-awareness. Keilhau education is thus the model of spherical education, because the pupil is taught here in the final analysis by things; the pupil recognizes the characteristics (the law and spirit) of things and so understands himself as a structuring spiritual being (see Heiland, 1993).

Fröbel's main work, *Die Menschenerziehung*, which was written at Keilhau

between 1823 and 1825, is therefore not just his educational philosophy and developmental theory, but also his school pedagogy, his theory of 'caring tuition'. In *Die Menschenerziehung* and in his six short Keilhau pamphlets, Fröbel characterizes the relationship between education and science as man's acquisition of self-awareness, as a relationship between the external and internal, a dialectic imbrication of the internal and external and their necessary 'unification in life'. In his main work, however, Fröbel also describes a wealth of individual 'foundation courses' which are designed to train the elementary forces in man, and he emphasizes their basic principle: caring tuition is governed by the law of objects. Pupils must understand the object which is central to the lesson. Teaching helps pupils to understand the structure of the object by encouraging them to pay attention to particular features and going on to give further indications. Thus, pupils become aware of themselves at the same time as learning to understand the object. Language teaching, for example, is not concerned with language in its external relationships, but with the education of man to become himself. Pupils discover their own principles and laws through language and also see themselves as being created by language. For Fröbel language is therefore always a medium, a way of putting across the 'external', as the designation of reality, and the 'internal', as intellectual productivity and creative linguistic potential. Similarly, Fröbel does not see mathematics as an accumulation of individual problems and operations, but as a principle which can only be grasped through a realization of the fact that man is the only being able to penetrate and structure reality on a mathematical basis, and break it down into relationships that can then be interpreted.

The caring tuition given at Keilhau is therefore, above all, cognitive, based on analysis, even though the mental/emotional and manual/practical sides are not overlooked. Fröbel is not concerned simply with teaching for work or with providing pupil-oriented vocational training, but rather with the acquisition of an insight into structures that remain firmly rooted in emotional and representational functions.

Keilhau family life, which was carried over into the manner of teaching, lay emphasis on the close relationship between life and cognition, between practice and theory. Keilhau thus also has certain unmistakable features of a rural educational home.

Fröbel's marriage in 1818 to Henriette Wilhelmine Hoffmeister, the daughter of a member of the Berlin War Council, the collaboration of Middendorff and Langethal, the move of Fröbel's brother Christian with his family to Keilhau and the marriages of Middendorff and Langethal, as well as the good reputation of Keilhau, all enabled the school to succeed while Fröbel was, at the same time, incurring heavy debts. In November 1825, fifty-seven pupils were present at Keilhau and the establishment was flourishing. But, at the same time, it began to decline.

In 1829 only five pupils were left and the establishment was on the verge of collapse. This adverse situation was bound up with Metternich's policy after 1815. National and democratic trends in Germany were impeded by conservative counter-currents (the Holy Alliance, the Karlsbad Decisions, the Prohibition of the Brotherhoods and the 'Persecution of Demagogues' after 1819). Keilhau did not escape

these developments since it had the reputation of being a liberal and national institution, and was closely scrutinized by the Prussian police.

Fröbel himself was cross-examined in Rudolstadt. Although the investigating report came out in favour of Keilhau, a rumour spread among the general public that Keilhau was a 'nest of demagogues'. Parents removed their children from the boarding school.

Fröbel tried to set up a 'People's Educational Establishment' at Helba in the nearby Duchy of Sachsen-Meiningen, to which an establishment for the care of 3- to 7-year-old orphans was to be attached. In an outburst of enthusiastic planning, he conceived a comprehensive system of schools: the Care Establishment (the forerunner of the kindergarten) and the next stage, the People's Educational Establishment (equivalent to the primary school) with aims clearly oriented towards tuition through work and an understanding of the living world. These were to be followed at a subsequent stage by both the scholarly General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau (a grammar school) and a kind of vocational secondary school (an 'Educational Establishment for German Art and German Trades' or a 'Polytechnic School'). However, nothing was to come of this concept of a kind of cumulative comprehensive school.

Keilhau was barely saved from closure through the intervention of Johannes Barop (1802-78) who took over as headmaster in 1829.

In terms of writing, the Keilhau period between 1817 and 1831 was Fröbel's most productive phase during which he wrote his six Keilhau publicity pamphlets: *To Our German People* (1820); *Comprehensive Education Satisfying Fully the Needs of the German Character is the Fundamental Need of the German People* (1821); *Principles, Purpose and Inner Life of the General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau near Rudolstadt* (1821); *On the General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau* (1822); *On German Education as Such and on the General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau in Particular* (1822); and *More News of the General German Educational Establishment at Keilhau* (1823). These short publications analyse the roots of Keilhau in the philosophy of the sphere, while also describing the individual courses, and so combining educational philosophy and school pedagogics or syllabus theory.

In some of these pamphlets, notably the first and fourth, Fröbel examines in detail his programme for a national education system, for which he took over the essential ideas from Fichte but without using nationalistic arguments. In his *Die Menschenerziehung* Fröbel paid no attention to this national programme but described the educational practice of Keilhau essentially in the framework of the philosophy of the sphere. This also holds good for his weekly 'Educating Families', the essays which describe both family life in Keilhau and certain courses (elementary geography and the theory of space).

The decline of Keilhau and the inability to get the Helba project off the ground were experienced by Fröbel as a failure. He decided to exercise his teaching activities elsewhere. Through contacts with the von Holzhausen family - he visited Frankfurt-am-Main in May 1831 - he met the Swiss, Xaver Schnyder von Wartensee, who invited him to open a private educational establishment in Switzerland.

The Swiss years

The Wartensee Educational Establishment was opened in August 1831. It was never viable as a boarding establishment and remained a day school. In 1833, it was transferred to Willisau. The protestant Fröbel was attacked in public by clerical (Catholic) circles and also by pupils of Pestalozzi (Niederer and Fellenberg). To bring his own pedagogics to the attention of public opinion, in 1833 he published his *Principles of the Education of Man*, which had actually been written in 1830 (Lange, 1862, pp. 428–56).

The canton of Bern was planning to set up an orphanage for the poor. Fröbel presented four separate plans (Geppert, 1976, pp. 235–76). These plans, like the syllabuses for Wartensee and Willisau, revealed the lingering influence of the Helba People's Education Establishment concept.

Despite the continuing validity of the principle of training all the different forces in the human being, 'creative action' now came to the fore. Teaching in the morning was to be followed by practical farm and handicraft work in the afternoon. However, this educational establishment for the poor did not see the light of day.

As Fröbel had patrons on the Bern cantonal council, in April 1834 he was entrusted with the task of training four future teachers ('schoolteacher apprentices') and with heading an advanced training course for elementary school-teachers. Fröbel conducted his advanced training course again in 1835. Detailed documentation on these activities is lacking. However, the available material does clearly show Fröbel's approach to teacher training: it should consist of three aspects – general education, basic familiarization with teaching methods and pedagogics.

In 1834, Fröbel learned that the Bern cantonal government was planning to put him in charge of the existing orphanage (with an elementary school) at Burgdorf. In that capacity, Fröbel believed that he could now put into practice the central part of his Helba project – the People's Educational Establishment as it was now called. In a letter to the Bern Councillor Stähli in March 1834, Fröbel set out the plan for an establishment of that kind, together with the Burgdorf orphanage, the educational establishment for the poor, a teacher training institute and a people's university – that is, a whole system of educational establishments centring once again on the People's Educational Establishment with its emphasis on 'creative action' combining theoretical teaching with life, and tuition with practical work.

However, this concept was not put into place either. But Fröbel did become headmaster of the Burgdorf orphanage and its attached elementary school in mid 1835. The elementary school was not opened until May 1836 when Fröbel returned to Germany with his sick wife.

The educational plans for the Burgdorf elementary school date from 1837 and 1838, that is, they were drafted by Langenthal who headed the school (and the orphanage) after Fröbel had left. These plans offered courses for three classes, 4- to 6-year-olds, 6- to 8-year-olds and 8- to 10-year-olds. While the courses for second and third classes coincided largely with the ideas set out in *Die Menschenerziehung*, the syllabus for the first class as the foundation for all subsequent subject teaching

now focused on games. A bridge was thus thrown to the next phase in Fröbel's life which centred on the education of infants through games (see Lange, 1862, pp. 479–507, 508–20).

The final years

At the end of 1835, Fröbel wrote a publication entitled *The Year 1836 Demands the Renewal of Life*, which begins with these words:

It is the announcement and proclamation of a new spring of life and mankind which rings so loudly in my ears in and through all the manifestations of my own life and the lives of others. It is you, the renewal and rejuvenation of all life, who speak out, through everything and in everything within and around me, so actively and clearly to my spirit. This time has been so long awaited by mankind and for so long promised to it as its golden age [Lange, 1863, p. 499].

The 'golden age' sees the family become 'sacred' again in the shape of the 'holy' family. The family heals the relations between parents and children and between siblings through an improved atmosphere, through shared play.

Fröbel now departed from his original plan of using school tuition, set out in *Die Menschenerziehung*, following the failure of the Helba project, the decline of Keilhau and the limited successes achieved in Switzerland. He now set his sights on the family and built up an associative organization which was not yet subject to any form of state control. He developed play materials to improve the pedagogical atmosphere in (bourgeois) families and wished to help found associations of parents who might exercise a stimulus on others through their experiences of play.

The creation of the kindergarten was not the first step in this last phase of Fröbel's life, but in effect became an outcome that he had not been seeking at all. Fröbel wished to change the family so as to make it the focal point of the education of the individual. He wanted to facilitate 'spherical' education from early childhood onwards, heralding the new 'spring of mankind'. This spherical education of infants and pre-school children is effected using the play material developed by Fröbel. This programme was later to become the kindergarten – professional educators (kindergarten nurses) looked after small children at play. Fröbel's play teaching, which was originally to take place within the family, was now transferred elsewhere so that one important feature of his original idea of education through play was lost.

When Fröbel returned to Germany in 1836 he already had some play material, which he called 'gifts', in his luggage. In 1836, he opened an Establishment to Take Care of the Activity Needs of Children and Young People at Bad Blankenburg in Thuringia, in effect a kind of toy factory.

He produced the first 'gift': six little balls made from woollen threads in the colours of the spectrum; and the second one: wooden spheres and cubes together with a cylinder; and finally the third one which consisted of a cube subdivided into eight further small cubes. Fröbel also made 'cutout books' and materials for school tuition, for example, a 'self-learning language cube' or a spatial (mathematical)

cube. A 'self-teaching' or 'speaking' cube meant that the surfaces of the cube carried transfers containing information on the cube as a mathematical shape. This information also pointed to different forms of speech.

Fröbel did not develop this material any further because it was, in practice, only used to a limited extent in schools. However, these materials were important to his theory of play, since they demonstrated the relationship between school and kindergarten education: the information imparted to the pupil by the message on the surfaces of the 'self-teaching' cube would now be provided for the pre-school child through play using the 'gifts' and 'occupations', that is, through active participation, construction and building, thereby bringing to light their structure, laws and nature as objects in relation to the child-subject.

The 'self-teaching' aspect is therefore still clearly present in Fröbel's new play materials. Through play, the 'gift' imparts to the child its properties and structure. With his 'gifts' and 'occupations' for pre-school children, Fröbel went beyond teaching materials as such and completed the auto-didactic aspect using games involving the participation of adults in the play of children, who could assist the child with suggestions and explanations while it was engaged in building and playing. Fröbel's educational games are therefore also a model of spherical education and intended to shape the child, no longer through 'science' but rather through active contact with elementary forms which clarify and symbolize the 'general' features of the objects concerned.

In March 1838, Fröbel combined his Establishment to Take Care of the Activity Needs of Children and Young People, which was originally to be called the Auto-Didactic Establishment, with an Establishment to Train Child Leaders.

Fröbel's wife, Henriette Wilhelmine, died in May 1839. On 28 June 1840, the General German Kindergarten was opened in the town hall at Blankenburg within the framework of the Gutenberg memorial celebrations.

After 1844, Fröbel was once more living at Keilhau, but in 1848 he moved to Bad Liebenstein where he opened the Establishment for the Universal Unification of Life through the Developmental and Caring Education of Man. This was a kindergarten together with a boarding establishment to train future kindergarten nurses. In May 1850, Fröbel moved to the Marienthal hunting lodge near Schweina where he married his second wife, Luise Levin, in June 1851 and where he died on 21 June 1852.

Fröbel welcomed the March Revolution of 1848 and hoped that it would bring not only revolutionary political innovations but also promote the spread of his kindergartens. With that end in view, he invited visitors to attend an assembly of teachers at Rudolstadt in August 1848. Here the pedagogical relationship between the kindergarten and the elementary school, and the important role of Fröbel's play materials in the school system, were discussed. This conference of elementary-school teachers tabled a motion to the Frankfurt National Assembly calling for the introduction of Fröbel's kindergartens as an integral part of the standard German education system. The failure of the revolution also marked the end of Fröbel's influence on the reshaping of pre-school establishments, 'schools for small children' and 'day-care establishments' into kindergartens or pedagogical institutions.

Fröbel's contacts with free-thinking circles and the undogmatic and unorthodox attention to religion practised in his kindergartens led the Prussian Government to ban these establishments throughout its territory in August 1851.

Fröbel popularized his play theory in many different ways, but did not summarize it in one particular text. The first documents on play and the 'gifts' were written in 1837 and published in the *Sonntagsblatt* in 1838 and 1840. This was Fröbel's second weekly after his *Educating Families* of 1826. In 1838, two small publications on the first and second 'gifts' appeared. In 1843, Fröbel published his *News and Accounts of the German Kindergarten* and in 1844 his pedagogic ideas for infants, known as *Songs of Endearment for Mothers*, as well as his pamphlet *The New Third Gift*.

In 1848, Middendorf wrote his *Kindergartens: A Need of Our Age – The Foundation of Unifying Education of the People* for the Frankfurt Parliament with the co-operation of Fröbel. In 1850, Fröbel's third weekly appeared: *Friedrich Fröbel's Weekly: A Unifying Journal for All Friends of Education*. In 1851 and 1852, he published his last weekly under the title *Periodical for Friedrich Fröbel's Endeavours to Implement Developmental and Caring Education in the Context of the Universal Unification of Life*.

In 1851, Fröbel published a pamphlet containing an extended version of his essay on the third 'gift' taken from the *Sonntagsblatt* (1838). This was his last major independent publication.

Fröbel's international stature is founded on the fact that his kindergarten was a teaching centre for 3- to 6-year-old children which stood in complete contrast to the pre-school establishments of his own day; the latter were either mere child-minding centres or provided formal tuition. Fröbel, on the other hand, wanted to develop educational procedures founded on play. That is how he intended to allow for the child's perception of things, while at the same time imparting elementary education.

Fröbel's original intention of teaching young children through educational games in the family became linked after 1840 with the social demand for ongoing daily care of young children in an establishment outside the home. Fröbel's concept of the kindergarten as a model play establishment for mothers who could see there how his ideas of educational games were practised now became an institution in which play was organized professionally. Fröbel's mostly male specialists for popularizing the idea of play in the family now became female kindergarten nurses who were professional play organizers, and had been trained by Fröbel in courses lasting up to six months.

In Fröbel's day the kindergarten, including his own establishment at Bad Blankenburg, involved three activities. It centred on play with the 'gifts' and 'occupations'. Alongside these, 'movement games' were played involving running, dancing, games played in the round and acting. The children's play group developed forms of movement without game material. The third area was 'garden care'. Here the kindergarten pupil was to learn about the development of plants, their growth and blossoming, and to see how their development could be influenced by careful tending. Here the young child could see a mirror image in nature of its own growth.

However, the kindergarten centred on materials: simple objects like a ball, a sphere, a cube and a rod. Fröbel structured this system of 'toys' into materials of different shapes with line and dot patterns; he described their features by separation (analysis) showing the four basic types of materials, and by joining the pieces together again (synthesis). Here Fröbel started out from the unity (of the ball) and returned through increasingly clearly structured and separable materials to his beads as dot-shaped materials, and so back to spherical structures. All this was intended to reveal the cosmos and creation through building, thus enabling the child to experience imagined and perceived elementary structures of reality through its own action. Fröbel gave particular attention to physical materials, especially in 'gifts' 3 to 6, known as the 'building boxes': the third gift contained eight part-cubes, the fourth eight squares, the fifth twenty-one part-cubes and the sixth eighteen squares. Building with these elementary pieces enabled an almost inexhaustible variety of shapes to be obtained which Fröbel typified as 'living shapes' (shapes of the living world), 'beautiful shapes' and 'cognitive shapes' (mathematical groupings).

Fröbel's last major work, his *Songs of Endearment for Mothers*, was published in 1844; this was a pedagogical scheme for infants and 1- to 2-year-old children who were still too young to attend his kindergarten. In his *Songs of Endearment for Mothers*, Fröbel comes very close to the everyday living world which he represents in scenes (pictorial illustrations), finger games and nursery rhymes. Experiences of the child's everyday life are acted out through the perceived physical medium of finger games or in illustrations. The mother plays the finger game and the child is asked to imitate it. This book is a sequel to Pestalozzi's *Book for Mothers*, but moves beyond that author's cognitive and schematic method.

Fröbel's principle is motherly love. The mother shows loving care for her child through play. Initially, the infant is a being at one with itself. As its own forces then begin to develop, that is, its motor system, senses and intelligence, the child begins to become familiar with its surroundings and is able to differentiate and structure them. The true self gradually becomes structured and differentiated through this experience of the outside world.

Influence

When Fröbel died in June 1852 his life's work seemed to have been a failure. The ban on kindergartens in Prussia initially prevented any further spread of Fröbel's educational games in Germany. The fact that his pedagogical scheme acquired worldwide significance is due in no small measure to Bertha von Marenholtz-Bülow (1810–93) who became friendly with Fröbel in the last years of his life – as did Diesterweg – and began to publicize Fröbel's scheme of kindergarten pedagogics posthumously through lectures and exhibitions in other West European countries, for example, in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Strong Fröbel movements grew up, in particular in the Netherlands and Switzerland, and took care of the subsequent spread of Fröbel's kindergartens. In the United Kingdom, an independent national Fröbel movement was formed in the

shape of the Fröbel Society, which later became the National Fröbel Union and was led by Johann and Bertha Ronge, Adele von Portugall, Emilie Michaelis and Eleonore Heerwart; they published textbooks on Fröbel games and established training centres for kindergarten educators. In the United States, Elisabeth Peabody, Mathilde Kriege and Maria Kraus-Boelte publicized Fröbel's ideas. In the 1880s and 1890s, the influence of the North American Fröbel movement led to the introduction of kindergartens in Japan.

Marenholtz-Bülów's most prominent pupil, Henriette Schrader-Breymann (1827-99), founded the Pestalozzi-Fröbel House in Berlin in 1873 and developed her own particular concept of kindergarten pedagogics which combined aspects of Pestalozzi's and Fröbel's theories. She was particularly active in encouraging the spread of kindergartens in Scandinavian countries. The German Fröbel movement had an unmistakable influence in the second half of the nineteenth century on the development of institutional pre-school education in Poland, Bulgaria, Bohemia, Hungary, Russia as well as in Spain and Portugal, as has been demonstrated by historical research.

The international success of Fröbel's educational programme for kindergartens can be traced back to the increasingly urgent need for pedagogical care of pre-school children as a result of the process of industrialization. Concepts such as child-minding or formal school-teaching did not correspond to the spirit of that age. Fröbel's elementary 'education of man' through play with activities which appealed manifestly to all the forces of the child seemed more appropriate to the needs of society. His kindergarten pedagogics combined the social aspect of care with elementary education through play, and thus paved the way for subsequent formal education without any excessive intellectual strain.

However, Fröbel's kindergarten programme owes much to the educational theory of neo-humanism: Fröbel is concerned with the education of the human being and not with the training and development of a 'viable' citizen.

This concept of kindergarten education, founded on the philosophy of the sphere, underwent far-reaching changes within the Fröbel movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. Marenholtz-Bülów helped to save Fröbel's kindergartens from oblivion, but also interpreted them in polytechnic-functional and cultural-philosophical terms, thus adapting them to the spirit of the industrial age. As a result, the kindergarten in effect became part of the school system dependent on socio-economic reproduction and legitimation. Meanwhile, although Marenholtz-Bülów was perfectly familiar with the foundation of Fröbel's pedagogics on the philosophy of the sphere, she did not take sufficient account of that fact.

The new concept of Fröbel's play-care, developed by Schrader-Breymann in the 1880s and the Fröbel movement after the turn of the century, was oriented towards developmental psychology and educational reform, and completely overlooked the original foundations of the kindergarten. Fröbel's gardening activities, his movement games and the play materials now became means to the end of developing relationships with the living world and everyday routine, for example through the didactic category of Schrader-Breymann's 'object of the month' (see Heiland, 1982, 1992).

In the twentieth century the kindergarten has admittedly remained an establishment to which the name of Fröbel is linked worldwide, but it has been exposed to many different influences. Since the collapse of the German Fröbel movement (about 1945), it has become an institution for infant pedagogics and pre-school education with pronounced group psychological and socio-pedagogical objectives. As such, it has ceased to be determined by aspects of Fröbel's original kindergarten pedagogics.

Nevertheless, Fröbel's elementary education in the kindergarten involving games with authentic play materials and, in particular, with the 'building boxes' ('gifts' 3 to 6) remains an important contribution to pre-school education. The constructive handling of simple play materials permits concentration on objects and a varied experience of the properties of materials through building and shaping activities, which also favours social learning and thus satisfies Fröbel's demand for the 'unification' of life (Heiland, 1989, pp. 91 et seq., 128 et seq.).

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In Japan, one can see a portrait of Fukutawa Yokichi on every 10,000-yen note. This official recognition is for his dedication to the cause of introducing Western institutions and thought into Japan. Some people, however, may wonder why such a man is presented wearing traditional Japanese robes. Although a number of pictures of Fukutawa exist, few are in Western attire. It seems that this reflects his basic stance: he always emphasised the spiritual revolution rather than the spurious imitation of things Western.

Fukutawa first learned Dutch and later changed to English studies; he visited the United States twice and travelled through Europe for almost a year before the Meiji Restoration (1868). On these journeys he was able to perceive the basic 'stones and pillars' of modern society developing in the West. There he also conceived his manifest destiny — education and journalism. Soon after his second voyage, he founded his school, Keio-gikaku, which was to produce many talented graduates in business, industry and politics.

Fukutawa published numerous pamphlets and textbooks which were used in the emerging modern schools and were also welcomed by a variety of other types of readers. The great attraction of these writings was that the topics were new, and the style was revolutionary in its simplicity. The Japanese people were eager to learn much about the forthcoming civilisation from the so-called 'Fukutawa books'.

Fukutawa also wrote many books and articles for schools. These were mostly published by the university press or through the newspaper *Shimbun*. (Indeed, that he launched in 1882. From that time on, Fukutawa wrote articles and essays on various contemporary issues, such as politics, international relations, education and financial problems, educational policy, women's rights and a whole lot more.)

His main theme was the argument in his work — 'I do propose it' — that he believed that personal and national independence was the real foundation of modern society in the West. In his schools, the self-education of Fukutawa's advise-

F U K U Z A W A Y U K I C H I *

(1835-1901)

Nishikawa Shunsaku

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Fukuzawa also wrote many books and articles for scholars. These were mostly published by the university press or through the newspaper, *Jiji-shimpo* [Times], that he launched in 1882. From that time on, Fukuzawa wrote articles and satires on various contemporary issues, such as politics, international relations, economic and financial problems, educational policy, women's rights and a moral code.

His main theme may be summarized in one word – 'independence' – since he believed that personal and national independence was the real foundation of modern society in the West. In order to achieve this self-independence, Fukuzawa advo-

* In this profile, Japanese personal names are written in the conventional Japanese order: the family name is put first and the given name second.

cated Western, or practical and scientific, learning, instead of the traditional studies of the Chinese classics. The more educated the people became, the better their national independence could be asserted, leading to a corresponding increase in public virtue and social morality.

Although Fukuzawa learned much from Western thinkers, he was not blindly attached to Western civilization. He was well aware of its flaws, but realized that Western civilization was technologically superior to the situation in Japan, and he concluded that the Japanese people could use it as a model. He seemed, however, to have anticipated difficulties in revolutionizing the minds of his countrymen.

Boyhood and student days

Fukuzawa was born in Osaka in 1835. This was a period that had been preceded by two centuries of isolation from the outside world and was to be followed nineteen years later by the opening up of Japan. The governing bodies of the Shogunate and the 260 domains which had held power for so long had not been able to adjust to the profound changes taking place in society. A budget deficit led to chronic suffering, a situation the government tried to alleviate through desperate attempts at political and economic reform.

Fukuzawa's family lived in Osaka, at that time the trading centre of Japan. His father worked as a minor treasury official representing his home domain of Nakatsu (a province in the northern part of the island of Kyushu). He was a samurai, but one of low rank with a modest hereditary position. The job did not appeal to Fukuzawa's father, but he remained loyally in service until his sudden death at the age of 44, barely eighteen months after the birth of his second son, Yukichi.

The widowed mother returned to Nakatsu to bring up her two sons and three daughters. Their allowance reduced them to poverty, and forced them to supplement their income with casual paid work in the home. Fukuzawa himself repaired sandals and did other odd jobs. There was no money for his schooling until he was 14, ten years after the usual starting age.

At school Fukuzawa excelled in the classroom, but outside his low rank left him vulnerable. For his upper-samurai classmates, the lower-ranking Fukuzawa was the brunt of their arrogance. Class divisions still prohibited marriages between the two groups. As a young man Fukuzawa was aware of and deeply resented the inequality of the system.¹

Elementary education at the time was divided into two types: one school for male children of samurai and another for children of commoners.² Sons of samurai, aged 5-7, studied the Chinese classics from either their father or some relative and masters of neo-Confucian learning, who often ran private classes or schools. Secondary and/or higher education was provided either in private schools or in the domanial school. Since the mid-eighteenth century, most of the large domains had inaugurated domanial schools. The domain of Nakatsu had its own school, but entry was restricted, the rank of the student's family being an important factor. The son of a low-ranking samurai, even if he were the eldest, did not necessarily qualify for enrolment in the domanial school.

The learning available throughout the isolated islands of Japan was limited by government decree, yet it would be simplistic to imagine Japan as totally cut off. Since the sixteenth century, Westerners had visited Japan, but from the early 1640s had been barred entry. Only on the small man-made island of Dejima were some Dutch traders allowed to stay. This contact with the outside world was tightly controlled by the Shogun, and merchants, interpreters and the military had to obtain special permission before going to Dejima. Despite this precaution, Western knowledge, especially about medicine and the natural sciences, somehow filtered through the Shogun's barriers and was diffused throughout the country. Eighty years before Fukuzawa's time, several Japanese physicians had pioneered the translation of the Dutch version of J. A. Kulumus' *Tabulae anatomicae* (*Ontleedkundige tafelen*).³ As a commodity, Western learning was in limited supply, strictly controlled and sometimes constituted a danger for its students, but it existed nevertheless.

The arrival of the United States fleet in the summer of 1853 sent a profound shock throughout the country – to samurai and commoner alike. For Fukuzawa it meant that his brother (who had inherited his father's position) asked him to go to Nagasaki and learn Dutch in order to master Western gunnery. The elder brother wished to give Fukuzawa a unique opportunity and expected him at the same time to work in the service of the lord of the domain. Fukuzawa accepted his suggestion with no real understanding of what Dutch was or what threat was represented by the outside world: his simple ambition was to leave his home town.

Fukuzawa left for Nagasaki one month before the Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed between Japan and the United States. Fukuzawa became a servant/student to the councillor of Nakatsu's heir, who was in Nagasaki for the same purpose. As the conditions were unsuitable for learning the Latin alphabet there, he was transferred to the 'master' of gunnery, who did not understand Dutch very well either.

Although there was no vast progress in Dutch studies in Nagasaki, the councillor's son was jealous of Fukuzawa. He fabricated a story that Fukuzawa's mother was ill in Nakatsu, showed him a falsified letter, and suggested that Fukuzawa should return home. Fukuzawa discovered the falsehood but decided to leave Nagasaki anyway. Having no money, he forged the signature of an official and charged his expenses to the domanial warehouse in Osaka. Instead of heading for home, he set off in the direction of Edo (now Tokyo), 1,000 kilometres to the north, to continue his studies.

The boat trip across the Inland Sea took two weeks owing to the numerous stops. Before reaching Edo, Fukuzawa disembarked and walked through the night to reach the Osaka domanial warehouse where his brother, Sannosuke, was stationed. Sannosuke persuaded Fukuzawa to stay and enrol in a Dutch-language school at Tekijuku, which was run by a physician, Ogata Koan (1810–63). The school did not teach medicine exclusively; however, Ogata was successful in distributing vaccines in Japan and in educating many young men like Fukuzawa who would later participate in the building of a modern nation.⁴

During Fukuzawa's three-year stay at Tekijuku, both he and his older brother fell ill and were sent back to Nakatsu to recover. Sannosuke died and Fukuzawa

succeeded him in his hereditary duties. This consisted of guard duty at the local castle, since he was not sufficiently experienced to take over his father's old job of treasurer. He begged his mother to let him return again to study at Tekijuku. Subsequently, he received official permission to do so.

During the next year, Fukuzawa became the top student at the school and his autobiography recalls fond memories of his schooldays.⁵ It is worth mentioning that, with his colleagues, he studied mainly physics, chemistry and physiology, and copied and translated a Dutch book on the art of fort-building.

The move to the capital and the world

In the autumn of 1858, Fukuzawa was appointed teacher of Dutch to the vassals of the domain of Nakatsu. The course was to be given in the second domanial house of Edo. This time Fukuzawa travelled on foot to Edo with 'real money' and a servant. This 'servant' was actually his colleague who wished to go to Edo and who later completed the translation of a statistical table giving figures about all nations.⁶

July 1859 marked the opening of three ports in Japan according to terms of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed in the previous year with the United States and some European nations. Soon after the opening, Fukuzawa visited Kanagawa (now Yokohama) and was disappointed to find that he was unable to read the signs or to make himself understood. English was the language of the port city. This experience made Fukuzawa determined to learn English, but his progress was slow since he could find neither a good teacher nor a good dictionary.

Within the terms of the Treaty the Shogunate decided to dispatch envoys to the United States. Fukuzawa immediately volunteered his services to Admiral Kimura Yoshitake (1830–1901) and was accepted. After thirty-seven days at sea on a voyage marked by consecutive storms, they reached San Francisco in the spring of 1860. During his one-month stay, Fukuzawa's most significant acquisitions were a Webster's dictionary and a photograph of himself with the photographer's daughter. This dictionary, recommended by the interpreter, John Manjiro (1827–98),⁷ became Fukuzawa's intellectual weapon in understanding Western civilization.

Upon his return, Fukuzawa was employed in the foreign affairs office of the Shogunate translating diplomatic documents. The next year he married Okin, the daughter of an upper-rank samurai from his home domain. Once again, in 1867, Fukuzawa was able to go to the United States. This time the mission visited Washington and New York to negotiate on the unsettled purchase of a warship from the United States Government. Fukuzawa's real aim was to acquire textbooks for students who, up till then, had been forced to copy their texts by hand. He bought as many books as possible within his budget.

Fukuzawa's most important voyage was with a mission to Europe, with the assignment of negotiating the postponement of additional port openings and an adjustment of the exchange rate. It failed on both accounts, but Fukuzawa travelled through France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia and Portugal. Acting as translator, he observed many new things and institutions, such

as hospitals, arsenals, mines and schools. Based on what he saw and read in the year-long tour, Fukuzawa published the first volume of *Seiyo jijo* [Things Western, or The Conditions of the West]⁸ which described these discoveries. It became a national bestseller.

Fukuzawa realized that technical progress had contributed to the prosperity that he had witnessed in Europe. He began to believe that revolutionary changes in people's knowledge and thinking were a fundamental requirement for similar progress in Japan. While in London, he sent a letter to a friend at home stating that the most urgent thing to do was to educate talented young people rather than to purchase machinery and armaments. He decided to postpone the writing of the second volume of *Seiyo jijo* and translated J.H. Burton's *Political Economy* instead. In this 1867 book, to which he gave the title *The Outside Volume*, the 'corner-stones and main pillars', the intangible social network constituting civilized society was discussed.⁹ It was indeed an introduction to 'the conditions of the west'.

After his return to Japan, Fukuzawa began to set up his own school. The number of students grew rapidly to 100 by 1867. His duties with the Shogunate were only six days a month, so he was apparently able to use the other days for reading, writing and teaching. The popularity of his accounts of Western life indicated an interest and tolerance of the outside world. Other groups, however, wanted to expel the 'barbarians', together with any Japanese scholars interested in Western studies. The fanatic *joi ronin* (breakaway groups of samurai who wanted to expel foreigners) were prepared to murder those who represented Western ideals. People like Fukuzawa were at risk. In fact, Omura¹⁰ was killed by them in 1869.

The encouragement of learning

Amid the sounds of gunfire from a battle only a few kilometres from Keio-gijuku¹¹ Fukuzawa continued his lectures on political economy as usual.¹² It was 4 July 1868 and the Restoration forces were challenging the tottering Tokugawa regime. Fukuzawa told his students, reduced from 100 to 18 on that day, 'Whatever happens in the country, whatever warfare harasses our land, we will never relinquish our hold on Western learning. As long as this school of ours stands, Japan remains a civilized nation of the world.'¹³

These words explain clearly what Fukuzawa had in mind – Western learning and education. Soon after the defeat of the Tokugawa forces in Edo, the new authorities asked Fukuzawa to join the government service. He declined the offer and never became a partisan of the new government, which gave him much more freedom to criticize and write about the policies of both parties. In the years that followed, he devoted himself exclusively either to teaching at Keio or helping to initiate modern schools elsewhere. He also translated or wrote pamphlets about the West, as well as elementary textbooks on a surprisingly wide variety of subjects, such as physics, geography, military arts, the British Parliament and international relations.

Among his books, *Gakumon no susume* [An Encouragement of Learning]¹⁴ is the most celebrated. It was originally a series of essays written and published be-

tween 1872 and 1876. The first essay, which was an enormous success, was the manifestation of Fukuzawa's thesis to the general public. The opening lines read: 'It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. Any existing distinction between the wise and the stupid, between the rich and the poor, comes down to a matter of education.'¹⁵

What is important here is Fukuzawa's concept of 'education' – the 'practical learning that is closer to ordinary human needs'¹⁶ or, in a word, *jitsugaku*. In his opinion it consisted first of learning the forty-seven Japanese *kana* letters, methods of accounting and the abacus, the way to use weights and measures, and then such subjects as geography, physics, history, economics and ethics.

The subjects in the first group had been taught in the *terakoya*, which literally means 'the temple school'. Its connection with Buddhism had been gradually relinquished since the seventeenth century, and in the next century it became a primary school for commoners' children and daughters of samurai, particularly those of low rank. The teachers were people such as poor samurai, village headmen or Shinto priests. Buddhist teachers were rather scarce in the eighteenth century. The *terakoya* mushroomed in the first half of the nineteenth century. Fukuzawa was aware of this, so apparently he put more stress on the subjects in the second group which could be taught in a modern school.¹⁷ He felt that these areas had been well developed in the West but not in the East.

He bitterly criticized the traditional Japanese school curriculum, which emphasized ancient texts and the enjoyment and writing of poetry. In his opinion, these were impractical pursuits. He argued that Western education was necessary and urged boys and girls who had just learned *kana* letters to consult translated textbooks and, at a more advanced stage, to read a Western language. In his school he relied on Western authors, and by 1890 had hired foreign teachers.

Fukuzawa felt that *jitsugaku* could contribute to personal independence, but that 'freedom and independence refer not only to the private self, but to the nation as well'.¹⁸ Fukuzawa also believed that these elements were a human right and concluded:

Each individual man and each individual country, according to the principles of natural reason, is free from bondage. Consequently, if there is some threat which might infringe upon a country's freedom, then that country should not hesitate even to take up arms against all the countries of the world.¹⁹

It can be understood from this why he translated military manuals.

Fukuzawa's style in *An Encouragement of Learning* and in other textbooks and manuals was completely new to Japan. In the past, books had been written in a Chinese script with characters difficult for ordinary people to understand. The new style was colloquial and comprehensible even for the less educated. In the face of the general opinion that the Japanese language did not lend itself to oratory, he started public speaking and conducted open debates. He was a prime exponent of the art of public speaking in the presence of sceptics and built a meeting hall at Keio where he, his fellows and students held many gatherings and debating contests. This small hall, the Enzetsukan, still exists today on the campus at Mita.²⁰

The theory of civilization

In a letter to one of his friends, dated 23 February 1874, Fukuzawa wrote:

I don't think I'll take on any more translations. This year I'm going to read and work without worrying about the hundreds of miscellaneous things. My health is getting better, and my knowledge will be exhausted unless I study more. I shall spend about a year on my studies.²¹

This was in anticipation of reading the references²² and drafting his *magnum opus*, *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* [An Outline of a Theory of Civilization], which appeared the following year.²³ Unlike the other works by Fukuzawa, which were mainly for public enlightenment, this book was intended for Japanese intellectuals. At that time they were divided into several camps – some were very enthusiastic about introducing an ideal Western model of civilization, while others were reluctant about or even opposed to modern values and principles. Presumably, Fukuzawa wanted to clarify the argument and to persuade them to present a common front in favour of modernity.

Fukuzawa was a prolific writer who produced an enormous quantity of work, but it took him an exceptional amount of time and toil to finish this book. The manuscripts, which are preserved today, show that they were subject to revision again and again. The style was scholarly, hence not easy to read, eloquent and presenting all points of view. None the less, his main objective is crystal clear: self-sufficiency and national independence. 'Civilization' was both the outcome and the means to independence.

What then was 'civilization'?

In its broad sense, civilization means not only comfort in daily necessities but also the refining of knowledge and the cultivation of virtue so as to elevate human life to a higher plane. . . . [Thus] it refers to the attainment of *both* material well-being *and* the elevation of the human spirit, [but] since what produces man's well-being and refinement is knowledge and virtue, civilization ultimately means the progress of man's knowledge and virtue.²⁴

Fukuzawa took great care to explain the distinction between knowledge and virtue. He defined virtue as morality, and knowledge as intelligence, and deliberately adds that in English they are termed respectively 'morals' and 'intellect'. These definitions were specified so as to avoid any association with neo-Confucian concepts. Fukuzawa's philosophy represents a break with traditional thinking.

Traditional Japanese teaching appreciated both private virtue and benevolent rule as imparted by the Chinese classics. In this case, the philosophy was concerned mainly with governing – the man of virtue, usually the king or emperor, ruling benevolently over his people and land due to his personal competence and virtue. The people, on the other hand, were uneducated and depended on the ruler. Most Japanese scholars, in both official and private academies, taught young people how to read, but they did not encourage any original thought or novel ideas. The courses had nothing to do with political economy: such subjects were considered either 'vulgar' or inappropriate for the young. Teaching in *terakoya* was assuredly practi-

cal, but not very scientific. Knowledge gained there at best only contributed to personal intellect and profit.

Buddhism in Japan had lost its authority and function in the previous centuries. Buddhists had become mere subjects of the political authority, namely the Tokugawa Shogunate. Thus, not only neo-Confucian scholars and Buddhists but also commoners and samurai depended on their hereditary positions. Most of them were indifferent to public matters. They were ruled, credulous and blindly faithful to the ruler upon whom all the power was vested. Fukuzawa remarked that this was the most outstandingly negative feature of Japanese civilization.

In Fukuzawa's thinking, virtue and knowledge could each be divided into two parts, private and public. He was convinced that man had an innate integrity and potential talent. While it was quite possible to acquire knowledge in school, it was impossible to make a person use his private virtue publicly. Looking at history, he saw that the ruled had their virtue bottled up inside them so that it could rarely surface – at best, only within the family unit. Private knowledge, on the other hand, could be diffused into society more easily and then transformed into public wisdom. People had begun to recognize empirical laws and science, not only natural but also moral (or social) science. 'In Western civilization,' Fukuzawa wrote, 'the social fabric includes various theories that have developed side by side, have drawn closer to one another, and finally united into one civilization – in the process giving birth to freedom and independence.'²⁵ While Japanese thinking had been concentrating on the impossible task of creating public virtue, the West had expanded public wisdom, which is why he revered Western learning and criticized neo-Confucian teaching in his country.

In this regard, Japanese civilization apparently lagged behind the West. According to the theory of human development proceeding in stages, Japan (along with China) was placed in the semi-civilized stage.²⁶ Although 'advanced' and 'backward' are relative terms, the distance between East and West was assuredly great. It was impossible, in Fukuzawa's thinking, to be able to catch up with the leaders simply by purchasing modern arms, machinery and external structures, since civilization meant the development of the inner spirit, namely the virtue and knowledge, of the entire nation. Thus it follows that 'Civilization [is] Our Goal'.²⁷

In the final chapter of *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, Fukuzawa turns again to the problem of 'national independence' which was a serious concern for all Japanese intellectuals. Japan, he believed, was at that time only a small Far-Eastern country and hence did not require great military power.²⁸ He concludes:

Moreover, the argument for national polity, for Christianity, and for Confucianism . . . are also insufficient to bolster people's hearts. What, then, will? I say there is one thing: namely, to establish our goal and advance toward civilization. . . . The way in which to preserve this independence cannot be sought anywhere except in civilization.²⁹

Hard years, 1877–81

The number of students at Keio-gijuku, which had climbed back to more than 300 between 1871 and 1876, thereafter began to decline, in part because of the unset-

tled domestic scene. As most of the students were samurai, a decision by the government in 1871 to abolish domains and to reduce the hereditary privileges and stipends of the lords and vassals also affected the amount of money that could be spent on education. In five years, this process of confiscation was completed. The *shizoku* (former samurai and their families) were given a compensating debenture, the amount of which was modest compared with that given to the *kazoku* (aristocrats), and the higher-ranking *shizoku*. The majority of *shizoku* – the medium and lower ranks – were not satisfied with this arrangement. Only Fukuzawa was pleased to declare himself a commoner (*heimin*) and declined any compensation.

During this period, Fukuzawa's students, most of whom were samurai, left the school because of their lost privileges, the war and worsening poverty due to inflation. Those who came from Satsuma returned to join the rebellion there and were either killed or wounded. In dire financial straits, Fukuzawa supplemented the school's budget with his personal income and also asked for loans from the government and private sources. No one, however, was willing to lend the Keio-gijuku any money and some suggested that it should be dissolved. His fellow teachers responded by voluntarily accepting a reduction of their salary by two-thirds. Subsequently, the number of students gradually recovered from a low of 200 in 1878 to as many as 500 in 1881. Interestingly, the ratio of commoners enrolled grew from a third to more than a half by 1875. Fukuzawa later conjectured that this was due to the post-war inflation which raised the wealthy farmers' income sufficiently to send their sons to Keio-gijuku.³⁰

As the government was heavily dependent on fixed land taxes for its revenue, it was also suffering financial deficits. As a measure to reduce expenditure, it decided to sell off government factories and enterprises. When it was announced that these properties had been sold off at incredibly low prices, civil-rights leaders criticized the government severely. A rumour appeared in the press that Fukuzawa, with the financial help of Iwasaki Yataro (1835–85) of the Mitsubishi Corporation, was urging a coup d'état by Okuma. In a counter move, Ito Hirobumi (1841–1901) purged Okuma from the provisional cabinet. The real reason for this political drama was a struggle for control over input on legislation for the future constitution. The man who was able to exercise this control was expected to be the de facto prime minister. Several Keio graduates who had worked under Okuma had suggested a constitutional monarchy on the British model, while the Ito group preferred the Prussian type. This group was responding to, and afraid of, Fukuzawa and the Keio school, since Fukuzawa himself often expressed active support for Okuma's policies.

Criticisms and appreciation

After the political victory, Ito suspended the constitution and the meeting of the Diet for ten years, and cancelled the sale of any further government properties. Before their split, Ito, Okuma and other members of the government had arranged with Fukuzawa to start a newspaper to help promote the early opening of the Diet, but this too was shelved. Fukuzawa decided to proceed alone and launched *Jiji-*

shimpo on 1 March 1882. In the inauguration editorial, he declared that this quality newspaper would remain impartial and independent.

From that time on most of Fukuzawa's writings appeared in *Jiji-shimpo*, not only serious articles but also satire. He addressed all contemporary issues – politics, domestic and international issues, political economy, education and educational policy, the moral code and particularly women's rights. These articles and parodies fill nearly half of the twenty-two volumes of his *Collected Works*.³¹

A broad overview of his works shows Fukuzawa proceeding in a straight line towards individual and national independence. Yet, even in the 1870s, there was some controversy over his discussions on moral issues concerning loyalty, money and so forth.³² Moreover, serious criticisms and comments have recently been levelled at his articles from the 1880s and afterwards. Such criticism has raised serious doubts as to Fukuzawa's real intentions or his real opinion. So violent has been the reaction against his articles about Asia that it has nearly obscured the impact of his less controversial articles – for instance, the ones about women's equality – and placed Fukuzawa in the very category of ideas that he was supposedly opposed to.

One such article, and perhaps the most disputed, is 'Datsu-a-ron [On Departure from Asia]', written in 1885. Fukuzawa states:

Our immediate policy, therefore, should be to lose no time in waiting for the enlightenment of our neighbouring countries [Korea and China] in order to join them in developing Asia, but rather to depart from their ranks and cast our lot with the civilized countries of the West. . . . We should deal with them exactly as the Westerners do.³³

Readers today react strongly to this passage. Yet such a statement can be more fully understood if it is seen in its proper context. Fukuzawa's seemingly aggressive stance reflects the changing international relations in East Asia during those years. Moreover, Fukuzawa's concern with Korea had its own history.

Fukuzawa had been acquainted with the Korean reformists, Pak Yong-hyo and Kim Ok-kyun, since 1881. Kim had particularly close contacts with Fukuzawa³⁴ as he came to Japan three times between 1882 and 1884, receiving much advice and every assistance from Fukuzawa during his stay (each one lasting several months). Fukuzawa recommended that talented young men should be educated, that the people should be enlightened through a 'newspaper', and that emphasis should be placed on Korean sovereignty and independence from China.

Thus, in the first instance, Kim sent a group of young students to Keio-gijuku, to the military academy and to other Japanese schools. Secondly, the newspaper, or more properly speaking a governmental bulletin, was published three times a month beginning in November 1883 through the efforts of Kakugoro Inoue (1859–1938), who had been dispatched by Fukuzawa in December 1882 and appointed project adviser by the king. The third objective, however, was extremely difficult to achieve; following the 1882 anti-Japanese revolt by the Korean army, China had declared her suzerainty and exercised a firm grip over the Korean court.

Fukuzawa's expectation for Korean progress faded as Korean dependence upon China grew. 'Traditions' were obviously the lifelong enemy of Fukuzawa; in such a hopeless situation, he saw a parting of the ways – Japan choosing change, with

Korea and China resisting it. A more sympathetic view of Fukuzawa's suggestion of turning away from Asia can be sustained with the knowledge that, for several years, his efforts were directed at aiding enlightenment and reform in Korea. Fukuzawa's articles on Korea after 1881 were numerous, but always emphasizing its sovereignty and national independence. On the contrary, in 'On Departure from Asia' he criticized Chinese imperialism and decided not to give China any special consideration simply on the grounds that it was a neighbouring country.

Fukuzawa's concern for women is apparent in his main writings, now collected in *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Japanese Women*.³⁵ From today's perspective his position on women's rights seems somewhat restrained. No one can deny that he was the only Meiji thinker who tirelessly argued for women's equality. In addition to several earlier articles, he wrote much in the late 1880s on the subject.³⁶ His focus was directed to where the biggest problem lay in Japan: women's rights in the home, the growth of their independence there, and eliminating the subjection of women to men in society.

Fukuzawa criticized the customary ill-conduct of men towards women, and condemned the remaining vestiges of polygamy. Both, he argued, were the most uncivilized customs of Japanese society. He claimed fundamental equality for women and equal ownership of the family property. He wrote:

Therefore, to teach them [women] at least an outline of economics and law is the first requirement after giving them a general education. Figuratively speaking, it will be like providing the women of civilized society with a pocket dagger for self-defence.³⁷

Some recent comments concerning his arguments on women suggest that Fukuzawa's view was rather narrow. For example, he never suggested public activism for women, he mainly encouraged middle-class women compared with those of the lower classes, he did not touch on the issue of women in the labour force (most of whom worked in wretched conditions) and, lastly, he did not condemn the prostitution of poor girls or their migration overseas, since he regarded it as preferable to starvation. Despite the limitations of Fukuzawa's definition of equality of women, considering their position, his arguments were appreciated by women at the time, as is shown by the following letter passed anonymously by a lady to Mrs Fukuzawa at the time of his funeral:

Every time I read Sensei's articles on Japanese women in *Jiji-shimpo*, I feel grateful that he is our real friend. Indeed, it is our deep sorrow to lose Sensei now. . . . With my tears, I sincerely hope that Sensei's desires shall permeate our country for ever.³⁸

To sum up, in his time Fukuzawa was a 'teacher' of not only boys and girls in schools but also of Japanese men and women, and this may still be considered the case today.

Notes

1. Fukuzawa gave a first-hand account of the rank structure of samurai society in 'Kyuhanjo [Conditions in an Old Feudal Clan]' (translated by Carmen Blacker), *Monumenta Nipponica* (Tokyo, Sophia University), Vol. 9, No. 1, 1953. The terms 'feudal' and 'clan' are not entirely appropriate – the Tokugawa regime was in very many ways different from European feudalism. Fukuzawa emphasized in 1890 that the term 'feudal(ism)' is a poor translation describing the *ancien régime* in Japan. In the field of contemporary Japanese studies, the term 'domain' is used for 'clan'. In the present text, this terminology has been followed.
2. The education of commoners is discussed in a subsequent section, 'The Encouragement of Learning'. R. P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) is an excellent study on the education of both samurai and commoners at that time.
3. J. A. Kulumus, *Ontleedkundige tafelen* [Anatomical Charts] (translated by G. Dicten), Amsterdam, De Jansoons van Waesberg, 1734.
4. For example, Omura Masujiro (1828–69), the son of a commoner physician, learned Dutch at Tekijuku, then mastered military studies, and became the first Minister of the Army after the Restoration.
5. E. Kiyooka (translator), *The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa (Fukuo jiden)*, Chapter 4, New York, Columbia University, 1966 (an enlarged version is now available from Hokuseido Press, Tokyo).
6. P. A. de Jong, *Statistische tafel van alle landen der aarde*, Arnhem, 1854.
7. A Japanese fisherman rescued by an American whaling ship, who returned home after working on the boat for nine years.
8. American and British scholars, Blacker, Craig and others, preferred the translation 'Conditions in the West' to 'Things Western'.
9. More exactly the first part discussing 'social economy' was translated. The original (anonymous) book was published in the series of popular books entitled 'Chambers' Educational Course' (Edinburgh, 1852). I suppose Fukuzawa purchased it in London in 1862. The author, a famous Scottish writer (1809–81), was identified by Albert M. Craig several years ago. The quotation in the text comes from the Foreword of the *Outside Volume*.
10. See note 4 above.
11. By April 1868, the school, located at nearby Mita, had no name. The convention at the time was to pick some favourite characters out of Chinese classics, but Fukuzawa simply utilized the name of the current era, Keio. It is ironic, however, that the name of the era is, even today, taken traditionally from the Chinese classics. *Gijuku* may imply 'public' school or 'college', and the whole property was transferred from Fukuzawa to a corporation. The school moved to the Mita campus in 1871.
12. The textbook was *Elements of Political Economy* (Boston, 1837), many copies of which Fukuzawa had purchased in New York or Washington in 1867. The author of the book was an American clergyman, F. Wayland (1796–1865), who was President of Brown University. He published another college textbook on moral science that Fukuzawa used in the following year (1869).
13. Kiyooka, op. cit., p. 211.
14. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning* (trans. by D. A. Dilworth and U. Hirano), Tokyo, Sophia University, 1969.
15. Ibid., p. 1.
16. Ibid., p. 2.

17. In fact, he referred to *Jitsugo-kyo*, a famous beginners' textbook on *terakoya*, on the opening page of the first essay of *An Encouragement of Learning*. For more information on *terakoya*, see Dore, op. cit.
18. Fukuzawa, *An Encouragement of Learning*, op. cit., p. 3.
19. Ibid., p. 5.
20. His selected speeches and addresses are translated in W. H. Oxford, *The Speeches of Fukuzawa*, Tokyo, Hokuseido Press, 1973; pictures of the Enzetsukan are included in that book.
21. Letter to Shoda Heigoro, *Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu* [The Collected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi], Vol. 17, p. 163, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1958-64 (in Japanese, 22 vols.).
22. He read Buckle and Guizot on European civilization, J. S. Mill, *Consideration on Representative Government*, and other writings, as well as notable Japanese historians. As far as Chinese history is concerned, he had learned enough in spite of his short schooling (see Kikooa, op. cit., p. 8).
23. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (trans. by D. A. Dilworth and G. C. Hurst), Tokyo, Sophia University, 1973.
24. Ibid., p. 35.
25. Ibid., pp. 37, 135.
26. Fukuzawa had already encountered the stage theory in J. H. Burton's *Political Economy*, pp. 6-7, in which the three stages are labelled 'barbarous and/or primitive', 'semi-civilized' and 'civilized'.
27. The title of Chapter 2 of *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*.
28. Fukuzawa, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, op. cit., p. 193.
29. Ibid., p. 193. These arguments are critically examined in the chapter. Three arguments listed have not much relevance to religion but may be called reactionary nationalistic, Westernized and conservative neo-Confucian, respectively.
30. 'Keio-gijuku kiji [A Short History of Keio-gijukul]', written by himself, and published in a fund-raising bulletin. No Keio fellow other than Fukuzawa noticed such a change in the composition of students.
31. *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu*, op. cit.
32. The sixth and seventh essays, for example, caused a heated controversy. Fukuzawa's rejoinder is given in the Appendix to *An Encouragement of Learning*.
33. The article was published in *Jiji-shimpo*, 16 March 1885. The translation by Sinh Vinh is given in *Fukuzawa Yukichi nenkan* [Annals], Vol. 11, Mita, Tokyo, Fukuzawa Yukichi Kyokai, 1984.
34. For more details about Kim Ok-kyun and his close relationship with Fukuzawa, see Hwang K., *The Korean Reform Movement of the 1880s*, Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman, 1978, pp. 78-92.
35. Kiyooka E. (ed. and trans.), *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Japanese Women*, University of Tokyo Press, 1988. Kiyooka also edited and translated *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Education*, also published by the University of Tokyo Press, 1985.
36. Fukuzawa had been very much concerned with women's rights since the mid-1870s. See Kiyooka, *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Japanese Women*, op. cit., p. 174. About that time he also read J. S. Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (New York, Appleton & Co., 1870), and mentioned the book in the fifteen essays of *An Encouragement of Learning*.
37. Kiyooka, *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Japanese Women*, op. cit., p. 223.
38. 'Fukuzawa Sensei aito-roku [Condolences to Our Mentor Fukuzawa]', *Keio-gijuku gakuho* [Review], No. 39, May 1901, p. 27 (reprinted by Misuzo Shobo, Tokyo, 1987). *Sensei* is a conventional honorific for a teacher in Japan, but the anonymous lady and the Keio alumni used it with the special connotation of 'our Mentor'.

Works by Fukuzawa Yukichi

Fukuzawa was a very prolific and all-round writer, and his complete works have been assembled in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu* [The Collected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi], 21 vols. + 1 additional vol., Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1958–64.

His point of view on education is scattered throughout many of the above-mentioned volumes. Fortunately, however, the most significant writings about education have been selected and translated into English by his grandson, Emeritus Professor Kiyooka Eiichi, in *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Education*, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1985. This volume contains more than thirty of his articles, speeches and chapters on education.

The following book manifests his thinking on education at the onset of modernization in Japan and exists in an English translation: *An Encouragement of Learning* (trans. by D. A. Dilworth and U. Hirano), Tokyo, Sophia University, 1969.

Works on Fukuzawa Yukichi

Makino K. *Meiji keimo-ki kyoiku no kenkyu: Fukuzawa Yukichi ni okeru nihon kindai kokka no keisei to kyoiku* [Studies of Education in the Period of Meiji Enlightenment: Nation Building and Education by Fukuzawa Yukichi]. Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo, 1968.

Yasukawa J. *Nihon kindai kyoiku no shiso kozo* [A Critical Study of Fukuzawa's Thinking about Education]. Tokyo, Shinhyoronsha, 1970.

Yamazumi M. *Kaisetsu* [Commentaries]. *Fukuzawa Yukichi senshu* [Selected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi], Vol. 3. Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1980.

Nakane K. *Fukuzawa Yukichi ni okeru hattatsu to kyoiku* [Human Development and Education in Fukuzawa's Thinking]. *Fukuzawa Yukichi nenkan* [Annals of the Fukuzawa Institute], Vol. 10, 1983.

—. *Kaisetsu* [Commentaries]. *Fukuzawa Yukichi kyoiku ronshu* [Fukuzawa's Writings on Education: A Selection]. Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1991.

MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI

(1869-1948)

Krishna Kumar

Rejection of the colonial education system, which the British administration had established in the early nineteenth century in India, was an important feature of the intellectual ferment generated by the struggle for freedom. Many eminent Indians, political leaders, social reformers and writers voiced this rejection. But no one rejected colonial education as sharply and as completely as Gandhi did, nor did anyone else put forward an alternative as radical as the one he proposed. Gandhi's critique of colonial education was part of his overall critique of Western civilization. Colonization, including its educational agenda, was to Gandhi a negation of truth and non-violence, the two values he held uppermost. The fact that Westerners had spent 'all their energy, industry, and enterprise in plundering and destroying other races' was evidence enough for Gandhi that Western civilization was in a 'sorry mess'.¹ Therefore, he thought, it could not possibly be a symbol of 'progress', or something worth imitating or transplanting in India.

It would be wrong to interpret Gandhi's response to colonial education as some kind of xenophobia. It would be equally wrong to see it as a symptom of a subtle revivalist dogma. If it were possible to read Gandhi's 'basic education' plan as an anonymous text in the history of world education, it would be conveniently classified in the tradition of Western radical humanists like Pestalozzi, Owen, Tolstoy and Dewey. It does not lend itself to be read in the context of the East-West dichotomy which Gandhi did deal with in some of his other writings. Yet the fact remains that Gandhi wanted education – reconstructed along the lines he thought correct – to help India move away from the Western concept of progress, towards a different form of development more suited to its needs and more viable, for the world as a whole, than the Western model of development.

Man versus machine

Gandhi was able to initiate an educational discourse outside the familiar East-West dichotomy yet forming part of the critique of the West by locating the problem of education in a different dialectic, that of man versus machine. In this dialectic, man

represented the whole of mankind, not just India, and the machine represented the industrialized West. Throughout his life Gandhi had perceived his personal life and the causes he fought for in a global context. This perception was no less operative in the final decade of his life, at the beginning of which he presented his 'basic education' proposal.²

The core of Gandhi's proposal was the introduction of productive handicrafts in the school curriculum. The idea was not simply to introduce handicrafts as a compulsory school subject, but to make the learning of a craft the axis of the entire teaching programme. It implied a radical restructuring of the sociology of school knowledge in India, where productive handicrafts had been associated with the lowest groups in the hierarchy of castes. Knowledge of the production processes involved in crafts, such as spinning, weaving, leather-work, pottery, metal-work, basket-making and book-binding, had been the monopoly of specific caste groups in the lowest stratum of the traditional social hierarchy. Many of them belonged to the category of 'untouchables'. India's indigenous tradition of education as well as the colonial education system had emphasized the skills (such as literacy) and knowledge of which the upper castes had a monopoly. In terms of its epistemology, Gandhi's proposal intended to stand the education system on its head. The social philosophy and the curriculum of 'basic education' thus favoured the child belonging to the lowest stratum of society. This is how it implied a programme of social transformation. It sought to alter the symbolic meaning of 'education' and thereby to change the established structure of opportunities for education.

The rationale Gandhi proposed for the introduction of production processes in the school was not as startling as this interpretation. The rationale he proposed was that schools must be self-supporting, as far as possible, for two reasons. One was purely financial: namely, that a poor society could not provide education to all its children unless schools could generate the physical and financial resources to run them. The other was political: that financial self-sufficiency alone could protect schools from dependence on the state and from interference by it. As values, both self-sufficiency and autonomy were close to Gandhi's heart. They belonged to his vision of a society based on truth and non-violence. Financial self-sufficiency was linked to truth, and autonomy to non-violence. No individual or institution that did not participate directly in the process of production for survival could afford to adhere to 'truth' for long. Such an individual or institution would have to depend on the state to an extent that would make violence, in one form or another, inevitable. A state system of education was a contradiction of Gandhi's view of education. The possibility of the school developing the resources for its own maintenance showed a way out of this contradiction.

The idea of productive schools clearly came from the two communities Gandhi had established in South Africa. Phoenix Farm, started in 1904, and Tolstoy Farm, which was established in 1910, provided him with a lasting interest and faith in the potential of life in a rural commune. The first of these experiments was apparently inspired by John Ruskin's *Unto This Last*. Gandhi drew three lessons from this book, or rather, as Louis Fischer has explained, Gandhi read three messages into the book.³ The first message was that the benefit of all is what a good

economy is all about; the second was that earnings from manual work (such as that of a barber) have the same value as mental work (such as that of a lawyer); and the third one was that a life worth living was that of a labourer or craftsman. Gandhi recalls in his autobiography that he decided to put these messages into practice as soon as he had finished reading Ruskin's book on a train journey.

The kind of life that Gandhi's 'basic education' proposal projected as the 'good' life was first practised by him at Phoenix Farm and, somewhat more rigorously and ambitiously, at Tolstoy Farm a little later. As the name indicates, by the time of this latter experiment, Gandhi had read the works of, and had established contact with, the Russian writer and thinker Leo Tolstoy. The inspiration Gandhi received from Tolstoy spanned a wide range of interests and concerns. Prominent among them was to fight the sources of violence in human society. Tolstoy's celebration of the individual's right to live in peace and freedom, and his negation of all forms of oppression, brought him close to Gandhi. Even though Gandhi did not read Tolstoy's articles on education in the journal *Yasnaya Polyana*, Tolstoy's view that 'education as a premeditated formation of men according to certain patterns is sterile, unlawful, and impossible'⁴ could well have been expressed by Gandhi.

The right to autonomy that Gandhi's educational plan assigns to the teacher in the context of the school's daily curriculum is consistent with the libertarian principles he shared with Tolstoy. Gandhi wanted to free the Indian teacher from the slavery of the bureaucracy. The schoolteacher's job had come to be defined under colonial rule as one transmitting and elucidating the forms and content of knowledge selected by bureaucratic authorities for inclusion in the prescribed textbook. Exposing the link between the mandatory use of textbooks and the feeble position of the teacher, Gandhi wrote: 'If textbooks are treated as a vehicle for education, the living word of the teacher has very little value. A teacher who teaches from textbooks does not impart originality to his pupils.'⁵ Gandhi's basic education plan implied the end of the teacher's subservience to the prescribed textbook and the curriculum. For one thing, it presented a concept of learning that could not be fully implemented with the help of textbooks. More important, however, was the freedom and authority that the basic education plan gave to the teacher in matters concerning the curriculum. It was a libertarian plan inasmuch as it denied the state the power to decide precisely what the teacher must do in the classroom. In accordance with his wider philosophy of social life and politics, this aspect of Gandhi's educational plan implied a dramatic reduction of the state's sphere of authority.

Self-sufficiency

Having assembled a conceptual outline of Gandhi's plan, we can now return to its core concern and probe it more deeply. Basic education was an embodiment of Gandhi's perception of an ideal society as one consisting of small, self-reliant communities. To him, Indian villages were capable of becoming such communities; indeed, he believed that Indian villages were historically self-reliant, and the great task now was to restore their autonomy and to create the conditions necessary for

economic self-sufficiency and political dignity in villages. Colonial rule, he thought, had damaged the village economy, subjecting it to exploitation by city-dwellers. Freedom from colonial rule would mean empowerment of the village and its development as a viable community. The basic education plan was meant to develop the village along these lines, by training children for productive work and by imparting to them attitudes and values conducive to living in a co-operative community.

This programme of development was rooted in Gandhi's view of industrialization as a threat to human sanity. Much debate has taken place about Gandhi's 'real' view of technology. It is not clear whether he was against the spirit of modern science and technology, or whether his opposition to Western-type modernity was confined to the manner in which science and technology had been used to exploit non-European societies. In the vast body of responses contained in his collected works, one finds ample evidence on both sides. Perhaps it is wrong to look for an either/or kind of position in Gandhi on this matter (and several others), for he was not so much a theorist of action as a person always ready to react and engage in action. Preparing for action by developing a symbolic model first was not his style. In the context of science and industrialization, he appears to have worked towards slowing down the march of capitalism and industrial development in India. He wanted India to develop socially and politically first, so as to be in a position of power to exercise options in the face of technological and market pressures coming from the industrialized West and from the capitalist lobby within Indian society.

His programme can be understood as a chronological ordering of priorities in which the consolidation of a viable political system would come first, and the development of productive processes through the use of machines would come second. According to Gandhi, a viable political system for India had to be centred on village republics, organized like 'oceanic circles'. The metaphor was meant to convey the principle of local power in combination with commitment to the larger society. He wanted such a political system to develop before the modernization of the means of production so that the masses, who lived in villages, would not lack the power to protect their interests under the imperatives of modernization.⁶ His educational plan fits nicely in this ordering of priorities. If the march of industrialization could be slowed down and shaped in accordance with a plan for social and political progress, basic education could serve a definite purpose in such progress. More specifically, if purposeful industrialization meant protecting the right of villages to produce what they could without competition from large-scale mechanized establishments, basic education could enhance the productive capacities of village children under such a plan.

The ideal citizen in Gandhi's Utopia was an industrious, self-respecting and generous individual living in a small community. This is the image underlying his educational plan. This image of man and the production system sustaining it brings to mind the American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), and it is useful to probe the similarities between the educational visions of these two contemporaries. Dewey grew up in a country whose frontiers were still developing. The small community of skilled, hard-working men and women, whose individual personalities mattered to the community, seemed the ideal democratic unit in Dewey's youth.

The growing capitalist economy had not yet revealed the nature of politics and culture that it would demand. In his famous book, *Democracy and Education*, published in 1916, Dewey had rooted his work-based model of teaching in the idealized small community of responsible individuals. Linking productive work with education was at the heart of Gandhi's model too, and it was rooted in the idealized village republic of his Utopia, not much different from Dewey's. But whereas Dewey sketched his democratic community rather late in terms of his country's development along the path of capitalism, Gandhi sketched his ideal village community at a point when he thought there was still time to make choices. Furthermore, Dewey's plans were not as dependent on traditional craft-based production processes as Gandhi's were. Both, however, were products of the ethos of early capitalist development. In retrospect, Dewey's educational proposal reads like a plea for protecting a special space for children in the midst of rampant, dehumanizing, capitalist advancement. Gandhi's proposal, on the other hand, reads like a plea for delaying the growth of capitalism, for buying time to strengthen the capacities of men and women to live with machines.

If we take this comparison between Gandhi and Dewey a step further, we shall discover another similarity between the two educators: both propagated a purely secular pedagogy. This is indeed somewhat startling in the case of Gandhi because, in every sphere of action except education, Gandhi acted as a man with deep religious feelings. In the context of education too he seemed reluctant to commit himself to a purely secular position, but the fact remains that his basic education plan provides no room for religious teaching. In June 1938 he had to explain the matter in some detail because a delegation of educators demanded to know precisely what his view was on this matter. His answer was:

We have left out the teaching of religion from the Wardha scheme of education because we are afraid that religions as they are taught and practised today lead to conflict rather than unity. But on the other hand, I hold that the truths that are common to all religions can and should be taught to all children. These truths cannot be taught through words or through books – the children can learn these truths only through the daily life of the teacher. If the teacher himself lives up to the tenets of truth and justice, then alone can the children learn that Truth and Justice are the basis of all religions.⁷

Apparently, Gandhi resolved the conflict in his mind between the religious role of education in which he believed and the secular programme of basic education by upholding the moral image of the teacher. By arguing that the teacher can convey the basic truths of all religions – which are similar, he says – by practising them, Gandhi was surely making an extraordinary demand. Whether the practical impossibility of the demand bothered him or not is a secondary matter. Most probably it did not, for he was used to overlooking the limitations – physical, intellectual or moral – within which ordinary people worked. And it is true that as a great educator active in politics he made many ordinary people do extraordinary things. The important thing for us to note is that by demanding the daily example of moral correctness in the teacher's conduct Gandhi was opting for a religious, as opposed to a purely professional, role for the teacher. Also, he was using a familiar Indian

motif, that of guru living in his *ashram* in the company of his disciples. In the ideal *ashram* community, the teacher was expected to set an example of the life worth living, and from this high pedestal of daily existence he was permitted to demand any conceivable form of sacrifice from the students. This quasi-mythologized image seems to have served an important rhetorical function in Gandhi's plea for reform in education along the lines of his basic education proposal. It promised to place what was a modern concept of education and pedagogy within the halo of Indian tradition.

Opposition

This modest strategy, however, could not protect basic education from the attacks, indifference and undermining to which it was subjected from the beginning. The hostility that Gandhi's proposal faced cannot be separated from the political battles of the final decade of India's struggle for independence. Basic education was described as a 'Hindu ploy' by the leaders of the Muslim League in northern India. These critics chose to miss the secular character of Gandhi's plan. On the other hand, they paid exaggerated attention to a scheme that happened to synchronize with Gandhi's proposal and had some features similar to it. This other scheme was initiated by Ravi Shankar Shukla in the Central Provinces under the name of *Vidya Mandir*, which literally means 'Temple of Knowledge'. The rural schools Shukla wanted to start under this scheme and, more than that, the known absence of liberal, secular elements in his personality made them vulnerable to attack. It was purely by metonymic logic that the attack covered Gandhi's original proposal. The attack found an audience wide enough to include members of the committee appointed by the Central Advisory Board of Education to discuss basic education in the perspective of state policy.⁸

Another perspective from which Gandhi's plan received suspicion and criticism was that of planning for industrial development in India. The basic education proposal coincided with the setting up of the National Planning Committee (NPC) by the Congress Party. The specific aim of the NPC was to formulate a plan for India's industrialization with the aim of 'economic regeneration' after independence. Its chairman, Jawaharlal Nehru, had believed for a long time that large-scale industrialization alone could solve India's problems of poverty and unemployment. But apart from Nehru's own beliefs, the NPC's reports on different spheres of development reflected the vision of a powerful and growing class of industrialists, their supporters in politics and intellectuals with high qualifications in different areas, including science and technology.

The projection of a centrally controlled economy and rapid expansion of large-scale industries in the NPC's reports could hardly have pleased Gandhi. He had been unhappy with the news of the NPC's meetings and work, and had said so. The conflict between Gandhi's view and the NPC's was not confined to the role and proportion of large-scale industries in the national economy; it extended to the rationale underlying industrial development. Apart from the material prosperity of India, the NPC's reports used India's security as a major rationale for the growth of

heavy industries. Militarization and development were to go hand in hand, as in the West. This association was not something we might regard as cheerful rhetoric to please Gandhi.

The NPC's sub-committee on general and technical education did not acknowledge this conflict, perhaps because it was not necessary to talk about larger conceptual issues in the context of education. But the sub-committee's report showed great reluctance in recommending a shift from the existing system to the one suggested by Gandhi. It argued that there had been a sudden increase since 1938 in the efficiency of primary schools under the Congress ministries (the data provided to support this claim were confined to Bombay). 'It would, therefore, be wrong', the report said, 'to displace the movement by one in favour of basic education. The introduction of basic education should be a process of grafting it on to the elementary education possible.'⁹ Obviously, the sub-committee saw serious problems in the Wardha scheme of basic education. The major problem had to do with the importance given to the teaching of productive skills. The sub-committee's argument against this was that 'too much stress on vocation at such [an] age is spiritually harmful and teaching of general subjects through such [a] single narrow-down medium makes the knowledge of subject superficial and defective'.¹⁰ The other major objection was related to this first one. The idea that the output of children's work at school should financially sustain the school was unacceptable to the sub-committee. 'To a certain extent such a system will mean [the] existence of child labour in schools,' the report said.¹¹

These were familiar arguments, and they were consistent with the general approach perspective adopted by the NPC. A broad, liberal curriculum for elementary education, and expansion of facilities for technical education, were the major thrusts of the recommended plan. Financial responsibility for compulsory primary education was assigned to be that of the state. This was indeed the staple of modernist thought, compared with which Gandhian ideas appeared obsolete and conservative. In contrast to Gandhi's Utopia of village republics enjoying considerable autonomy but offering a modest standard of life dependent on rudimentary production processes, the modernist Utopia featured a strong centralized state responsible for building an industrial infrastructure in order to ensure a high standard of living for all. A liberal curriculum under state-supported arrangements for elementary schooling was part of the modernist vision. The pedagogical strengths of such a system were indicated by Nehru in one of his few reflections on education which figured at the end of a sub-chapter entitled 'The Congress and Industry', in *The Discovery of India*:

It is well recognized now that a child's education should be intimately associated with some craft or manual activity. The mind is stimulated thereby and there is a co-ordination between the activities of the mind and the hands. So also the mind of a growing boy or girl is stimulated by the machine. It grows under the machine's impact (under proper conditions, of course, and not as an exploited and unhappy worker in a factory) and opens out new horizons. Simple scientific experiments, peeps into the microscope and an explanation of the ordinary phenomenon of nature bring excitement in their train, an understanding of some of life's processes, and a desire to experiment and find out instead of relying on set phrases and

old formulae. Self-confidence and the co-operative spirit grow, and frustration, arising out of the miasma of the past, lessens. A civilization based on ever-changing and advancing mechanical techniques leads to this. Such a civilization is a marked change, a jump almost from the older type, and is intimately connected with modern industrialization.¹²

There can be little doubt that, while writing these words, Nehru was engaging in a dialogue with Gandhi's basic education plan. He starts by agreeing with the main pedagogical assumption underlying basic education, namely, that a craft or manual activity stimulates the child's mind. Then, by the force of analogy between craft and machine, he goes off along another argument which challenges the main economic assumption underlying basic education, without identifying it. The starting-point of a dialogue with Gandhi's proposal turns, after two sentences, into a statement regarding the pedagogical value of scientific experiments and the relation such experiments have with an industrial civilization. Nehru was, of course, correct in pointing out this relationship, and also in stressing the enormous role that an experiment-based pedagogy of science could play in revitalizing education in India. He shared the hope of such revitalization with many Indian intellectuals who were committed to rapid modernization and who found Gandhi's educational plan unacceptable. One of them was the well-known novelist Mulk Raj Anand, who wrote in his book *On Education*, published at the time of independence:

The dream of perfecting good little minds on the basis of Khadi and non-violence, so that these morons vegetate within the limits of their self-sufficient communities, is not only impossible in an India where every village is already inundated with cheap machine-made goods produced by foreign and indigenous capitalists, but is likely to bring about the very opposite of all those qualities which the Mahatma seeks to create in the average Indian.¹³

Clearly, from the modernists' point of view, Gandhi's plan was an invitation to take India backward. Furthermore, they believed that modernization of children's education (to the extent of providing microscopes in elementary schools) could be accomplished within the foreseeable future with the help of available resources.

Implementation

Not all responses to Gandhi's scheme of education were hostile. Many eminent educators welcomed basic education, and they prepared extensive plans to implement it. As might be expected, the ways in which Gandhi's idea was interpreted differed widely. At one extreme were educators and leaders who understood the scheme in the context of progressive educational thought associated with thinkers like Pestalozzi and Dewey. At the other extreme were those who lived by the letter of Gandhi's thoughts and who saw basic education as a fixed charter, a matter of orthodoxy. The fact remains that despite this range in the interpretations which Gandhi's proposal received, and despite imaginable administrative and financial problems, the scheme of basic schools was implemented on a considerable scale in several parts of India after independence. It is customary to look back at this implementation as a big failure, a conclusion that may not appear to be particularly

sound if examined in the light of historical circumstances. But that is another story. The only fact that ought to be recorded here is that the implementation of Gandhi's plan could not survive the 'development decade' of the 1960s when the Indian economy and its politics entered into a new phase featuring the penetration of Indian agriculture by the advanced economies of the West and the centralization of power.

Notes

1. M. K. Gandhi, *The Problem of Education*, p. 164, Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1962.
2. For a collection of Gandhi's speeches and articles on basic education, see *Educational Reconstruction*, Wardha, Hindustan Talimi Sangh, 1938. See also Gandhi's speech at the Wardha Conference on 22 October 1937 in T. S. Avinashilingam, *Gandhiji's Experiments in Education*, Delhi, Ministry of Education, 1960.
3. Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, London, Granada, 1982 (first published 1951).
4. Leo Tolstoy, *Tolstoy on Education*, p. 111, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.
5. In *Harijan*, 9 September 1939.
6. See Gandhi's speech at Nagpur in 1938 to a group of visiting economists, in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. 68, p. 258, Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1977.
7. M. K. Gandhi, *Documents on Social, Moral and Spiritual Values in Education*, p. 20, New Delhi, NCERT, 1979.
8. Bureau of Education, *Post-War Educational Development in India*, 3rd ed., Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1944 (report of Central Advisory Board of Education).
9. National Planning Committee, *General Education and Technical Education and Developmental Research*, p. 58, Bombay, Vora, 1948 (Reports of Sub-Committees series).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
12. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 416, London, Meridian Books, 1960 (first published in 1946).
13. Mulk Raj Anand, *On Education*, p. 20, Bombay, Hind Kitab, 1947.

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A L - G H A Z Ā L Ī

(A.D. 1058-1111; A.H. 450-505)

Nabil Nofal

Until recently, Islamic thought as propounded by al-Ghazālī constituted the pre-dominant school with regard to the theory and practice of Islam (and, in particular, Sunnite Islam). With his immense intellectual stature and his encyclopedic knowledge, al-Ghazālī has influenced Islamic thought and defined its practice for nearly nine centuries. He was a representative of 'conciliatory Islam'.

Over the past three decades, a new current of 'combative Islam' has appeared and grown rapidly, and is attempting to gain control of the Islamic world. Some observers see this trend as a new revival movement, while others perceive in it a threat not only to the Islamic countries, but to the entire world, and a source of destabilization, taking Islam and Muslims back fourteen centuries. This new movement derives its intellectual foundations from the teachings of Abū-l-A'ālā Maudūdī, Sayyid Quṭb and Rūḥollāh Khomeinī, as well as their hard-line followers active in a number of countries. It advocates the proclamation of society as impious, the forcible elimination of existing regimes, the seizure of power and a radical change in social lifestyles; it is aggressive in its rejection of modern civilization. The adepts of this trend hold that Islam, as professed and practised over many centuries, provides the solution to all the political, economic, social, cultural and educational problems facing the Arab and Islamic world, and indeed the whole planet.

The struggle between the thought of al-Ghazālī and that of al-Maudūdī is still under way and may turn out to be one of the most important factors in shaping the future of the Arab and Islamic world.

Whatever the outcome of this struggle, al-Ghazālī remains one of the most influential philosophers (though he objected to being described as such) and thinkers on education in Islamic history. His biography – as a student in search of knowledge, as a teacher propagating knowledge and as a scholar exploring knowledge – provides a good illustration of the way of life of students, teachers and scholars in the Islamic world in the Middle Ages.

The life of al-Ghazālī¹

Al-Ghazālī was born in A.D. 1058 (A.H. 450) in or near the city of Tūs in Khurāsān to a Persian family of modest means, whose members had a reputation for learning and an inclination towards Šūfism. His father died when he was young, having entrusted one of his Šūfī friends with the education of his two sons. The friend undertook that task until the money bequeathed by the father ran out, whereupon the friend advised the two brothers to enter a *madrasa*,² where they would be afforded board and instruction. Al-Ghazālī appears to have begun his elementary education at approximately age 7, studying Arabic, Persian, the Koran and the principles of religion. He went on to intermediate and higher education at a *madrasa*, where he studied *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), *tafsīr* (Koranic exegesis) and *hadīth* (Prophetic tradition) (see Glossary, page 536).

Towards the age of 15, al-Ghazālī moved to Jurjān (a flourishing centre of learning at that time, some 160 kilometres distant from Tūs) to study *fiqh* under Imām al-Isma‘īlī. Such ‘travel in search of learning’ to study under famous masters was traditional in Islamic education. The following year, he returned to Tūs, where he remained for three years, memorizing and endeavouring to understand what he had taken down from the masters, and continuing the study of *fiqh*. He then moved to Nishāpūr, where he studied *fiqh*, *kalām* (scholastic theology), logic and, possibly, some philosophy under Imām al-Juwainī, the most illustrious Šāfi‘ite (one of the four Sunnite Schools of Law) *faqih* (jurist, scholar of Islamic religious law) of the day. At that time, al-Ghazālī was 23 years of age. He continued to study for five years under Imām al-Juwainī and to assist him with teaching. He also began to write and to study Šūfism under another *shaikh*, al-Fārmadhī.

Al-Ghazālī’s period of apprenticeship ended with the death of al-Juwainī in 1085 (A.H. 478); he was now about 28 years old, becoming involved in politics and mingling with the ruling circles. He travelled to meet Nizām ul-Mulk, the Seljuq minister, and remained with him in his ‘camp’ for six years, during which time he lived the life of a ‘court jurist’. He took part in political and learned disputes and wrote books until he was appointed as a professor to the Nizāmiya *madrasa* at Baghdād, the most celebrated and important centre of science and teaching in the *Mashriq* (Islamic East) at that time. He worked there for four years, and composed a number of works on *fiqh*, which he also taught, together with logic and *kalām*; the most important of those works were the *Al-Mustazhiri* [The Exotericist] and *Al-Iqtisād fi-l-‘Itiqād* [The Golden Mean in Belief], both works of a political nature on *fiqh*.

Al-Ghazālī was a protagonist in three vehement political and intellectual controversies which were raging in the Islamic world at that time: the struggle between philosophy and religion (between Islamic and Greek culture), in which he took the side of religion against philosophy; the struggle between the Sunnites and the Shi‘ites, in which he defended the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate against the Bāṭinites; and the struggle between revelation and reason, and between *fiqh* and Šūfī mysticism.

While resident as a professor at the Nizāmiya *madrasa* in Baghdād, al-Ghazālī made a thorough study of philosophy (Greek philosophy, in particular that of Aris-

totle, Plato and Plotinus, as well as Islamic philosophy, in particular that of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and al-Fārābī) in order better to refute it. The basic problem facing al-Ghazālī was that of reconciling philosophy with religion. He resolved this conflict by maintaining that philosophy was correct in so far as it agreed with the principles of (Islamic) religion, and was flawed wherever it was at variance with it. As a prelude to his attacks on philosophy, he wrote a book in which he summarized the fundamentals of philosophical thought as known in his time, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa* [The Aims of the Philosophers]. That was followed by his famous work, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* [The Incoherence of the Philosophers]. He summed up his opposition to the philosophers in twenty major points, dealing with God, the universe and man. For al-Ghazālī, the world is a recent creation, bodies are resurrected into the hereafter along with their souls, and God knows both particulars and universals.

The *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* caused a great stir and had a profound effect in the Islamic world. Indeed, its influence was felt as far afield as Christian Europe. Al-Ghazālī and his *Tahāfut* contributed to the weakening of Greek philosophical thought in the Islamic world, despite several attempts to defend philosophy by Ibn Rushd (Averroës) and others.³

As military and intellectual confrontation flared up between the Sunnites and the Shī'ites, between the 'Abbāsid Caliphate and the Fātimid state and its partisans and adherents in the *Mashriq*, al-Ghazālī joined the fray, and in fact wrote a series of works on the subject, the most important of which was *Faḍā'il al-Bāṭiniyya wa-Faḍā'il al-Mustazhiriyya* [The Infamies of the Esotericists and the Virtues of the Exotericists].

Bāṭinite esotericism is based on two fundamental principles: the infallibility of the *imām* (see Glossary, page 536), the obligatory source of knowledge, and an esoteric interpretation of *sharī'a* (the revealed law of Islam) by the *imām* and his representatives. Al-Ghazālī aimed his attacks more against the principle of the infallibility of the *imām* than against the esoteric interpretation of *sharī'a*. He also endeavoured to defend and justify the existence of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate – even if only as a symbolic entity, since the Caliphate was then in an extremely weak state – to ease the conditions of admission to the imamate and to confer legitimacy on the Seljuq sultans, the real military and political force at the time, a juridical and political problem which had been tackled by other Muslim *fuqahā'*, in particular al-Māwardī. However, al-Ghazālī's attack against esotericism was not as successful as his attack against the philosophers.

In 1095 (A.H. 488), at the age of 38, al-Ghazālī suddenly underwent a six-month-long spiritual crisis, which may be briefly described as a violent internal conflict between rational intelligence and the spirit, between this world and the hereafter. He began by doubting the validity of existing doctrines and schools (knowledge as such), and eventually came to question the efficacy of the tools of knowledge. This crisis brought on a physical illness which prevented him from speaking or teaching and, having attained the truth by means of the light with which God had illuminated his heart, finally caused him to leave his post and renounce wealth, fame and influence.

Al-Ghazālī classified the prevailing doctrines of his day into four main groups:

scholastic theology, based on logic and reason; Bātinism or esotericism, based on initiation; philosophy, based on logic and proof; and Šūfism, based on unveiling and receptiveness thereto. He also held that the means whereby knowledge could be attained were the senses, reason and revelation. In the end, he came to prefer Šūfism and revelation (inspiration), and since it was difficult or impossible to reconcile the imperatives of this world with those of the hereafter, he left Baghdād under the pretence of making a pilgrimage to Mecca, and went to Damascus.⁴

Šūfi influences were many and powerful in the life of al-Ghazālī, and a number of factors caused him to lean in the direction of Šūfism. It was a period in which Šūfism had become prevalent; his father had been favourably disposed towards Šūfism; his tutor had been a Šūfi; his brother had turned to Šūfism at an early age; his professors had been inclined towards Šūfism; the minister Niām ul-Mulk was close to Šūfism; and finally, al-Ghazālī himself had studied Šūfism. However, Šūfism is not a theoretical science that can simply be studied from books or learnt from a master; it is also an activity, a practice and a mode of conduct, with its own rules, including withdrawal from the world, seclusion and itinerancy. This is what al-Ghazālī did, spending nearly two years in seclusion and wandering between Damascus, Jerusalem and Mecca. It was during this period that he began work on his most important book, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn* [The Revival of the Religious Sciences], which he may have completed later. This work is divided into four parts, dealing with devotional practice, social customs, the causes of perdition and the means of salvation, and while al-Ghazālī hardly says anything new in it, its four volumes totalling some 1,500 pages constitute a compendium of Islamic religious thought in the Middle Ages. With its comprehensiveness, clarity and simplicity, it occupies a unique position in the history of Islamic thought.

Al-Ghazālī returned to Baghdad in 1097 (A.H. 490) and continued to live the life of a Šūfi in the *ribāṭ* of Abū Sa'īd of Nishāpūr opposite the Nizāmīya *madrasa*. He took up teaching again for a short time, expounding his *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*. He then went to his birthplace, Tūs, where he continued to live as a Šūfi and to write. It is apparently during this period that he completed the *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn* and several other works of a clearly Šūfi nature.⁵

After ten years of absence, al-Ghazālī went back to teaching at the Nizāmīya *madrasa* at Nishāpūr in 1104 (A.H. 498), at the request of the Seljuq minister Fakhr ul-Mulk. However, he continued to live as a Šūfi and to write until 1109 (A.H. 503),⁶ when he left Nishāpūr to return to his birthplace, Tūs, to devote himself to the life of an ascetic Šūfi and to teaching. Near his house he built a *khāngāh* or Šūfi hermitage, and it was in this period that he wrote *Minhāj al-'Ābidīn* [The Path of the Worshippers],⁷ which appears to be a description of his way of life and that of his pupils: renunciation of this world, seclusion and cultivation of the innermost self. And so he continued until his death in 1111 (A.H. 505).

The philosophy of al-Ghazālī

The main theme of al-Ghazālī's philosophy, and indeed of Islamic philosophy in general, is the concept of God and His relationship with His creation (the world

and mankind). Although al-Ghazālī initially followed the mainstream of Islamic *fiqh*, and in particular of Ash'arī (traditional Sunnite) *kalām*, in describing the essence and attributes of God, and Šūfī undercurrents in defining the relationship between God and mankind, he then goes on to propose his own conception of the essence, attributes and actions of God.⁸

Like many legal experts and philosophers, al-Ghazālī divides the universe into the transient world and the eternal hereafter. This world, or material, temporary existence, is subject to the will of God; it is not governed by a set of scientific laws, which form an integral part of the world, but is maintained, governed and driven by the direct and continual intervention of God (rejection of causality). God is not only the creator of the universe and of its attributes and laws (or the cause of existence); He is also the cause of every event in the world, great and small, past, present and future.⁹

In this universe lives man, a creature with an immortal soul and a mortal body. Man is neither good nor evil by nature, though his natural disposition is closer to good than to evil. Furthermore, he operates within a constrained framework, within which there is more compulsion than freedom of choice. He is not so much meant for this world, in which he toils, as for the hereafter, to which he must aspire and strive to achieve.¹⁰

Society is composed of human beings, and in al-Ghazālī's view is not and cannot be virtuous. His is a society in which evil outweighs good, to such an extent that man may acquire greater merit by shunning society than by living in it. Society can only change for the worse, and individuals have rights and duties with respect to society. However, the existence of the individual is insignificant compared with the existence and strength of the group. It is a class society divided into a thinking and ruling élite, and the masses, whose affairs are entirely in the hands of the élite. Religious and doctrinal questions are left to the scholars, and worldly things and matters of state come under the authority of the rulers. The common people have no choice but to obey. Lastly, it is a society that is completely subject to the authority and guidance of God; it has no other goal than that of upholding the religion of God and of affording people the opportunity of adoring Him.¹¹

Awareness and knowledge are the most important characteristics of man, who derives knowledge from two sources: the human attributes of the senses and reason, which are deficient, allow man to know the material world in which he lives, while the divine properties of revelation and inspiration enable him to discover the invisible world. These two types of knowledge must not be equated, whether with respect to their source, method or reliability. True knowledge can only be unveiled once the self has been cultivated and made ready through learning and exercise for what is engraved on the Well-Guarded Tablet (the contents of the Holy Koran) to be imprinted on it. The more the self comprehends such knowledge, the better it knows God, the closer it comes to Him, and the greater is the happiness of man.¹²

The man of virtue, in al-Ghazālī's view, is he who renounces this world, turns towards the hereafter and prefers seclusion to the company of his fellow men. Poverty is preferable to wealth, and hunger to a full belly. The comportment of the man of virtue is governed by reliance on God rather than an urge to achieve su-

premacy, and his habits are more those of patience than of struggle.¹³ It is remarkable that at the same time as the ideal of the man of virtue was beginning to change in Europe, where the 'warrior monk' was taking over from the monk in the cloister, the attire of the man of virtue was also changing in the Arab East. There, however, it was from the bristling armour of the fighting knight to the rags of the Ṣūfī. While Peter the Hermit was rallying the European masses to join in the Crusades, al-Ghazālī was urging the Arabs to submit to their rulers or to turn away from society. Thus the thinker and philosopher helped to mould society and change the course of history.

Aims and principles of education

Al-Ghazālī's philosophy of education represents the high point of Islamic thinking on education, in which al-Ghazālī's evident inclination towards reconciliation and the integration of various intellectual schools is apparent. Here he achieves a synthesis of legal, philosophical and mystical educational thinking.

Al-Ghazālī was not primarily a 'philosopher of education' (even though he did work as a teacher at the beginning of his career); he was a philosopher of religion and ethics. When he had completed the outlines of this great philosophical edifice, and begun to put it into practice, al-Ghazālī found himself turning to the fields of education and teaching, much as the great philosophers before him had done.

Al-Ghazālī's philosophy was more an expression of the spirit of the age in which he lived than a response to its challenges; his thinking on education, as indeed his philosophy, favoured continuity and stability over change and innovation.

For Al-Ghazālī, the purpose of society is to apply *shari'a*, and the goal of man is to achieve happiness close to God. Therefore, the aim of education is to cultivate man so that he abides by the teachings of religion, and is hence assured of salvation and happiness in the eternal life hereafter. Other worldly goals, such as the pursuit of wealth, social standing or power, and even the love of knowledge, are illusory, since they relate to the transient world.¹⁴

Man is born as a *tabula rasa*, and children acquire personality, characteristics and behaviour through living in society and interacting with the environment. The family teaches the children its language, customs and religious traditions, whose influence they cannot escape. Therefore, the main responsibility for children's education falls on the parents, who take credit for their probity and bear the burden of their errors; they are partners in everything the children do, and this responsibility is subsequently shared by the teachers.¹⁵

Al-Ghazālī stresses the importance of childhood in character formation. A good upbringing will give children a good character and help them to live a righteous life; a bad upbringing will spoil their character and it will be difficult to bring them back to the straight and narrow path. It is therefore necessary to understand the special characteristics of this period in order to deal with the child in an effective and sound manner.¹⁶

It is important that boys should begin to attend *maktab* (elementary school)

at an early age, for what is learnt then is as engraved in stone. Those entrusted with the education of the boy at school should be aware of how his motivations develop and interests change from one period to another: a fascination with movement, games and amusement, followed by a love of finery and appearances (in infancy and childhood), then an interest in women and sex (adolescence), a yearning for leadership and domination (after the age of 20), and finally delight in the knowledge of God (around the age of 40). These changing interests can be used by educators to attract the boy to school, by offering first the lure of ball games, then ornaments and fine clothes, then responsibilities, and finally by awakening a longing for the hereafter.¹⁷

In the elementary stage, children learn the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet's companions; they should be preserved from love poetry and the company of men of letters, both of which sow the seeds of corruption in boys' souls. They must be trained to obey their parents, teachers and elders, and to behave well towards their classmates. They should be prevented from boasting to their peers about their parents' wealth or the food they eat, their clothes and accessories. Rather, they should be taught modesty, generosity and civility. Attention is drawn to the potentially pernicious influence of the children's comrades on their character. They must therefore be advised that their friends should possess the following five qualities: intelligence, good morals, good character, abstemiousness and truthfulness.¹⁸

Education is not limited to training the mind and filling it with information, but involves all aspects – intellectual, religious, moral and physical – of the personality of the learner. It is not enough to impart theoretical learning; that learning must be put into practice. True learning is that which affects behaviour and whereby the learner makes practical use of his knowledge.¹⁹

The children's tutors must devote attention to religious education. First, the principles and foundations of religion are instilled into them such that by the age of about 7 they can be expected to perform the ritual ablutions and prayers, and to undertake several days of fasting during Ramaḍān until they become accustomed to it and are able to fast for the whole month. They should not be allowed to wear silk or gold, which are proscribed by the Faith. They must also be taught everything they need to know about the precepts of religious law, and must learn not to steal, eat forbidden food, act disloyally, lie, utter obscenities or do anything that children are prone to do. Naturally, at this early age they will not be able to understand the intricacies of what they are taught or expected to practise, and there is no harm in that. As they grow older, they will come to understand what they have been taught and what they are practising. At times, al-Ghazālī the Ṣūfī overshadows al-Ghazālī the educator: for instance, he advocates cutting the boy off from the world and its temptations in order for him to renounce it, and accustoming him to a simple, rough life in poverty and modesty.²⁰

And yet the educator quickly reappears, for he feels that once the boy has left the school premises, he should be allowed to play suitable games in order to recover from the fatigue of study, and be freed from the constraints imposed upon him. However, he must not tire or overtax himself at play. Preventing the boy from playing and burdening him constantly with learning can only weary his heart and

blunt his mind, spoiling his life and making him so despise study that he resorts to all manner of tricks to escape it.²¹

If the boy obeys his tutors, has good morals, shows excellence and makes progress in his studies, he should be honoured and praised in public so as to be encouraged and to incite others to imitate him. If he makes a mistake, but appears to be aware of it, the tutor should not mind, for the boy may have understood his mistake and be determined not to repeat it. If, however, he commits the same error again, his tutor should give him a small reprimand in private. The teacher may sometimes need to punish his pupils with a light beating, the purpose of which should be chastisement rather than physical injury.²²

The teachers should take into account the differences in character and ability between pupils, and deal with each one of them appropriately. The teachers should not push the pupils beyond their capacity, nor attempt to bring them to a level of knowledge which they cannot absorb, since that is counter-productive. By the same token, they should not keep a bright pupil back at the level of his schoolmates, for then the teacher would be in the position of someone who would feed infants on flesh which they cannot eat, digest or benefit from, or someone who would give a strong man human milk, which he has long outgrown. To feed someone with the right food is to give life; to burden someone with what is not right can only cause ruin.²³

Obscured by his borrowings from philosophers (Ibn Miskawayh in particular) or by their influence, al-Ghazālī the *faqīh* and *Ṣūfī* returns to the fore when, in addressing the arts and artistic education, he deals with the general principles of education. He begins well by defining beauty and goodness as the perception of a thing in its entirety, but his *Ṣūfism* quickly gets the better of him and he condemns listening to music and singing because they are associated with gatherings where wine is drunk. The only kind of singing to be allowed, in his view, is that of religious and heroic songs, or those sung at official festivities (religious festivals, celebrations, banquets, etc.), since such songs revive one's spirits, rejoice the heart and help one to carry on the work of this world and the next. However, an excess of music and singing should be avoided: as with medicine, they should be taken only in prescribed doses.

The same is true of dancing, which may be practised or watched in the appropriate places, as long as it does not arouse desire or encourage sinful acts.

Al-Ghazālī attacks drawing and painting vehemently, in conformity with the aversion of the *fuqahā'*, particularly in the early days of Islam, to the depiction of man or animals, which was associated with the veneration of idols or icons. He therefore rules that pictures should be removed or defaced, and he does not recommend working as an engraver, goldsmith or decorator.

With regard to poetry, al-Ghazālī advises men not to waste their time with it, even if the composition or recitation of verses is not forbidden.

Thus, al-Ghazālī adopts a strict position which is in agreement with that of the most rigorous legal experts. He divides the arts into the categories of licit, reprehensible and forbidden. The licit arts are those dealing with religion or which inspire fervour. Arts intended for pleasure or entertainment al-Ghazālī tends to

declare either reprehensible or forbidden. In any case, he pays scant attention to the arts or artistic education. However, we should no doubt do al-Ghazālī an injustice if we were to disregard the criteria and ideas of his day and age and judge him solely by the standards and concepts of our time.²⁴

Al-Ghazālī advises marriage as soon as the sexual urge appears and maturity is reached. But he also stresses that marriage and the founding of a family is a great responsibility, which one should be properly prepared to assume. Al-Ghazālī advises that those unable to marry should endeavour to cultivate and discipline themselves and curb their impulses through fasting and spiritual exercises.²⁵

The concept of knowledge and methods of teaching

With the emergence of the new religion (Islam) and the civilization that arose with it, a set of religious and linguistic disciplines came into being, among which were those dealing with the Koran, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, linguistics, the biographies of the Prophet and his companions, and the military campaigns of the Prophet, which were designated the 'Arab sciences'. With the growth of Arab and Islamic culture, and through contact and interaction with and borrowing from foreign cultures, another set of disciplines arose, such as medicine, astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, philosophy and logic, which were called the 'non-Arab sciences'. From these native and borrowed sciences a flourishing scientific movement grew rapidly, although a conflict soon arose between the religious sciences and the disciplines of philosophy and the natural sciences, or between the *fuqahā* and the philosophers. Al-Ghazālī and his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* was one of the elements in this struggle, which ended with the victory of the *fuqahā* (and *Ṣūfīs*) over the philosophers and scientists. And yet the religious sciences emerged from this battle weakened and lacking in vigour, especially after the gate of independent inquiry was closed and the method of relying on earlier authorities gained supremacy: Arab civilization and science thus went from an age of original production, creativity and innovation to one of derivation, imitation and compilation.

As a scholar and teacher, al-Ghazālī was interested in the problem of knowledge: its concepts, methods, categories and aims.²⁶ True knowledge, in al-Ghazālī's view, is knowledge of God, His books, His prophets, the kingdoms of earth and heaven, as well as knowledge of *sharī'a* as revealed by His Prophet. Such knowledge is thus a religious science, even if it includes the study of certain worldly phenomena. Disciplines relating to this world, such as medicine, arithmetic, etc., are classed as techniques.²⁷

The purpose of knowledge is to help man to achieve plenitude and to attain true happiness – the happiness of the hereafter – by drawing close to God and gazing upon His countenance.²⁸ The value of learning lies in its usefulness and veracity. Hence, the religious sciences are superior to the secular sciences because they concern salvation in the eternal hereafter rather than this transient world, and because they contain greater truth than the secular sciences. This is not to say that the secular sciences should be completely ignored; they have their uses, and are needed by society. Examples of such disciplines are medicine and linguistics.²⁹

The Muslim philosophers and scholars – al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn an-Nadīm, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and others – had a passion for classifying the sciences, and were influenced in this respect by the Greek philosophers, in particular Aristotle. Al-Ghazālī has several classifications of the sciences: he first classifies them according to their 'nature' into theoretical (theological and religious sciences) and practical (ethics, home economics and politics),³⁰ and then according to their 'origin' into revealed sciences, taken from the prophets (unity of God, exegesis, rites, customs, morality) and rational sciences, produced by human reason and thinking (mathematics, natural sciences, theology, etc.).³¹

There is no contradiction, in al-Ghazālī's opinion, between the revealed sciences and the rational sciences. Any apparent conflict between the prescriptions of revelation and the requirements of reason stems from the incapacity of the seeker to attain the truth and from his faulty understanding of the reality of revealed law or the judgement of reason. In fact, the revealed and the rational sciences complement – and indeed are indispensable to – one another. The problem is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to study and understand them together. They constitute two separate paths, and whoever takes an interest in the one will be deficient in the other.³²

Finally, al-Ghazālī classifies the sciences according to their purpose or aim, dividing them into the science of transaction (governing the behaviour and actions of human beings – the sciences of rites and customs) and the science of unveiling (pertaining to the apprehension of the reality and essence of things), an abstract science which can only be attained through unveiling a light that illuminates the heart when the heart is purified, a light that is ineffable and cannot be contained in books. It is the supreme science and the truest form of knowledge.³³

The eleventh century (fifth century A.H.) witnessed the triumph of the religious sciences over philosophy and the natural sciences. Al-Ghazālī's violent attack on philosophy was one of the factors that contributed to its weakening in the Islamic East. Al-Ghazālī divides the philosophical sciences into six categories: mathematics, logic, natural sciences, metaphysics, politics and ethics. Mathematics, logic and the natural sciences do not contradict religion, and may be studied. The problem is that whoever studies them may go on to metaphysics and other disciplines which should be avoided. Metaphysics is the science that is most dangerous and at variance with religion. Politics and ethics are not incompatible with the sciences and principles of religion, but here again, whoever studies them may slide into the study of other, reprehensible sciences.³⁴

Curiously, although al-Ghazālī attacked philosophy and the natural sciences, and was influential in persecuting and weakening them, he also helped to restore them to the curriculum at al-Azhar at the end of the nineteenth century, where the head of that university, Muḥammad al-Anbābī in 1878 (A.H. 1305) adduced al-Ghazālī's writings on the natural sciences in order to demonstrate that they were not contradictory to religion and to authorize their teaching.³⁵

The Islamic education system was divided into two distinct levels: elementary schooling was dispensed in the *kuttāb* for the common people, and by men of letters in private houses for the children of the élite; higher education took place in

various Islamic educational institutions such as mosques, *madrasas*, 'houses of science and wisdom', Šūfi hermitages, brotherhoods, hospices, etc.

The elementary curriculum had a pronounced religious character, and consisted mainly of learning the Koran and the fundamentals of religion, reading and writing, and occasionally the rudiments of poetry, grammar, narration and arithmetic, with some attention being devoted to moral instruction.

At the beginning of Islam, the higher curriculum was purely religious and included the sciences of *tafsir*, *ḥadith*, *fiqh* and *kalām*, and disciplines designed to aid in their study, such as linguistics, literature and poetry, as well as branches of knowledge which had developed in the margins of the religious sciences, such as narratives, the military campaigns of the Prophet and history. As Islamic civilization developed and assimilated Greek science, there arose alongside the Islamic curriculum a new one, in which philosophy and science (mathematics, logic, medicine, astronomy, natural sciences, etc.) were studied. It was not easy to combine these two types of knowledge; only a small number of students and scholars succeeded in doing so. Owing to the weak position of philosophy and science, and the strength of the attack against them, they gradually began to disappear from the curriculum in the eleventh century (fifth century A.H.), to be taken up again only in the early nineteenth century, albeit primarily in independent scientific institutes.

It should be noted that in Arab and Islamic civilization, curricula were not rigidly defined, but were flexible and allowed students the freedom of choosing the subjects they wished to study and the masters they wished to study under.

Al-Ghazālī distinguishes clearly between two types of curriculum: (1) obligatory sciences, which must be studied by everyone, including the religious sciences and related or ancillary disciplines such as linguistics and literature; (2) optional sciences, which are studied according to the wishes and capacities of the student. These are in turn divided into: (a) revealed sciences, of which there are four: (i) the fundamentals (the Book, *sunna*, *ijmā'* and the teachings of the companions of the Prophet); (ii) the branches (*fiqh* and ethics); (iii) means (linguistics and grammar); and (iv) the accessories (reading, *tafsir*, the sources of *fiqh*, annals and genealogy); and (b) non-revealed sciences (medicine, mathematics, poetry and history).³⁶

The criterion governing the choice of subjects is their usefulness for the student and for society. Hence religious subjects are preferred, since they are conducive to the godliness of the eternal hereafter rather than the mundaneness of this transient world.

Al-Ghazālī clarifies his conception of the contents and methods of teaching by classifying the subjects students may choose into three categories:

1. Knowledge that is praiseworthy whether in small or large amounts (knowledge of God, His attributes, His actions, the Law which He established in His creation, and His wisdom in giving pre-eminence to the hereafter over this world).
2. Knowledge that is reprehensible whether in small or large amounts (witchcraft, magic, astrology);
3. Knowledge that is praiseworthy to a certain extent (*tafsir*, *ḥadith*, *fiqh*, *kalām*, linguistics, grammar, etc.).³⁷

He recommends beginning with the fundamental sciences: the Koran, followed by *sunna*, then *tafsir* and the Koranic sciences. These are to be followed by applied ethics – *fiqh*, then the sources of *fiqh*, etc.³⁸

Al-Ghazālī then divides each branch of knowledge into three levels: elementary, intermediate and advanced (primary, secondary and higher), and he lists the books that may be studied at each level of the various sciences and subjects of study.

In Al-Ghazālī's eyes, education is not merely a process whereby the teacher imparts knowledge which the pupil may or may not absorb, after which teacher and pupil each go their separate ways. Rather, it is an 'interaction' affecting and benefiting teacher and pupil equally, the former gaining merit for giving instruction and the latter cultivating himself through the acquisition of knowledge.

Al-Ghazālī attaches great importance to the climate in which teaching takes place, and to the kind of relations that are desirable; in doing so, he continues and reaffirms the Islamic traditions of education. For him, the teacher should be a model and an example, not merely a purveyor or medium of knowledge. His work is not limited to the teaching of a particular subject; rather, it should encompass all aspects of the personality and life of the pupil. The pupil, in turn, has a duty to consider the teacher as a father, to whom he owes obedience and respect.³⁹

Among the principles governing the art of teaching, al-Ghazālī stresses that teaching should be linked to concrete situations and emphasizes the need for various types of knowledge and skills. Whenever a particular knowledge or skill is needed, it should be taught in such a way as to meet that need and be functional.⁴⁰ He also stresses that learning is only effective when it is put into practice, and is aimed at inculcating the right habits rather than simply memorizing information.⁴¹ Al-Ghazālī comes close to the idea of 'proficiency learning' when he recommends that the teacher should not move on from one subject matter to another without first ensuring that the pupil has mastered the first subject matter, and to the concept of the 'complementarity of sciences' when he advises that the teacher should pay attention to the interconnectedness of knowledge and the relations between its various branches. Finally, he counsels a gradual and patient approach in teaching.⁴²

With respect to religious education, al-Ghazālī recommends an early introduction to the fundamentals of religion through inculcation, memorization and repetition, there being no need for understanding at first. A subsequent stage involves explanation, understanding and conscious practice.⁴³ Here too, al-Ghazālī continues the Islamic traditions of education, in which the Koran was first to be memorized without being explained, the fundamentals of religion inculcated without clarification and practice was enjoined before the emergence of commitment rooted in conviction.

Scholars, teachers and pupils

As Islamic society evolved, numerous changes took place in the nature of the educated élite and its role in society. At first, this élite was essentially made up of religious scholars; there then appeared 'writers' and 'philosophers', followed by

Šūfis. Each group represented a specific category of social leaders, who at times co-existed peacefully, but at other times had violent and bloody clashes over the principles or interests of their respective groups. These clashes, in turn, helped to shape Islamic society and civilization, and ended in the eleventh century A.D. with the victory of the alliance of the *fuqahā'* and Šūfis over the philosophers and scholars. Things remained thus until the end of the eighteenth century, when a new intellectual leadership appeared, that of the modern, secular, Western-educated scholars, who imposed themselves in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Al-Ghazālī is greatly concerned by the problem of the scholarly élite. In his criticism of the scholars of his time there may be an element of self-criticism since, before undergoing a spiritual crisis, he first immersed himself in politics and academic disputes seeking fame and social advancement, subsequently forsaking the wealth and influence he had enjoyed, and retreating into seclusion and asceticism.

Al-Ghazālī represents the traditional Islamic approach in his insistence on the importance of scholars (the inheritors of the prophets) in society. He defines the role of the scholar in society as: (a) seeking to attain the truth; (b) cultivating his innermost self and acting in accordance with the knowledge he has attained; (c) disseminating the truth and teaching others without desire or fear.⁴⁴

Whoever learns, acts and teaches shall be mighty in the kingdom of heaven, for he is as the sun, whose resplendence illuminates other bodies, or as musk, whose fragrance perfumes other objects; in undertaking to teach, he accomplishes a great and momentous task, and must therefore be mindful of his rules of conduct and functions.⁴⁵

The scholar who does not use his knowledge, but who withholds it and does not disseminate it, shall be punished.⁴⁶ The standing of scholars is determined in accordance with the standing of the sciences they work in: the religious sciences being more important than the temporal sciences, *fiqh* more significant than medicine, medicine more noble than witchcraft, the sciences of unveiling more important than those of transaction.

Al-Ghazālī is critical of the scholars of his age (and of himself), particularly in view of their avidity for wealth and influence, their proximity to the rulers, their failure to abide by their own teachings, their interest in the traditional sciences, which help them to gain high office (e.g. *fiqh*), and their neglect of useful sciences (such as medicine).⁴⁷

Although al-Ghazālī places the Šūfis above the '*ulamā'*' (*fuqahā'* and philosophers), he does not spare them from his criticism or attacks. In his view, most Šūfis have strayed far from the essence of Šūfism and only aspire to the social position which Šūfism confers on them.⁴⁸

Al-Ghazālī is faced with two important questions: the relationship of the scholars to the common people and to the rulers. The function of the scholar is to seek the truth and disseminate it; teaching is a duty for the scholar. Al-Ghazālī is very close to the idea of the 'society of teachers and learners'. In his opinion, teaching is not the duty of scholars and teachers alone; anyone who learns something has a duty to teach it.⁴⁹

However, that does not mean that the scholar or teacher must teach every-

body everything. The scholar must take into account the differences between the common people and the élite, and between licit knowledge and 'that which is to be withheld from those unworthy of it'. He must even keep secret truths which cannot be divulged for fear that they may have a harmful effect on people or cause them to doubt their own faith or reason. Al-Ghazālī practised this himself and recommends it in many of his books, in particular *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*. This position was the result of the persecution and intellectual terrorism prevailing at that time, which led to the assassination of a number of thinkers and the burning of their books.⁵⁰

As a reaction against his previous habits and experience, al-Ghazālī stresses the need for scholars to practise asceticism, to shun authority and rulers, and to counterbalance the power of the rulers, in order to prevent the corruption of society. If it were not for the existence of unscrupulous judges and scholars, sovereigns would be less corrupt, for fear of rejection.⁵¹ In order to preserve their independent judgement, it is best for the scholars to remain aloof from the rulers and to refrain from visiting them or undertaking any work for them, such as teaching them or their children, and to refuse any salary or material compensation from them, because most of their wealth is ill-gotten. However, social necessities may force scholars to work and they are consequently compelled to accept remuneration from the state. It is therefore licit for them to receive payment from public funds.⁵²

In the early days of Islam, there was a category of *mu'allimīn*, who taught the younger generation reading and writing in *makātīb*. Similarly, the elder companions of the Prophet, reciters of the Koran, transmitters of *ḥadīth*, narrators of epics and *fuqahā'* gave instruction to adults in the mosques. In the Umayyad period, there arose a new category of *mu'addibīn* (educators, tutors), who tutored the children of the élite at home; they grew in numbers and influence in the 'Abbāsid period. There also appeared a further category of *mudarrisīn* of higher education, who engaged in research and university teaching; this coincided with the growth of specialized educational institutions (*madāris*, etc.).

In Islamic civilization, schoolteachers and professors had a certain prestige springing from the religious nature of teaching and the eagerness of students to seek knowledge directly from the master. And yet, the social standing of Koranic schoolmasters was rather low, unlike that of venerable religious authorities and scholars. There thus emerged a clear concern in Islamic society to draw up rules governing the work of schoolteachers.⁵³

Al-Ghazālī considers the seeking of knowledge as a form of worship, and teaching as a duty and an obligation, and indeed a most excellent profession. Teachers are indispensable to society.⁵⁴ Šūfī influence is clearly in evidence in his writings, particularly with regard to the need for schoolteachers and the qualities they should possess, which include erudition, renunciation of the world, spiritual accomplishment, devotion, frugality, morality, etc.⁵⁵ Al-Ghazālī proposes a 'professional code of ethics' for teachers, who, he says, should practise what they preach, and be an example to their pupils and to people in general.⁵⁶

O Disciple! How many sleepless nights have you passed reading science and poring over books – but I do not know its purpose. If it was for worldly ends, to gain its baubles, win its honours and to boast over your contemporaries and equals, woe to you, and again woe! But

if your purpose was to vitalize the Sacred Law of the Prophet, to develop your character and break 'the soul commanding evil', then blessing on you and again blessings.⁵⁷

In such eloquent terms does al-Ghazālī define the aim of study and learning. He then proceeds to advise students (especially those in higher education) to divide their days in the following manner, spending from dawn to sunrise in invocation of God and private worship; from sunrise to mid-morning seeking knowledge from their professors; from mid-morning to mid-afternoon in writing notes and making fair copies; from mid-afternoon to sunset in attending learned gatherings or in performing rites of invocation, begging forgiveness or glorification of God. The first third of the night should be spent in reading, the second third in prayer, and the final third in sleep.⁵⁸

Finally, he proposes a 'code of ethics' whereby students should:

1. Ensure that they are spiritually pure before they undertake the quest for knowledge.
2. Divest themselves of their worldly possessions, detach themselves from hearth and home, and devote themselves to the search for knowledge and the pursuit of the hereafter.
3. Respect the rights of their teachers and behave in a civil manner towards them.
4. Beware, especially at the beginning of their studies, of paying too much attention to doctrinal controversies.
5. Master the fundamentals of the praiseworthy sciences (linguistics, *tafsir*, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh* and *kalām*), and then specialize by studying one or more of those sciences in greater depth.
6. Choose useful subjects in which to specialize, especially those that are conducive to salvation in the hereafter.
7. Study each subject thoroughly before going on to another, bearing in mind the logical sequence and interconnectedness of the various disciplines.
8. Have as their main goal in their search for knowledge the cultivation and perfection of the innermost self in this world, and proximity to God in the hereafter, rather than the attainment of high office or the acquisition of wealth or fame.⁵⁹

All these recommendations bear the clear stamp of Sūfism, and represent al-Ghazālī's thinking in his later years.

The above applies to the education of boys; girls are treated differently by al-Ghazālī, and indeed by other Islamic philosophers of education. Despite the fact that Islam is concerned with improving the social status of women and devoting attention to their education, the later *ḥadīth* and the social and educational principles derived therefrom accorded women an inferior position.

Al-Ghazālī exemplifies this negative tendency regarding the way in which women are to be considered, dealt with and educated. In his view, women are for the most part of dubious morality and limited intelligence; a virtuous woman is a rare phenomenon. He places women at a lower rank than men, and he enjoins them to obey men and to remain inside the home.⁶⁰

Although he holds that girls may claim from their parents, and wives from their husbands, the right to be educated, such education is very limited. It is enough for a young girl to learn the fundamentals of religion; she should not endeavour to acquire any loftier forms of knowledge, nor should she, except with the permission of her husband, go outside the home to seek knowledge, as long as he performs his duty to educate her. If, however, he does not educate her, she may go outside the home to seek education, and the man who would prevent her from so doing is at fault.⁶¹

In his treatment of education, al-Ghazālī draws on numerous and varied sources: he borrows from Ibn Miskawayh and the *Ikhwān a-afā'* [Brethren of Purity], as well as from the *fuqahā'*. As was his custom, he brings together various disparate and contradictory elements, and his writing is a combination of *fiqh*, philosophy and Ṣūfī mysticism, in which the Ṣūfī element is nevertheless dominant.

The impact of al-Ghazālī

Al-Ghazālī died at the age of 55 (according to the Hegira calendar), after a life that was not as long as it was productive, wide-ranging and influential. He is rightly considered to be one of the most important and profound Islamic thinkers, who was aptly called the 'renovator of the fifth century A.H.'. Al-Ghazālī's influence may be witnessed by a number of factors, such as:

1. The profundity, power and comprehensiveness of his thought, contained in some fifty different works, the most important of which are *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* and *al-Munqidh min a-alāl*, which are still studied today.
2. The fact that his views were well suited to his age and milieu, and were more a reflection of that age than a response to its needs and requirements – they constituted more an element of continuity and conservatism than a factor of renewal and change.
3. After al-Ghazālī, Islamic society and thought entered into a long period of stagnation and decline, and produced few other great minds. Al-Ghazālī has thus remained alive and influential.

The influence of al-Ghazālī on Islamic thought may be summed up as follows:

1. He reinstated the 'principle of fear' in religious thinking and emphasized the role of the Creator as the centre around which human life revolves, and an agent intervening directly and continuously in the course of human affairs (once the 'principle of love' had gained supremacy among the Ṣūfis).
2. He introduced several principles of logic and philosophy (despite his attacks on those subjects) into the disciplines of *fiqh* and *kalām*.
3. He reconciled *sharī'a* and Ṣūfī mysticism (the *fuqahā'* and the Ṣūfis) and contributed to the spread of Ṣūfī brotherhoods.
4. He defended Sunnite Islam against the tenets of philosophy and Shi'ism.
5. He contributed to the weakening of philosophy and the natural sciences.

Al-Ghazālī's influence was not limited to the Islamic world, for he also had an impact on Christian European thought. In the late eleventh century A.D., and especially in the twelfth century, a large number of works in Arabic on mathematics,

astronomy, the natural sciences, chemistry, medicine, philosophy and religion were translated into Latin, as were several books by al-Ghazālī, and in particular *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa* (which some scholars mistakenly took to represent al-Ghazālī's thought rather than a compendium of the philosophical principles current in his age), *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* and *Mizān al-'Amal*. A number of European scholars knew Arabic and thus became acquainted with al-Ghazālī's views in the original. The influence of al-Ghazālī is clearly perceptible in the works of numerous philosophers and scholars of the Middle Ages and the early modern period, especially St Thomas Aquinas, Dante and David Hume. In his *Summa Theologiae*, St Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) draws heavily on al-Ghazālī's ideas contained in *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, *Kimīyā-yi Sa'ādat* and *Ar-Risāla al-Laduniya*. The works of Dante (1265–1321) show clear Islamic influences from al-Ghazālī and from *Risālat al-Ghufrān* [The Epistle of Forgiveness] by al-Ma'arri. The influence of al-Ghazālī is also apparent in the writings of Pascal (1623–62), especially in the primacy he gives to intuition over reason and the senses, and Hume (1711–76) in his rejection of causality.

Al-Ghazālī had an even deeper influence on Jewish than on Christian theology. Many Jewish scholars in the Middle Ages knew Arabic well, and some of al-Ghazālī's books were translated into Hebrew. *Mizān al-'Amal*, in particular, was widely read by Jews in the Middle Ages; several translations of it were made into Hebrew, and it was recast for Jewish readers by replacing verses of the Koran with passages from the Torah. One of the greatest Jewish thinkers to be influenced by al-Ghazālī was Maimonides (in Arabic: Mūsā Ibn Maimūn; in Hebrew: Moshe ben Maimon) (A.D. 1135–1204), whose *Dalālat al-Hā'irīn* [Guide for the Perplexed] (originally composed in Arabic) is one of the most important books of medieval Jewish theology.⁶²

Al-Ghazālī's writings on education constitute the high point of thinking on the subject in the Islamic world. The theory of education which he elaborated is the most complete edifice relating to the field; it clearly defines the aims of education, lays out the path to be followed, and the means whereby the objectives can be achieved. From the twelfth to nineteenth centuries A.D. (sixth to the thirteenth centuries A.H.), Islamic thinking on education was heavily influenced by al-Ghazālī. Indeed, theoretical and practical educators, with few exceptions, hardly did anything other than borrow from al-Ghazālī and summarize his ideas and books. In support of this claim, it is sufficient to note some of the writings on education that have come down to us:

The work by Az-Zarnūjī (died A.D. 1175; A.H. 571) entitled *Ta'lim al-Muta'allim* *Ṭariq at-Ta'allum* [Teaching the Student the Method of Study] is basically a compilation of passages from al-Ghazālī's *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn* and *Mizān al-'Amal* reproduced literally, with a few minor additions: This work, which is noted for its conciseness, simplicity of style and liveliness, was one of the most widely circulated books on education.

The indirect influence of al-Ghazālī is found in the writings of Aṭ-Ṭūsī (died A.D. 1273; A.H. 672), one of the foremost scholars of the Middle Ages, the author of a vast and varied output of over 100 books on philosophy, logic, ethics,

mathematics and astronomy. His most important works on education were *Akhlāq-i Nāṣiri* [Nāṣirean Ethics] (in Persian) and *Ādāb al-Muta'allimīn* [Rules of Conduct for Students]. In the former, he was influenced by Ibn Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq wa-Taṭhīr al-A'rāq* [The Refinement of Character and the Purification of Races] and Greek philosophy. The latter is merely a résumé of Az-Zarnūjī's *Ta'lim*, which in turn was influenced by al-Ghazālī.

Similarly, Ibn Jamā'a (died A.D. 1332; A.H. 733), the author of *Tadhkirat as-Sāmi' wa-l-Mutakallim fi Adab al-Ālim wa-l-Muta'allim* [Memorandum for the Pupil and Master on the Rules of Conduct of the Scholar and Student] was directly influenced by al-Ghazālī, as well as by Az-Zarnūjī and Aṭ-Ṭūsī, both of whom borrowed from al-Ghazālī. He lived in Egypt, Palestine and Syria and worked variously as a teacher, preacher and judge. His book is noted for its simplicity and orderliness, and contains an abundance of *ḥadīth*, and Prophetic sayings and stories. He deals in a traditional manner with themes that had become familiar in Islamic education, such as the merit of knowledge and the rules of conduct for scholars, teachers and pupils. A chapter is devoted to the rules of conduct for boarders at *madāris* (which had become widespread at that time), and a further chapter deals with the art of using books.

The work by Ibn al-Ḥājī al-'Abdari (died A.D. 1336; A.H. 737), *Madkhal ash-Shar' ash-Sharīf* [Introduction to the Sublime Revelation] is practically in the same mould as *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, but reflects the great difference between the Islamic civilization of the fifth century and that of the eighth century A.H. The author mentions al-Ghazālī frequently, and appears to be well acquainted with his ideas and writings on both general topics and on education.

In the sixteenth century A.D. (eighth century A.H.) we find Ibn Ḥajar al-Haitamī, the author of *Tahrīr al-Maqāl fi Ādāb wa-Aḥkām wa-Fawā'id Yaḥtāju ilaiḥā Mu'addibū-l-Atfāl* [The Liberation of Discourse on the Rules of Conduct and Moral Advantages Required by the Educators of Children], an Egyptian who studied and taught at al-Azhar before moving to the vicinity of Mecca. His writings are typical of the thought and literature of the Ottoman era. He concentrates on teaching in *katātīb* and the situation and statutes of school-teachers. He quotes al-Ghazālī and refers to him frequently. Islamic (particularly Sunni) educational thought followed the course mapped out by al-Ghazālī and this influence has remained valid even after the influx of Western civilization and the emergence of a modern, contemporary Arab civilization.

Glossary

'Ālim: see 'ulamā.

Awqāf: see waqf.

'Abbāsīd: the second dynasty of Caliphs (A.D. 749; A.H. 132 to A.D. 1258; A.H. 656), following the Umayyads (q.v.), based in Baghdād from A.D. 762 (A.H. 145) and ending with the sacking of Baghdād by the Mongols in A.D. 1258 (A.H. 656).

Al-Azhar: the most renowned and prestigious university in the Islamic world, founded in Cairo in A.D. 969 (A.H. 358), with a reputation for authority in religious matters which it has maintained to the present day.

Bāṭinism, *Bāṭinite*: relating to an esoteric (allegorical) and initiatic (*bāṭin* 'inmost, hidden, secret') interpretation of Islam.

Faqih, pl. *fuqahā'*: jurist, scholar of Islamic religious law.

Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence.

Fuqahā': see *faqih*.

Ḥadīth: (lit. 'account, narrative') Prophetic tradition.

Ijmā': the consensus of the community of the faithful on a point of doctrine.

Imām, pl. *a'imma*: prayer leader who stands facing the rows of worshippers; head of a community or group, especially of a school of law; (Shi'ite) intercessor, who may exercise both spiritual and temporal authority.

Kalām: scholastic theology.

Khāngāh: a Ṣūfī hermitage.

Katātib: see *kuttāb*.

Kuttāb, pl. *katātib*: elementary Koranic school.

Madāris: see *madrasa*.

Madrasa, pl. *madāris*: Islamic religious college. These were established in approximately the fifth century A.H. for higher religious education in general and for the dissemination of Sunnite doctrines in particular. Students usually boarded in the *madāris*, whose endowments enabled those enrolled to devote themselves to their studies. Another characteristic was that the state provided teachers to work in the *madāris*.

Makātib: see *maktab*.

Maktab, pl. *makātib*: elementary school.

Mashriq: the Islamic East.

Mu'addib, pl. *mu'addibin*: educator, tutor.

Mu'allim, pl. *mu'allimin*: schoolteacher.

Mudarris, pl. *mudarrisin*: professor.

Ribāṭ: religious establishment in which Ṣūfis usually lived, devoting themselves to worship and study.

Seljuq: A Turkic temporal dynasty (A.D. 1038; A.H. 429 to A.D. 1194; A.H. 582) during the latter part of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, centred in Iran, Central Asia and Iraq.

Shaikh, pl. *shuyūkh*: (lit. 'old man') venerable religious master (often Ṣūfī).

Shar': the Divine Revelation.

Shari'a: the revealed Holy Law of Islam.

Shi'ite (from *shī'a* = 'party'): Those Muslims who believe that the leadership of the Islamic community rightfully belongs to the descendants of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet and wife of 'Alī, Muḥammad's cousin and son-in-law.

Ṣūfī, *Ṣūfism*: relating to Islamic mysticism or esotericism.

Sunna: (lit. 'custom, usage, tradition') practice established by the Prophet's example, often complementing the Koran.

Sunnite: the majority grouping in Islam: those Muslims who claim to follow the tradition (*sunna*) of the Prophet.

Tafsīr: Koranic exegesis, commentary.

'Ulamā', sing. *ālīm*: scholars, men of religion.

Umayyad: the first dynasty of Caliphs, based in Damascus (A.D. 661; A.H. 41 to A.D. 749; A.H. 132).

Umma: the community of the faithful.

Waqf, pl. *awqāf*: Islamic endowment, usually for a religious or charitable purpose.

(Translator's note: With reference to Farid Jabre, *Essai sur le lexique de Ghazali* (Beirut, Université Libanaise, 1970), *nafs* has been translated as 'self, innermost self', not 'soul'; 'revelation' is reserved for *wahy*, while *ilhām* is rendered as 'inspiration' and *kashf* as 'unveiling').

Notes

See the bibliographies at the end of this article for further details and a translation of Arabic titles.

1. On the life of al-Ghazālī, see 'Abdulkarīm al-'Uthmān, *Sīrat al-Ghazālī wa-Aqwāl al-Mutaqaddimin fihī*.
2. *Madrasa*, pl. *madāris*: educational institution comparable to a modern college or university. See Glossary.
3. See Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, and Faṣl al-Maqāl wa-Taqrīb mā bain ash-Sharī'a wa-l-Hikma min al-Ittiṣāl.
4. Details of this spiritual and intellectual crisis may be found in al-Ghazālī's famous work *Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl*. Furthermore, there is some doubt as to whether this crisis was purely spiritual or whether there were political causes stemming, among other things, from infighting between the Seljuq sultans and the growing threat of Bātinism (esotericism).
5. These works include: *Bidāyat al-Hidāya*, *Ayyuhā-l-Walad*, *Al-Kashf wa-t-Tabayin fi Ghurūr al-Khalq Ajma'in*, *Al-Maqṣid al-Asnā fi Sharh Ma'āni Asmā' Allāh al-Husnā*, *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*, *Ar-Risāla al-Laduniya* and *Al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā ghair Ablihi*. See Works by al-Ghazālī, p. 540.
6. Works from this period include *Al-Mustaṣfā fi 'Ilm al-Uṣūl* and his famous book, *Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl*.
7. Among his last works, one should also mention *Ad-Durra al-Fākhirā fi Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhira* and *Iljām al-'Awāmm 'an 'Ilm al-Kalām*.
8. A religious character predominates in al-Ghazālī's works in general; the most important of his works which show the theological aspect of his thinking are: *Ar-Risāla al-Qudsiya fi Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id* (which forms part of *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*), *Al-Iqtisād fi-l-'Itiqād*, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, *Ma'ārij al-Quds fi Madārij Ma'rifat an-Nafs*, *Al-Maqṣid al-Asnā fi Sharh Ma'āni Asmā' Allāh al-Husnā*, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, *Al-Ma'ārif al-'Aqliya* and *Kitāb al-Arba'in fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn*.
9. See in particular *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, pp. 237 et seq.
10. See *Ma'ārij al-Quds fi Madārij Ma'rifat an-Nafs* and *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3.
11. Al-Ghazālī stresses in his writings the importance of preserving the status quo, and tends to take the side of society (the *umma*, or community of the faithful) against the individual, the élite against the masses, and the ruler against the people. He even goes so far as to refuse to recognize the right of a subject to rebel against an unjust leader (a question that greatly exercised the minds of Muslim *fuqahā*) and to leave the victims of social oppression no other escape than that of emigration. See *Al-Mustaṣfā fi 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*, Vol. 1, pp. 111 et seq.; *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 50 et seq.; *Al-Iqtisād fi-l-'Itiqād*, pp. 118 et seq.
12. Al-Ghazālī anticipated Descartes and Hume in making 'doubt' a means of attaining knowledge. On the problem of doubt and the means of attaining knowledge, see, in particular, *Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl*, *Mi'yār al-'Ilm* and *Al-Ma'ārif al-'Aqliya*.
13. On al-Ghazālī's view of ethics, see *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, in particular, Vols. 3 and 4.
14. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, p. 46 and Vol. 4, p. 83; *Al-Iqtisād fi-l-'Itiqād*, pp. 118-19; *Mizān al-'Amal*, p. 98. In dealing with education, al-Ghazālī was clearly influenced by Ibn Miskawayh, see his *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq wa-Tathir al-A'rāq*.
15. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3, pp. 61-2; *Mizān al-'Amal*, p. 124.
16. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3, pp. 62-3, 243.
17. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 52; Vol. 4, pp. 256-7.

18. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 61–2; here the considerable influence of Ibn Miskawayh, in his *Tahdhib al-Akhlāq wa-Taṭhīr al-A'rāq*, is also apparent on al-Ghazālī.
19. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3, pp. 49–50.
20. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 63.
21. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 62–3; this too al-Ghazālī borrowed from Ibn Miskawayh.
22. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3, p. 62.
23. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 52, 61; *Bidāyat al-Hidāya*, pp. 277–8; *Al-Qiṣṭās al-Mustaqīm*, pp. 6–7.
24. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 2, pp. 213–14, 270–1; Vol. 4, pp. 243–7.
25. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 19–27.
26. On this subject, see *ibid.*, Vol. 1, ch. 1.
27. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 28–9, 43.
28. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 8, 10, 51.
29. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 45–6; *Ar-Risāla al-Laduniya*, pp. 99–100.
30. *Mizān al-'Amal*, pp. 32–3.
31. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 3, pp. 13–16.
32. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 16–18; *Mizān al-'Amal*, p. 86.
33. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 16–18; *Fātiḥat al-'Ulūm*, pp. 39–42.
34. *Al-Munqidh min ad-Ḍalāl*, pp. 140–1; *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, p. 9; *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, pp. 138–40; *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, *passim*.
35. See 'Abbās Maḥmūd al-'Aqqād, *Muḥammad 'Abduh*, Cairo, Maktabat Miṣr, 1926.
36. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 13–14, 46–8; *Fātiḥat al-'Ulūm*, pp. 35–9; *Ar-Risāla al-Laduniya*, pp. 99–100, 108–9.
37. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 33–4.
38. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 34.
39. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 42–51.
40. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 12.
41. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 49–51; *Mizān al-'Amal*, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–3.
42. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, p. 45.
43. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 80–1.
44. *Al-Munqidh min ad-Ḍalāl*, pp. 124 et seq.; *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, p. 41.
45. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 48.
46. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 2, 8.
47. *Al-Munqidh min ad-Ḍalāl*, *passim*; *Faisal at-Tafriqa*, pp. 127–9; *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 51 et seq., 313 et seq.; *Al-Kashf wa-t-Tabyīn fi Ghurūr al-Khalq Ajma'in*, pp. 3 et seq.
48. Ibid., pp. 27–33.
49. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 2, p. 273.
50. Al-Ghazālī often reiterates this position and states that he holds certain opinions which cannot be divulged or committed to paper; see *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 50–1, 104–5; Vol. 3, pp. 18, 23, 26.
51. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 120.
52. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 107–19.
53. Schoolteachers are thus subject to supervision by inspectors. See Ash-Shaizari, *Nihāyat ar-Rutba fi Ṭalab al-Ḥisba*, pp. 103–5; on the attention paid by *fuqahā'* and educators in their writings to defining the duties and rights of schoolteachers, see, for instance, al-Qābisī, *Ar-Risāla al-Mufaṣṣala li-Aḥwāl al-Mu'allimin wa-Aḥkām al-Mu'allimin wa-l-Muta'allimin*.
54. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, p. 11.
55. *Ayyuhā-l-Walad*, p. 134.

56. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 48–51; *Mizān al-'Amal*, pp. 98–104; *Fāṭihat al-'Ulūm*, pp. 60–63.
57. *Ayyuhā-l-Walad*, p. 127 (*O Disciple*, p. 7). English translation: George H. Scherer, *Al-Ghazali: O Disciple*. Beirut, Catholic Press, 1951.
58. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 277–8.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 42–7, *Mizān al-'Amal*, pp. 87–98, *Fāṭihat al-'Ulūm*, pp. 56–60.
60. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 2, pp. 32–6, 42–4; *At-Tibr al-Masbūk fi Naṣiat al-Mulūk*, pp. 163–4.
61. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Vol. 2, pp. 36–43.
62. On the influence of Arab and Islamic thought on Christian and Jewish European civilization in general (including the influence of al-Ghazālī), see E. Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World in the Golden Age of Islam*.

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FRANCISCO GINER DE LOS RÍOS

(1839-1915)

Julio Ruiz Berrio

Giner's education

Francisco Giner was a lawyer by training and profession. He was well versed in a number of branches of knowledge, had a systematic grounding in philosophy, great artistic sensitivity, wide-ranging intellectual curiosity and high ethical standards, which distinguished him as one of the great pedagogical innovators and as a national educator. He planned and implemented a remarkable programme of national education for Spain, of genuine *paideia*, as Werner Jaeger would say, which merged with *politeia* by virtue of its quality and its aims.

He was born at Ronda (Málaga) in 1839 and died in Madrid in 1915. His early years were spent in Andalusia, but after the age of 24 he lived permanently in Madrid. He attended primary and secondary school in Cádiz and Alicante and began his university training in Barcelona, completing it in Granada where he obtained a law degree. While in Granada he also made a point of studying literature and aesthetics, German philosophy, painting and music, and continued to cultivate those subjects all his life, cogitating, writing, painting and playing the piano. All of these interests, taken together, shed light on features of Giner's personality and explain many characteristics of his educational theory.

A strong personal influence in this period was the philosopher Llorens y Barba, positivist, professor at the University of Barcelona, 'perhaps the most abundant source that his exceptional nature drew upon during this early stage. A true educational influence . . . in the severe discipline of thought and the noble, pure meaning of life' (Cossío, 1919). Also worth mentioning is his professor of literature and aesthetics in Granada, Francisco Fernández y González. And, of course, albeit at another level, it should be pointed out that his time in Granada saw the beginning of the lifelong friendship with his companion in intellectual and reform work, Nicolás Salmerón, also a lawyer and one of the Presidents of the first Spanish Republic.

In the period around 1870, much of the world was undergoing considerable political, economic, social and ideological upheaval: in Germany, the United States, France, Italy and Japan, for example. Spain was also entering a process of decisive

change at that time. This period and the later unfolding of events coincide with the first fifteen years of Giner's life in Madrid. It is therefore not surprising that his main formative years, with regard to his thinking and also his practical politics, occurred within this period.

He was awarded his doctorate in law and in 1867 sat a competitive examination as a result of which he was appointed to the chair of philosophy of law and international law at the Universidad Central of Madrid. He resigned this position after a few months out of solidarity with colleagues dismissed by the government for refusing to swear personal allegiance to the Queen, loyalty to the throne and the Catholic Church, and for having taken the view that citizens were not obliged to reveal their religious or political convictions. This was the first public occasion on which Giner acted in conformity with several basic principles that he upheld, more particularly those of the freedom and dignity of the human being, and defended them to the hilt.

The country was in a complex position from all points of view, and a few months later, in September 1868, the revolution triumphed and the professors who had been dismissed were reinstated in their chairs. Furthermore, many of them went on to hold important political posts, but neither then nor later was Giner affiliated to any party or denomination. Moreover, as Rafael Altamira said at his death, 'nobody was more radical, but he was anti-revolutionary in principle and did not sympathize with any of the extreme solutions' (Altamira, 1915). This did not prevent him from agreeing to advise the authorities on various matters, especially the reform of prison conditions and educational issues; he supported projects and decrees to the extent that they embodied educational freedom and strove for all-round modernization in the scientific, cultural, ethical and pedagogical fields.

Spanish Krausism

Giner had lost some of his optimism by the end of the period known as the 'democratic six years', and from that time onward he always mistrusted disturbances and street revolutions, both those won by force of arms and those imposed in the pages of the ministerial gazette. And although he yearned for change in Spain, he came to the conclusion that this could happen and be meaningful only through 'a revolution of conscience', through change sought and effected by every single individual, by all and for all. He devoted the rest of his life, tirelessly and without losing heart, to planning such a revolution, pushing for it, promoting it and guiding it.

For a better understanding of his work it is helpful to bear in mind Giner de los Ríos' principal philosophical tenets, sometimes based on his personal experience and sometimes on his reading, but nearly always dating from the first fifteen years that he spent in Madrid. One of his best students, José Castillejo, once gave an accurate summing up of the philosophical influences that guided Giner's thinking and action: 'He was inspired by Kant and Rousseau; he absorbed Hegel's idea of unity and Schelling's synthesis of nature and spirit; he agreed with the process of inculcating law into the public conscience that the historical school of Savigny had devised; he approved the conquests of positivism and sociology, the psychological

analysis of Wundt, the idealistic trend of the theological school and the harmonious solidity of Krause's system' (Castillejo, 1926). Names such as Ahrens and Spinoza should be added to the list. However, we should stress the importance that Krause's philosophical system assumed in shaping his ideology and his outlook, which together, as López Morillas suggests, are best described as 'pragmatic rationalism' (López Morillas, 1988). Indeed, Giner and his work can never be understood without a corresponding knowledge of the intellectual and moral adventure of Krausism in Spain, and it must therefore be mentioned, if only in outline.

The story begins in the first decade of the liberal regime in Spain, a little before 1840, when K. C. F. Krause himself was already dead (Ureña, 1991). This was a period of all-round reconstruction in Spain, a period of transition in which new patterns of thought, new paths of research and new ways of life were being sought. A group of intellectual friends published an introduction to Krausism in the form of *A Course in Natural Law* by Ahrens, one of his students who was still living. This book was translated and published. In 1843, the leading member of the group, Julián Sanz del Río, travelled throughout Europe to study the philosophical trends of the time, stopped in Brussels to meet Ahrens personally, and then settled in Heidelberg, undoubtedly the main centre of Krausism in Germany at the time, for a considerable period. On his return, he translated some of Krause's works (Ureña, 1988), arranged for other translations and set up a circle of friends and students with strong Krausist leanings.

Sanz del Río considered that 'harmonious rationalism', as Krause called his philosophical system, gave a full explanation of the knowledge process through two distinct stages, the first consisting of analysis and the second of synthesis. On the assumption that knowledge is self-knowledge, analysis leads us to Being, the 'absolute infinite' which should co-ordinate the three 'relative infinities': nature, spirit and humanity. Contemplation of God is life in its perfect form, the dream of humanity.

Analysis ends there, but not the task of the philosopher. Now, for deductive work, synthesis reorders and reconstructs all the previous analytical work. If analysis has led us towards God, synthesis, descending from God, will lead us to a full explanation of the world, and this will yield the whole range of existing sciences, the most important of which is philosophy. Science, then, will show us the harmonious order of the universe. Finding this harmony and ensuring that it prevails among human beings is the essential and ineluctable task of practical philosophy. This is the message that Krausism brought to the Spaniards [Llopis, 1956].

Sanz del Río emphasized this Krausist message of educating humanity, and also the prerequisites for achieving it: a wide range of knowledge, scientific rigour, a spirit of tolerance, sound ethical principles; above all, moral integrity. And until his death in 1869 he took pains to set up an enlightened inner circle, known as the Spanish Krausists, largely made up of friends and companions, and another circle, and more numerous, of students, among whom Giner was the most prominent. In a Spain tainted by feudalism, with an almost entirely agricultural economy, great backwardness in many areas and little respect for the ideas of others, Spanish Krausism faced a task which was both daunting and ripe to be tackled. This does

not mean that it was either easy or welcome, except in progressive circles. Finally, as Elías Díaz pointed out:

Krausist philosophy showed itself from the outset to be the political theory and ideological expression of the progressive trends of the liberal middle classes. Outside this context, in the face of liberalism . . . there would always be the traditional and Carlist ideologies and also, after them – and distinct from them – the various ‘neo-Catholic’ and fundamentalist positions [Díaz, 1973].

The Institución Libre de Enseñanza

In 1875, the monarchy and the Bourbon dynasty were restored in Spain, and the Ministry of Public Works (then responsible for education, *inter alia*) took it upon itself to exercise rigid control over official education. For that purpose, it ordered that curricula be submitted for approval to the rectors, and prohibited any form of education contrary to dogma or critical of the throne. A large group of teachers, most of whom were Krausists, were outraged by this attack on the freedom of science and education and protested against it. Giner (then the recognized leader of the Krausist group) was among them and was arrested, imprisoned and exiled. They were all dismissed from their posts for failing to obey these orders and to show the obedience they owed to the educational authorities. Thus ended the ‘second university question’.

This event is another important illustration of Giner’s uncompromising moral stance and of the difficulties in developing science and thought in Spain; but its true importance resides in the fact that it resulted in the establishment of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Free Institution of Education – ILE), Giner’s experimental teaching centre and the driving force of his reforming work.

In view of the constraints laid and the attacks made since 1857 on efforts to renovate national education as a whole, and in particular the universities, which occupied a leading position on account of the strategy upheld by Sanz del Río from the very beginning to train intellectual and social élites which could then reform other sectors of society, the Spanish Krausists had on several occasions considered opening a centre of higher education in which university education, its content, methods, organization, etc., could be modernized. It first became possible to put this idea into practice in 1866, when Nicolás Salmerón, who was to become professor of metaphysics at the University of Madrid, opened the International College in the Spanish capital. The experiment, which lasted for eight years, was a very interesting one and was the main precursor of the ILE. This college provided classes at university level and others of a more open nature, nearly all of them using new approaches and themes. They were taught by teachers with a range of philosophical opinions, Giner being one of them.

When he was dismissed and persecuted, Salmerón and others devised a plan to establish a free university in which neither the authorities nor the forces of reaction could prevent university education from being shaped on the lines they advocated. Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution of 1876, which allowed educational centres to be set up provided that they complied with moral and health standards,

gave them the legal framework they needed in which to carry out their design. They divulged their plan to a number of friends and sympathizers, of various professions and different ideologies, held meetings and drew up draft statutes on the basis of the outline prepared by Giner. To solve the financial problem, which was of particular importance in this case, since complete independence had to be maintained, an association of subscription-paying shareholders was set up. The subscribers included teachers, politicians, bankers, doctors, soldiers, scientists, writers, one aristocrat and numerous property owners: the liberal middle classes. It was thus possible for the ILE to function without receiving financial aid either from the state or from any other institution or group throughout its existence.

On 31 May 1876 the statutes of the ILE were approved. The most important of these, Article 15, deserves to be reproduced here:

The Free Institution of Education has absolutely no connection with or leanings towards any religious belief, school of philosophy or political party; it upholds only the principle of the freedom and inviolability of science and of the consequent independence of scientific research and explanation with regard to any authority other than that of the conscience of the teacher, who is alone responsible for what is taught [Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 1876].

These, in a nutshell, were the principles that governed the work of the ILE until 1936–39, the teaching methods of the college as much as its drive to educate society. Efforts were made to seek harmony and coexistence in all spheres of human activity and among all human beings, with particular emphasis on the cultivation and development of science, and viewing the individual as a being endowed with freedom as a necessary condition of dignity.

Launched in 1876, the institution began to operate as a true centre of higher education with a teaching staff made up for the most part of those who had been dismissed during the 'second university question' period. It continued the substantial task of cultural and scientific extension begun in 1868 and brought out its own publication, edited and written by Giner, the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (BILE – Newsletter of the Free Institution of Education) which, during its early stages, 1877–1936, was one of the leading European educational reviews. But as Giner became more actively involved in the task of reforming Spanish society, or 'of training teachers' (Barnés Salinas, 1927), he placed greater emphasis on general education (Gómez y Rodríguez de Castro, 1992), that is, education provided up to the age of 16 or 18. Then in 1878 he suddenly introduced general education from childhood to adolescence into the institution. When, three years later, the government reinstated the teachers who had been dismissed, most of them were already scattered around the country pursuing their careers in public education; the institution, as an educational centre, was converted into a free college of general education which provided complete but unofficial education for infants, primary and secondary schoolchildren.

In discussing the educational characteristics of this institution and its innovative nature, which were very similar to those of the *escuelas nuevas* – but a quarter of a century earlier – I shall refer to Giner's educational theory since, in the final

analysis, it is Giner's ideas that are being assessed. I shall confine myself here to quoting the testimony of one of its alumni:

If anything remains of the Institution's work, and if its educational action leaves its mark, this must always be sought in the prevailing moral tone. Francisco wanted his pupils to be not only healthy, strong and active – never sad – but also educated and thoughtful. Above all, he wanted them to be sincere, loyal and truthful [Do Rego, 1927].

National education

The ILE was the arena of ongoing innovation discussed above: innovation in design, structure, methods, administration, techniques and teaching staff for the most part, but it was at the same time the source of intense activity for the regeneration of society, this being the great task that Giner had set himself and in which he was strongly supported by many friends and successive generations of students. It was, as Luis de Zulueta said, a 'diffused institution' (Zulueta, 1915) which could also be called an 'institution-cum-movement'. It sparked off or carried out much of the work of modernizing Spain through new social, political, educational, scientific and artistic institutions, congresses, debates, centres for women, students' hostels, articles and books, teaching missions, drama, associations, courses, etc., and, above all, through new ways of being, acting and behaving. Its principal limitation lay in the very small number of those concerned, this being mainly the result of the error made by the first Krausists in adopting a uniquely élitist strategy. Nevertheless, the supporters of the institution did enough to earn the label 'reformers of contemporary Spain' (Gómez Molleda, 1966).

The spirit of this national reform and its leader was none other than Francisco Giner. He was a cross between Socrates and St Francis, and regarded by many as little short of a saint. The Greek writer Kazantzakis had this to say of him:

He was a saintly, quiet man, very gentle, a professor of philosophy of law at the University of Madrid. He was sensitive, a man of few words, so limpid that he almost shone and appeared transparent. He always wore a white bow tie. His conversation was full of irony, humour and warmth [Kazantzakis, 1966].

But those who spoke of his asceticism and sensitivity, although they were, of course, right, perhaps forgot how his personality was transformed when it came to fighting the cultural and moral uncouthness of individuals and organizations, shaping worthy individuals, and fighting for the regeneration of the country. His sarcastic vein then gave a sting to his righteous anger and he lashed his opponents hard and tirelessly.

It seems that Giner expressed himself thus on many occasions, and he also left written proof. When he criticizes Spanish society, urging it to be equal to the task that the times demand of it, his dialectical ability rivals his talent as a writer and offers us some of the most telling passages of Spanish satirical prose (Giner, VII, p. 127; XVII, pp. 177–80, etc.). To sum up those strictures, Giner considered much of the Spanish population to be clearly in a state of moral perversity, so that, as an heir of the Enlightenment, he sought to regenerate or 'redeem' it, as Morillas says

New education

While 'national regeneration' (or 'national redemption') is a task for national education, an undertaking usually entrusted to schools, it is easy to understand the extraordinary importance that Giner attached to education. In the first place he gave a very negative analysis of the education already being provided (which at best amounted to no more than lecturing and rote-learning), studied and assessed the renovative educational models existing up to that time and assiduously sought all the innovations relating to education that were springing up in the Western world.

His philosophical opinions and educational ideas led him to support a line of educational modernization which began with Comenius and came closest to him in the person of Fröbel, via Rousseau and Pestalozzi. He hardly mentioned the Englishman Locke, but he had undoubtedly read and been influenced by him with regard to many educational issues, such as the importance of 'character training', physical education and a realistic curriculum, as also in other matters such as political and religious tolerance and the empiricist theory of knowledge. Among his contemporaries, I believe that he paid particular attention to Jovellanos and Montesino, especially the latter, of whom Giner wrote in glowing terms, despite his disinclination to praise the living or the dead. Not in vain had Jovellanos and Montesino also expected educational reforms to yield solutions to the political, economic and cultural problems of Spain.

With regard to his contemporaries, suffice it to say that this was the era of experimentation with schools, methods and doctrines. His constant co-operation with the *BILE* thus takes on importance, and confirms his up-to-date knowledge of education in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and North America, in fact throughout the Western hemisphere. In his daily struggle to discover educational innovations which could help him to improve teaching practice, he showed a great talent for comparison (naturally with a wider field of objectives than that of education systems) and, although he was well acquainted with education in Europe, he also took an interest in other civilizations, such as those of Japan and China. He acquired this mastery of new educational concepts and techniques by reading the main educational texts available, and also the literary, philosophical and scientific works that were being published throughout the world; a wide selection of specialized reviews which the *ILE* received; the highest quality international press, which he read every day; visits to other countries (especially the United Kingdom and Portugal); and attendance at a number of international congresses, where he made significant presentations.

With this educational culture as a basis and these constant efforts to improve his knowledge and educational abilities, together with his philosophical opinions, it is easy to imagine that Giner advocated a type of education that was not only modern in its techniques but was truly new in its overall design, premises and methods. He supported a type of education in which all the proposals he made were not only of value in themselves, but also progressive for their time, in promoting the achievement of an improved educational process designed to make the indi-

vidual a worthy member of the human race, and a human race that would truly be the work of God, the reflection of divine harmony. This was of fundamental importance in the 'Panentheism' of the Krausist system which he upheld (López Morillas, 1956).

As Professor Nieves Gómez has explained, 'two axioms lie at the heart of Francisco Giner de los Ríos' philosophical thinking: the existence of a Supreme Being, absolute perfection, and the existence of the individual as a finite but perfectible being, continuously progressing' (Gómez García, 1983). These two axioms, and the dialectical relations between them, according to Giner's thinking, provide the basis for his anthropological approach to education and show Giner to be a forerunner of the humanism of the mid twentieth century, close to the personalized view of Meunier and also to the social view of Erich Fromm to such an extent, I believe, that we are entitled to speak of his educational humanism and (why not?) of his humanistic pedagogy – a pedagogy in the service of character-building (as Pablo Montesino had already urged half a century earlier) designed to reform the individual, and to do so from within. 'It seems that every day brings greater recognition of the fact that there are only two main branches of education: (a) general education to train the individual as an individual, all of whose potentialities are unified and harmonized; (b) specialized or vocational education to prepare the individual for an occupation of a specific social type, according to talent and aptitude and other natural and social circumstances,' Giner emphasized once again in 1892 (Giner, XVII, p. 161), with a view to clarifying the stages and types of education of the individual for the sake of teachers and politicians.

In the same paper he added that such principles laid the basis for these conclusions: '1. Primary and secondary education together form a continuous period of truly general education, beyond which there can be nothing but vocational or special education. 2. The grading of education into primary, secondary and higher levels needs to be modified to take account of the fact that there are no more than the two qualitative branches of which I have spoken. . . . ' He thus spread his renovating and educational concept of secondary schooling, giving it a meaning of its own which it has seldom had, while at the same time rejecting the poor teaching meted out to girls and boys at the intermediate stage of their general education for no other reason than social prejudice and the absence of a psychology of development.

Taking as a starting-point this clear and unequivocal distinction between general education and special/vocational education, which I consider to be fundamental, I shall attempt to summarize the most characteristic pedagogical and didactic principles of Giner's general education policy. One of the foremost is the need to educate in freedom and for freedom, as an intrinsic necessity of the human condition. In accordance with this requirement, education will be neutral as far as religion, philosophy and politics are concerned. This does not mean that there will be no education of this type, but education 'with a common spirit and foundation'. Moreover, Giner, who was a deeply religious person (though he belonged to no particular denomination) (García Morente, 1922), stated during the early years of his training as an educator that

without religion, without raising the child's spirit to at least a glimpse of a universal order of things, of a supreme ideal of life, a first principle and fundamental link between human beings, education is incomplete, arid, devoid of value, and efforts to involve all the child's faculties and initiate that child in all aspects of reality and thinking will be made in vain [Giner, VII, p. 76].

That stage of general education will therefore include religious education, social education and physical, artistic, intellectual and moral education. All-round, active and unified education is co-educational (this system was considered central to character training and also to combating the inferior position of women in society). Training in a sense of duty, a healthy and vigorous body, decent habits, suitable intellectual activity, sound aesthetic taste, intellectual tolerance and moral self-control were among his objectives, all aimed at forming individuals 'with a sense of the ethical meaning of life'. Echoing the well-known English educator Arnold, with whom he was in fairly close contact, Giner would often repeat that he wanted to turn out individuals who were versatile, truthful, valiant, pure and tenacious.

Among the practices that he recommended (and which were introduced on an experimental basis in the institution from 1880 onwards) were regular relations with the family and a family-style school life as a model for the dynamics of school activities, frequent close contacts with nature and art, physical games in the open air, school walks and excursions, study trips, holiday camps, vocational guidance, etc.

Giner was a firm believer in the learning process occurring step by step throughout the process of general education. He also believed in the value of intuition and left us many writings on the subject. The development of the intuitive method on the lines proposed by Pestalozzi and Fröbel fitted perfectly with his idea of activity as essential to learning, with instruction constantly aspiring to be educational. As he had observed that some teachers who claimed to use the intuitive method did not know how to proceed, he called more than once for its correct use. On one of these occasions he said:

Exploration, like experiment, like the analysis of a concept or the observation of a known fact – like all the aspects, indeed, of the intuitive process – should not follow the usual pattern of being used to illustrate and compare with the previously expounded theory, but should precede that theory, so that the pupil arrives independently at the theory, guided and encouraged, but not taken over, by the teacher [Giner, XII, p. 17].

He also adopted the principle of adapting education to the individual and that of education as a lifelong process. We cannot forget, as I said at the outset, that Giner was more than an educationist; he was an educator, and in this connection it is useful to recall that he used the Socratic, heuristic procedure, helping his pupils and students to find for themselves the right sort of training for them. He roundly condemned examinations in educational establishments as instruments of misguided teaching policy and hence of moral error. He eliminated homework and did away with set texts, and the pupils at the ILE made their own textbooks out of exercise books. He likewise emphasized the importance of school materials prepared by the pupils themselves. Creativity was, manifestly, one of the sovereign principles of his educational theory.

In fact, throughout his life, Giner tackled nearly all the problems involved at all levels of teaching and the whole issue of education, and he has bequeathed to us truly modern approaches and solutions to nearly all of them. It sometimes seems incredible that a man of such profound philosophical knowledge and such great professional activity should have known and been concerned about such apparently disparate matters as the need for first-aid kits in schools, the causes and consequences of neurosis, football, the location of schools, the value of the campus, drugs, and many other things. Proof of the significance of these concerns in his educational theory as a whole, always aimed at shaping the individual, is to be found in a paragraph in a speech made in 1880 but whose vibrant nature, pedagogical modernity and claims are such that it appears to have been written since the First World War. It reads thus:

Change these old-fashioned classrooms, get rid of the teacher's podium and chair, an icy barrier which isolates and makes close contacts with pupils impossible; get rid of benches, grades, amphitheatres – lasting symbols of uniformity and boredom. Break up these huge masses of pupils, constrained to listen passively to lessons or to be tested on what they have memorized, when they have been sitting so far away from the teacher and the blackboard that they could hardly absorb anything. Instead of all these classic features, surround the teacher with a small circle of active pupils, who think, speak and debate, who are alive and active. . . . Then the lecture room becomes a workshop and the teacher is a guide in the work; the pupils are a family; the link with the outside world becomes an ethical one, experienced internally; the smaller and the larger society breathe the same air; life circulates everywhere and teaching becomes richer, more solid and more attractive, to make up for what it loses in pomp and circumstance [Giner, VII, pp. 34–5].

In spite of the importance he attached to these principles, methods and techniques, there was one element in the educational process that he considered to be of the highest importance: the teacher. He was convinced, partly through the influence of his favourite student, Manuel Bartolomé Cossío (Otero, 1992), that the key element in education, to be treated with the greatest care, was the teacher. To begin the reform process, he called for a teaching staff carefully trained to a level higher than elsewhere, sound educational preparation of a theoretical and practical nature and, of course, thorough knowledge of their special subjects. He drew attention to the lack of educational preparation of secondary-school teachers and expressed misgivings about the teaching methods used; he called for the establishment of centres providing full training for such a teaching profession, as the sole means of rendering their teaching truly educational.

The ideal university

In Giner's reformist organizational structure for education, the university always held pride of place, since it was the highest sphere for advancing science, for developing knowledge to the utmost and for training fully rounded human beings rather than narrow professionals. It was certainly the teaching establishment with the most experience, the greatest physical and human resources and also the most power.

His aim was to transform it into the driving force of national regeneration, somewhat in the style of the thinkers of the Spanish Enlightenment. But, as was the case for them, the corresponding process was very slow, and gathered speed only a few years before Giner's death, with the establishment of the Junta de Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas (Council for the Extension of Scientific Study and Research).

Without going so far as to sign the vehement petition of Joaquín Costa (an ardent champion of political regeneration in Spain) who believed it was necessary to set fire to the university, Giner ridiculed the latter on several occasions and constantly called for its reform, wishing Spain to have the benefit of a university education of the same standard as the German or English ones, renowned for their scientific and their educational merits, respectively. He believed that Latin universities were exclusively concerned with training for the professions, and he wanted to improve that situation. With his knowledge of the history of most Western universities and of the way they operated during that period, he was able to outline what the Spanish university ought to be. In the first place, it must be self-governing and independent of the state. And he declared that its special functions should be the development of science through research and teaching, the general education of its students and their care and guidance both inside and outside its precincts, the dissemination of culture throughout all social classes, top-level policy-making (by virtue of its moral influence and free development) for national education and its individual establishments, and the training in teaching methods of all the teachers in the country, directly or indirectly.

Specific ways of helping to achieve this type of university would be: to relegate training for diplomas to a more secondary position; to give top priority to further scientific training; to establish closer connections between different courses of study and faculties; to pay greater attention to the material conditions, moral concerns and intellectual life of the students; to enlist students' participation in university life; to assist and maintain closer relations with other cultural institutions; and to establish more contacts and promote educational activities in a sphere that today would be called non-formal or informal. Finally, Francisco Giner wanted the university to be 'not only a body of students and scholars but an ethical force in life' (Giner, II, p. 121).

Giner's influence

The university reform advocated by Giner and the institutionalists in general gained momentum in the first three decades of the twentieth century to the extent that the state established a body capable of carrying forward part of the strategy imagined by them: sending the best teachers and researchers abroad to update their knowledge, and making greater resources available for scientific research in Spain and for fully fledged academic training. The body in question was the Council for the Extension of Scientific Study and Research, which, besides setting up a useful programme of study grants, promoted the establishment in the country of various other institutions which carried out complementary activities in this great national

education scheme, such as schools, laboratories, a centre of historical studies, male and female students' hostels and so forth.

The generations trained in these establishments in their turn held various posts in education and research in Spain at all levels and helped to spread these educational ideals throughout the country, in their classrooms, in reviews, in inspection work, in study plans, in the training of teachers and in educational missions. Giner's reform programme was studied with interest at the political level during the first few years of the second Spanish Republic (1931-36).

The Franco regime harshly condemned persons, programmes or methods that had connections with the ILE, but a private centre, the Colegio Estudio, kept the flame of Giner's ideals burning. From 1975 onwards, the college/residence of the institution was given back to the Giner de los Ríos Foundation, some of its activities were resumed, publication of the *BILE* started up again and, more significantly, many aspects of Giner's educational plan received pedagogical and social accolades. Others, naturally enough, have lost their relevance with the passage of time.

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DIMITRI GLINOS

(1882–1943)

Marie Eliou

Dimitri Glinos was a key figure in the history of Greek education. A philosopher, educationist and politician, he made several attempts to institute reform in a system of education that was sorely in need of it. The history of education in Greece in this century – and the present problems of the Greek education system – cannot be discussed without reference to the work of Glinos; but in order to understand his influence it is also necessary to try to understand the struggle for educational reform in Greece.

The implications of reform

SOME POINTS OF REFERENCE

At the time of Glinos' birth, the Greek education system, the institutional basis of which had been laid in 1833–37, was highly centralized, formal and overwhelmingly given over to classical studies, to the detriment of science, mathematics and vocational training. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, this system reflects the move away from the current of thinking that emerged from the Enlightenment, and whose proponents, even before the Greek state had been founded, had created exemplary educational institutions. Those institutions had long suffered the victorious onslaught of conservative forces, the Orthodox Church in particular.

The language of instruction was the official language, *katharevusa* ('pure' or 'noble'), a laborious construct, a sort of pedantic halfway-house between classical Greek and Neo-Hellenic Greek, the 'demotic' (colloquial) language. The choice of the language of instruction should be seen in the context of a long-standing debate (the celebrated 'language question') that was closely tied in with the direction in which various social and political forces aimed to steer the development of the country; this problem of Neo-Hellenism, with all its political, social, ideological and educational implications, was to find a solution only with the promulgation of the 1975 Constitution.¹

Education and the very definition of the national language have always been

involved in a tug of war between the social and political forces in Greece; attempts at educational reform and counter-reform campaigns have regularly marked this eventful history.²

The attempts to reform a system whose major flaws had already been amply demonstrated began in the 1870s. Three times between 1877 and 1889, ministers of education prepared reform projects that were subsequently shelved, thus establishing a pattern that has been repeated up to the present day. The demands for the modernization of the education system made in 1897–1900, 1909–11, 1913 and 1917–20 all came to nought. The 1929 reform, among other things, successfully modified the curricula that had been in use since 1836, and introduced the 'six plus six' (primary plus secondary) structure, but very little remained of that reform after the dictatorship was set up in 1936.

The educational reform bill drafted by the Provisional Committee of National Liberation and submitted in 1944, during the German occupation, to the National Council, meeting in a zone which had been freed by the Resistance, had not the remotest chance of being implemented during the post-liberation and civil war periods.

The 1952 Constitution, in the same terms as the 1911 Constitution, re-established *katharevusa* as the national language and language of instruction and again banned any action prejudicial thereto.³

In the major political struggles leading to the victory of the Democratic Centre in 1963, constant reference was made to the problem of education. Following mass demonstrations, education was placed at the top of the list of anticipated reforms. The Democratic Centre government swiftly drew up an educational reform programme, reintroducing elements from earlier projects, which was passed by Parliament in 1964, in spite of violent reactions from the opposition. One of its most important features was the introduction of the demotic language into the classroom.

The campaign to destabilize the democratic regime did not spare the education system, which was already feeling its effects by 1965. The reform had thus been scuppered well before the 1967 coup; it only remained for the colonels to dismantle the rest, in particular by restoring *katharevusa* in schools.

With the return of democracy, educational reform once again became a priority, and it was the political party that had been so adamantly opposed to it in its 1964 form that was responsible for including parts of it in the 1976 Act (law 309/1976).⁴ Other, partial reforms, including reforms of higher education, were to follow, but the Greek education system today remains anachronistic and continues to suffer from problems that have been obvious since the beginning of the century. True reform remains a thing of the future.

THE FRUSTRATED CHAMPIONS OF REFORM

In the early days of this century, three young men who had all been influenced by the ideas circulating in the German universities at the time found themselves, on their return to Greece, engaged in a battle for educational reform. These three

personalities, who have left their mark on Greek thinking, were the educationist, A. Delmouzos, the linguist, Manolis Triantaphyllidis and Dimitri Glinos, the scholar and reformer. Delmouzos (1880–1956) created the Volos pilot school (1908–11), where he put into practice the most advanced educational theories, particularly those of Kerschensteiner. The school was closed as the result of a campaign orchestrated by anti-reform forces, and its founder was brought to trial for ‘immorality’, ‘atheism’ and ‘socialist propaganda’. Triantaphyllidis (1883–1959) studied the development of the Neo-Hellenic language and codified its grammar.

Glinos, Delmouzos and Triantaphyllidis, who collaborated with one another and became friends, worked hand in hand for many years to promote educational reform, particularly through the influential Association for Education which, as early as 1911, had brought together all of Greece’s reform-minded educationists. Later referred to as ‘the triumvirate of reform’, they were to have a profound effect on the history of Greek education, but, having drawn different lessons from the failure of their efforts, they went their separate ways from the late 1920s onwards. Triantaphyllidis made a brilliant career as an academic and linguistic researcher, who promoted and defended the demotic language. Delmouzos, after a few years of university teaching, was forced to give up his position and devoted the rest of his life to chronicling and analysing his achievements in the field of education.

Glinos carried his determination to live his life in accordance with his intellectual beliefs through to its logical conclusion. From his prison cell, on 15 February 1937, he wrote to one of his followers:

‘From an early age, I wanted to build a palace/to match my dreams; a very real palace.’ I wrote these lines when I was 18. I toiled and struggled to blaze a trail, a path which led to truth and enlightenment. At 18, I had become fluent in the demotic tongue; and by 25 I had opened my eyes to the social question, but it took twenty years of struggle before I could ‘tell’, reveal the truth within me regarding this question, and enter into ‘the light of reality’.⁵

During the period after the three friends separated and even later, after their deaths, educational reform never ceased to be a rallying call for social consciousness. On a less ambitious scale, some of the trio’s most brilliant fellow-workers attempted to continue their efforts, but the times were not propitious for radical reform. Banished from the public school system, dispossessed of their testing ground for educational innovation, they, in turn, were subjected to official harassment, imprisonment and detention.⁶

After Glinos, Evangelos Papanoutsos (1900–82), another teacher, tenaciously defended the cause of global reform of education for many years. A liberal far removed from the radical positions of Glinos, he was relieved on five separate occasions of his duties as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Education, managing to carry out this function for only a very short period each time between 1944 and 1965, and was the last of these frustrated champions of educational reform.

Glinos' life⁷

THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1882-1911)

The eldest of twelve children of a family of modest means, Dimitri Glinos was born in Smyrna (Asia Minor), where he completed his studies up to secondary level. He graduated from the Faculty of Arts of the University of Athens, and taught in Greek schools in the Ottoman Empire (Lemnos, Asia Minor).

Having espoused the ideas of the movement for the use of the demotic language, he exercised his functions as teacher and headmaster with a keen awareness of the shortcomings of the Greek system of education. In his writings between 1904 and 1908, he had already formulated a radical reform project, systematically challenging the various aspects of the system. Both in his studies and in his action – for he made a point of disseminating the results of his research and reflections to other teachers and to the general public – the teaching of the Neo-Hellenic language enjoyed a prominent place. In one of his texts, addressed to the Teachers' Association of Athens, after having noted 'the reasons why Greek schoolchildren do not learn the Neo-Hellenic language properly', at both primary and secondary levels, he proposed measures for reforming curricula and teaching methods and materials in order to remedy the situation, and concluded: 'We must all work for the success of these reforms, confident that all prejudice can be overcome by those who are devoted to their duty, morally free⁸ and sincerely desirous of progress.'⁹

Married in 1908, Glinos was able, with the support of his father-in-law, to continue his studies in philosophy, education and experimental psychology from 1908 to 1911 at the Universities of Jena and Leipzig. His archives contain notes from the lectures he attended, including those given by W. Rein and W. Wundt, and a detailed – and admiring – description of the educational research carried out in the Landerziehungsheime of Hermann Lietz. The relaxed rapport between teachers and students, the non-authoritarian teaching methods, the promotion of initiative in the learners, the introduction of manual work in schools, all those were innovations that opened up exciting prospects to him. He planned to write a thesis on 'Plato and the New Social Pedagogy', but his move to Leipzig and contact with Wundt resulted in his working in the latter's laboratory on a thesis in experimental psychology.

It was at this time that he became familiar with the socialist ideas that he was gradually to adopt as his own, but concern with the need for educational reform remained uppermost in his mind. Writing from Leipzig to one of his colleagues, he said:

It is clear that if schools are won over by social or intellectual reform, everything has been won. Schools are always a mirror image of the society in which they exist. They are not the first but the last bastion to be taken by the reform, but they are, and should be, the first that can come under attack. Schools are instruments of the dominant ideology. . . . The language is certainly not just a means and a method but a constituent part of the ideology. Changing the language therefore means changing an essential part of Neo-Hellenic ideals. But that is not all: if the educational reform succeeds only in this respect and leaves intact the rest of the

Greek ideology – Greeks' relationship to their past, mistaken ideas of life and Hellenocentrism, and the stagnation, the logic of stagnation, which is predominant in Greece today – if the reform leaves all of this intact, it will be imperfect and false, and will therefore not be the one we need.¹⁰

THE YEARS OF ACTION (1912–25)

On his return to Greece, Glinos first taught in secondary schools in Athens and was soon thereafter appointed director of the advanced training institute for secondary-school teachers. Deeply concerned by the social and political developments in the country, he joined forces with the intellectuals backing Eleftherios Venizelos, who had become Prime Minister. In 1912, he submitted a report on the problems of the education system to the Ministry of Education, and was asked to draft the white paper and the educational reform project that was presented by the government in 1913.

This is an impressive set of texts, comprising, on the one hand, the white paper containing a historical survey, a critical examination of the existing system of education and a presentation of proposed changes, and, on the other hand, seven bills each prefaced by a detailed introductory report, covering primary and secondary education, primary and secondary teacher-training, the creation of a technical teacher-training college, primary- and secondary-school administration, and school buildings.

This was the one and only time in Greek history that such a comprehensive school reform project was put before Parliament, which, after dragging out the debate for several months, shelved it without reaching any conclusions. The violent reactions of the conservative elements of Greek society overwhelmed the bill as a whole, but a few innovative measures were nevertheless adopted and, most important, the project served as a catalyst for intellectual and political debate at the time.

Throughout this period, the Association for Education, in the persons of its leading figures, Glinos, Delmouzos and Triantaphyllidis in particular, played an extremely active role, both in the education debate and the political battles waged around it. In his writings and lectures, Glinos explained the meaning of the proposed reforms, as well as analysing and assessing them. As a ministerial aide, he had to come to terms with what was possible at the time, and did not see the project as representative of his entire vision. He stressed that an educational reform must first and foremost entail changes in attitudes and mentalities, which cannot be achieved through legislation or institutional measures alone. 'The organizational changes', he declared, 'open the way for a new spirit to move abroad. . . . The bills pave the way for a renaissance in Greek education.' Among the 'jewels in the crown' of the proposed legislation, he singled out, firstly, six-year compulsory education, asserting that this innovation responded to 'the demands of science, social development and living conditions in Greece', while demanding 'for the Greek people, the ploughman, the shepherd, the workman, the wage-earner, the craftsman . . . light, language, vision and conscience'. Secondly, with regard to 'the intellectual liberation of women', he wrote that

Greek womanhood should no longer be stifled by ignorance, condemned to a living death by idleness and the wait for a husband . . . women as full human beings, conscious individuals taking an active part in society, independent enlightened women who work for social progress and are not passive bystanders . . . such women will come into being through education, and it is educational reform that will bring them forth.¹¹

Changes of political fortune led to Dimitri Glinos being called back to important duties under Venizelos, who again became Prime Minister. A Committee for Education, comprising Glinos, Delmouzos and Triantaphyllidis, was set up in 1916, with a view to continuing, and providing a framework for, efforts for educational reform. Glinos was appointed Chairman of the Education Council, and Secretary-General of the Ministry of Education (1917), a post he was to occupy until 1920. This proved to be a productive time for draft measures and bills aimed at making far-reaching changes in the field of education, but not for projects only: the time in office of the 'triumvirate' was marked by noteworthy achievements, not the least of which was the introduction of new textbooks in the drafting of which famous writers were involved and whose content contrasted strongly with that of previous texts.

The political pendulum swung inexorably back again and, following Venizelos' electoral defeat in 1920, Glinos continued his campaign for educational reform far from the corridors of power, while the new administration withdrew the innovative textbooks, threatening at one point to burn them.¹² All the work that had been put into educational reform was thus suddenly called into question. One of Glinos' most important works is the racy pamphlet of around 100 pages on the textbook issue that he published under the pseudonym 'A. Gabriel, teacher'.¹³

The political landscape changed again as Venizelos was re-elected Prime Minister in 1922, and Glinos became Secretary-General of the Ministry of Education once more. He was appointed Director of the Secondary Teacher Training College, which, although founded in 1920, did not open its doors until 1924, whilst Delmouzos was made Director of the Primary Teacher Training College. Hopes were rekindled, but the take-over by the dictator Theodore Pangalos in 1925 once again put a damper on the country's political and social development and, of course, on educational reform. Glinos was removed not only from the Ministry of Education but from the teachers' college as well.

THE YEARS OF COMBAT (1926-43)

Having given up all hope that the necessary reforms could be promoted from the top down in a country with weak institutions and highly resistant to social change, Glinos began to turn increasingly to civil society and social struggle as alternative solutions. In a book significantly entitled *Dead but Not Buried*, which presented and analysed the attempted educational reform of 1913, he had written: 'Educational problems cannot be scientifically solved by theory and reason alone; they are above all problems of society.'¹⁴

Glinos thereafter refused to serve in the important posts offered him by the Ministry of Education once political life had become stabilized, preferring instead to invest his energies in other projects. In 1926 he founded the socialist-leaning

review *Renaissance*, which was to serve as a forum for left-wing intellectuals. The review featured an educational supplement aimed at teachers. During this period, Glinos gave a more radical start to the Association for Education, and became its chairman. It was in this capacity that he was brought to trial, along with Nikos Kazantzakis, for having organized a lecture by the Romanian writer Panaït Istrati.

Through his commitment and his writings, Glinos emerged as a leading Marxist theorist in the 1930s. Deported for several months in 1935, elected as a Communist Party deputy in 1936, deported once again that same year following the takeover by the dictator Metaxas, imprisoned, deported yet again, he was finally placed under house arrest until 1941, when he immediately joined the Resistance, in which he was to be a key figure. Living underground from the beginning of the occupation, he was to have headed the government founded by the Resistance fighters in the free zone in 1943, but died as he was preparing to join them there.

Some of his works from this latter period of his life were written during his deportation or in prison. Additional light is shed on Glinos the man by the letters sent to those who were close to him during these ordeals.

My life here has become increasingly difficult . . . our barrack-room is much more crowded. More than a hundred intellectuals: I live in the midst of a non-stop demonstration. How can one concentrate or sort one's ideas out? One can think only when the others are sleeping. Life is a river in which one must swim for oneself, and not make do with others' descriptions of how they swam [25 June 1937]. . . . If I cannot live in truth, I prefer to live and die a prisoner. My life here is real; there are no lies. Lies cannot climb the three hundred steps of the Akronauplia [26 September 1937].¹⁵

In prison or in deportation, Glinos continued not only to study and write but to teach as well. His comrades looked back on those days with great emotion. The poet Costas Varnalis, a prominent figure in Greek literature who shared the ideas and fate of Glinos, wrote a poem on a prisoner transfer during which they were shackled together:

They put irons on our hands
and rifles circled us on all sides. . . .
You were lucky, that woeful night
to be chained to Glinos the Teacher.
Black eyes gleaming. Upright
and impassive, above Destiny
he looked towards the better days that lay ahead.¹⁶

Another of Glinos' letters is revealing as regards his constant preoccupation with education:

In a few days, the thirtieth month of my deportation will begin. . . . But let us leave behind the sad thoughts with which my solitude has encircled me. . . . I am particularly pleased to hear that the circular on the teaching of the demotic language¹⁷ in schools has been issued and that the commission on grammar has been set up. This means that the most important thing I have ever accomplished, the introduction of the demotic language in schools, has not been entirely in vain. Who knows, then, who can say whether my present sacrifice will have been entirely wasted? [30 December 1938].¹⁸

Glinos' achievement

THE SCHOLAR

A man of great erudition, Glinos could have made a career as a writer or philosopher. In his youth, he was a successful author of poetry and prose, and translated French poetry (Hugo, Sully-Prudhomme, Louys and de Heredia) and texts from the ancient Greek (Aeschylus, Plato), and he published noteworthy essays on Plato's philosophy and humanist studies in Greece which to this day are standard reference works for specialists. He could not, however, conceive of his intellectual and scientific activity as being independent of the problems and fundamental debates that concerned both the present and the future of his country.

Integral to Glinos' writings are a critical reflection and an intense commitment to mobilizing the minds and progressive forces of the country with a view to transforming structures, institutions and outdated or retrograde mentalities. In his philosophical works, he scrutinized the relationship between the historical memory and ideology, and contrasted 'creative' with 'sterile' historicism. He brought out something that was not obvious at the time – or today for that matter – that is, that the awareness of a glorious past and a remarkable cultural heritage could be either a force for consciousness-raising or, on the other hand, a dead weight serving to reinforce conservatism and inertia. 'It is the germinating seed that is alive, and thus truthful. The sole criterion of truth is action.'¹⁹

From his philosophical viewpoint, form, defined as 'an unstable and shifting balance of different forces', is closely linked to substance, as being cannot be dissociated from becoming. In his essay on the humanities, Glinos developed a theory of 'dynamic realism' which stood in contrast to both 'formalism' and 'static realism', an approach in which we can discern the influence of Marxist thought.

The *War Trilogy*, written during his deportation to Santorini in 1938, is one of Glinos' major works. The first part, entitled 'The Golden Fleece: The War to Come', is an essay on war.²⁰ The second, entitled 'After Chaos: Society and Social Structure', is a carefully constructed reflection on sociological thought and ideologies. The third, unfinished part, 'Peace on Earth', developed a 'philosophy of peace', incorporating the social revolution into the utopia of a peaceful future world society.

THE EDUCATIONAL REFORMER

Glinos emerges as an exceptional teacher, both through his students' recollections and through teaching notes found in his personal archives, while in his writings on educational reform, which extend over some forty years, he clearly comes across as someone in touch with the grassroots, a man with practical teaching experience.

Glinos was, however, above all else a visionary and proponent of educational reform. The reform project which he spent his entire life trying to promote envisaged a radical, global and well-structured reform, each component of which had been thoroughly thought out. Glinos' activities to win acceptance for it were many and various. He began by analysing the education system as it then was, revealing

its defects through extremely rigorous research. His highly detailed reform proposals had practical results in the form of draft legislation and his organizational activities at the Ministry of Education were supplemented and supported by his teaching work in the educational institutions that he led and inspired and where he encouraged the testing of innovative ideas.

The detailed and incisive analysis given by Glinos on the state of the education system at the time the reform scheme was submitted (1913), and in his later writings, is extremely revealing. It pointed out, among other things, that purely book-based teaching 'transforms schools into Procrustean beds for our children and a wasteland of meaningless words . . . for their minds',²¹ and further stressed that 'any real knowledge has been repressed by grammar'.²²

He severely and repeatedly criticized the verbalism which was rife in schools and in other places. Among the major failings of educational trends at the time were

the worship of form, appearance, words and noises, and not [getting closer to] reality and substance. We make do with words, we live, move and have our own being in words; an appalling verbalism rules our lives. . . . This produces people who are inclined to verbalism and impossible dreams, who see this empty eloquence as education, who spurn reality, the earth, toil, who worship outward show, dubious glamour and sensationalism. It is words that drive science and action, observation and movement out of our schools. Creative abilities thus atrophy, and aversion towards manual work sets in, while mercantile and parasitic attitudes are encouraged. The entire system is designed to produce a single type of man: the functionary type, the unenterprising bureaucrat, pettifogger and smooth talker. The postulates of the reform were born of these failings.²³

The reform advocated by Glinos encompasses education in all of its facets:

The language of instruction. Introducing the demotic language involved changes in course content and orientation. Only the demotic language would make it possible to 'connect the school with life outside'.

The structure of the school system would proceed from a lengthening of the period of primary schooling from four to six years (the 'six plus six' system), the autonomy of each level of schooling (in order that all students should benefit from it and not only those who went on to the next level), and vocational training for students not going on to higher education.

First, our system of education is dominated, at all levels, by an élitist and retrograde attitude.²⁴ . . . Élitism is interested only in the minute proportion of students who will go on to obtain a university degree. Our concern and attention are directed towards them. . . . Let the other 90 per cent be sacrificed for this select few, let the rest of the nation be intellectually stunted for the benefit of this élite. The élitist spirit has left the working class in darkness and the lower-middle class in a state of semi-ignorance.²⁵

Educational content. The reform would give education a new direction: greater emphasis would be placed on science, and language and literature classes would shed their formalist approach. Glinos studied primary and secondary curricula in depth and presented, on a number of occasions, detailed alternative proposals.

Educational methods. Educational materials would be diversified, textbooks updated, observation and experimentation introduced into science courses, and students would be encouraged to think for themselves and adopt a critical attitude. Rote learning, then the rule, would be abolished.

Teacher training. The emphasis that the reform placed on teacher training and the stringency of the proposals relating to it are something unique in the history of Greek education. Following an in-depth study, three bills were submitted simultaneously, covering the training of primary- and technical-school teachers, and general secondary-teacher training. In his writings on the reform, Glinos made reference to other countries (particularly Germany, which he knew well) in order to set up an exemplary image of teachers who had received a solid training and played an innovative role in the school system. In these countries, the teacher 'is the first to light his candle from that of the philosopher, sociologist and researcher. . . . And schools are continually assimilating innovations.'²⁶

The education of girls required that the level of their instruction be raised to that provided in boys' schools; that secondary schools be created for girls, and that they be enabled to go on to vocational studies and higher education.

The meaning of the reform scheme can be summed up by two major thrusts: democratization – schooling for all children; and modernization – schools finally catching up with the times, and becoming receptive to the real world.

Glinos delved with particular interest into two important aspects of the education system: teacher training and textbooks. The founding of the secondary-teacher-training college that Glinos headed until his dismissal and of the primary-teacher-training college, the establishment of the League of Secondary School Teachers, the creation of the reviews *Education* and *Educational Practice*, both intended for teachers, as well as a large number of articles and other texts, are proof of the deep thought he had given to this question and of a strategy which assigned a central role to the teacher.

In his inaugural address to the secondary-teacher-training college, Glinos held forth on the role of the teacher as a social actor:

Education should be able to respond . . . to conditions that are constantly changing, creating new problems, new demands, and consequently requiring new skills. . . . Education becomes useless and counter-productive when it does not adapt itself to this evolution . . . and when it does not contribute to it. And, as evolution and change in conditions are continuing processes, reform should be a constant accompaniment to education. Active and meaningful education is inseparable from reform, just as immobilism in educational structures and conditions is inseparable from inert, ineffective and counter-productive education. When, over a very long period, education is unable to adapt to new conditions and to relate to needs . . . , the distance between education and life becomes greater and greater, and it is no longer a reform but a revolution that is needed in order to re-establish this correlation. This is what has happened to Greek education. . . . It is for this reason that a radical change, a real revolution, is increasingly necessary.²⁷

Powerful leverage was to be supplied by the teacher.

Glinos took a deep and constant interest in textbooks (textbook reform was one of the projects that was at least temporarily put into effect, with the outcome we have already seen). He devoted a number of his writings and two important studies to their subject: the above-mentioned pamphlet and a survey of Greek textbooks which appeared in a collection of surveys of post-war textbooks published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This in-depth study is based on an analysis of about eighty primary and secondary textbooks, and ten or so other works for children and young people.

Comprising an introduction and three chapters ('The Spirit of Greek Education in the Nineteenth Century up to the Balkan Wars'; 'Greek Primary-level Textbooks from 1914 to 1917'; and 'Greek Primary-level Textbooks from 1917 to 1926'), the study endeavours to identify the 'ideological trends that developed in Greek education in consequence of the historical events of the past decades'. The analysis of textbook content is indeed constantly tied in with the historical and political evolution of Greece and the Balkans, and the changing relationships between the Balkan countries resulting from these historical events. Evidence of nationalism, stereotyping and ethnocentrism, as well as of patriotism and humanism, is pointed out in the textbooks. This analysis shows what a fundamental ideological difference there was between the textbooks resulting from the reform to which Glinos was devoted for many years (a reform of which, as we have said, only a few parts were put into effect) and those they replaced. The study, published in 1926, concluded with a paragraph which is of disturbing relevance today:

If the thinking of philosophers, scientists and the intellectual élite of the Balkan peoples can pierce the storm clouds of political and ethnic tensions – tensions often cleverly nurtured by third parties – and if it is focused on current problems, without preconceptions but with a concern for humanity and its culture, it will contribute much more effectively to the resolution of those problems than if it places itself at the service of blind inclinations and passions that can only bring further misfortunes upon the long-suffering Balkan peoples.²⁸

THE PROPONENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Action to change society was a thread running through the whole of Glinos' work. As a very young headmaster on Lemnos in 1904, he had already made the following remark in his end-of-year speech:

It is meaningless to make constant reference to pupil enrolment figures without making a comparison between the total number of children living on the island and those who attend school so as to ascertain how many children remain illiterate or fail to complete their schooling, in order that this wrong may be righted.²⁹

Glinos' plans for education were part of a broader vision he had for society. The reason he devoted many years of his life to promoting radical educational reform was that he felt it was indispensable for his country's progress and for social justice. A man of reflection as well as action, a man of conviction but also a realist, he analysed the situation and prepared his approach with a view to efficiency. Thus, in his work on the reform, he combined background studies and practical proposals,

backed up by alternative proposals or solutions, the organization of suitable forums for discussion, the grouping together of the social forces capable of participating in this debate and of playing an active role in events, and dissemination among the general public of information about the seriousness of the educational problem.

In the repressive atmosphere of the early 1920s, when conservative forces had come back into power and the reform had been suspended, Glinos endeavoured to reactivate the Association for Education, thereby hoping to mobilize teachers and the general public to resist the counter-reform. At the same time, he worked relentlessly to create structures and institutions capable of offsetting the influence of the University of Athens, a bastion of conservatism and counter-reform. Thus, his project for a Free University of Athens, though it never saw the light of day, gave rise to two major institutions, the University of Salonika,³⁰ whose charter was drafted by Glinos, and the Women's College, a free, university-level institution (1921).

Glinos was naturally drawn to social movements that demanded greater justice and democracy. Thus, associating himself with the feminist cause, he became a member of the Council of the League for Women's Rights (1927), and published several articles, some of them written by himself, on the fundamental issue of women's rights in the review *Renaissance*. In 'Feminine Humanism', he maintains that woman should 'find the rightful place to which her value entitles her in the higher forms of social life', and he describes 'the great social movement known as women's liberation or feminism that is rapidly spreading from one country to the next, throughout the civilized world'. He saw this movement as one among other social movements, seeking its roots in 'the great struggle which aims to change the shape of society'. He writes:

We have witnessed, lived through, and are still living amidst conflicts between nations, for we could not do otherwise, but how many other struggles there are within societies themselves just as bitter, if not as bloody – the class struggle, the struggle of the have-nots, women's struggle for liberation and children's struggle for health, happiness and initiative!³¹

In Glinos' work, theory and action are mutually supportive. The commitment to intellectual and political movements that began in his youth placed him in the camp of social and political reform from the very start. It was a logical extension of this commitment that, in his later years, realizing he had reached a dead-end with his attempted reform of both education and the anachronistic social structure, he sided with the revolutionary forces.

A politician, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and a Resistance fighter, he wrote his last works while he was underground during the German occupation: an essay on *Current Problems of Hellenism* and the Resistance manifesto *What the National Liberation Front Is and What It wants*.

The heritage of Dimitri Glinos

Glinos' work is strikingly relevant to the present. It was not, for example, until very recently that Greek teachers and a wider public began to become aware, through popular works on the sociology of education, of the interactive relationship be-

tween education and society. Yet, as early as 1915, Glinos had written: 'The state of education at any given time – its structure and curricula, the quality of the teaching provided and the ideology governing it – is both the cause and the effect of the expansion or decline in the economy, social mores, the arts, sciences and the political regime.'³² In 1914, Glinos wrote: 'Among the peoples of Europe, we spend proportionally the least on education';³³ the most recent international statistics show that this is still the case.³⁴

If we compare the current situation of education in Greece with the reform advocated by Glinos at the beginning of the century, we could sum up by saying that, while the democratization of access to education has been achieved, it no longer corresponds to its former objective in as much as access no longer has the same meaning as it then had, while the need to 'modernize' education – and the economy and society as well – is more pressing than ever. The same social and institutional inertia persists, seriously jeopardizing the country's development.

Taking various aspects of the education system, the following observations may be made: the question of the national language and language of instruction was, as we have said, resolved only in 1975.

The period of compulsory education was increased from six to nine years in 1976, and a core curriculum was introduced, but although the compulsory attendance rule seems to be applied for the six years of primary school, this is not yet the case for the three years of the secondary cycle; educational content and methods remain largely out-of-date.

The trend towards general education – which succeeded the trend towards 'classical' studies – and the disaffection for technical and vocational education continue to create a number of serious problems, such as the dysfunctional relationship between education and the economy, the exodus of young people leaving to study abroad, etc.³⁵

Sexual inequality, though considerably reduced in education, is still very prevalent in the area of educational and vocational guidance; in Greece, Glinos' brand of far-reaching and clear-sighted feminism is still ahead of its time.

Teacher training, in particular the training of secondary-school teachers, remains a gaping deficiency in the Greek education system, the various institutional changes introduced in the course of the century having not led to any well-thought-out or credible solution.

Finally (and rather remarkably), no proposals for global educational reform with as broad a scope as those advocated by Glinos have been put forward since his time.

Dimitri Glinos has bequeathed to us a task to pursue, and an example to follow, that of an alert consciousness and singleness of purpose. Having been drawn by reflection and action from educational reform into social struggle, he had, as he wrote from prison, the 'good fortune' to live his life in accordance with his principles.

Notes

1. As the text of the Constitution stipulated nothing about language, the introduction of the demotic form of Greek as the language of instruction was, so to speak, achieved by default. See. A. Dimaras, 'The 1975 Constitution and Teaching', *Philologos*, 8 January 1976, p. 9.
2. The title of Dimaras' major work on the history of Greek education is itself significant: *The Reform That Never Was*, Vol. 1, 1821–94; Vol. 2, 1895–1967, Athens, Hermes, 1973 (in Greek). On the history of Greek education, see also the informative article by D. Anastasiou, 'L'enseignement grec et son démantèlement par la junte', *Les temps modernes*, No. 276bis, 1969 (Aujourd'hui la Grèce.)
3. See A. Dimaras, 'The Greek Constitutions and Education', *The Reform . . .*, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 303–11.
4. M. Eliou, 'Les ambiguïtés d'une réforme qui se contre-dit: le cas grec', *Education comparée* (Sèvres, France), No. 31/32, May 1983.
5. Published in *In Memoriam Dimitri A. Glinos*, pp. 175–6, Athens, Ta Nea Vivlia, 1946.
6. The educators Rosa Imvrioti, Miltos Kountouras, Michalis Papamavros, Costas Sotiriou and Fotis Apostolopoulos, among others.
7. The present article owes much to the analyses of Philippe Iliou in his edition of Glinos, *Complete Works*, Athens, Themelio, 1983, 2 vols.
8. In Glinos' diary of this period, there is an entry about a linguistic observation made by a hierarchical superior to whom he had submitted one of his articles, ending with this reflection: 'My entire being protests, [as do] knowledge, science and education. O moral freedom [i.e. of conscience], how precious and rare!' (Glinos, *Complete Works*, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 463.)
9. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
10. Previously unpublished letter dated 29 September 1910, part of which is cited by Ph. Iliou in 'From Mistrionis to Lenin', in *Dimitri Glinos, Teacher and Philosopher*, p. 15, Athens, Gutenberg, 1983.
11. Excerpted from an article concerning the draft legislation on education published in the newsletter of the Education Club and reprinted in Glinos, *Complete Works*, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 369–72.
12. Triantaphyllidis was to publish a work describing this experience under the revealing title, *Before They Are Burned: The Truth About the Demotic Readers*, Athens, 1921 (in Greek).
13. Many of Glinos' writings first appeared under a variety of pseudonyms, owing to the personal situation of the author at various times in his life and the political developments in the country.
14. D. Glinos, *Dead But Not Buried: Studies on Our System of Education*, p. 162, Athens, Athina, 1925 (in Greek).
15. The ancient fortress of Nauplia, transformed into a prison.
16. Costas Varnalis, *Epitheorissi Technis*, X, Vol. 20, No. 119–20, pp. 533–4. In another text, Varnalis recounts how he had attended classes given by Glinos at the secondary teachers' college in the 1920s, and had seen him teaching again during his deportation (C. Varnalis, 'Glinos the Teacher', *In Memoriam . . .*, op. cit., pp. 56–60).
17. The dictator Metaxas had favoured the demotic language, opting for a pragmatic and non-ideological approach to the 'language question'.
18. Excerpts from letters published in *In Memoriam . . .*, op. cit., pp. 180, 181, 194.
19. *The Present Situation of the Humanities in Greece*, p. 10, Athens, Lacharopoulos, 1940 (in Greek).

20. In a polemical text ('War on War', published in the Communist review *Young Pioneers*, No. 7/8, June–July 1932), Glinos had already pointed out the ominous signs of the disaster that was brewing.
21. Glinos, *Complete Works*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 194.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 393.
24. This retrograde spirit, considering that 'the highest measure of perfection' is to be found in the past, 'persists in making the Greeks advance into the future facing backwards' (ibid., p. 392).
25. Ibid., p. 391.
26. Glinos, *Dead But Not Buried* . . . , op. cit., p. 300.
27. D. Glinos, *The Aim of the Teacher-training College*, p. 9, Athens, 1924 (in Greek).
28. This paragraph has been translated by the author from the unpublished Greek original soon to be included in Vol. IV of Glinos' *Complete Works* being prepared by Philippe Iliou. Glinos' study was published in a French translation in 'Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, direction des relations et de l'éducation', *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*, Vol. 2, Paris, Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1927. In his chapter entitled 'School Textbooks and Nationalism: Dimitri Glinos' Approach', where he analyses Glinos' study, Iliou mentions that this book already appears as out of print in the publications catalogue of the Dotation Carnegie in 1928.
29. Glinos, *Complete Works*, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 69.
30. The University of Salonika was founded in 1925 in response to the new population situation in Macedonia, but also in order to counterbalance the University of Athens, whose traditionalism made it a stronghold for those forces opposing any idea of reform.
31. D. Glinos, *Feminist Humanism*, pp. 7–8, Athens, Women's College, 1921 (in Greek).
32. D. Glinos, 'The Responsibility of Greek Teachers for the Renaissance of Greek Education', published in the review *Education* in 1915 and restated in Glinos, *Dead But Not Buried* . . . , op. cit., p. 298.
33. Glinos, *Complete Works*, op. cit., p. 398.
34. See Table 4.1, 'Public Expenditure on Education' which gives the total of all public expenditure and this figure as a percentage of GNP, *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook*, 1992, pp. 4–16, Paris, UNESCO, 1992.
35. M. Eliou, 'Mobility or Migration? The Case of Greek Students Abroad', *Higher Education in Europe* (Bucharest), Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1988.

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PAUL GOODMAN

(1911–72)

Edgar Z. Friedenberg

Paul Goodman died of a heart attack on 2 August 1972, a month short of his 61st birthday. This was not wholly unwise. He would have loathed what his country made of the 1970s and 1980s, even more than he would have enjoyed denouncing its crassness and hypocrisy. The attrition of his influence and reputation during the ensuing years would have been difficult for a figure who had longed for the recognition that had eluded him, despite an extensive and varied list of publications, until *Growing Up Absurd*, published in 1960, finally yielded him a decade of deserved renown.

It is unlikely that anything he might have published during the Reagan-Bush era could have saved him from obscurity, and from the distressing conviction that this obscurity would be permanent. Those years could not have been kind to Goodman; but, then, he was not too kind himself. He might have been and often was forgiven for this; as well as for arrogance, rudeness and a persistent, assertive homosexuality – a matter which he discusses with some pride in his 1966 memoir, *Five Years* – which occasionally got him fired from teaching jobs. But there was one aspect of his writing that the past two decades could not have tolerated.

Although he was often eccentrically dogmatic about most of the controversial issues of the day that were important then, and are even more urgent now, Paul Goodman was usually right. And mainstream American thought, carrying Western industrial society blithely on to ever more treacherous shoals, was wrong. Dead wrong. Goodman's insights into the ways American society vulgarizes and perverts its institutions – especially its schools – and subverts human growth are even more valid today than when he published them. Meanwhile, the resulting damage has grown more widespread and more profound.

So the world may not be able to afford to ignore Goodman any longer. Twenty years of neglect is quite enough. This profile is intended to show why, and to help bring that neglect to a decent end.

Yet, it is rather astonishing that Paul Goodman should ever have commanded world attention. Looking back critically at the climate of opinion that so briefly permitted his influence to flourish, it is apparent that this occurred through a kind

of cultural syzygy, a rare enough condition. This is not a question of influences on Goodman's thought, but of the changing ideological currents that opened the minds of others – minds which might otherwise have continued to ignore him. The right configuration of social forces did not occur till he was nearly 50 years old; until then, he had struggled to be recognized as poet, fiction writer and intellectual force – without much success.

So, what made him suddenly a celebrity?

I believe that the single most important event in leading readers to take Goodman seriously was the launching of the Soviet *sputnik*, the first orbiting space satellite, in 1957. I do not mean that this triumph greatly impressed Goodman, though he did become enthusiastic about the programmes that succeeded in landing three relatively harmless persons on the moon just two years before his death. But the *sputnik* impressed the American people. It terrified them into scrutinizing American education as the probable cause of deficiencies in American technical and scientific competence. And this, in turn, required that they interest themselves in what might be happening to American youth. This, in *Growing Up Absurd*, Paul Goodman was more than eager to tell them. In the Preface to that work, he observed (Goodman, 1960, p. xv):

The present widespread concern about education is only superficially a part of the Cold War, the need to match the Russian scientists. For in the discussions, pretty soon it becomes clear that people are uneasy about, ashamed of, the world that they have given their children to grow up in. That world is not manly enough; it is not earnest enough; a grownup may be cynical (or resigned) about his own convenient adjustments, but he is by no means willing to see his children robbed of a worthwhile society.

This, in view of American fiscal policy since Goodman wrote, seems too generous. American views of young people are variable and complex, but some prevalent attitudes are quite stable, conspicuous and influential. They are not very favourable. On the familiar evidence of so many sexy TV commercials, teen movies and rejuvenating cosmetic operations, Americans are widely believed to worship youth. But, more often, they covet youth, and covetousness does not dispose us to affection.

Adults who consider youth seriously are expected to view them with detachment as problems or sources of problems. To approach them respectfully as human beings with their own lives to lead and selves to govern arouses suspicion – even in the young people themselves, who cannot imagine, or imagine all too vividly, what so well-disposed an adult might want from them.

Sputnikangst did not change all that. Intergenerational hostility today throughout much of the world is more intense than ever and reels from folly to folly as hysteria seizes on alleged instances of drug abuse and child abuse, without much caring which is which. But *Sputnikangst* did breach a wall of adult indifference about youth, providing a temporary opening for Goodman's concern for the plight of boys and young men in American society.

Goodman was forthright in acknowledging that his interests were asymmetric with respect to gender; and he had no problem justifying his neglect of girls in

his book. Today, his politically incorrect explanation seems both offensive and implausible; but it is not illogical.

The problems I want to discuss in this book belong primarily, in our society, to the boys: how to be useful and make something of oneself. A girl does not *have* to, she is not expected to 'make something' of herself. Her career does not have to be self-justifying, for she will have children, which is absolutely self-justifying, like any other natural or creative act. With this background, it is less important, for instance, what job an average young woman works at till she is married. The quest for the glamor jobs is given at least a little substance by its relation to a 'better' marriage [Goodman, 1960, p. 13].

So much for girls in *Growing Up Absurd*. Boys, however, face a lifetime of meaningless work at tasks they do not select and are not free to reject, which provide them with neither autonomy nor security, and which undermine their self-respect. Repeatedly and poignantly, Goodman laments the dearth of opportunity for 'manly work'. Those who choose or are forced into the paths of juvenile delinquency may, indeed, find more challenge, though at enormous risk to their ultimate development.

Goodman's intense need to build and share communities with virile young men strongly influenced all his writing, as he proudly acknowledged. His preoccupations with boys and images of boys marred much of his fiction and poetry, which he often allowed to become so self-indulgent that the characters in them seem merely reflections of what he would like to have been himself. But his sexuality was a great asset to him in *Growing Up Absurd*.

I feel qualified to make such an assessment: my own book, *The Vanishing Adolescent*, published in 1959, was also devoted, in every sense, to boys. The two books were often confused. In the 1960s, several people I met congratulated me by telling me how much they had enjoyed reading *Growing Up Absurd* and I would assure them, sincerely, that I had too.

Although gender equality had not yet attained its present moral authority, some readers and reviewers reproached me for my bias and neglect of young women. I was not greatly troubled by this criticism. I believed, then as now, that a writer has a right and, indeed, a duty to write only about things and people he knows and cares about – one way or another. A less limited person might have written a better book; but *my* book would not have been improved by attempts to extend it beyond my emotional range. Goodman doubtless agreed; we both used homosexuality as a talisman to permit us to write lovingly about young men without troubling to find some instrumental justification. Readers seized on *Growing Up Absurd* as a book about education and the need for school – indeed social – reform. How else could they have accepted it?

Goodman clearly intended *Growing Up Absurd* to have a practical and beneficial influence on school and society. But what gives the book its strength is its unabashed conviction and assertion that boys are to be treasured and nurtured rather than, as so often happens, crippled and distorted to make them useful to others in the social roles for which they are to be prepared. Conversely: it is society's obligation to provide them with the means to develop into decent citizens and members of a caring and productive community.

If *Sputnikangst* helped make adults listen seriously to men who treasured boys, there were certain other factors in the social climate of the day that made it more receptive to Goodman's message. Climates are changeable, which may make them propitious at certain transitional points. Today, *Growing Up Absurd* would be unlikely to survive the derision of women justly critical of Goodman's literally cavalier neglect of them. But if it had appeared a few years earlier, the book would have been rejected because of its acceptance of adolescent sexuality itself – not just homosexuality, which is briefly and rather pedantically discussed in *Growing Up Absurd* (Goodman, 1960, pp. 127–9) – but exuberant sexuality in general.

By the mid-1950s Goodman's hour had come round at last. The prevailing 'squeaky-clean' image of American youth was under attack and was being relinquished by a film industry increasingly dependent on the patronage of youth. In 1955 the young actor, James Dean, whose image might have been designed to win Goodman's heart, was killed in an automobile accident at the age of 24. This was the same year the two films that made Dean an icon as well as a falling star, *East of Eden* and *Rebel Without a Cause*, were released. The immortal Elvis Presley's first hit-movie *Love Me Tender* appeared in 1956. Clearly, the time was ripe for movies and books that celebrated the sexuality of adolescent males.

Goodman's interests were, however, sharply focused and narrowed by his strong and rather exceptional social values, political commitments and preference in what we would now call 'lifestyles'. The changing political climate of the 1960s, at first supportive, became problematic. He admired what he and Norman Mailer called 'hipsters' (as distinct from their successors, 'hippies': flower children not tough enough for him – especially intellectually – and who tended to adopt rural lifestyles disconcerting to this inveterate New Yorker).

Hipsters do not drop out; they establish themselves in the nooks and crannies of society as gamesmen and tricksters. They get along. Horatio, the picaresque young hero of Goodman's enormous phantasmagoric novel, *The Empire City*, revised and published piecemeal from 1942 to 1959, might be regarded as the archetype of the hipster.

If sexuality provided one focus of Goodman's hyperbolic discourse, the other was surely provided by community. *Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life*, written in collaboration with and illustrated by his architect-brother Percival, is arguably his best book. Published in 1949 and revised in 1960, it has become a landmark in the literature of city planning, rather like the better-remembered work of Lewis Mumford, whose influence it shows. *Communitas* (Goodman and Goodman, 1960) is far more than a treatise on the problems of urban development. It is a moral discourse rooted in the issues city dwellers in a modern industrial society confront or fail to confront; and illustrated with concrete proposals for the design and construction of a metropolis in which civility might develop and be maintained.

This interest continued to inform Goodman's work for the rest of his life, extending to the broadest issues of national policy. Consider the mere titles of some of his later essays: *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals* (1962); *The Society I Live in Is Mine* (1963); *People or Personnel* (1965). Perhaps, paradoxically, it both

dated him and made him prophetic. It dated him because American interest in community tends to be superficial and nostalgic. To the creators and distributors of Disneyland, Disneyworld and Euro-Disney, a concern for genuine community may seem embarrassingly old-fashioned. But this very concern underlay Goodman's continued critique of American society as mercenary, impersonal, destructive of personal intercourse and fidelity, and of the natural order as well. The effect of these catabolic social processes on youth was the subject of *Growing Up Absurd*; but Goodman continued to analyse and decry their influence on all aspects of society for the rest of his life, abandoning the literary forms that had previously constituted his *œuvre*. He could hardly have found the time or the privacy to continue to write fiction. For the next and final decade of his life he was in too much demand as a public figure.

The decay of community and the consequent destruction of the quality of American life have now become so familiar as to arouse more cynicism than anger. Goodman was angry for most of his life; but he was quite incapable of cynicism. His personality was too old-fashioned for that. He frequently referred to himself as 'a man of letters in the old-fashioned sense', disclaiming rather scornfully the identity of social scientist that was often thrust upon him. In fact, Goodman was even more old-fashioned than that.

Throughout his difficult and often troubled life, and most insistently towards the end when he could count on some attention being paid, Paul Goodman was an American patriot. As such, he was necessarily a highly articulate opponent of American foreign policy in the Viet Nam War.

In retrospect, it seems rather curious that a man who so articulately attacked the core values of a nation-state, notorious at the time for its ill-treatment of political dissent, should have been spared public and official attack. Why was Goodman not attacked and destroyed early on as a subversive? This is an interesting question. Goodman's unusual political position made him peculiarly suited to pass unscathed through the window of opportunity that ultimately opened to him – and that probably no longer exists.

As Kingsley Widmer (1980) observes in his sometimes scathing but perceptive study:

In several ways it is odd that Goodman became an avowed anarchist in the mid-1940s. He showed little interest in libertarianism, or even in much of what was then called 'social conscience', in his student days, in his twenties, and in most of his writings. He was not in most usual senses a rebellious character as a student – far less than most who became anarchists. His anxious and defensive self-conceit, his petty-bourgeois origins, his narrow worldly experience and confinement to a New York *lumpen*-intellectual milieu, his insistent role-playing as Artist and Man of Letters, his lack of concern with most issues of equality and justice – these hardly encourage the styles of the great rebel or revolutionary.

Character and attitudes such as these, if less repellent than Widmer makes them sound, would certainly have served to make Goodman less vulnerable to the attacks on left-wing expression that silenced so many American intellectuals during his active life. He seldom became heavily involved in groups he could not domi-

nate, which limited him to becoming at most a cult figure; and the cults in which he figured were not explicitly political; they did not seek power as such. As opposition to intervention by the United States in South-East Asia and, particularly, to the ways in which universities supported the war effort, intensified, student activists turned increasingly to Goodman as one of the few intellectuals over the age of 30 whom they could trust; many worshipped him and he gloried in their admiration and welcomed their intimacy.

But he became their harsh critic and occasionally their opponent as they mounted their attack not only on universities as tools of national policy but on the very idea of the university and of scholarship itself. He deplored their conviction that ignorance is to be cherished as a virtue and their eagerness to learn nothing from history. And he disliked coercive violence; Goodman endorsed such violence as fist-fights as an unambiguous expression of feelings that cleared the air and resolved tension. But the penultimate days of the 1960s student revolt, like the war itself, repelled him.

Nor – and this is surprising – did Goodman show much interest in political activity as such. Despite his emphasis on the value of community, he displayed and aspired to few political skills. He was not sufficiently interested in other people even to manipulate them effectively over a long period of time. Before his death Goodman had, in effect, abandoned the student left wing: though he remains one of its memorable figures.

Energy that contemporaries who shared his social values were devoting to action that brought them to the unfavourable attention of the authorities, Goodman devoted to his career. He struggled to become recognized as an established academic for most of his life; but though much in demand as a visiting lecturer after *Growing Up Absurd* was published, he never received a conventional, tenured academic appointment. He became a graduate student at the University of Chicago in 1936, survived in the 'second city' for four years before returning to New York, and resided there for the rest of his life. Eighteen years later, he completed his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago; it was published as *The Structure of Literature* by the University of Chicago Press in 1954. This seems an unpromising record for a revolutionary social critic. Yet, as an author Goodman rather admired once observed: 'Sweet are the uses of adversity which like the toad, ugly and venomous, bears yet a precious jewel in its head' (Shakespeare, *As You Like It*). The same might on occasion have been said of Goodman himself. But his protracted earlier exemption from public haunts certainly served to protect and preserve him for later, invaluable service; as did his 1944 draft deferment and rejection.

Two other important *leitmotifs* that recurred throughout Goodman's statements placed him conspicuously in the limelight of contemporary controversies, but would limit his influence today: his attitudes toward the authority of science and toward psychotherapy. He supported both enthusiastically. In the 1950s these were positions that rather sharply defined one's place on the spectrum of enlightened opinion.

Then as now, the general public accepted science as the arbiter of truth and the source of progress. But after the atomic bombing of Japan and the testing of the

hydrogen bomb, even mainstream thought, and certainly progressive intellectuals, became wary of the sinister possibilities of scientific development and of the uses to which governments might put it. A self-proclaimed anarchist might have been expected to share these trepidations most strongly; but Goodman, though an active and dedicated opponent of American belligerence, did not see the uses to which institutionalized science lends itself as implicit in the nature of scientific endeavour itself.

Paradoxically, Goodman's confidence in the beneficent promise of science confirms Lord Snow's famous complaint that the profound and mutual ignorance of the 'two cultures' – scientists and humanists – jeopardizes the society they share with all of us. Few scientists could have been quite so uncritical of the limitations of their own discipline. But as a former student and disciple of Richard McKeon trained in philosophy at Columbia and the University of Chicago, Goodman should have been more sceptical of the scientific method as an epistemological instrument. And certainly after 1962 when Thomas Kuhn's epoch-making *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was published and most of Goodman's most influential decade still lay before him, any serious scholar should have become aware that scientific knowledge, like all knowledge, was inherently ideological and contingent on the politics of its discipline. Goodman continued to hope against hope, however, that it might serve the world as *deus ex machina*. This, like his patriotism and of a piece with it, tends to obscure the continued validity of his more fundamental contributions to social thought, making his work appear naïve and imperfect.

Again paradoxically, the ideas about human feeling and thought that informed Goodman's work, including his early adherence to the Dionysian doctrines of Wilhelm Reich and his later practice of gestalt therapy as a lay analyst, were strongly and often sardonically anti-scientific. The paradox probably never troubled him, since his objections to a scientific approach to psychotherapy were not directed against the conventions of scientific method as such, but against treating human emotion and behaviour as phenomena that could best be analysed coolly apart from the contexts in which they occurred. Gestalt therapy, as formulated by Fritz and Lore Perls, with whom Goodman worked, was not a research technique. Theoretically, it was a miscellany and proud of it: the predecessor of the 'encounter-group' and 'primal scream' procedures that became fashionable a few years later. But this was 1951, when Goodman collaborated with Perls on the second volume of *Gestalt Therapy*. In a passage from the book Goodman asserts that patients who surrender to gestalt therapy are helped

by finally 'standing out of the way', to quote the great formula of Tao. They disengage from their preconceptions of how it 'ought' to turn out. And into the 'fertile void' thus formed, the solution comes flooding [Perls et al., 1951, pp. 358–9].

But the basic approach is illustrated in an earlier passage:

The only useful method of argument is to bring into the picture the total context of the problem, including the conditions of experiencing it, the social milieu and the personal 'defenses' of the observer. That is, to subject the opinion and his holding of it to gestalt-analysis . . . we are sensible that this is a development of the argument ad hominem, only

much more offensive, for we not only call our opponent a rascal and therefore in error, but we also charitably assist him to mend his ways [Perls et al., 1951, p. 243]!

Tao? It sounds a lot more like Mao. And, having observed one gestalt therapy session at Goodman's invitation, I can confirm that it looked and felt that way too. Both Mao and Lao-tzu had a strong appeal to dissenting youth in the 1960s; and both had something useful and unfamiliar to contribute to their understanding, and ours, of what is wrong with the world we live in. But Goodman was, indeed, neither a Maoist nor a Taoist; he seems to have been a bit of a Manichaeon, and that has made his thought biodegradable.

If those views on the care and nurture of the human psyche that appealed to counter-cultural youth then seem repellently atavistic today, it is not so much because their specific content is obsolete but because the prevailing attitude toward psychotherapy of any school has changed. Like science, psychotherapy now seems neither a promising instrument of liberation nor necessarily of oppression; though it can be and often is effectively used for either purpose. More fundamentally, both are epiphenomena of modern industrial society and, as such, cannot be innocent of its abuses. We take them for what they are worth, pay more for their prospective benefits than we can possibly afford, and worry, with good reason, about the consequences. Lao-tzu did give warning, though, that to those who seek to seize the good while rejecting the evil, as Goodman consistently did, evil returns with redoubled strength.

The common factor underlying Goodman's faith in the authority of science and the effectiveness of psychotherapy, which has now become much less acceptable, is his commitment to intrusiveness: that is, confident technical intervention into conditions and processes he found deplorable. This has changed, though probably not permanently, in the past twenty years. Partly in response to the Viet Nam fiasco, even Americans have come to understand that good intentions are no guarantee of good results, and no justification for meddling forcefully in situations you may not understand as well as you think you do. Neither Goodman nor I, of course, would agree that our intentions in Indochina *were* good, so this seems a rather limited insight. But, even though this falls far short of true repentance, it is sometimes enough to temper current responses to reformist zeal.

Today, Goodman's hectoring tone seems offensively optimistic. Most of the abuses he attacked are too deeply rooted in our culture and our economy to be eradicated without risking its destruction: a hazardous and thankless – though necessary – undertaking. Perceptive and prescient as he clearly was, his approach to problems and his rhetoric now seem self-indulgent, imprecise and, curiously, both streetwise and naïve. In a word, perhaps, adolescent – a word Goodman would surely have recognized as a compliment.

Three books about education

In the preceding section of this profile, I have discussed how the most salient convictions and issues that pervade Paul Goodman's work were affected by the social climate in which he lived, and how that social climate determined the way his work

was received. In doing this I have made his development and his place in society appear more coherent than, in fact, they could have been. And I have not explained how an extremely prolific author who did not address questions of education until the final decade of his 60 years should have earned so prominent a place among critics of schooling.

Goodman's life was in fact more coherent than his reputation would suggest. One could hardly have expected, considering the sexual orientation that coloured his work and that he proclaimed publicly long before most gay men thought it prudent, that Goodman would have lived, consecutively, with two women for most of his adult life. The first, Virginia Miller, who lived with him for five years, bore him a daughter. The second, Sally Duchsten, bore him a son and a daughter seventeen years apart. The couple lived together for twenty-seven years until Goodman's death.

Despite his evident delight in the role of iconoclast and anarchist, his family was the heart of his emotional commitment. His son Matthew's clear-eyed, humorous affection for his father was apparent to anyone who knew him. It was mutual, certainly. Matthew was killed in a mountaineering accident in 1967, shortly before his 21st birthday. Although he was not there at the time, the tragedy also ended Goodman's life, though it took five years to do it.

Though Goodman sometimes gloried in promiscuity, he was largely incapable of infidelity. And though he wrote in every conceivable genre – poetry, plays, novels, short stories, literary and social criticism – his *œuvre* is coherent: even, indeed, repetitious. In some of these forms – plays especially and sometimes poetry – he wrote very badly; and his best work was often angrily polemical and none the worse for that. But taken at a whole, it is remarkably faithful to the values and issues that concerned Goodman deeply.

Yet, the reception accorded to *Growing Up Absurd* marked a change in the nature of Goodman's output. He no longer published works like the essays his friend Taylor Stoehr collected and published posthumously under the title *Nature Heals: The Psychological Essays of Paul Goodman* (Stoehr, 1977) and *Gestalt Therapy* (Perls et al., 1951). He no longer produced the short stories that he had previously written so prolifically, four volumes of which Stoehr would also collect and publish after Goodman's death (Stoehr, 1978–80).

Growing Up Absurd marks an intellectual divide between Goodman's earlier, largely forgotten literary and philosophical writing and his later polemical writing on issues of public policy, especially education, which seems more pertinent than ever. What brought this change about? Did Goodman's interests suddenly alter? That depends on what is meant by 'interests'. But on the whole, the answer is 'no'.

It was certainly in Goodman's interest to exploit the opportunity to reach the wider audience that fame had brought him. For the first time in his 50 years, he and his family enjoyed a decent income. Interest in his fiction also revived; *The Empire City* (1959) and the short stories attracted renewed interest and were reprinted. But only by continuing to develop the kind of social criticism manifested in *Growing Up Absurd* could he continue to meet and foster the growth of the demands now being made on him as a public speaker, reaching their summit perhaps in an

invitation to deliver the prestigious Massey Lectures for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on 'The Moral Ambiguity of America' in 1966 (Goodman, 1967), and as a contributor to major American journals of opinion.

Critics disagree as to whether *Growing Up Absurd* is Goodman's best book; but there can be no doubt that it became the most influential. Why is this, and why did it lead to his becoming recognized as a leading authority on education?

Goodman has not really that much to say about schools as such in *Growing Up Absurd*; that came later in *Compulsory Miseducation* (1964). *Growing Up Absurd* provided him with a forum from which to address the issues of sexuality, community, and the truncation of emotional and intellectual development that had concerned him all his life. But people in industrial societies think of youth as school-children; during school hours it is illegal for them to be anywhere else. Among the prevailing assumptions about schools is that they prepare pupils for useful employment and successful careers, and are designed to further their development; that schools should discipline their exuberant sexuality; that school is where they belong and is the right place for them to be – at worst, it keeps the kids off the streets. Rejection of schooling is a serious social problem which readers expected *Growing Up Absurd* to help them solve.

Goodman rejected all these assumptions. He insisted that serious improvement in education, as in life, could only be achieved by fundamental restructuring of society itself.

For it can be shown – I intend to show – that . . . our abundant society is at present simply deficient in many of the most elementary objective opportunities and worthwhile goals that could make growing up possible. It is lacking in enough man's work. It is lacking in honest public speech, and people are not taken seriously. It thwarts aptitude and creates stupidity. It corrupts ingenuous patriotism. It corrupts the fine arts. It shackles science. It dampens animal ardor. It discourages the religious convictions of Justification and Vocation and it dims the sense that there is a Creation. It has no Honor. It has no Community.

Just look at that list. There is nothing in it that is surprising, in either the small letters or the capitals. I have nothing subtle or novel to say in this book; these are the things that everybody knows [Goodman, 1960, p. 12].

Well, yes. Isn't that what society is supposed to do? Civilization has its discontents.

As to jobs and careers; Goodman regards these as crucially important. How could he not? The first chapter in *Growing Up Absurd* deals with and is entitled 'Jobs': the school's role in preparing pupils to acquire them.

For the uneducated there will be no jobs at all. This is humanly most unfortunate, for presumably those who have learned something in schools, and have the knack of surviving the boredom of those schools, could also make something of idleness; whereas the uneducated are useless at leisure too. It takes application, a fine sense of value, and a powerful community-spirit for a people to have serious leisure, and this has not been the genius of the Americans.

From this point of view, we can sympathetically understand the pathos of our American school policy, which otherwise seems so inexplicable; at great expense compelling kids to go to school who do not want it and who will not profit by it. There are, of course, unpedagogic motives, like relieving the home, controlling delinquency, and keeping kids

from competing for jobs. But there is also this desperately earnest pedagogic motive of preparing the kids to take *some* part in a democratic society that does not need them. Otherwise, what will become of them if they don't know anything?

Compulsory public education spread universally during the nineteenth century to provide the reading, writing, and arithmetic necessary to build a modern industrial economy. With the overmaturity of the economy, the teachers are struggling to preserve the elementary system when the economy no longer requires it and is stingy about paying for it. The demand is for scientists and technicians, the 15 per cent of the 'academically talented' [Goodman, 1960, pp. 32–3].

For Goodman – an admirer of John Dewey, who so strongly believed that schooling must be rooted in personal experience and community life – the schools are part of the problem. As components of what he calls 'the organized system' they cannot contribute much to the solution. *Growing Up Absurd* is devoted to an indictment of that system, category by category, for its baleful influence on 'Class Structure', 'Aptitude', 'Patriotism' and 'Faith': these are some of the chapter headings. In a final chapter, 'The Missing Community', Goodman sums up in some detail '*the missed revolutions of modern times – the fallings-short and the compromises – that add up to the conditions that make it hard for the young to grow up in our society*' (Goodman's italics) (Goodman, 1960, p. 231). If his diagnoses no longer astonish, it is because, in the thirty-two years since he made them, there has been so little improvement despite a lot of technological and superficial political change.

As an anarchist, Goodman could hardly have been required to present and advocate a systematic programme for social change. Nor does he. It is his anarchy, rather than his genuine patriotism, that saved him from being condemned as a subversive. Having no great expectations of the state, he made no doctrinaire demands for fundamental change. He was a libertarian, not a socialist. You can't be more American than that!

Four years after *Growing Up Absurd*, Goodman published a book dealing specifically with education, or rather, as the title indicates, *Compulsory Miseducation* (1964). The book is essentially a much shorter sequel to *Growing Up Absurd*, but it provides a more manageable source for readers primarily interested in Goodman's thought about education.

Unlike *Growing Up Absurd*, *Compulsory Miseducation* offers a multipronged critique of schooling, and provocative programmes for improving education at the elementary, secondary and college level. These are less often directed at improving schooling than at enabling learners to escape and find alternatives to the schools that might enhance rather than impair their prospects for education.

It is in the schools and from the mass media, rather than at home or from their friends, that the mass of our citizens in all classes learn that life is inevitably routine, depersonalized, venally graded; that it is best to toe the mark and shut up; that there is no place for spontaneity, open sexuality, free spirit. Trained in the schools, they go on to the same quality of jobs, culture, politics. This *is* education, mis-education, socializing to the national norms and regimenting to the national 'needs' [Goodman, 1964, p. 23].

Asserting that 'the compulsory system has become a universal trap and it is no good' (Goodman, 1964, p. 31), Goodman presents six alternative proposals:

1. Have 'no school at all' for a few classes. These children should be selected from tolerable, though not necessarily cultured, homes. They should be neighbors and numerous enough to be a society for one another and so that they do not feel merely 'different'. . . . This experiment cannot do the children any academic harm, since there is good evidence that normal children will make up the first seven years' school-work with four to seven years of good teaching.
2. Dispense with the school building for a few classes; provide teachers and use the city itself as the school – its streets, cafeterias, stores, movies, museums, parks and factories. . . .
3. Use appropriate *unlicensed* adults of the community – the druggist, the storekeeper, the mechanic – as the proper educators of the young into the grown-up world. . . . Certainly it would be a useful and animating experience for the adults.
4. Make class attendance not compulsory, in the manner of A. S. Neill's Summerhill. If the teachers are good, absence would tend to be eliminated; if they are bad, let them know it. The compulsory law is useful in getting the children away from their parents, but it must not result in trapping the children. . . .
5. Decentralize an urban school (or do not build a new big building) into small units, 20 to 50, in available storefronts or clubhouses. These tiny schools, equipped with record-player and pin-ball machines, could combine play, socializing, discussion, and formal teaching. For special events, the small units can be brought together into a common auditorium or gymnasium, so as to give the sense of the greater community. . . .
6. Use a pro-rata part of the school money to send children to economically marginal farms for a couple of months a year, perhaps six children from mixed backgrounds to a farmer. The only requirement is that the farmer feed them and not beat them; best, of course, if they take part in the farm work. . . .

Above all, we must apply these or any other proposals to particular individuals and small groups, without the obligation of uniformity. There is a case for uniform standards of achievement, lodged in the Regents [the New York State Education Authority] but they *cannot* be achieved by uniform techniques [Goodman, 1964, pp. 32–4].

In retrospect these suggestions, though sincerely offered, do not seem quite serious as efforts to correct the deficiencies of schooling Goodman attacked. He was obliged to offer them; critics, especially in the United States, are expected to tell their readers how to correct the abuses they deplore. Goodman, moreover, was ambivalent about his status as an intellectual and wanted badly to be regarded as a practical man. I can recall him reporting indignantly on the reaction of some broadcasting executives who had invited him to take part in a panel on the influence of sponsors on programme content. In those days, programmes were associated with individual sponsors who frequently interfered directly in programme planning; and Goodman suggested instead that they be permitted to buy time for their commercial messages as they do advertising space in periodicals, rather than identify themselves as 'the company that brings you' whatever.

This, of course, is the way television is financed today; but Goodman reported that the executives were infuriated by his attempt to help them solve the problem. 'We expected you to attack our programming as dreadful', they explained, 'but it's inevitably so! We didn't expect you to try to tell us how to run our business.' Goodman published this account, but I am daunted by the task of finding the quote among his mass of publications, and I did hear him tell this story myself. Often.

Throughout his work, Goodman complained that nothing would actually be done to correct the things he complained about since, whatever they were, they reflected establishment policy or they would not have occurred in the first place. In fact, his suggestions came to be widely adopted, though in piecemeal and diminished form. Some were assimilated into established practice, like taking pupils out into the city itself, which expanded from the conventional field-trip into a much more comprehensive interaction of the kind Goodman described, initiated by an innovative school superintendent in Philadelphia. Respected mainstream practitioners like TheodoreSizer, in his influential books *Horace's Compromise* (1984) and *Horace's School* (1992), recommended dividing large, impersonal schools into smaller units, each with its own faculty, though he would design a much more academic curriculum than Goodman. Sizer's plan is now being explored in practice by some 200 members of the Coalition of Essential Schools, formed in 1984 (Sizer, 1992, pp. 207 et seq.).

Conversely, several of the educational practices Goodman condemns in *Compulsory Miseducation* have been either abandoned or assimilated beyond recognition. It is difficult even to remember now just what was meant by 'programmed instruction': the fad of 'teaching machines' to which Goodman devoted his entire Chapter 6 (Goodman, 1964, pp. 80-91). Computers have become less conspicuous but more ubiquitous in schooling, as in real life: while the threat of depersonalization and diminution of the teacher's role has been even more fully realized by institutional than by technological means.

The de-skilling of the teaching profession, which has been the subject of much of Michael Apple's (1979) brilliant work, is being accomplished by prescription rather than by mechanization, with published teacher's guides scripting permissible uses of materials. The centralization of curricular construction and the penalties incurred by teachers who expand on the materials provided has gone much further than Goodman could have imagined, and not only or even primarily in the United States. James Meikle (1992) reports recent tightening of national control over education in the United Kingdom where 'a compulsory canon of great works' will also be introduced on the advice of the National Curriculum Council, whose recommendations were welcomed by John Patten, the Education Secretary. He also ordered that for the next three years all 14-year-olds must face tests in one of Shakespeare's plays: *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, *Romeo and Juliet*, and *Julius Caesar*. In the recommendations, David Pascall, the former Downing Street adviser who chairs the National Curriculum Council, suggested that teachers should sensitively correct pupils who speak sloppily in playgrounds. 'English is the most important national curriculum subject,' he said. 'It provides the foundation for all future learning and for success in life.' Nearly thirty years earlier, Goodman (1964, p. 79) had observed:

Speech cannot be personal and poetic when there is embarrassment of self-revelation, including revelation to oneself, nor when there is animal diffidence and communal suspicion, shame of exhibition and eccentricity, clinging to social norms. Speech cannot be initiating when the chief social institutions are bureaucratized and predetermine all procedures and decisions, so that in fact individuals have no power anyway that is useful to express. Speech

cannot be exploratory and heuristic when pervasive chronic anxiety keeps people from risking losing themselves in temporary confusion and from relying for help precisely on communicating, even if the communication is Babel.

Appropriate as it clearly was for Goodman to offer useful suggestions for improving the quality of schooling, I find that they weaken his work. Its main strength lies in the clarity of the moral and civic vision on which he based his criticism of the school and the society of which they were a part, and whose instrument they were and are. It is disturbing to find him nevertheless so ready to help make the best of a bad job; though, for the student's sake, one has to try. Thirty years later, it is apparent that many of the suggestions he offered have indeed been adopted as customary practice; and that, indeed, they have not made much difference after all.

As the whole tenor of Goodman's discussion shows, effective improvements in schooling depend upon drastic improvement in the social and political status of youth. They have been waiting a long time. The third and final section of *Compulsory Miseducation* is devoted to a discussion of college education. Goodman initially emphasizes the unsuitability of academic education for many young people who feel compelled to go to college for the sake of their economic future, and to which, in any case, college may offer little that is relevant. One of his persistent concerns in much of his work, which the experience of young drop-outs in the 1960s reinforced, is the extreme difficulty of managing a life of stable, decent poverty outside the rat-race. Goodman (1964, pp. 124-30) offers 'Two Simple Proposals' to make college more meaningful and accessible. The first is that

half a dozen of the most prestigious liberal arts colleges . . . would announce that, beginning in 1966, they required for admission a two-year period, after high school, spent in some maturing activity. . . . The purpose of this proposal is twofold: to get students with enough life experience to be educable on the college level . . . and to break the lockstep of twelve years of doing assigned lessons for grades, so that the student may approach his college studies with some intrinsic motivation, and therefore perhaps assimilate something that might change him.

The second even simpler proposal is that grading be abolished and testing used, albeit more extensively, for diagnostic purposes in guiding teaching. Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, has, in effect, done this; though students still must ultimately write acceptable dissertations in order to graduate.

It is not that simple, as Goodman must have known. This section of *Compulsory Miseducation* dealing with college seems to be tacked on, digested from the work Goodman published in 1962, *The Community of Scholars*. Much of the book is devoted to a casually presented history of universities from medieval times, intended to define their essential nature and judge how much of that may still be rescued from the ravages of bureaucratization. The book is sensible and, for its time, highly perceptive. Goodman, moreover, was about the only left-leaning critic of education who wrote with respect for, and commitment to, classical learning; as, indeed, 'a man of letters in the old-fashioned sense' though prideful of the letters 'Ph.D.'. Still, *The Community of Scholars* now seems a bit peculiar, like a treatise on cetology written by Jonah.

Goodman's place among critics of education: then and now

In 1967, the journalist and social critic, Peter Schrag, published an article in the *Saturday Review* in which he summarized and appraised the critique of schooling that a number of us with somewhat similar perspectives had generated during the previous decade. Besides myself and Goodman, Schrag included George Dennison, John Holt, Herbert Kohl and Jonathon Kozol, among others. James Herndon, the most perceptive of us all, as well as the only one who had been and was to remain a public schoolteacher all his working life, had not yet published *The Way It Spozed to Be* (1968), the first of a series of books that still provide the best account I know of how schools – in this case in northern California – really operate from day to day.

Schrag called us 'education's romantic critics', by which he meant that our warm concern for schoolchildren was admirable but our political demands on schools were unrealistic. But in the 1960s, in the United States, cultural conflict was pervasive and intense enough to suggest that, though politics may be the art of the possible, that art was getting more expressionistic. We were a part of the movement: Archimedes searching for tenure.

Although we recognized one another as peers who shared many common values that were poorly served in schools, there were significant differences among us. George Dennison founded the First Street School on Manhattan's Lower East Side in the autumn of 1964, with a group of twenty-three children, mostly poor, with whom the public schools had failed. Their only common feature at the outset was their detestation of, and distrust for, the schooling that had branded them as failures. The school was brought to an abrupt demise at the end of the school year by its own success: when it ran out of money, it was refused foundation grants on the grounds that, having proved itself successful, it was ineligible as an experimental school. Dennison (1969) described the school and its pupils in *The Lives of Children*, perhaps the best-written and most moving book any of us had written.

Though he trained with Paul Goodman at the Institute for Gestalt Therapy and quotes from him favourably in *The Lives of Children*, Dennison's work reveals, by comparison, Goodman's sentimentality. Dennison's pupils do use the city as their classroom, often driving him beyond exasperation by their extramural behaviour:

By this time I was thoroughly disgusted with all of them, their incessant screaming, their violence, their fearfulness, their shallow, wretched personalities, their superstitions, their worship of Cadillacs and crooks, their stupid fantasies, their impatience, their emptiness. I turned around without a word and walked away, fully intending to abandon them and go home [Dennison, 1969, p. 145].

Oh, sure, José, the saturnine young Puerto Rican whom Dennison virtually nurses back to literacy after the New York City schools had driven the native language he had read and written fluently out of his mind, contrasts sharply with Goodman's wish-fulfilment: Horatio, the fantastic adolescent Latino hero of *The Empire City*

(1959). Still, Goodman was correct in wanting to send some of the city kids he loved for a respite on a farm like Dennison's; and Dennison, I believe, would have welcomed them to the farm in Maine where he spent his later life as a distinguished novelist.

John Holt, one of Dennison's closest friends, was also totally unlike Goodman. Holt was a cool man; a US Navy submarine commander during the Second World War and a mathematics teacher. His first book and the one that made him famous, *How Children Fail* (1967), originated in Holt's curiosity about the intellectual miscarriages that make it impossible for some children to learn simple arithmetic. Careful observation revealed to him that they were usually preoccupied with a quite different problem: figuring out from her behaviour what answer the teacher wanted, they were not thinking about mathematics at all.

Even today, people often misquote the title of Holt's book as '*Why Children Fail?*': but Holt was never that clinical: he meant 'how', not 'why'; and as soon as he understood 'how', 'why' was obvious. Schools ran on competition and anxiety, and the children understood quite well what was actually demanded of them and that failure must be avoided at whatever cost to what they might otherwise have learned. Holt came quickly to share – perhaps he surpassed – Goodman's loathing and contempt for institutionalized schooling as an obstacle to education. As a life-long bachelor, I think he prized children as people more than any of us and had an uncanny rapport with them.

He and Goodman could not have been less similar: Goodman the quintessential New York Jew, a seductive lecturer at once casual and pretentious; Holt, midwestern born and Colorado bred, also casual but a dull and simple lecturer whose audience and readers understood exactly what he meant. What they did have in common was an interest in local, community politics, to which they brought contrasting emphases. Goodman was an ideologue for community; Holt was a quiet technician increasingly skilled at showing parents how to get their children out of the organized system Goodman so stridently condemned. He organized a network of correspondents throughout North America and beyond with a newsletter through which parents could keep one another informed about their progress and problems in organizing small, independent schools or home schooling for their children. But he had very little interest in the broader issues of politics, and never seriously addressed the segregationist implications of his approach to deschooling, which would certainly and properly have troubled Goodman. He wrote several books after *How Children Fail*, some intended to suggest to teachers ways they might improve their instruction, but increasingly devoted to getting children out of formal schools altogether, like *Teach Your Own: A Hopeful Path for Education* (1981).

Herbert Kohl and Jonathan Kozol – both former Harvard undergraduates – began by focusing their attention on the difficulties slum and, especially, black children encounter in schooling. Their approach contrasts with that of Herndon who, equally respectful of such pupils as human beings, writes of them as equals with a sardonic appreciation for their strategies in dealing with schools that can be a lot dumber than they are. Kohl's *36 Children* (1967) is an account of his poignant

experiences in teaching English and, especially, poetry to classes of Harlem school-children who often developed real poetic gifts, only to have them stifled by school administrators who were shocked by the student's language and who denied that children could even have had the experiences with pimps and drug-pushers that they wrote about so vividly.

Throughout his career, Kohl has continued to write about the concrete difficulties of teaching caringly and effectively in American public schools. Only he and Herndon have devoted their attention so fully to discussing most imaginatively and most practically what can be done for pupils, and how to get it done in a conventional school setting. Kohl's book *Growing Minds: On Becoming a Teacher* (1984) is a small masterpiece, at once a moving autobiographical account of his motives in choosing his profession and his formative experiences along the way, and a series of finely honed, detailed case-studies of classroom problems and how to deal with them effectively. The book is seductive, yet honest:

I am sorry to make learning to teach well seem like such a lonely activity, but it has been that way for me. For over twenty years now, I've tried to talk with colleagues and administrators about educational ideas and things that have a chance of interesting and challenging students, and have generally received stares of incomprehension. It wasn't so much that the educators didn't like me or my ideas, but that they had settled into the established curriculum and it had settled into them. Teaching meant performing a series of tasks within a set time without losing control. The teacher as skilled craftsman or creative artist was not part of the image they had of themselves [Kohl, 1984, p. 137].

Jonathan Kozol's career has taken him a long way from his beginnings as the undergraduate – though even then radical – editor of the *Harvard Crimson*. His first book, *Death at an Early Age* (1967), dealt with the wretched treatment of black children in the Boston schools of the day. It is an angry, poignant and wholly authentic indictment of indecent school practice; but Kozol's underlying interest lies primarily in the processes, and the effects, of impoverishment and exploitation in which schooling plays so important and so ambivalent a part. He has continued to write about schooling: *Children of the Revolution: A Yankee Teacher in the Cuban Schools* (1978) is a warmly sympathetic though occasionally critical account of Cuban schools Kozol visited in 1976 and 1977 (he did not teach there); and his most recent book, *Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools* (1991), shows how tragically little has changed fundamentally since he wrote *Death at an Early Age*. *Rachel and Her Children: Homeless Families in America* (1989), perhaps his finest work, is about the far more serious underlying problems of poverty in the United States. Kozol, too, cites Goodman approvingly in his writing, but his understanding of poverty makes Goodman's seem almost frivolous.

Among this group of 'romantic critics', Goodman now appears to have been, in a sense, central. He was the earliest, and the first to die. His influence has been the most frequently acknowledged. His way of looking at the plight of youth in society was prophetic and trend-setting; and his influence on discussions of education, if not on the practice of schooling, has been profound. His attitudes toward sexuality and sexual expression in schooling were as exemplary as he could make

them and, had they proved acceptable, would have altered the conception of sexual abuse and deprived our culture of the materials from which it weaves its most destructive scandals. Until Ivan Illich's *Deschooling Society* (1971) appeared in the year before Goodman's death, he was both chief iconoclast and icon among left-leaning critics of education; and even today, it is he who is most likely to be remembered as our representative. Yet he had less to do with actual schooling than any of us: even I, who never attended school until I went to college.

Is this a paradox? I think not. For the striking fact is that none of us could bear the schools we criticized for long. None of us stayed there; we each escaped by one of two different routes. Dennison and Kohl spent most of their later years in the deep woods of, respectively, Maine and northern California, continuing to interest themselves in local school issues and, in Kohl's case, directing a summer camp for youngsters with learning difficulties. The rest of us, as I have indicated, either lost interest, like Holt, in the schools as such; or were shocked into a broader and deeper interest in just how a society that could support such institutions and compel its young people to attend them functioned. *Cui bono? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

In thus broadening the inquiry, Ivan Illich was to surpass us all. A Jesuit priest, born in Vienna in 1926, he burst meteorically into the arena of educational conflict through his inspired work with illiterate young Puerto Ricans in New York City. As founder of the Center for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) in 1964 in Cuernavaca, Mexico, Illich played host to most of us, including Goodman in his final years, for seminars which confronted issues far transcending education. This is not the place to attempt a summary of Illich's contribution; he requires and deserves a profile of his own [a profile of Illich appears in this volume – Ed.]. Suffice it to say that schooling served him as a metaphor for the processes of alienation and excessive technological development in all areas of social and economic life that he proceeded to explore in such works as *Tools for Conviviality* (1973) and *Medical Nemesis* (1975), among many others.

Meanwhile, to be sure, other schools of criticism distinct from the 'romantics' continued to develop in America. Radical critics like Michael B. Katz (1971), Joel Spring (1972), Clarence Karier (1975) and Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976), while sympathetic to the issues we 'romantics' had raised, rooted them much more firmly in a fundamental economic critique – anarchist or neo-Marxist as the case might be. Antithetically, conservative critics of schooling sought means of making the schools more effective instruments of socialization, and of raising standards of academic achievement or at least arresting the decline they believed to be taking place. Some, like Diane Ravitch (1978) engaged the radicals directly. Others, like David P. Gardner (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) and TheodoreSizer (1984), among many mainstream critics, accepted the conventional mission of the schools with little debate as they devised means of making them more effective instruments for, primarily, increasing the competitive advantage of American society.

This viewpoint now dominates, as it has for some years, the continuing debate about the purpose and quality of American schooling. 'Excellence' and 'lit-

eracy' become recognized as code words referring to the mastery of a traditional curriculum and of the skills and, especially, the attitudes required for successful job competition, if only because prospective employers demand the credentials that attest to them. American schooling has always been primarily job-oriented; indeed, compulsory schooling up to mid-adolescence is a creature of industrialization that became widely established throughout the world as nations developed and took on their modern form: developing nations, as Illich (1971) stresses in *Deschooling Society*, almost routinely seek to establish compulsory school systems that, if fully implemented, would bankrupt them at the outset. But traditionally, other important claims have also been advanced on behalf of state-supported schooling: the need for an informed electorate, and for the recognition of a shared, common culture. These arguments are certainly still advanced, often with mounting anxiety as the schools are seen to fall far short of achieving them. But they become less compelling as the conflict of interest between classes and between organized interest groups obscures the vision of a common culture; and the schools become more explicitly recognized as essentially a part of the mass media, at least as subject to censorship and control as film or television. Joel Spring's *Images of American Life* (1992) provides a convincing historical analysis of this development.

At this juncture, Goodman's relevance confronts a paradox. It is now clear that, despite the limitations imposed by his narcissism, his vision of schooling and its deficiencies was precise. American culture, including schools, has developed much as he warned it might. But this surely means, as he might have predicted, that his counsel will continue to go unheeded, dismissed as quaintly tainted with the inexpedient idealism of the 1960s, and as blindly reluctant, despite his patriotism, to celebrate the United States' position as permanent acknowledged leader of the forces of freedom in the world. A surprisingly large number of people share this reluctance. The problem is that, as American educators continue to narrow their claims on education, merely demanding with mounting urgency that it serve the ends of national leadership, the problems of schooling become, if no less important, certainly less distinctive and therefore less engrossing. As Goodman would surely have acknowledged, there is nothing wrong with American education except what is wrong with American society.

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Many Italian intellectuals who have a place in European history spent their lives and wrote their best essays while in prison or in exile. The more relevant their thoughts and actions were for the people's cultural and educational development, the more repressed and the more deformed was their society.

Just as Tommaso Campanelli (1568–1638) wrote the first Italian *Utopia* (*La città del sole*) during his twenty-seven years of imprisonment, Antonio Gramsci writes in prison the most important drafts on the social, cultural and political functions of intellectuals: 2,848 pages of handwritten notes which are known today as the *Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del carcere*).

What should have been, according to his original intention, the first analysis of the history of Italian intellectuals, became a prophecy on the destiny of his own work, his message and the way he is perceived by others.

According to Gramsci's analysis, the last phase and the most important dimension of many Italian intellectuals has been (and perhaps still is) to make, that is, universal, and therefore more relevant to Western or even world culture, than to Italy – relevant for the awareness and the growth of the cultural identity of the Italian people. The reason for this lies in the historical separation, that exists in Italy's than in other European countries, between culture and development, intellect and work in a traditional sense, and cultural leadership.

Education is a field where theory and practice, culture and politics, intellect and work come together, and where intellectual leadership and cultural development have vital and political stakes. However, in education, if not in research, between these two aspects of education is not a separation and the intellectual part of culture and science still has a strong role in the development of the intellectual and cultural values of culture development and the development of the political power by democratic means, which, however, can be defined as "democratic" in itself, within the traditional sense of the word, and in the sense of the word of cultural research, to define the development of the intellectual and cultural part of culture, to the growth of children and the schooling of people, whether from primary school or university.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI

(1891-1937)

Attilio Monasta

Many Italian intellectuals who have a place in European history spent their lives and wrote their best essays while in prison or in exile. The more relevant their thoughts and actions were for the people's cultural and educational development, the more repressed and the more deformed was their message.

Just as Tommaso Campanella (1568-1638) wrote the first Italian 'Utopia' (*La città del sole*) during his twenty-seven years of incarceration, so also did Antonio Gramsci write in prison the most important draft on the educational and political function of intellectuals: 2,848 pages of handwritten notes which are known today as the *Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del carcere*).¹

What should have been, according to his original intention, a critical analysis of the history of Italian intellectuals, became a prophecy on the destiny of his own work, his message and the way he is perceived by others.

According to Gramsci's analysis, the best known and the most positive function of many Italian intellectuals has been (and perhaps still is) 'cosmopolitan', that is, universal, and therefore more relevant to Western or even world civilization than to Italy - relevant for the awareness and the growth of the cultural identity of the Italian people. The reason for this lies in the historical separation, more evident in Italy than in other European countries, between cultural development, intellectual 'work' in a traditional sense, and political leadership.²

Education is a field where theory and practice, culture and politics inevitably merge together, and where intellectual research and achievement combine with social and political action. However, a distinction, if not an opposition, between these two aspects of education is not infrequent and the ideological use of culture and science often pushes toward both the 'neutralization' of the educational and political effects of cultural development and the 'justification' of the political power by domesticated theories, which, therefore, can be defined as 'ideologies'. It is difficult, within the traditional division and separation of disciplines and fields of cultural research, to define all that 'education', since education is consistently related to the growth of children and the schooling of pupils, whether from nursery school or university.

A profile of Gramsci as an 'educator', however, is not based on the few pages which can be found within his writings on school and education in a traditional sense, but rather on the assumption that the core of Gramsci's message and even the purpose of his writings is profoundly and largely 'educational'.

The early life and youth of Antonio Gramsci coincide with the first industrial and economic development of Italy. Despite the peculiarities of Italian society (i.e. the marked differences between north and south, the variety of regions, dialects and traditions, the long domination of different foreign powers and, last but not least, the domination of the Catholic Church centred on Rome), at the beginning of the twentieth century a great effort was made by the industrial and financial world to 'modernize' Italian society based on the model of central European countries. Within the 'positivistic' approach to science, technology and education, a parallel development in the 'scientific organization of work' (i.e. Taylorism for industrial production) and a scientific organization of culture and education was gradually implemented under the governments of Giolitti.³ For a short time before the First World War Italy enjoyed a period of apparent social peace, imposed at the end of the nineteenth century by reactionary governments, justified by the need for colonial conquest and paid for by a large haemorrhage of southern Italians migrating abroad, to the Americas or to Australia.

Political apprenticeship

Gramsci was born in Sardinia, one of the poorest regions of Italy, which, as is often the case with islands, has maintained its own strong cultural identity. It has its own language, history and culture, which differ considerably from those of the Piedmontese who ruled the Kingdom of Sardinia from Turin in the northern part of the mainland. It was to Turin that Antonio Gramsci went to study at university, but which he eventually had to abandon due to lack of money and severe health problems. Turin was, at that time, the centre of Italian industrialization and the focus of the first organization of the Italian working class.

Gramsci started his political and educational apprenticeship during the First World War as a journalist and theatre reporter, attending, frequently in the evening, the meetings of the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro trade union and socialist party. After the war, within the core of 'red' socialist Turin, he created two journals, *Ordine Nuovo* and *Unità*, with an explicit function: to educate the new working class created by industry and the war.

The most prevalent theme of *Ordine Nuovo* was the relationship between the 'scientific management of work' (Taylorism and Fordism) and the scientific management of education and training. However, this relationship, which has now been recognized by many as the beginning of the educational sciences, was not, for Gramsci, intended to be simply an intellectual exercise. A few years before the war, scientific research on Italian education had already been drastically marginalized and repressed by the dominant hegemony of the idealistic philosophers, Croce and Gentile, who considered this field of studies as a branch of philosophy, ethics or even religion. In 1923, Giovanni Gentile, the first Secretary of State for Education

of the new fascist government, reformed the whole Italian school system by emphasizing the ideological division between technical and vocational preparation (for work), and cultural and scientific preparation for the 'spiritual' development of mankind and, of course, for political leadership.

Gramsci was developing a different approach to these problems, which did not fall into the positivistic arrogance of solving human problems through science and technology, nor into the idealistic illusion of the 'independence' of intellectual and cultural life from economic and political determinants. The link between the organization of work and the organization of culture was rather envisaged by Gramsci as the new 'professional culture', the new technical and vocational preparation needed by manpower (from the skilled worker to the manager) to control and to lead industrial development, as well as the society which this development inevitably generates.

After 1917, the Russian Revolution captured the attention of working-class movements more than the internal problems of any other nation emerging from one of the worst European wars ever. The Socialist Party in Italy, as in many other countries, became split not only between the 'reformists' and the 'communists', but also between the 'reformists' and the 'nationalists', the latter soon becoming the populist section of the fascist party and, a few years later, the national-socialist (i.e. Nazi) regime.

From 1922, the fascist regime in Italy brought to a complete halt any attempt to find democratic solutions, not only to economic problems, but also to the social, cultural and educational growth of the people. In November 1926, Mussolini's government adopted 'special legislation', which dissolved the Italian Parliament and all remaining opposition organizations, and also banned their publications. Within the massive series of arrests that followed, Antonio Gramsci was jailed. He was 35 years old, a Member of Parliament and had been, from 1924, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party. At his trial, in 1928, the official prosecutor ended his peroration with the following statement to the judge: 'We must stop this brain working for twenty years!'

It was already evident to the fascist regime that the most dangerous opposition would come not just from political action in the traditional sense (i.e. an organization) or from an intellectual protest based only on principles, but rather from the blending of both intellectual and political criticism and action.

Gramsci's brain did not stop working in prison. On the contrary, soon after his arrest he began to make plans to conduct research on what is now considered as the most important analysis on 'hegemony', that is, on the links between politics and education. In a letter to his sister-in-law, Tatiana, dated 9 March 1927,⁴ he speaks about a project to write something *für ewig* [for ever], something which would also serve to absorb him and 'give a focus to [his] inner life'. The first point of the plan refers to a history of Italian intellectuals; then he speaks of studies on linguistics, on the theatre of Pirandello and on serial novels and popular literary taste. Even if the study plan was meant to be *für ewig*, which means for the sake of knowledge and not for practical or political purposes, the same letter already shows a common thread underlying all the different subjects. He defines the history of

intellectuals as the process of 'formation of the public spirit' and, finally, he writes that the different topics of his plan have in common 'the creative popular spirit', that is, the way the hegemony of a certain social group grows up, from the soul of the group, toward its political organization.

In fact, in another letter to Tatiana⁵ he says: 'thinking "disinterestedly" or study for its own sake are difficult for me . . . I do not like throwing stones in the dark; I like to have a concrete interlocutor or adversary', and he speaks of the 'polemical nature' of his entire intellectual formation.

Gramsci died in 1937 without having had the possibility of completing his work. His thirty-three prison notebooks were saved by his sister-in-law, Tatiana, and smuggled out of Italy. He had written a good deal before his imprisonment,⁶ but his reputation as one of the major Italian thinkers and educators rests on the *Letters from Prison* and the *Prison Notebooks*.

Gramsci: the symbol

Only after the fall of the fascist regime and the ending of the Second World War, between 1947 and 1951, was a first edition of the prison writings brought out by the Turin publisher Einaudi in six volumes. They were edited by Felice Platone and directly supervised by the general secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti. The first volume was a selection of Gramsci's letters from prison,⁷ which received the Viareggio Prize, the most prestigious Italian award for literature.

It was in 1947 that alliance between the two largest and most popular political forces involved in the defeat of the fascist regime – the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party – led the country for a few months, and Gramsci would become the symbol of fascist persecution and anti-fascist resistance. However, it was also the beginning of a sort of sanctification of Gramsci within the Olympus of traditional intellectuals: Gramsci as a philosopher, as a historian, as a political scientist, as a literature reviewer and, quite incidentally, as an educator, inasmuch as he wrote some words on school and education. The structure of the first edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* reveals how much his work could have been 're-absorbed into more traditional forms of thinking'.⁸ The six volumes of this edition are a thematic collection of the many notes, whose order is therefore rearranged according to the different themes:⁹ philosophy first and, above all, 'Marxism'; secondly, culture, and intellectuals as a separate subject; then Italian history, politics and literature; and the remaining, apparently miscellaneous notes.

The editorial construction of the image of Gramsci was justified and explained by the particular situation in which the notes were written and left. Given the incomplete nature of the work, its 'fragmentary' character and the uncertain nature of Gramsci's intentions, the editors were encouraged to give it a more coherent and readable form.

The irony was that frequently Gramsci, in his notes, pointed out the difference between the writings of an author and his or her intentions, on the one hand, and their 'fortune', on the other, which it is necessary to observe whenever one wants to understand the real 'educational' meaning of the author's message.

It was only in 1975, after important changes in the Italian political and cultural milieu, that a critical edition of the *Prison Notebooks* appeared,¹⁰ reproducing the complete texts as they were written. This means, therefore, that they were reproduced in the same order and in the different versions that Gramsci himself had written them, sometimes crossed out with a thin pen-line and frequently re-written in another more 'monographic' notebook.

It has been shown, by a philological comparison of the two editions, that it is possible to have two quite different images of Gramsci.¹¹ The faithful reproduction of his work is much less 'fragmentary' than one would have believed; through the different themes, which in fact inspired most of the titles of the first edition, there is a deep unity, a strong common message, insistently repeated. By giving examples from different fields (philosophy, history, literature, the organization of culture and schools), Gramsci wished to discover (and wished to educate towards the discovery of) the real 'intellectual function' within societies, a function that is – always and inseparably – educational and political. Inasmuch as the first edition portrays Gramsci as a leading intellectual figure, emphasizing the traditional image of the intellectual, possibly a multifaceted Renaissance man, finding even in prison the road to spiritual freedom through reading, studying and writing for posterity, the centre of his image was missing. In the early 1950s it was probably not possible, either in the West and or in the East, to reveal the truth. The dominating force of culture, whether conservative or progressive, was not ready to be the 'object' of itself, to let someone reveal its own 'material' and political roots.

Gramsci's pedagogy

The central message of Gramsci is that the organization of culture is 'organic' to the dominant power. Intellectuals cannot be defined as such by the job they do, but rather by the role they play within society; this function is always, more or less consciously, that of the technical and political 'leadership' of a group, either the dominant group or another, tending towards a dominant position.

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates organically, together with itself, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.¹²

The first example of an 'intellectual' given by Gramsci is: 'the capitalist entrepreneur', who creates, 'alongside himself, the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organizer of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc. . . . The entrepreneur himself represents a higher level of social organization, already characterized by a certain managerial and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity.' This is Gramsci's definition of 'organic' intellectuals and their function, which is, at one and the same time, technical and political. However, we must understand why many intellectuals 'put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant group', and believe themselves to be a distinctive social group. This is because

every 'essential' social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure . . . has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which, indeed, seemed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms.¹³

Examples of this type of intellectual, which Gramsci defines as 'intellectuals of the traditional type', are the ecclesiastics and a full stratum of administrators, scholars, scientists, theorists, non-ecclesiastical philosophers, etc. It is not by chance that until now many of these intellectuals have been defined in English as 'clerks', while other similar words derived from the Latin *clericus* describe, in many other languages, this traditional form of intellectual work.

If we want to find a 'unitary criterion to characterize all the diverse and disparate activities of intellectuals and to distinguish these at the same time and in an essential way from the activities of other social groupings', it is an 'error of method' to look only into 'the distinctive nature of intellectual activities, rather than at the whole system of relations in which these activities . . . have their place within the general complex of social relations'.

Criticism of the traditional distinction between 'manual work' and 'intellectual work' is one of the most important steps towards a new theory of education. Following Gramsci, this distinction is ideological as far as it diverts attention from the real functions within social and working life towards the 'technicalities' of working.

In any physical work, even the most degrading and mechanical, there exists a minimum of . . . intellectual activity. . . . All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society. . . . There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *Homo faber* cannot be separated from *Homo sapiens*.¹⁴

The educational implications of Gramsci's analysis are developed throughout the twelfth notebook (from which we have taken the above quotations). This notebook is a long 'monograph' into which Gramsci incorporated several texts taken and partially rewritten from other notebooks. His message is not at all ambiguous and finishes with this famous conclusion:

The mode of being the new intellectual can no longer consist of eloquence . . . but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator . . . ; from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains 'specialized' and does not become 'directive' (specialized and political).¹⁵

The separation between classical and technical education, which tends to reflect the social division between intellectual and manual work, must be revealed as ideological, hiding the real division, which is rather between 'directive' and 'subaltern' roles in society, no matter whether the job that characterizes a group of persons is called intellectual or manual. As far as education in a strict sense is concerned, Gramsci suggests that 'in the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unskilled level, must form the basis

of the new type of intellectual'. This means education for all, therefore, and close links between school and work, as well as between technical and humanistic education.

Gramsci's analysis on the educational and political levels is not limited to the twelfth notebook – which we consider, however, to be central – but is rather spread throughout all of his prison writings. The nineteenth notebook, again a monographic second draft of a collection of texts about the *Risorgimento* (Italian history preceding national unity), cannot be considered purely as a historical overview. The longest text of this notebook (twenty-four pages from page 119 onwards) deals with the 'problem of political leadership in the formation and development of the nation and the modern state in Italy'.¹⁶ There, we find the same analysis, explicitly based on

the methodological consistency of a criterion of historico-political research: no independent class of intellectuals exists, but every social group has its own stratum of intellectuals, or tends to form one; however, the intellectuals of the historically (and actually) progressive class, in each particular circumstance, exercise such a power of attraction that, in the final analysis, they end up by subjugating the intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity between all intellectuals, with bonds of a psychological nature (vanity, etc.) and often of a caste character (technico-juridical, corporate, etc.).

From the analysis of the development of a new ruling class, Gramsci makes an important difference between 'direction' and 'domination', which had already been made by Lenin, in order to focus on the differences between the use of force (in the so-called 'temporary' phase of proletarian dictatorship) and the use of cultural hegemony to obtain the consent of the people. However, this distinction has a different meaning for Gramsci, as far as he speaks about society being 'directed' by a new social class 'before' this class enters the government. The function of 'organic' intellectuals is that of the 'intellectual and moral' leadership of society by means of education and the organization of culture, rather than by the traditional means of legal and forceful coercion.

Within the tenth and eleventh notebooks, dealing with 'philosophy' and an account of the important role played by the Italian intellectual Benedetto Croce during the First World War and the subsequent fascist regime, we find the same analysis and other important developments. The central theme is 'political hegemony' as an educational process. It is essential to destroy, he says, the widespread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and difficult thing because it is the specific intellectual activity of a particular category of specialists or professional or systematic philosophers. It must first be shown that all men are 'philosophers', by defining the limits and characteristics of the 'spontaneous philosophy' which is proper to everybody.

This philosophy is contained in the language itself, in 'common sense' and in popular religion, that is, 'in the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of regarding things and of behaving'. The real problem, therefore, is not one of being a philosopher or not, but rather whether 'to take part in a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e. by one of the

many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious world', or 'to work out consciously and critically one's own conception of the world and thus, through the labour of one's own brain, to choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the history of the world, be one's own guide, refusing to accept passively and apathetically the moulding of one's personality from the outside'.¹⁷

One of the most debated topics within his theories of education is the relationship between 'spontaneity' and 'conformity'. Gramsci deals with this problem both in the analysis of the passage from 'spontaneous philosophy' to 'critical thinking', and in his notes on school, education and 'active education'. In acquiring one's conception of the world one always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all the social elements that share the same mode of thinking and behaving. We are all conformists of some conformity or another, always the man-in-the-street or collective man. The question is: of what historical type is the conformity, the human mass to which we belong?

A similar, though more crude, analysis on what 'conformity' is can be found in the twenty-second notebook on Americanism and Fordism. The new Tayloristic organization of work had created, for the first time in history, a radical 'massification' of the man at work, and Gramsci seems to consider it as a step forward from the primitive, even animal condition of humankind, towards a new type of man.

The history of industrialization has always been a continuing struggle (which today takes on an even more marked and vigorous form) against the characteristic of 'animality' in man. It has been an uninterrupted, often painful and bloody process of subjugating natural (i.e. animal and primitive) instincts to new, more complex and rigid habits of order, exactitude and precision, making possible the increasingly complex forms of collective life which are the necessary consequence of industrial development. . . . Up to now all changes in modes of existence and modes of life have taken place though brute coercion. . . . The selection or 'education' of men adapted to the new forms of civilization and to the new forms of production and work has taken place by means of incredible acts of brutality which have driven the weak and the non-conformists into the limbo of outcasts or eliminated them altogether.¹⁸

The crude and realistic language used by Gramsci to describe the process of 'educating' large masses of people for adaptation to the contemporary transformations of the economy made many scholars believe that he was in favour of an authoritarian pedagogy.¹⁹ On one hand, he was superficially identified with various trends of Marxist education in the USSR, and therefore his 'theory of education' was considered nearer to Lenin's theory of proletarian dictatorship, if not with Makarenko's methods of re-education for maladjusted young people. On the other hand, Gramsci himself wrote some pieces opposing 'some principles of modern education', such as those coming from the 'Geneva tradition' of Rousseau and Pestalozzi, for which the 'spontaneous development of the child's personality' must not be disturbed or deformed by the intervention of the educator. In some of his letters and in one of the first notes he criticizes the 'illusion' of the 'spontaneous development' of the child: from the first moment of his or her life, the child is educated to 'conform' to the environment, and school is only a small 'fraction' of one's life. 'Education is

always a struggle against the instincts related to the basic biological functions, a struggle against nature, to dominate it and to create the "actual" human being'.²⁰ And the effort of learning, the psychological and physical discipline necessary for studying and for any educational achievement, is not 'pleasant': 'it is a process of adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, tedium and even suffering'.²¹

While one could have some doubts about Gramsci's actual opinion of 'pedagogics' (i.e. teaching methods at school or in the family), because of the relatively small development of these topics within his work, the general theory of education coming from Gramsci's thinking is unequivocal.

Any interpretation of Gramsci's theory of education could be misleading if we do not differentiate between his 'descriptive' and his 'prescriptive' approach. The term 'conformity' does not mean for Gramsci the negative tendency of people to let themselves be driven and conditioned by 'fashion', but rather an instrument for the interpretation of the process through which the majority of the population, within any society and under any regime, usually follow tradition and stick to the rules.

Conformity, then, means nothing other than 'sociality', but it is nice to use the word 'conformity' precisely because it annoys imbeciles. . . . It is too easy to be original simply by doing the opposite of what everyone else is doing. . . . What is really difficult is to put the stress on discipline and sociality and still profess sincerity, spontaneity, originality and personality.²²

The real problem for education is therefore an awareness of the different types of 'conformity', such as socialization, which are proposed or imposed within a given society and the struggle for one rather than another. The real innovation of Gramsci's general theory of education is the 'scientific' approach to what education really is, at any level, from political leadership to social 'conformity', and up to the school and family life. However, following the traditional value-oriented approach to education, one could ask some delicate questions. Does Gramsci's theory necessarily imply a cynical perspective on education? Can we have criteria to 'prescribe' rather than purely 'describe' the type of education that would be preferable?

These questions imply the analysis of values and beliefs, that is, the problem of 'ideology' and its function in modern society. We can translate our questions in the following way: Can we have education without ideology, and, if we cannot, how can we prefer one ideology to another?

In the first step of analysing ideologies, Gramsci clarifies that 'ideologies do not exist in themselves'; they are deformations of theories resulting from a theory becoming a 'doctrine', that is, not an instrument for understanding the reality but rather a set of moral principles for 'orienting' practical actions and human behaviour. This development from theory to doctrine and into ideology is not 'spontaneous', arising from inside the theory itself, but rather 'organic' to the political use of theories, which is in itself ideological. 'Ideology' is an adjective, one could say, given that we do not have ideologies in a proper sense, but rather the ideological (i.e. educational) use of theories and doctrines.

One of the few notes that remained unpublished before the critical edition of the *Quaderni del carcere* gives us Gramsci's definition of 'ideology': ideology is 'a

scientific hypothesis which has a dynamic educational character and is verified and criticized by the actual development of history'.²³

The critical function of education, which also seems to be essential in Gramsci's thought, could be put at risk if we believe it necessary to relate education to ideology. It is difficult to say what education should be according to Gramsci, since he seems to be more interested in revealing what education actually is.

The philosophy of praxis

Another similar 'case-study', to which Gramsci frequently refers, is that of Machiavelli. His name and the adjective 'Machiavellian' still recall the brutal and perverse aspects of political power, because he 'described' what politics really was (and perhaps always will be), rather than suggesting what politics could be.

Gramsci and Machiavelli leave us with an important question: What is the 'educational' function of a precise description of the mechanisms of political power, and, in the case of Gramsci, of the mechanisms of ideology? That of educating people towards a realistic approach and therefore towards the political struggle opposing one power with another, or that of revealing to the people the hidden side of politics, to make them diffident and independent from political power in living their lives and choosing their opinions?

Many signals lead us to believe that Gramsci's aim was not purely 'descriptive' and he suggests a strategy for a new type of education.

First of all, his interpretation of 'Machiavellian policy': when writing about the role played by Machiavelli in the scientific description of 'politics', Gramsci poses to himself and to all of us these questions: 'Whom' was Machiavelli addressing when writing *The Prince*? What was his aim and his 'policy'? It seems to be evident that he did not wish, and he did not need, to teach rulers how to achieve power and how to maintain power, but rather he wanted to explain and make known the real mechanism of politics. The 'policy' of Machiavelli is not 'politics' according to Machiavelli, because the educational effect of a critical understanding of politics made new classes more aware and therefore more powerful against the old aristocratic ruling class.

Secondly, the scientific and 'descriptive' process in itself introduces a new conception of 'critical thinking'; according to common sense, criticism is a sort of opposition against what we do not want; on the contrary, 'critical thought' is not, for Gramsci, a theoretical game which opposes one theory with another, one ideology with another, or the 'idealistic illusion' that theory, culture and, therefore, education could be 'independent' from their historical 'material' base. For Gramsci, critical thinking is the continuous research and discovery of the material bases of theory, that is, criticism of the ideological use of theory. Finally, Gramsci is not 'scientifically neutral' in his educational strategy. In his opinion, there is one particular ideological (i.e. educational) approach which is preferable to any other, not for theoretical reasons, for one is 'true' and the others are 'false', but rather for practical reasons: that is the 'philosophy of praxis', an ideological instrument for widening popular awareness of the mechanism of politics and culture, awareness

of the historical and economical determination of ideas, and therefore rendering people more able to master their own lives, to 'lead their own society and to control those who lead'.

Here is the focus of different and perhaps opposite interpretations of Gramsci's 'profile'.

'Philosophy of praxis' was identified by the editor of the first edition of Gramsci's notebooks purely and simply with 'Marxism' and 'historical and dialectic materialism'.²⁴ It was argued that Gramsci, in the work he wrote in prison, used to conceal behind key-words or paraphrases the names and definitions that could have caused the censor to interrupt his work. This is only partially true, if we consider that it was not unknown, both inside and outside prison, that he had been sentenced to imprisonment as the leader of the Italian Communist Party. In the case of the expression 'philosophy of praxis', it is evident that it is not the equivalent of 'Marxism'.

An analysis of the many points of discord between Gramsci and the 'official' and 'orthodox' doctrine of Marxism, which was being developed in the USSR while Gramsci was in prison, would take up much more space than is available in a 'profile' about Gramsci. It is enough to note that Gramsci wrote many notes strongly critical of the vulgarization of Marxism conducted by Bukharin on behalf of Stalin (before Bukharin himself became the victim of Stalinism). Moreover, it is known that Gramsci in prison disagreed with many of his comrades in the Italian Communist Party on the development of Marxism in Europe.

'Philosophy of praxis' is, for Gramsci, an autonomous term to define what he saw to be a central characteristic of Marx's heritage: the inseparable link it establishes between theory and practice, thought and action. The originality of 'philosophy of praxis' stands, according to Gramsci, in that it is the only ideology that could be critical of itself, that is, able to discover the 'material' (i.e. economic and political) roots of all doctrines (including, therefore, Marxism itself) and to adapt theory and practice continuously to each other.

One of the last ideological uses of theory, science and information seems to be, at the end of the twentieth century, the widespread message that 'ideologies fail' and 'ideologies have failed'. Within this doctrine, the old image of Gramsci as 'one of the major Marxist thinkers'²⁵ seems to be out of date and may vanish together with the disappearance of all Marxist ideas. We believe, however, that a different image of Gramsci can be found within his great work. He opened up new ways of thinking, political action and education during the 1930s, a period of world history when the three movements of dictatorship, social organization and strong conformity were in competition with each other up to the final holocaust of the Second World War. Many differences exist, of course, between Soviet Stalinism, German Nazism and American Fordism, particularly on the constitutional and political side. However, from the point of view of the largest part of the population living under these different regimes, their conditions of work, the circumstances of their lives and the educational conformity of their societies did not allow any particular space for 'critical thought' and personal development.

This is why we believe that Gramsci's message, as it now emerges from the

shadows of that historical epoch, helps us to discover a new approach to education, which is scientifically critical of all kinds of ideological and educational processes.

A new educational strategy

The main hypotheses of this theory and practice of education, which we have derived from Gramsci, are the following.

Educational processes develop in a large variety of ways and they must be studied and mastered with particular attention to the educational moments which are not usually considered educational in a strict sense. School, vocational training, adult education and university could be considered as a façade, on which the organization of culture and political power seem to be in conflict, while most of the actions of 'permanent persuasion' are taking place behind and outside the formal education system. Decisions taken within the world of the media and the world of publishing, changes made in the organization of work, choices between one technology rather than another in industry and services, the system for selection and appointment of trade-union and party officers and leaders and their function in the daily life of society, are the main arenas of the modern educational processes, concealed rather than immediately evident.

From Gramsci we can derive both a method of analysis and of educational action, focused on the types of intellectuals and the type of function they have in society, and a new educational strategy, which can also rejuvenate the education system in a strict sense, that is, primary, secondary and tertiary education.

As far as Gramsci's general theory of education is concerned, we believe that the new type of intellectuals in modern society can be more easily found among administrators and managers of industry and services, among the upper echelons of state administration and in central and local bureaucracy, as well as within the teaching profession and the growing sector of vocational and occupational training, rather than among traditional 'academic' intellectuals who still, however, seem to be opinion leaders. The latter are, more or less consciously, becoming rather an ideological screen for political and cultural operations, decided and implemented not by themselves, but through them.

One could disagree with Gramsci's analysis and educational strategy. But it cannot be denied that a study of the history of intellectuals and the history of the organization of culture has never been attempted. Intellectuals of the traditional type seem to be experts and specialists on all subjects other than themselves. This is rather meaningful and it can be explained by the arrogance (and the illusion) of believing to be the 'subject' rather than the 'object' of knowledge. However, for the intellectual function in general, and for intellectuals of a new type, the lack of awareness of their real role in society could engender a greater risk for democracy. It could mean that the real decision-making processes, namely, those related to the cultural and political hegemony within society, are displaced from their 'natural' (i.e. institutional and constitutional) ground, where popular control could be easily exercised, and are assumed by hidden powers, beyond any democratic control.

Finally, as far as the visible education system is concerned, Gramsci's approach does not mean that school and university education are irrelevant within the strategy of educating for critical thought. It suggests rather innovations in methods, content and organization of study which should be consistent with the following main points: tighter links between school and work, as well as between theory and practice; a growing attention to the history of the organization of work and of the organization of culture, and therefore more interest toward the study of the 'fortune', namely, the different interpretations, of classics and theories; and, last but not least, an open debate on the aims of education and the values on which educational action is based in a given society.

Moreover, this new educational strategy and method affect the professional status of teachers, in so far as teachers do not perceive themselves as traditional intellectuals, and therefore independent from both social and political pressures. Education as a process of conformity and hegemony could disturb most teachers, particularly those who work towards helping their pupils or students to achieve more freedom and personal independence. However, the teacher's awareness of political hegemony as an educational process, for good or bad, could be the starting point for a new professionalism of teachers and educators.²⁶

Notes

1. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere* [Prison Notebooks], edited by Valentino Gerratana, Turin, Einaudi, 1975 (identified as Q in these notes).
2. The English version of Gramsci's writings refers to the first large (though not complete) English translation of the notebooks (Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (eds. and trans.), *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971; identified as N in these notes). However, many other excerpts from the *Prison Notebooks* have been translated into English and published in another volume: D. Forgacs and G. Nowell Smith (eds.), *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Cultural Writings*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1985; identified as CW in these notes. It is interesting to note that the English translator had to make numerous references to particular difficulties of translating some words that play a central role in Gramsci's analysis, such as 'the group of words centred around the verb *dirigere* (*dirigente*, *direttivo*, *direzione*, etc.). Here we have in part followed the normal English usage dictated by the context (e.g. *direzione* = leadership; *classe dirigente* = ruling class), but in certain cases we have translated *dirigente* and *direttivo* as "directive" in order to preserve what for Gramsci is a crucial conceptual distinction between power based on "domination" and the exercise of "direction" or "hegemony". In this context it is also worth noting that the term "hegemony" in Gramsci itself has two faces. On one hand it is contrasted with "domination" (and as such bound up with the opposition state/civil society) and on the other hand "hegemonic" is sometimes used as an opposite of "corporate" or "economic-corporate" to designate an historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social area. Non-hegemonic groups or classes are also called by Gramsci "subordinate", "subaltern" or sometimes "instrumental" (pp. xiii-xiv).

3. The first Italian translation of F. W. Taylor's *The Principles of Scientific Management* dates from 1911. In 1909 Maria Montessori, the first Italian female university graduate in medicine, had published *Il metodo della pedagogia scientifica applicata all'educazione dell'infanzia* [The Method of Scientific Education Applied to Early Childhood].
4. Antonio Gramsci, *Lettere dal carcere* [Letters from Prison], pp. 57–60, edited by S. Caprioglio and E. Fubini, Turin, Einaudi, 1965.
5. Letter of 15 December 1930, *ibid.*, pp. 389–92.
6. Gramsci's writings of the period before his imprisonment were published by Einaudi after the six volumes of the *Prison Notebooks* (see note 9 below). Most of these writings are collected in a series of five volumes: Antonio Gramsci, *L'Ordine Nuovo* [The New Order] (1919–20), Turin, Einaudi, 1954; *Scritti giovanili* [Youthful Writings] (1914–18), Turin, Einaudi, 1958; *Sotto la mole* [The Crushing Weight] (1916–20), Turin, Einaudi, 1960; *Socialismo e fascismo: L'Ordine Nuovo* [Socialism and Fascism: The New Order] (1921–22), Turin, Einaudi, 1966; *La costruzione del Partito Comunista* [The Construction of the Communist Party] (1923–26), Turin, Einaudi, 1971. His famous essay on the 'southern question', which Gramsci was writing when arrested and therefore remained unfinished, was published in 1966 (Antonio Gramsci, *La questione meridionale* [The Southern Question], Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1966).
7. Antonio Gramsci, *Lettere dal carcere*, Turin, Einaudi, 1947, now superseded by a more complete edition (see note 4 above).
8. Leonardo Paggi, *Gramsci e il moderno principe. I – Nella crisi del socialismo italiano* [Gramsci and Modern Principles: I – the Crisis of Italian Socialism], Introduction, p. xi, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1970.
9. Antonio Gramsci, *Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce* [Historical Materialism and the Philosophy of Benedetto Croce], Turin, Einaudi, 1948; *Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura* [Intellectuals and the Organization of Culture], Turin, Einaudi, 1948; *Il Risorgimento* [The Resurgence], Turin, Einaudi, 1949; *Note sul Machiavelli, la politica e lo Stato moderno* [Notes on Machiavelli, Politics and the Modern State], Turin, Einaudi, 1949; *Letteratura e vita nazionale* [Literature and National Life], Turin, Einaudi, 1950; *Passato e presente* [Past and Present], Turin, Einaudi, 1951.
10. See note 1 above.
11. See Attilio Monasta, *L'educazione tradita: criteri per una diversa valutazione complessiva dei Quaderni del carcere di Antonio Gramsci* [Education Betrayed: Criteria for a Global Re-evaluation of Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*], Pisa, Giardini, 1985. (2nd ed. Florence, McColl Publisher, 1993.)
12. Q, p. 1513 (N, p. 5).
13. Q, p. 1514 (N, pp. 6–7).
14. Q, p. 1516.
15. Q, p. 1551 (N, p. 10). The central part of the twelfth notebook is dedicated to an analysis of the Italian school system and the need for development away from the old classical 'educational principle' to a new one, on which the unified and comprehensive school for all should be based. In the first edition of the *Prison Notebooks*, the texts in the twelfth notebook were split up into three different parts: the conclusion was included within the first part as a simple explanation of the definition of the new-type intellectuals and the longer texts on the school and 'in search of an educational principle' were postponed until after a long series of notes on several types of 'intellectuals'. The traditional gap between 'intellectuals' and education was therefore reinforced.
16. Q, p. 2010 (N, p. 55). The title of this note in the first version is even more meaningful: 'Political leadership before and after the conquest of the government.'

17. Q, pp. 1375-6 (N, pp. 323-4).
18. Q, pp. 2160-1 (N, p. 298).
19. Harold Entwistle, *Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
20. Q, p. 114 (our translation).
21. Q, p. 1549 (N, p. 42).
22. Q, p. 1720 (CW, p. 124).
23. Q, p. 507 (our translation).
24. See the Glossary at the end of the Foreword to Antonio Gramsci, *Il materialismo storico* . . . op. cit., pp. xix-xx.
25. See Nigel Grant's review of H. Entwistle's book in *Comparative Education* (Abingdon, Carfax), Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1981, p. 97.
26. Attilio Monasta (ed.), *The Children of Japhet: A European Programme for the New Professionality of Teachers and Trainers*, Florence, McColl Publisher, 1989.

Works on Antonio Gramsci

Studies and writings on Gramsci are extremely numerous. The largest bibliography, though relatively old, can be found in:

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Below we suggest only a few essential references to the most well known and useful sources.

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NIKOLAY GRUNDTVIG

(1783–1872)

Max Lawson

Nikolay Frederik Severin Grundtvig is Denmark's only educator of international stature¹ as well as being a theologian, historian and writer who exercised a profound influence on Danish life, even though he is far less known outside Denmark than his younger contemporaries, the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) and the writer Hans Christian Andersen (1805–75).

A clear example of Grundtvig's abiding legacy in Denmark is that, of the 754 hymns contained in the Danish Hymnal, 271 were written by Grundtvig. Many of Grundtvig's prolific writings, however, remain unpublished – a collected edition would run to at least 100 volumes – and it is only comparatively recently that Grundtvig's educational writings have been partially translated, for example, into English.² Yet the Danish folk-high-school movement, which these writings inspired, has led to Grundtvig being called 'the father of Western adult education' and interest in Grundtvig and the folk-high-school movement has extended to developing countries as well.

Grundtvig's life, particularly the first half, spanned momentous changes in Danish society. In 1788 the laws of adscription, whereby male members of the population were not allowed to move away from the estate where they were born without permission from the landowner, were abolished. Christian VII followed this reform a year later with the establishment of an education committee. By 1814, laws for compulsory school education were passed. When Denmark took the first steps towards democracy in the 1830s with the establishment of advisory assemblies from the estates of the realm (including the peasantry), Grundtvig increased his writings on education, because if the 'lower orders' were to have a voice in these advisory assemblies they had to have an appropriate education so they could effectively participate in the proceedings. At first Grundtvig had been sceptical of these councils but was soon able to declare that 'the voice of the people' was indeed heard in them and hence he pursued his educational plans with great vigour.

Before his educational writings of the 1830s, Grundtvig had experienced quite a chequered career as a clergyman. He was the very opposite of his father, a clergyman in a country village, who was content with a theology that has been described

as pietistic and conservative.³ The younger Grundtvig, while being influenced by such theology, made several departures from it. Because of his polemical writings and often abrasive behaviour, Grundtvig was for a considerable part of his life a preacher who was either forbidden to preach or allowed to preach but not to administer the sacraments. It was only through the intervention of Christian VIII on his accession to the Danish throne that Grundtvig, at the age of 55, at last had a permanent position as chaplain to Vartov, a Copenhagen church home for elderly women. This minor post (which Grundtvig held till his death at the age of 89) gave him the opportunity to continue his voluminous publications, his collected essays on education⁴ appearing only some weeks before his death.

There is an almost regular pattern in Grundtvig's life of being helped out by royal patronage. Long before being appointed to Vartov and subsequently being appointed an honorary bishop by Frederik VII, in 1818 Grundtvig had been given a royal grant in appreciation for translating Old Norse myths and sagas. Grundtvig had also been supported by the King, who gave him a series of three grants, and by the Queen, who later gave him one, to visit England in 1812, 1830, 1831 and 1843, respectively.

It was these first three visits, where Grundtvig was able to observe British education at first hand while continuing his work on Nordic mythology, together with the rapidly changing political and social scene in Denmark, that coalesced and enabled him to produce in the 1830s a series of writings in which the idea of the Danish folk high school was born.

The living word

In Grundtvig's preface to his 1832 study of Scandinavian mythology, *Nordens Mytologi* [Nordic Mythology], the first glimpses can be seen of the Danish folk high school of the future:

There will be the common centre from which the institution branches out into all the main lines of practical life, and back to which it endeavours to gather and unite all the energies of society. Here, all the civil servants of the state who do not need scholarship but life, insight and practical ability, and all those who wish to belong to the rank of the educated should get the very best chance of developing themselves in a suitable direction and of getting to know one another.⁵

Although Grundtvig's ideas for a folk high school are in the merest embryonic form in *Nordic Mythology*, nevertheless this work does contain a full dress-rehearsal for Grundtvig's later attacks on the 'schools for death', as he called the Latin grammar schools. Latin is ridiculed mercilessly; its literature Grundtvig considers to be an 'abomination . . . imitation work and unlike Greek and Old Norse did not spring from the life of the people'.⁶ In Grundtvig's contrasting of the 'spiritless and lifeless learning of the Romano-Italian'⁷ with the vivid oral traditions behind Greek and Norse mythology, there is a foreshadowing of the great importance Grundtvig was to give to oral communication in his plans for education.

Grundtvig's first long book to deal with education, *Det danske Fiir-Kløver*

[The Danish Four-leaf Clover], was written in 1836 as a response to the first sessions of the Provisional Advisory Councils, promulgated in 1831 but not meeting till 1835/36. Although Grundtvig was delighted at these assemblies that 'the people's voice had risen from the dead', he nevertheless despaired about the then present state of the 'loveliness' of the four-leaf clover – the King, the people, the homeland, the mother tongue – and saw his task as 'to write on what in my opinion must be done so that the rare and fine flower, far from withering away, can be strengthened and lift its head to the glory of the field'.⁸

The solution was to be, Grundtvig claimed, 'the voice of the People' demanding a Danish folk high school 'where everything will be about king and people, homeland and mother tongue, and where the bards who praised king and homeland in the words which they took from the mouth of the people are forced to make themselves useful for both food and honour'.⁹

This stress on the centrality of the 'bard', or *skald*, is consistent with Grundtvig's championship in 'Nordic mythology' of Scandinavian over Roman mythology. With ironic justification Grundtvig referred to himself as a *skald* and claimed that the *skald* was the real teacher of the common people because of the ability 'to entirely awaken and nourish love for the homeland and obtain strength and richness in the mother tongue'.¹⁰ Hence the centrality of myths, legends and poems in Danish in the curriculum of the first Danish folk high schools and the great importance given to the oral traditions of the past and oral communication, particularly story-telling with its rich historical precedents, of the present. Indeed note-taking in the early folk high schools was often discouraged. There is an oft-told story that Christen Kold, the folk-high-school headmaster who first gave a distinctive shape to the early folk-high-school movement, made the following comment in response to a student's complaint that he could not remember what was said if he did not take notes:

Do not worry about that. It would be another matter if we were speaking about dead knowledge. It is like what happens out there in the fields. If we put drainpipes into the ground, we must mark the place in order to find them again. But when we sow corn, there is no need to mark the place, for it comes up again. You may be sure that the things you have heard from me with joy will come up all right again when you want them.¹¹

Running parallel with Grundtvig's championship of the old bards and the centrality of the oral tradition in his concept of the folk high school is his continuing attack on Latin, 'the ruling language here [in Denmark] for six hundred years'¹² and its grammar-school repositories, the 'schools for death' as opposed to Grundtvig's 'schools for life' which would embody the 'living word'.

It is in *The Danish Four-leaf Clover* (1836) that Grundtvig spells out his basic educational aim, *livsoplysning* (enlightenment about life), claiming that enlightenment 'must originate mostly from the single person's own life or at least be tried to see how it fits',¹³ but it is not until two years later in *Skolen for Livet og Akademiet i Soer* [The School for Life and Academy at Soer] (1838) that Grundtvig (as a result of a request by Christian VIII) attempts to further develop his educational ideas.

The School for Life continues Grundtvig's onslaught on Latin studies wherein he claims that it took him thirty years to 'get Rome and Latin out of my system',¹⁴ but he is even more negative about book knowledge and examinations. In a poetic vein, Grundtvig claims 'for all letters are dead even if written by fingers of angels and ribs of stars, all book knowledge is dead that is not unified with a corresponding life in the reader'.¹⁵

This knowledge must involve 'living contact and interaction with others'.¹⁶ In the second part of *The School for Life*, where Grundtvig sketches the beginnings of a programme for his proposed school, he talks of 'mutual education' and 'living interaction' as being at the heart of his educational proposals. As Professor K. E. Bugge has stressed, this idea of 'living interaction' is especially well suited to be the basic formula for Grundtvig's educational theory.¹⁷ Clearly Grundtvig's 'School for Life' would have to be built upon such a foundation.

'Living interaction' can be seen as a secular corollary to Grundtvig's concept of the 'living word', a phrase intimately associated with Grundtvig and deeply woven into the fabric of his mature theological thought. In a theological context the 'living word' was the term Christ used at the Last Supper. The point is that this sacrament is not silent but, in Grundtvig's words, 'accompanied by the utterance of that wonderful invisible thing which is laid upon our tongue to unite spirit and body; that is the word, and hear not our weak words but the words of the almighty power of Jesus'.¹⁸ The sacrament is also interactive: in response to Christ's words, repeated by the minister, in which Christ's continuing presence is felt, the gathered Christian community partake of the elements of bread and wine. In a secular context, Grundtvig meant that the 'living word' was not formal instruction or lecturing as such but the communication of personal life between teacher and taught; either the teachings live in the life of the teacher and are actively responded to by the student or they do not live at all, the teachings being mere dead words. The 'living word' is not Biblical fundamentalism but the spiritual communication of 'the truth', words of power and authority evoking an active response in the listener. This concept, expanded from its theological context, is not confined to the actual classroom; indeed, its most appropriate expression may often be found in the wider life of the shared residential learning community of the folk high school.

During the 1840s Grundtvig continued to write on the need for Danish folk high schools, particularly in *Bøn og Begreb om en Danske Højskole i Sørø* [Request for and Idea of a Danish Folk High School in Sørø] (1840) and in a section on the Danish folk high school in *Lykønskning til Danmark med Det Danske Dummerhoved og Den Danske Højskole* [Congratulations to Denmark on the Danish Blockheads and the Danish High School] (1847), which latter work may be said to round off Grundtvig's development as a writer on educational matters.

In this period of writing Grundtvig becomes more concerned with the actual organization of the folk high school: details like students' councils, mutual teaching and conversation on Danish community matters. Grundtvig took up the issue that if ordinary people were to have a say in the shaping of Denmark's destiny through participation in People's Councils it would be good if they received training in self-government in the folk high schools wherein, on all important matters,

'the steward (or whichever name should be given to the headmaster) would have first to consult the School Council, the members of which were to be elected (almost all of them) by the students themselves'.¹⁹

To this day student participation in the running of folk high schools – although varying in degree from school to school – is still important in the philosophy of the folk-high-school movement.

Redefining a headmaster as a 'steward' is a clue to what Grundtvig meant by mutual teaching. The life experience the students brought to the folk high school was to be respected, and a primary emphasis was on exploring what the students and teachers had in common rather than on emphasizing differences.

Grundtvig had at first hoped to implement his ideas at Sørø Academy, an institution with rich historical associations dating from 1586 – in fact, according to Grundtvig, from the time of Bishop Absalon (twelfth century).²⁰ It flourished for some 200 years, and was then closed only to be re-established as an academy again in 1826 by the Danish King. From this time onwards Grundtvig saw this venue as a distinct possibility for implementing his educational ideas.

The Sørø Academy underwent many reforms after its re-opening, culminating in 1847 when a royal resolution announced the opening of a practical high school at the institute. Although this school in many ways was not what Grundtvig intended, he nevertheless congratulated the King and Denmark on the establishment of the Danish high school: 'I have only one prefatory remark, namely that it become a really Danish school.'²¹ In the course of his congratulatory remarks in this 1847 essay Grundtvig hoped that all the students who attended, having already found a vocation before coming to the school, 'would return to their task with increased desire, with clearer views of human and civic conditions, particularly in their own country, and with an increased joy in the community of people'.²²

Grundtvig envisaged his folk high schools as having a mixture of students from different socio-economic strata as well as different age-groups, all coming together to further his stress on fellowship and to help realize his claims that our common humanity takes precedence over particular religious or political beliefs.

This stress on fellowship in the residential folk high schools is clearly related to Grundtvig's theological belief that the Church was not a Bible-reading circle but a fellowship of believers. Nevertheless, Grundtvig was adamant that the systematic teaching of religion had no place in the folk high school or, for that matter, in any state primary or secondary education – it was a matter for the Church alone.

It may seem surprising that Grundtvig as a clergyman would want to repudiate religious instruction in schools, but this must be seen in the context of another of his puzzling concepts: 'First, the human, then the Christian.' By these words Grundtvig meant that one cannot be a true Christian without first being a true human being.

Thus, despite frequent obscurity of expression, there are a number of common threads that run through Grundtvig's educational thought: the fellowship of teachers and students living and working together and learning from one another, as well as sharing in the running of the school; the importance of the 'living word'; the stress on common humanity even though one needs a thorough understanding

of one's own culture before understanding that of others; and, most importantly, education as a matter of 'living interaction', leading to enlightenment, a coming to terms with the meaning of one's own existence rather than vocational training or formal instruction.

The first folk high schools

Grundtvig himself did not found any folk high schools and his relationship to the development of the folk-high-school movement which invoked his name is sometimes puzzling. For his part, except for tending to the needs of his congregation at Vartov, Grundtvig rarely left his study, trying as he wryly put it 'to write himself into clarity'. At Vartov, however, there was 'a singular radiance'²³ about the church life that served as the focal point for the spread of Grundtvigianism throughout Denmark in the next generation.

While Grundtvig was tied to his study and his congregation at Vartov, it was left to others to develop the folk-high-school movement. Although the first folk high school was founded at Rødding in South Jutland in 1844, it was not until Christen Kold founded his school in 1851 that Grundtvig was to have a disciple who ensured the development of the folk-high-school movement, even if in a different form than that which Grundtvig had intended. Nevertheless, the link with Grundtvig remained strong because Kold used to visit him annually with long lists of questions which 'Grundtvig helped me so wonderfully to get all smoothed out'.²⁴

Grundtvig, however, did not visit the early folk high schools, not even the first one at Rødding, despite having received many invitations to do so. It was not until 1856, when Grundtvig became involved in the founding of Marielyst High School outside Copenhagen, that he became a regular speaker at such an establishment. This early reluctance of Grundtvig to be involved in the initial development of the folk-high-school movement has been explained by Bugge as being because Grundtvig still held out hopes of realizing his dream of a large state school at Sørø, hopes which were only finally dashed by the death of his benefactor Christian VIII in 1848 and the closing down of the Sørø Academy in 1849.²⁵

By 1864, fifteen folk high schools had been established but, in that year, Denmark, having been defeated by the Prussian-Austrian army, suffered the loss of Schleswig. This was to have ramifications for the burgeoning folk-high-school movement.

The Schleswig-Holstein dispute was a complicated matter: the Danish King was Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, Schleswig being the southernmost part of Denmark and Holstein belonging to the German Empire. This situation brought about wars in 1848-50 and in 1864. Denmark's defeat meant the loss of between 150,000 and 200,000 Danish North Schleswigians to German domination. It was not until 1920, following a referendum, that North Schleswig was returned to Denmark, while South Schleswig and Holstein remained part of Germany.

The loss of Schleswig was of great symbolic significance for the fledgling folk-high-school movement. Rødding, where the first folk high school had been opened, was now on German soil. Ludvig Schroder, the headmaster of this establishment,

with two assistant teachers, moved to Askov three kilometres north of the new frontier and the high school founded there 'became the flagship and model that other folk high schools looked up to'.²⁶

Understandably, in such close proximity to Germany, a special effort was made at Askov to preserve all aspects of Danish culture. Other folk high schools followed Askov's lead in what was later referred to as the 'golden age of the folk-high-school movement'.²⁷ Although, with hindsight, during this period the folk high school may seem to have been excessively nationalistic, this is a result of historical circumstances and a justification for such nationalism should not be sought in Grundtvig's own writings.

Although Grundtvig wanted students to have a thorough understanding of conditions in their own country, this does not mean that he was an ardent super-nationalist, as he is sometimes depicted.²⁸ Indeed, Grundtvig had a pronounced respect for other people's rights to protect their own identity, as is shown very clearly by his opposition to the Danish Government's attempts to promote Danish sympathy in Schleswig through language ordinances which barred the use of German during the period between the two Schleswig-Holstein wars.²⁹

Misunderstandings arise from Grundtvig's use of the term '*folkelighed*'. It is said to be untranslatable, but perhaps Peter Manniche's rendering of the term as 'community life that embraces everyone'³⁰ is helpful. It is concerned with the preservation of identity, of a people's literature, poetry and way of life.³¹ Paradoxically, Grundtvig, following the philosopher Herder, argued that unless a nation has a strong sense of identity it is stuck in the nationalistic phase, and tends to expand and conquer at the expense of weaker neighbours.

Folkelighed, rather than promoting a narrow nationalism, must be seen as promoting, as Bugge has suggested,³² a means of defending a small country such as Denmark from being culturally crushed by more powerful nations. Another Grundtvigian scholar, Erica Simon, sees similarities between Grundtvig's *folkelighed* and Léopold Senghor's '*négritude*', which has been defined as 'that complex of attitudes and dispositions which make up the collective personality of black people and determine their unique outlook on the world'.³³

A citizen of the world

In many ways Grundtvig was a citizen of the world, symbolized by his writing not a history of Denmark but a three-volume history of the world. One of his twentieth-century followers, Peter Manniche (who, in 1921, founded the International People's College at Elsinore), always stressed Grundtvig's international dimension and claimed that the folk-high-school movement, suitably adapted, had much to offer developing countries.

Not only was the folk high school an intensely personal form of education which helped restore a sense of security for people uprooted from 'family, tribe or clan',³⁴ but it adapted its curriculum to the students. For example, Manniche stressed that, over a long period, the Danish folk high schools had helped Danish farmers develop their full capacities to return and remain in their jobs. Accordingly, this

principle, argued Manniche, recommends itself particularly to schools for rural development overseas: 'These must have leaders that can be educated without leaving their villages for a long time and becoming accustomed to and dependent on city amenities.'³⁵

As for Denmark itself, the nature of the population of the folk high schools changed, as did the overall structure of Danish society. Throughout the nineteenth century and for a considerable part of the twentieth, the Danish folk-high-school movement was considered a rural phenomenon. But from the 1950s and 1960s, instead of the Danish economy changing from one form of agriculture to another, as it had done in the nineteenth century, Denmark changed considerably from an agricultural to an industrial economy.

Initially it was thought that Grundtvig's ideas and the educational innovation of the folk high school would not survive the twentieth century. By 1940 there were only fifty-four high schools in Denmark – hence the nostalgic looking back to the 'golden age' following the rapid expansion of these schools after the Schleswig-Holstein war of 1864. But the 1980s saw a remarkable resurgence of the folk-high-school movement – even if its clientele, including urban unemployed and refugees, changed considerably. The number of folk high schools has fluctuated slightly around the 100 mark in recent years in Denmark, showing a similar vitality in Sweden, Norway and Finland, and continuing activities in other countries such as Germany and Poland. Indeed, Grundtvig's plans for short-term residential colleges, where life itself replaces dead knowledge and examinations, may be an educational innovation but, although they were first promulgated in the 1830s and 1840s, they have yet to come fully into their own.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Pastor Folmer Johansen of the Danish Lutheran Church in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, for translating some of Grundtvig's educational writings hitherto unavailable in English, and Professor K. E. Bugge of the Royal Danish School of Educational Studies, Copenhagen, for his unstinting advice.
2. J. Knudsen (ed.), *N. F. S. Grundtvig: Selected Writings*, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1976 (out of print); N. L. Jensen (ed.), *A Grundtvig Anthology*, Cambridge, James Clarke & Co., 1984.
3. K. E. Bugge, *Skolen for Livet* [The School for Life], p. 362, Copenhagen, G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1965.
4. *Smaaskrifter om den historiske Højskole* [Lesser Writings on the Historical High School], 1872.
5. N. F. S. Grundtvig, 'Preface to *Nordic Mythology*', in Jensen, op. cit., p. 50.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
8. N. F. S. Grundtvig, *The Danish Four-leaf Clover* (translated by F. Johansen), unpublished.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

11. N. Davies, *Education for Life: A Danish Pioneer*, p. 118, London, Williams & Norgate, 1931.
12. Grundtvig, *The Danish Four-leaf Clover*, op. cit.
13. Ibid.
14. N. F. S. Grundtvig, 'The School for Life', in Jensen, op. cit., p. 74.
15. Ibid., p. 66.
16. Ibid., p. 74.
17. K. E. Bugge, 'Grundtvig's Educational Ideas', in C. Thodberg and A. P. Thyssen (eds.), *N. F. S. Grundtvig: Tradition and Renewal*, p. 30, Copenhagen, Danish Institute, 1983.
18. Quoted in Davies, op. cit., p. 61.
19. N. F. S. Grundtvig, *Request for and Idea of a Danish Folk High School in Søro* (translated by F. Johansen).
20. A. P. Thyssen, 'Grundtvig's Ideas on the Church and the People, 1825-47', in Thodberg and Thyssen, op. cit., p. 272.
21. N. F. S. Grundtvig, 'Congratulations to Denmark on the Danish Blockheads and the Danish High School', in Knudsen, op. cit., p. 161.
22. Ibid., p. 162.
23. Davies, op. cit., p. 171.
24. H. Koch, *Grundtvig* (translated by L. Jones), p. 112, Yellow Springs, Ohio, The Antioch Press, 1952.
25. K. E. Bugge, 'Grundtvig's Educational Ideas', in Thodberg and Thyssen, op. cit., p. 24.
26. T. Rørdom, *The Danish Folk High Schools* (translated by Alison Borch-Johansen), p. 46, Copenhagen, Det Danske Selskab, 1986.
27. Ibid., p. 52.
28. See, for example, E. F. Fain, 'Nationalist Origins of the Folk High School: The Romantic Visions of N. F. S. Grundtvig', *British Journal of Educational Studies* (Oxford), Vol. XIX, 1971, pp. 70-90.
29. P. Ram, *Nikolay Frederik Severin Grundtvig*, p. 67, Copenhagen, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1983.
30. P. Manniche, *The International People's College, 1921-1971*, p. 21, Elsinore, International People's College, 1971.
31. K. E. Bugge, 'N. F. S. Grundtvig', in J. E. Thomas and B. Elsey (eds.), *International Biography of Adult Education*, p. 223, Nottingham, Department of Adult Education, University of Nottingham, 1985.
32. Ibid.
33. Irele Abiola (ed.), Introduction to *Selected Poems of Léopold Sédar Senghor*, p. 22, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
34. Manniche, op. cit., p. 72.
35. Ibid., p. 73.

Works by Nikolay Grundtvig

The definitive Danish edition of Grundtvig's writings on education is:

Bugge, K.S. (ed.). *Grundtvigs Skole Verden* [Grundtvig's Educational World]. Copenhagen, G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1968. 2 vols.

The only collection of Grundtvig's educational writings (in English) is:

Lawson, Max (ed.). *N. F. S. Grundtvig: Selected Educational Writings*. Elsinore, International People's College/The Association of Folk High Schools, 1991.

The main writings of Grundtvig that deal solely or in part with education are as follows:

Det Danske Fiir-Klover partrisk eller Danskheden betragtet [The Danish Four-leaf Clover, or Danish Nationality Looked at from a Partial Viewpoint], 1836.

Af Grundtvigs Rigsdagstaler [Grundtvig's Speech before the Constituent Assembly], 1848.

Lykønskning til Danmark med Det Danske Dummerhoved og Den Danske Højskole [Congratulations to Denmark on the Danish Blockheads and the Danish High School], 1847.

Af Nordens Mythologi [Nordic Mythology], 1832.

Til Peter Larsen Skraeppenborg i Dons [Letter to Peter Larsen Skraeppenborg in Dons], 1854.

Af Statsmaessig Oplysning [Education for State Affairs], 1834.

Skolen for Livet og Akademiet i Soer [The School for Life and the Academy of Soer], 1836.

Universitet i London og Akademiet i Sorø [University of London and the Academy at Sorø], 1829.

The part of *Af Nordens Mythologi* (1832) dealing with education is in Bugge (see above) and also in English in:

Jensen, N. L. (ed.). *A Grundtvig Anthology*. London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983.

A selection of *Af Statsmaessig Oplysning* (1834) is in the edition of Bugge (see above), but has also been edited in full as:

Bugge, K. E.; Nielsen, V. N. F. S. *Grundtvig: Statsmaessig Oplysning*. Copenhagen, Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1983.

All the remaining educational writings of Grundtvig listed above are in K. E. Bugge's two-volume selection or in the Lawson selection.

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Allen, E. L. *Bishop Grundtvig: A Prophet of the North*. London, James Clarke & Co., 1949.

Bugge, K. E. *Skolen for Livet. Studier over N. F. S. Grundtvig pædagogiske tanker* [The School for Life: Studies on N. F. S. Grundtvig's Educational Ideas]. 1965.

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M A R I A G R Z E G O R Z E W S K A

(1888–1967)

Alicja Siemak-Tyliowska

Maria Grzegorzewska was born on 18 April 1888 in the village of Wołuczka (near Rawa Mazowiecka, Poland), the daughter of Adolf and Felicja (née Bogdanowicz). She was the last – sixth – child in a very close-knit family. Her parents held the lease of a farming estate and considered themselves to be deeply rooted in their surroundings, which made them feel responsible for the people they provided work for and led them to the acceptance of their workers' needs as a factor controlling their own and their children's existence. This characteristic was shared by all their children.

In 1907 Maria Grzegorzewska, having completed a seven-form school for girls, enrolled for a year-long university entrance course run by the Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences in Warsaw. At that time she also began providing education for the workers. Her activities were sufficiently significant to arouse the interest of the Russian military police, who forced her to leave Warsaw. She went to Lithuania, where she worked as a private tutor in order to earn enough money to pay for university studies.

In 1909, in spite of financial difficulties, Maria left for Kraków and entered the Department of Natural Sciences at the Jagiellonian University. A period of hard study and difficult survival began. Private teaching and odd jobs hardly provided enough money to cover her basic needs, even more so as she always found someone whose condition was even worse than her own and whom she felt obliged to help. What was left of her money was eked out on meals at the poor people's canteen. However, these difficulties in her everyday life seemed insignificant, for it was the time when her youthful dreams were coming true. She gave herself wholeheartedly to her studies and to the student life. Fellow students were fascinated by the beauty of this charming girl – joyful, warm, goodwilled and helpful, as she was described by those who knew her then. They called her a 'pagan angel'.¹

However, her changing fortunes meant that she did not graduate from the natural science faculty. Instead, disease of the lungs led her to interrupt her studies and go to Zakopane for treatment. There she learned that a Polish scientist, Professor Józefa Joteyko, had created an international faculty of paedology in Brussels. In October 1913, she became a student there. The studies acquainted Grzegorzewska

with the achievements of psychology, sociology and pedagogics, and enabled her to meet personally such eminent educators as Bovet, Claparède, Dalcroze, Decroly, Ferrière and, most importantly, the creator of the faculty, Professor Joteyko herself, whose friend and co-worker Maria soon became. It was here that Maria Grzegorzewska formed the basis of her educational thought and acquired her scientific tools.

After a year of studies in Brussels, she went back to her parents for a vacation. She was there when the First World War broke out. The paedology faculty ceased to exist as an international establishment. Maria Grzegorzewska travelled to London on a warship via the mined North Sea. From there she went to Paris, together with Professor Joteyko. She enrolled in the department of literature at the Sorbonne.

During her studies at the Sorbonne she took part in an excursion to Bicêtre Hospital for the profoundly mentally retarded. That visit determined her future life. She decided to become a social worker, helping those who were most helpless and in need of care – disabled children. The decision to give up everything she had herself aspired to in order to help others could be undertaken only by someone for whom another person constituted the highest value. In spite of the fact that since her early childhood the sight of physical impairment had induced in her feelings of fear and rejection, the need to compensate for the unfairness suffered by the handicapped became the guiding force in her life. Her first intention had been to devote her life to experiencing and popularizing beauty. Her doctoral dissertation on aesthetics, defended in 1916 at the Sorbonne, was devoted to a genetic and psychological analysis of children's and young people's aesthetic experiences.

Maria Grzegorzewska decided to bring her love of beauty to the world of human anomaly, disfigurement and handicap. In May 1919, she returned to Poland with the intention of pursuing her dream in the newly formed Polish Republic. Several months later, she became an assistant in the special education section at the Ministry of Denominations and Public Enlightenment. The social aim of bringing help to the handicapped required extensive organizational work in which Grzegorzewska could apply her educational knowledge.

This was the beginning of her future scientific, social and organizational career devoted to the people most in need of help – the handicapped – an activity that took up the whole of her life. She died in 1967.

Social and organizational work

Maria Grzegorzewska had learned to involve herself with altruistic social work in her childhood. It was in her parents' house that she acquired an awareness for the moral responsibility for her deeds, the necessity of taking the good of others as her guideline and of helping those in need. The family home taught Maria deep patriotism and gave her moral direction so as to place her personal life at the service of the country. Patriotic traditions in the Grzegorzewski family, as in the majority of Polish families, were extremely strong.

In the year of Maria's birth, it had been 116 years since the first partition of Poland. The Polish state did not then exist, but the Polish nation had preserved its

identity and its traditions, and had never ceased to believe in regaining its independence in spite of the many set-backs to nationalist uprisings. The memory of ancestors killed in the combat for independence and the constant struggle to get back the fatherland, even at the price of one's life, were basic educational truths to everybody at that time.

Maria proved that these notions were very real for her. In her early youth she was involved in underground movements during the period of partition, as well as later during the Nazi occupation and in the Warsaw Uprising. Equally early, Maria became involved in social activities. In 1907 she established contacts with the Polish Socialist Youth Association and began her social service mainly in the form of clandestine and educational work among the workers. She co-operated with such distinguished scientists and social workers as Ludwik Krzywicki, Helena Radlińska and Marian Falski.

All her future was subservient to the realization of this social call. Towards the end of her life, she wrote:

What can I say about my social work? First of all, I cannot differentiate among the social, the economic, the scientific, etc. I was simply interested in an important though neglected social problem – social rehabilitation of the handicapped, caring for their lives and understanding this important social phenomenon; this became my goal. From whatever perspective I looked at it – humanistic, social, economic, scientific or educational – it remained equally important.²

When Grzegorzewska returned to Poland – a nation reborn after more than a century of bondage – there was no national system of institutions for the handicapped. The whole problem was set aside while the national education system was being set up.

In Poland, practical educational activity among the handicapped (initially the deaf, then the blind and the delinquent) had already started in the nineteenth century; in 1917 education for the mentally retarded was provided. These were, however, piecemeal actions, concentrating on the care of children with one type of impairment. This was the situation when Grzegorzewska began her struggle to restore to the handicapped a socially useful role, to give them back their place in life and among humanity. As a result, the Department of Special Education was created at the ministry.

This opened up the possibility for Grzegorzewska to put into practice the ideas she had presented in the article 'On the Necessity of Organizing Special Education for Handicapped Children', which had been publicly discussed at a meeting of the Polish Teaching League in Paris in 1918.

For the majority of European countries, special teacher education consisted of different courses organized in various ways and for various durations. In four European cities, there were established institutions preparing teachers for special education (Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Zurich). In Zurich and Moscow there were also scientific research institutions (the Chair of Curative Pedagogics and the Defectological Department of Moscow University). Various universities and teacher-training schools also carried out higher education in this area. However, it was

only in Hungary where the supply of staff for special schools was linked to the demand.

Polish special education and pedagogics developed later and in a different way from those in the majority of European countries. At the time of regaining independence, there were only a few institutions for handicapped children, mostly set up on a haphazard basis on the initiative of private persons or charitable institutions.³

According to Grzegorzewska's approach, the struggle to improve the fate of handicapped children had to be accompanied by training for teachers in special education. That is why she organized a Special Education Course which, after several reorganizations, became the State Institute for Special Education three years later. The institute was an innovatory centre, the organization of which was based on an original concept of educational methods not previously encountered in any foreign centre.

There were two key factors that made the Polish system of training special-education teachers different from the systems used in other countries at that time. Firstly, this type of activity was undertaken simultaneously with the development of a network of special-education institutions. In the majority of other countries, the officially planned training of staff began only when educational provision for the handicapped was already relatively well developed. However, in Poland – practically from the very beginning – a continuous system of training for teachers working in regular special-education institutions was introduced. While elsewhere this training was carried out in a variety of courses, it must be added that there were similarities in conception and programmes throughout Europe.⁴ Maria Grzegorzewska based herself on foreign experience in organizing the special-education system and staff training, but she managed to avoid the pitfalls encountered by others.

In the second place, from the very beginning the State Institute for Special Education pursued not only didactic but also research goals. Obviously, the latter would not yield results through short-term, randomly organized projects, for systematic, long-lasting observation and experiments were required.

Maria Grzegorzewska was the head of the institute from its creation until the end of her life. At the same time, she founded the Teachers' Institute – a centre for professionally active teachers who were attempting not only to raise their qualifications but also to perfect their teaching technique. This approach reflected Grzegorzewska's assumption that the main aim of studies at an educational university was to develop the students' inquisitiveness and desire for self-development. A special school was, according to her, a magnificent workshop which imposed no limits; it discouraged inactivity and passivity, but encouraged constant observation, inquisitiveness, mental development and resistance to routine.⁵

During her directorship of both institutes, Grzegorzewska visited many schools scattered over the country in order to acquaint herself with the living and working conditions of Polish teachers.

Teacher education and training did not stop when trainees graduated from the institute. Grzegorzewska organized a School Centre within the Special Educa-

tion Section, which grouped together all those involved with care for the handicapped. The centre organized vocational courses and seminars, thus enabling the exchange of ideas and experiences, together with direct contact between its members and Maria Grzegorzewska, and hence ensuring her influence upon them.

The other field of Grzegorzewska's activity in the inter-war period was her work with organizations for the handicapped – the Deaf and Their Friends' Association, the Polish Association of the Blind – and social groups whose aim was to help the socially maladjusted, the mentally retarded and the physically handicapped.

The Second World War and the occupation of Poland interrupted this activity. The institute was closed and Maria Grzegorzewska's struggle turned against the Nazis. Already, in September 1939, she had become a nurse in an army hospital. Later she was active in underground movements, distributing printed materials and arms, and participating in clandestine education. She was a member of the Main Committee for Helping the Jews; she helped to hide some of them and thus saved their lives.

After the liberation, she reopened the State Institute for Special Education, destroyed during the war, and once more became its head. The Special Education Section renewed its activity and so did the Polish Teachers' Union. Grzegorzewska was the Chairperson of the Pedagogics Section on the Main Board of the Union, which enabled her to stress the necessity for continuous teacher training. The loss of life among teachers during the war (30 per cent of them were killed) made it necessary to make up the numbers quickly. The section headed by Grzegorzewska initiated many forms of teacher training, both for serving and prospective teachers. She also launched wide-ranging research on the social status of teachers, on educational programmes, the role of the school in its local community, and the question of aesthetic education. Such a wide range of subjects points to the wealth of Grzegorzewska's interests.

In 1958, she was appointed to the first Polish Chair in Special Education in the Education Department of Warsaw University. She received the title of full professor. Thus, the institute's activities became connected with university work, and the graduates of the institute could continue their studies and broaden their knowledge within the field of their speciality.

Scientific activity

Maria Grzegorzewska often stressed that her creative scientific work, though a regular activity, was somehow marginal when compared with her social and organizational functions: 'My scientific work is like tiny scraps in between the social activity filling my life,' she wrote in 1961 in *Letters to a Young Teacher*.⁶ Those 'tiny scraps' made a valuable and rich contribution to Polish and international educational thought. It is thanks to Grzegorzewska that a new sub-branch of education was created in Poland – special education. The name was popularized by Grzegorzewska herself.

Already, through the use of, and emphasis put on, the term 'special education', the essence of her views on the subject and the goals of this field of science

were expressed. Special education, in her view, covered the whole area of facts and situations, together with their theory, which went beyond the biological and social norms. Thus, it concerned all educational situations connected with organic impairment and handicap, as well as with social maladjustment. Consequently, she drew people's attention to the significant differences between special education and other sciences. The differences comprise: the goal itself, the methods applied, the scientific equipment and the necessity of special training for the tutor before conducting his or her work with the handicapped child. The term 'curative pedagogics' points to the character of treatment; 'defectology' does not include the pedagogic influence; 'special education' indicates the uniqueness of the whole working scheme.⁷

According to Grzegorzewska, the object of the study of special education covered not only defects in the general somatic, psychic and sociological structure of the handicapped child, but also the healthy elements, which must be developed and exploited to compensate for the shortcomings. This holistic view of problems connected with the handicapped child's life is typical of Polish special education up to the present.

The main goal of special education was, according to Maria Grzegorzewska, social rehabilitation for the maladjusted, disabled or otherwise abnormal children. Her scientific novelty was not limited exclusively to introducing the above-mentioned problems to education. A shift of emphasis occurred from focusing on the type of handicap to concentrating on the type of rehabilitation required. This resulted from Grzegorzewska's original approach to rehabilitation. In its literal sense, the term 'rehabilitation' may be applied only in the case of children in special care, for example the chronically ill or the socially maladjusted. 'In the case of other such children, this notion must be understood metaphorically – the aim of special education to bring them back to *health* within the limits attainable by them, and – in other cases – to find means of compensation.'⁸ Thus, 'the ultimate goal of special education is to give the handicapped the feeling of *being normal* [in so far as it is] possible for them to achieve, training them and providing them with knowledge and skills allowing for socially useful work, that is, adapting them to social life, which should improve their self-image.'⁹

The aim of special education expressed in this way indicates an evolution compared with earlier views expressed, for example, by Decroly or Hessen. They believed that the only aim of special education was to overcome and compensate for inborn or acquired organic deficiencies. Consequently, educational work concentrated almost exclusively on means and methods to compensate for shortcomings. Thanks to Maria Grzegorzewska, the goals of special education became broader; they became part of general education.

Accepting the basic assumption that all abnormalities stem from a common cortical and sub-cortical somatic source, she believed that various rehabilitation mechanisms should operate in the same way. Her laws of compensation and adaptation played the main role in this process. Her studies and observations led her to the conclusion that any sensual impairment results in the creation of specific structures in the other senses to compensate for the original deficiency. Thus, for instance, the so-called 'sense of obstacle' is a compensating dynamic structure in the

blind. Consequently, education of children with sensual deficiencies should consist in controlling the creation of such structures. In all cases, compensation follows the same pattern and results in the creation of substitute behaviours. The adaptation mechanism is also common for all types of impairment. Compensation and adaptation allow us to prepare a child to lead a life as full as is attainable. Grzegorzewska's views on the phenomenon of sense compensation underwent evolution: from the theory of simple sense replacement (theory of *wikariat*, 1930) to dynamic structural patterns of a complex structure (1959). The theory of *wikariat* was described in a work unique at that time – *Psychology of the Blind*¹⁰ – an extensive monograph in which she explains the phenomena of a blind person's psychological life not previously understood, basing herself on the recently launched gestalt psychology.

In 1959, in the article 'The Phenomenon of Compensation in the Blind and Deaf', she presented a theory of dynamic structural patterns. In her justification of the theory, she used Pavlov's terminology, explaining the relations between the primary and secondary signal systems and the patterns that appear in the functioning of sensual analysers. This theory is still the basis for understanding the patterns in the sensual compensation processes and for rehabilitation of the blind, deaf and deaf-mutes. In this article she wrote:

The ability to perfect the cortical components of the analysers is the ability to form dynamic structural patterns based on the data which were provided by many analysers simultaneously which – together with the perfection of these systems – makes the mechanism of sense reception of stimuli covered by the structure richer and more diversified, which in turn makes the structural patterns themselves richer and more diversified, the relations between them becoming also more detailed and diversified (for they become inter-analysers). In the cases of sight or hearing deficiencies, the structures arising in the blind or the deaf will differ from those in people who can see and hear, for different sense organs will contribute their part to replace the absent visual or acoustic factors. Hence, different senses are important for the blind and the deaf – such cortical functions as attention or association become more important for them. According to earlier terminology, sense perception is interrelated, which means it is part of the same structural system. Thus, it is the whole structural system that performs the compensating substitutive role and not its parts. Responsiveness is not formed while whole sets of structural systems are. Therefore, the elements constituting their parts acquire new significance and, because of their ultimate function, become more complex by adding new components. . . . The formation of dynamic structural systems in the blind and the deaf does not principally differ from the same process taking place in those who see and hear. They are formed by simple differentiation in the primary signal system and in the transformations of higher analysis/synthesis in the secondary signal system.¹¹

According to Grzegorzewska, the basic guidelines of rehabilitation activities comprise: stimulating individuals' inner dynamism; activating them and making them independent; introducing them to life going on around them; combining mental and physical work; and introducing them to community activities.

Apart from rehabilitation, the field of special education also covers preventive and adaptive activities. According to Grzegorzewska, preventive actions should stem from respect for, and profound knowledge of, the individual.

Preventive actions should be undertaken and developed not only in relation to an individual endangered by impairment, but also in relation to his environment, that is, one should constantly control the development of all conditions favourable to the proper development of a person, and avoiding the development of those conditions which in any way can hinder this development.¹²

Similarly, the social adaptation of a handicapped child should concern both the child and the family. According to Grzegorzewska, this process consists not only in adapting to existing conditions, but also in introducing changes to these very conditions. The subject of special education – the handicapped child – is a child who, because of organic deficiencies or functional problems, has difficulties in getting to know the world and making contact with its environment, thus being prevented from spontaneous social adaptation. In her classification of handicapped children, Grzegorzewska distinguished the following groups: the blind and the partially sighted; the deaf and the hard-of-hearing; the mentally retarded; the chronically ill and the handicapped; and the socially maladjusted.

Maria Grzegorzewska, although interested in the whole of special educational theory – that is education, oligophrenopedagogy, surdopedagogy, therapeutic education and resocialization education – pursued these sub-branches to varying degrees. She was mostly interested in the problems of the blind, then of the deaf – mainly because of her long-term research on the phenomenon of compensation in these two types of handicap. This does not mean that she considered the other branches less important. She considered the problems of re-educating the mentally retarded, the socially maladjusted or the chronically ill to be equally valid. She spoke about those problems in numerous articles which were frequently published in the journal *Special School*.

The theory of dynamic structural patterns formed the foundation of Grzegorzewska's method of teaching in special-education institutions. This method has found wide application in the activities of Polish special-education schools. According to Grzegorzewska:

The method teaches us how to look, observe, examine, and understand natural and social phenomena, how to draw conclusions, connect causes with effects, and systematize one's observations, how to think and thus develop the capacity of adapting phenomena and conditions to the needs of man and society. The method provides a valuable and rich reflection and experience in the process of shaping the patients' outlooks.¹³

Her method consisted of organizing work centres. It was based on Decroly's interest-centre method. However, while in the latter the core of the activity was work undertaken by students pursuing their own interests, the former stressed the process of children's socialization – the outcomes of their own work should be socially useful. In this way, a child acquires personal experience, and develops substitute images facilitating its adaptation to life through individual activity and practice of living. The basic didactic unit in the work-centre method starts with the introduction of classes stimulating or toning up a child as part of the process of preparation for work. Then, the teacher should describe an interesting goal to be achieved through the work and present the different stages for reaching it, obviously adapted

to the child's cognitive potential. The children's proper cognition follows. This is a way to experience rich and diversified activities.

The next stage of connecting theory with practice consists of a variety of creative and reproductive expressions. The unit is concluded with external and subjective evaluations of the activities conducted. Grzegorzewska pointed out that each unit should be accompanied by broad and thorough cognition, an understanding of social and natural environments, a dialectical approach to the ideas presented, team work, and the linking of physical and mental activities. The power and beauty of work to bring one's intentions to fruition was stressed; so were active attitudes to life and the feeling of responsibility.

Grzegorzewska's deep faith in the possibility and effectiveness of education was always the foundation of her pedagogical ideology. It was supplemented, however, with a realistic view of the problems and aims of education, and its limits in individual cases. A thorough analysis of every patient and his or her educational situation should be a starting point for individual preventive treatment. The analysis should concern not only deficiencies, symptoms or sociological behaviour found in the patient, but also note the healthy points, which should be particularly protected, developed and exploited.

Basing rehabilitation on a thorough knowledge of the child required the application of verifiable methods and diagnostic procedures, as well as an acquaintance with the norm constituting the point of reference for a given deviation. Consequently, Grzegorzewska had to develop her methodical interests. Her theory of preventive treatment, diagnosis and pedagogical therapy was based on experience, thus ensuring its practicality and utility. In creating the Polish special-education schools, she based herself on systematic empirical studies, which was a novelty in itself, and made use of the achievement of other disciplines such as psychology, biology, physiology and medicine. She never separated theory and scientific reflection from educational practice. The titles of her works alone show how much scientific and practical educational activities were interconnected.

Maria Grzegorzewska has also earned a name in the world of Polish education as an eminent specialist of the teaching profession and an innovator in the area of teacher training. She considered the model of a teacher-tutor from the perspective of the requirements imposed on teachers by society and themselves, and also from the perspective of concrete activities in teacher training. In her reflections on teachers, she tried to find answers to questions about the value of teachers as human beings, about the most important features enabling them to function effectively and about how these features can be drawn out in teachers. In the simple and direct words used in her letters to her younger colleagues/teachers, she points to the significance of a teacher's work, for whom the human being constitutes the ultimate value, and for whom the most important task is serving society. Her description of social service, based on Adam Chmielowski's definition ('the blessed brother Albert'), states that 'man should be like bread to feed everyone'. Such a function may be performed by 'an ethical, social and real human being'.¹⁴

Ethical human beings, according to Maria Grzegorzewska, consist of good men or women, motivated by concern for others, and evoking concern in fellow

human beings by their example. Concern and kindness, in turn, are impossible without responsibility. One is responsible for what one cares for. 'The feeling of responsibility is not only a motivation to work but also a determinant of its value.'¹⁵ These views undoubtedly reflect the echo of Jan Władysław Dawid's words about 'the love of human souls'. A teacher should understand that his/her work 'constitutes in reality a great contribution, a great socio-cultural value, for it introduces a man to the world of knowledge'.¹⁶ 'The world and life of a man' may depend upon what kind of teacher one has.¹⁷ Such understanding of the dignity of the profession obliges teachers to pursue self-education, to develop their personality and to acquire knowledge. In *Letters to a Young Teacher*, Grzegorzewska presents various types of teachers in various situations, both good and bad. The play of opposites illustrates the possibilities for change – for improvement. The routine and boredom resulting from teaching are opposed to the creative teacher who undertakes research work. Education and acquired knowledge, though extremely important, are not the key values in the teacher's work. What is more important and significant is the teacher's attitude towards people, a concern for the child, and creative dynamism that could make the school into a cultural centre. These assumptions form the foundation of training at the Teacher Training Institute founded by Grzegorzewska.

It is impossible to present all the aspects of Maria Grzegorzewska's activities in this profile – she was a social worker, an organizer and a scientist. However, her portrait would be incomplete if we did not mention the way she is remembered by her students and co-workers. For them, she was first of all a good and warm human being, ready to help with a word or a deed whenever necessary. 'The open doors of her study and apartment were symbolic; they would never be closed because, as she said, if someone wanted something of me, it was easier for him just to stand in the door rather than to knock.'¹⁸ In *Letters to a Young Teacher*, directed to those who, after the difficult years of war and occupation, undertook the burden of being teachers, she wrote: 'To do something worthy, one has to be internally a person, one has to have one's own life, world, set of beliefs – something to be convinced of and to be of service to.'¹⁹ Her life was witness to the truth of these words.

Notes

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
3. W. Gasik, *Training Special School-teachers in Poland before 1939*, p. 191, Warsaw, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1991 (in Polish).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
5. Maria Grzegorzewska, *Wybór pism* [Selected Writings], p. 39, Warsaw, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1964.
6. Maria Grzegorzewska, *Listy do młodego nauczyciela (Cykl III)* [Letters to a Young Teacher: Third Cycle], p. 43, Warsaw, Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1961.

7. Maria Grzegorzewska, *Special Education: Lecture Notes from the State Institute of Special Pedagogics*, p. 4, Warsaw, Państwowy Instytut Pedagogiki Specjalnej, 1960 (in Polish).
8. Ibid., p. 90.
9. Ibid., p. 88.
10. Maria Grzegorzewska, *Psychology of the Blind*, Vol. 1, Warsaw, The Scientific Pedagogical Society, 1929.
11. Maria Grzegorzewska, 'A Phenomenon of Compensation in the Blind and the Deaf', *Szkoła specjalna* (Warsaw), Vol. 21, No. 3, 1960, p. 124 (in Polish).
12. Grzegorzewska, *Special Education* . . . , op. cit., p. 99.
13. Ibid., p. 102.
14. Maria Grzegorzewska, *Listy do młodego nauczyciela (Cykl I)* [Letters to a Young Teacher, First Cycle], Warsaw, Nasza Księgarnia, 1947, p. 51.
15. Grzegorzewska, *Listy do młodego nauczyciela (Cykl III)*, op. cit., p. 4.
16. Grzegorzewska, *Listy do młodego nauczyciela (Cykl I)*, op. cit., p. 14.
17. Ibid., p. 13.
18. Doroszevska, Falski and Wroczyński, op. cit., p. 152.
19. Grzegorzewska, *Listy do młodego nauczyciela (Cykl I)*, op. cit., p. 24.

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(classified in chronological order)

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G E O R G H E G E L

(1770–1831)

Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines

As is usual in the German language, the concept of *Bildung* (shaping or education in the broadest sense) is used by Hegel in a variety of different ways and applied equally to the study of nature, society and culture with their different developments and forms. It accordingly extends from the organic natural drive (*nisus formativus*, inward form) to the processes by which ethical and mental maturity is acquired and on to the highest spiritual manifestations of religion, art and science in which the mind of an individual, a people or the whole of mankind may be represented. The specific pedagogical or educational significance of the German word plays only a subordinate role.

In this article, the pedagogical content of Hegel's work will be approached primarily from the theoretical perspective of education in its broadest sense. This is not an arbitrary decision which might be prejudicial to the existing body of texts and to their objectively correct interpretation. On the contrary, this viewpoint is the only way of arriving at a correct assessment of the possible significance of typically Hegelian reflection on what is commonly referred to today as 'educational action', with a view to applying those ideas in a derived form under the present circumstances. In contrast, for example, with Kant, Hegel himself assigned a particularly high importance to this broad concept of education as a source of proof in his *Phenomenology of the Mind* and in his lectures on 'The Philosophy of Justice'. He did so for historical reasons and also for reasons pertaining to developmental logic. These are the two areas in which it is possible to perceive most clearly how Hegel interpreted the 'educational question' and what he saw as its limits and problems.¹

However, in order to acquire a comprehensive picture of the different aspects from which the phenomenon of education is viewed in its natural and mental, as also in its ethical and cultural, aspects, we must move beyond these sources and turn our attention to texts on aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and even on logic, which repeatedly provide sometimes surprising insights into the Greek *paideia*, and also into the characteristic educational principles of modern times. At all events, that has always been the approach of leading Hegelians to the area of pedagogics.

The same attitude is encountered when Willy Moog, for example, goes so far as to put the question as to whether the more extensive principle of *Bildung*, which was systematically developed by Hegel, did not at the very least relativize the task of education as such or even render it superfluous.²

However, the concept of education in its narrower sense was not alien to Hegel. It was after all one of the guiding themes of his age, even if its relative value in the interplay of schooling, training and teaching was not uncontroverted, after the frontiers of all education committed to the principle of practical reason had become indeterminate. Hegel also associated certain more clearly defined concepts with the word 'education'. However, he never developed them in a broader context so that any exegesis must draw together the threads of the many – occasionally whimsical – statements dispersed throughout his work and try to establish a mosaic pattern before drawing conclusions from them. With that end in view, we shall concern ourselves primarily with the 'Nuremburg texts' and with the passages from the 'Encyclopedia' which are a source of information on natural, mental and ethical development. Here, we shall also find statements on the need for, and limits of, educational measures, and on the function of general, specialized and philosophical teaching.

But even in these publications that deal in various contexts with pedagogical issues, many a false hope will be disappointed because Hegel's interest in what is commonly termed 'shaping of the will' or character formation was not particularly high. He was quite rightly concerned that educational endeavours of this kind might imperceptibly turn into doctrinal teaching or mere mental *dressage* in which reason, understood as personal insight, reflection and intelligence, would fall by the wayside. However, in the narrower area of intentional endeavours and teaching measures, it is possible to discern in Hegel's work the fundamentals of an educational theory whose principal purpose is to overcome self-willed action and self-seeking interests in the theoretical and practical spheres alike, and so move on ultimately to that common purpose of knowledge and volition which is essential to permit ethical action and culture.

Significantly, Hegel believes that pedagogics must serve to 'shape the subjective mind'³ and, referring to the teaching situation, recalls 'the extent to which Christ had in mind the shaping and perfection of the individual through his teachings'.⁴ In both cases the task must be to 'impart a sense of ethics to man'. Logically, therefore, pedagogics takes a 'natural' view of man and points the way to 'his rebirth, to the transformation of his first nature into a second, spiritual nature so that spirituality becomes a habit for him'.⁵ This is the only route by which man can take possession of his true, spiritual nature.⁶ However, this is only possible if the 'individual will' is relegated to the background; man must be made aware of the 'futility of self-seeking', whereas the 'habit of obedience' must be instilled in him.⁷ Man must therefore learn, in the interests of his own broader education, to abandon his purely subjective ideas and to be receptive to the thoughts of others,⁸ in so far as they are superior to his own.

It is therefore unacceptable for man to 'indulge in his own caprices'; that would simply throw the door wide open to arbitrary action. This self-will, which

bears within it the germ of 'evil', may even have to be broken by 'discipline'.⁹ The transition from natural love in the parental home to the strict objectivity of a school must be seen in this light; here the child 'will not only be loved, but also criticized and guided according to general principles'.¹⁰ Consequently, the school must reflect a common will and the teaching must be focused solely on the material which is to be presented and understood.

That being so, the task of all education would not simply be to take suitable action to ensure that natural and mental developmental processes take place with the fewest possible inhibitions, but also to see to it that individual and social life are conducted in a spirit of reflective speech, generous thought and reasoned action to their highest possible level of perfection. Hegel was convinced that this, in turn, would only be possible if, in both practical and productive terms, the distinction between will and reason made by the old school of psychology of character attributes could be overcome and with it the disjunction between ethical and dianoetic virtues. These two contrasts both tend to destroy the unity of action and, in the final analysis, mean that the individual ceases to be recognizable in his own actions and works.

This alienation had, of course, already led in philosophy to an ethic of external success and, at the other end of the scale, to an ethic of sentiment. Hegel believed that both these approaches bore within them the risk of ethical and moral isolation. His judgement of 'romantic irony' and of its consequences for philosophical ethics was correspondingly harsh. Torn between the longed-for 'beyond' and the disillusion of the 'here and now', recent moral philosophy had increasingly been characterized by a divided and split consciousness whose certainties and truths bore within them its own contradiction, accompanied by the hope of emerging from this desperate situation with outside help. Hegel's analysis of education must be understood in terms of its deep roots in this horizon of questions which point far beyond strictly educational interests. His analysis sought to reduce a historical and systematic problem to a common denominator, taking in all forms of consciousness as they were understood in his day and suggesting a pressing need for their interpretation.

With reference to the classical, medieval and modern understanding of education whose possibilities and limits Hegel thought through in a manner which, in all likelihood, nobody before or after him equalled, he distinguishes various sides, levels and forms in the process of ethical and mental education, and in its different stages and manifestations. He was always aware of the risk of 'excessive'¹¹ or 'distorted' education, and he also cited the reasons for which the enlightened 'viewpoint of education'¹² must, despite its recognized absolute significance,¹³ be refuted.¹⁴ In this sense, Hegel was certainly the greatest educational theorist of the age of German idealism; he was also the sharpest critic of the modern principle of education which ran the risk of degenerating into 'mere egoism' or into a pure instrument of 'arbitrary action and domination'.¹⁵ As to the indispensable 'acquisition' of formative knowledge,¹⁶ which enriches the cognitive and active subject in equal measure and transforms and liberates him,¹⁷ Hegel warned that the subjective-formal aspect of the 'appropriation' and 'use' of acquired knowledge must not be made the sole centre of attention in this process; account must also be taken of

their objective side by which knowledge itself is brought to life and reshaped in the spirit of the age.¹⁸ It is true that each individual must first pass through 'the formative stages of the general mind' in the learning process, but the thinking contemplation of nature and a reasoned shaping of history will bring about a substantive change. In that twofold sense, the formative process must not be seen simply as a quiet and continuous progression. On the contrary, education has an earlier material content and object which it reprocesses, changes and reformulates independently.¹⁹ That in turn is only possible if the mind has escaped from the 'immediacy of substantial life', acquired a 'knowledge of general principles and viewpoints' and attained the stage of 'objective thought',²⁰ which will in future enable it to think and act in a reasoning manner. The subjective side of the formative process by means of which the human condition is placed on a 'free mental foundation'²¹ is therefore described as follows: 'This individuality assumes its own essence and that is the only way in which it can have a true existence; its reality and force are equivalent to its degree of education.'²²

These different standpoints and levels of modern educational thinking also include the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical education, which can be compared to the difference between contemplative and active reason.²³ This brings into play a second form of knowledge which is essentially different in terms not only of its object and genesis but also of its justification. However, both forms share the ability to abandon the 'individual particularity' of knowledge and volition in order to impress upon both the 'stamp of generality'. Seen in that light, education always takes the 'form of thought' according to which 'man is able to know himself and act not simply according to his inclinations and desires, but to pull himself together'. Thus he sets the object free and is accustomed to 'act theoretically'.²⁴ This 'emphasis on the generality of thought' and this achievement of a reasoned abstraction constitute the absolute value of education²⁵ which is not attained automatically. Referring to both theoretical and practical knowledge, Hegel speaks of the need for 'hard work to eliminate the mere subjectivity' of feelings and behaviour, of opinions and volition in so far as they follow mere 'caprice'.²⁶ Theoretical education includes, above all, the acquisition of varied and proven knowledge and 'the generality of points of view' from which things can be judged, in other words a 'feeling for objects which are free and independent and not overlaid with subjectivity'.²⁷ On the other hand, practical education imparts the ability for man to adopt a reflective and moderate attitude to the satisfaction of his natural needs. That, in turn, is only possible if he liberates himself from blind nature, devotes himself to his profession and does not merely remain confined to the necessary 'satisfaction of natural needs' but is also capable of 'sacrificing himself to higher duties'.²⁸

Modern theoretical and practical education

Hegel appreciated, and at the same time criticized, the modern form of theoretical and practical education for its strictly formal and unilaterally subjective character. The theoretical plane involved first and foremost the standpoint of modern reflec-

tive philosophy founded on the theory of cognition²⁹ which, hand in hand with the viewpoint of the psychology of character attributes, distorted understanding of the independent nature and inner purpose of the 'thing itself'.³⁰ At the practical level, he went on to criticize the lack of understanding of the forces of the objective mind which were made clear in their independence and freedom in the institutions of society and culture expressed through ethics and language. He set great store by the 'unique attitude of Greek education as spirituality with its own individual character',³¹ but warned at the same time, taking the example of the sophists, against an education that was merely subjective or strategic without any deeper system of reference. He believed that this had many points in common with 'modern evil'.³² This 'position of subjectivity' could only 'arise in an age of high education in which serious faith has perished and mere vanity prevails'.³³ But this same position is exposed to the criticism of creating room for arbitrary and random action in the theoretical and practical spheres alike.

Hegel was thus conscious of the origin of, and need for, the concept of education, but its intermediate position in the case of the sophists, who had shaped the nature of philosophy,³⁴ already called attention to a dilemma that persisted in modern education. Referring to Socrates, Hegel maintained that the mind must have attained 'a given level' of 'subjective and objective mental development' before the emergence of philosophy;³⁵ he therefore attributes an 'infinite value' to education.³⁶ On the other hand, he speaks of an 'absolute point of transition' to call attention to the limits of an education that adheres to a fixed standpoint instead of moving on to 'understanding thinking'.³⁷ That risk already lay in store for the sophists.³⁸ However, it did not develop fully until the days of late-scholastic philosophy and the modern Enlightenment. Viewed from this angle, the feature shared by both forms of enlightenment was that their content consisted solely of the 'development of formal understanding, but not of reason'.³⁹

With reference to the typical, modern principle of education, Hegel concedes that education has been decisively important in all ages but believes that it 'acquired a unique significance' in the days of the Reformation.⁴⁰ This 'education in reflection' created, in respect of both volition and judgement, a need to 'adhere firmly to general viewpoints and apply them to the particular so that general forms, laws, duties, rights and maxims are determining factors and reign supreme'.⁴¹ But this form of education could only lead to 'free judgement' and not to conceptual thinking. It therefore remained strictly formal with a one-sided attachment to the subjectivity of knowledge and volition. This was made apparent by an analysis of the bourgeois conscience and by an assessment of the French Revolution, both of which proved capable of liberating the subject absolutely but were at the same time unable to give a positive meaning, that is, a firm content and an objectively convincing shape, to freedom. Education under these conditions thus became a 'source of disintegration'⁴² whose effects were bound to be felt very soon in the theoretical and practical spheres, although to differing degrees.

By directing his criticism at the ambiguity of all modern education, Hegel raised problems that have continued to overshadow us up to the present. The ambiguity of 'renunciation' and 'alienation', which are necessary attributes of all edu-

cation, has left an inevitable mark on the history of the moral sciences and gained a permanent place in our thinking, speech and action. In this sense, Hegel of course saw the general task of his *Phenomenology of the Mind* as that of 'leading the individual away from his uneducated standpoint and on to the acquisition of knowledge',⁴³ which could only be achieved by 'shedding his immediate self'.⁴⁴ In this context, Hegel was also prone to speak of 'alienation' which, in effect, occurs whenever the mind has lost its faith in an immediate ethic and sees itself as a moral subject.⁴⁵ In this confused state, 'perfect education' is placed in 'deadly jeopardy'⁴⁶ – a situation that led on to the phenomenon of 'romantic irony'⁴⁷ in the history of philosophy and became the preserve of 'bourgeois society' with all its consequences.⁴⁸

The true contradiction, however, facing modern education, which it was unable to understand or surpass, led the moral world view on which it was based astray into a state of unjustified self-certainty and endless criticism of everything that already exists. Hegel described this dubious certainty of all 'moral education' in the following words:

This negative aspect is itself a characteristic of education; it is in the nature of a feeling of profound revolt against everything that exists today, which is alien to self-awareness and wishes to exist without it, in which it finds no trace of itself; a certainty of the truth of reason which it assumes with the distance between intellectuality and the world and is certain of its own destruction.

Significantly, he goes on to mention the other side of the moral viewpoint:

The positive phenomenon includes so-called immediately understandable truths of sound human reason . . . which contains nothing other than this truth and the need to find itself and remains blocked at the level of that need.⁴⁹

Against this ironic suspension of all that exists, which allows nothing real to escape its own judgement and declares itself to be the sole yardstick of goodness and justice, he objects elsewhere: 'Incipient education always begins with criticism, but complete education sees the positive side in all things.'⁵⁰

The modern notion of reason

An even more fundamental reproach is levelled against typical modern education when it is accused of being in a state of inner torment which is manifested in its own language.⁵¹ This criticism culminates in the following observation:

Mental education, the modern notion of reason, brings out this conflict in man which makes him an amphibious being trying to live in two mutually contradictory worlds so that the conscience is set adrift in this contradiction and blown hither and thither, unable to find satisfaction anywhere.⁵²

But if education resides in this very contradiction, which it is unable to overcome through reason, it will remain at the level of reason-based judgements that distinguish between being and appearance or being and volition as direct contrasts, just as they distinguish between the prosaic here and now and the ideal hereafter, or the incomparably divine and the pathetically human.

But for Hegel this was only half the truth of this conscious form of an eminently ironic or even despairing faith, since these very conflicts bore within them the hope of 'intercession' or 'reconciliation'. He therefore goes on to write in the work cited above: 'This duality of life and conscience brings with it a need for modern education, governed by reason, to put an end to this very contradiction. However, if understanding cannot break out from the vice-like grip of these contrasts, the solution for the conscience will remain purely hypothetical. . . .'

When the 'standpoint of education' is viewed in this manner with Hegel in both philosophical/historical and systematic perspectives, it is seen to be a necessary stage in the general and individual process of acquisition of maturity by the mind which, torn by inner conflicts, has not yet come into its own and now looks forward to its future fulfilment. In Hegel's scheme of things, this conscience is consequently not only split, but also feels an urgent need to settle those very conflicts which it has itself brought forth, although it can never do so. In the long run, it is impossible to live in this dual world;⁵³ and so education looks, in the last resort, to philosophy for an answer to those questions that it had itself raised but was unable to answer within the confines of its own horizon:

The question then arises as to whether this universal conflict which is unable to move beyond the stage of mere theory and postulated solutions, is truth itself and the highest ultimate purpose. If general education has lapsed into the same contradiction, the task of philosophy will be to resolve the conflicts, i.e. to show that neither the one in its abstraction nor the other in its same biased position hold the truth, but are on the contrary self-destructive; truth lies in the reconciliation of the two and in intercession between them, and this intercession is no mere abstract demand but something which has already been brought to completion and must always be so completed hereafter.⁵⁴

The fracture between two worlds which is deeply felt by education and the 'need for a philosophy'⁵⁵ which is supposed to resolve this contradiction without simply negating it in the name of a direct or absolute knowledge affects practical knowledge in particular, because the growing alienation between ethics and morality, which was to gather pace in the modern world, led to a lack of direction in speech and action in which education played a determining role.⁵⁶ The criticism already made by Hegel of the education system of the sophists, which owed much to the philosophy of Plato or Socrates, was strengthened in the longing for a pure morality which could forget reality and the present in its radical criticism of existing circumstances in the name of the absolute.

The truth of this education, which either degenerated into irreconcilable contradictions or awaited its redemption from outside in a spirit of longing despondency, was either a 'feeling of deepest revolt'⁵⁷ or the inability to act⁵⁸ in relation to a world which did not bend itself to its own ideal standards and justifiably made its own demands of a morality that had become alien to it. In this way, modern education suspended the link between practice and reason, so opening the door to ideologies which were to become dangerous to human action in many respects. Pedagogics were also exposed to this risk and their plea for 'development of the personality' may under certain circumstances seem just as dubious as the tendency to

subscribe to an educational theory that has long ago lost all certainty of its foundation in reason and increasingly seeks its salvation in the irrational; but this may well deprive it of any firm basis in comparison with the Hegelian position.

Notes

1. Gustav Thaulow, *Hegels Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht* [Hegel's Views on Education and Teaching], Glashütten, 1974. 4 vols. (Kiel, 1853); Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines, (ed.), *Hegels Theorie der Bildung* [Hegel's Theory of Education], Vol. 1: *Materialien zu ihrer Interpretation* [Elements for Its Interpretation]; Vol. 2: *Kommentare* [Commentary], Hildesheim/Zurich/New York, 1983, 1986. The first volume contains original texts taken from various editions of Hegel, while the second contains important interpretations published since 1900.
2. Willy Moog, *Grundfragen der Pädagogik der Gegenwart* [Basic Questions on Education Today], p. 114, Osterwieck/Leipzig, 1923.
3. Quotations from Hegel are taken from Suhrkamp's *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* [Works in Twenty Volumes], Frankfurt am Main, 1971 (quoted hereafter as WW; see 'Principal Works on Education' below), or exceptionally from the edition published by Meiner-Verlag, Leipzig, in 1928 and Hamburg in 1962 (hereafter *Ph.B.*) and also from *Samtlicher Werke*, Vol. 26, ed. by H. Glockner, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1961–68 (hereafter referred to as Jub. edition). In this instance: WW, 6.374.
4. H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* [Hegel's Youthful Theological Writings], p. 360, Tübingen, 1907.
5. WW, 7.302.
6. WW, 18.543.
7. WW, 10.225.
8. WW, 18.228.
9. WW, 10.82.
10. Ibid.
11. Cf. WW, 13.345.
12. WW, 7.345; cf. WW 12.89.
13. WW, 7.344.
14. WW, 7.345.
15. WW, 7.464.
16. WW, 7.327: 'Man is not by instinct that which he must become; he must acquire his own characteristics. That is the foundation of the right of the child to be brought up.'
17. *Ph.B.*, 165, p. 311; cf. WW, 7.344: 'In its absolute determination, education is therefore liberation and the task of a higher liberation. . . .'
18. WW, 3.19; cf. WW, 3.365: 'That which appears as education in relation to the individual is the essential moment of the substance itself, namely, the direct transition from its conceptual generality to reality, or the simple soul of that reality, through which that which is-perceived and existence itself have their being.'
19. *Ph.B.*, 165, p. 311
20. WW, 3.14; cf. WW, 18.231: 'True education does not consist in guiding attention towards oneself and concentrating on oneself as an individual – mere vanity, but rather in forgetting the self by a deep penetration of objective generality – forgetting the self'.
21. WW, 10.52.
22. WW, 3.364.
23. Cf. the view that the distinction between thought and volition is simply the contrast between theoretical and practical behaviour. In that case, volition is 'a special manner

of thinking: thought being translated into existence, as a drive to acquire existence.' WW, 7.47; cf. WW, 10.240–6.

24. *Ph.B.*, 171a, p. 65.
25. WW, 7.71; cf. 7.343–5.
26. WW, 7.344; cf. seq. and *Ph.B.*, 165, pp. 184 et seq.
27. Jub. edition, 3.83.
28. Jub. edition, 3.85.
29. Cf. WW, 7.67; 12.25 et seq.
30. Cf. Kant, KU paras. 63–66 followed by Hegel in WW, 6.436–61; WW, 17.31–45; Jub. edition, 6.125–8 (with reference to Aristotle).
31. Hegel, 'Fragmente', in *Hegel-Studien* [Hegel Studies], Vol. 1, p. 18.
32. WW, 7.283 (summary).
33. WW, 7.286.
34. WW, 18.409; cf. seq.
35. *Ph.B.*, 171a, pp. 167–83.
36. WW, 7.345.
37. Cf. WW, 3.56 et seq.
38. Cf. WW, 18.404–560; *Ph.B.*, 171, p. 915, 'Sophistik des Denkens'.
39. *Ph.B.*, 171, p. 916; cf. WW, 4.419 (in particular pp. 418–25).
40. *Ph.B.*, 171, p. 910–38; cf. WW, 12.492–508.
41. WW, 13.25; cf. 80 et seq.
42. *Ph.B.*, 171a, p. 65.
43. WW, 3.31; cf. seq.
44. *Ph.B.*, 67, pp. 243 et seq. (in particular, p. 250).
45. Cf. WW, 3.327–494.
46. *Ph.B.*, 171, p. 263.
47. Cf. WW, 18.460; WW, 7.277–86 (after Solger).
48. WW, 7.339–45.
49. WW, 20.291.
50. WW, 7.414 (summary).
51. Cf. WW, 3.359–90 ('The true mind. Ethics'; 'The alienated mind. Education').
52. WW, 13.80.
53. WW, 16.56.
54. WW, 13.81 et seq.
55. WW, 2.20–25, cf. seq.
56. Cf. WW, 4.344–55; *Ph.B.*, 171a, p. 165; WW, 12.92.
57. WW, 20.291.
58. WW, 10.84 et seq.

Principal works on education by Georg Hegel (*'Erziehung'* and *'Bildung'*)

Hegel, G. W. F. *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* [Works in Twenty Volumes]. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971. (Cited as WW.) In particular:

1. *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [Phenomenology of the Mind] (1807), WW, 3.359–98: 'Der sich entfremdete Geist. Die Bildung.'
2. *Nürnberger Schriften* [Nuremburg Writings] (1808–17), WW, 4.305–76.
3. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [Basic Guidelines for the Philosophy of Justice] (1821), WW, 7.325–45.

4. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften [Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences] (1830), WW, 10.229–302: 'Psychologie. Der Geist.'

The following two books contain summaries of the complete texts and remarks on education (*Erziehung, Bildung, Unterricht*).

- Thaulow, G. *Hegels Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht* [Hegel's Views on Education and Teaching]. Glashütten, 1974. 4 vols. (Kiel, 1853.)
- Pleines, J.-E. *Hegels Theorie der Bildung* [Hegel's Theory of Education]. Vol. 1: *Materialien zu ihrer Interpretation* [Elements for Its Interpretation]. Vol. 2: *Kommentare* [Commentary]. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 1983, 1986. (Philosophische Texte und Studien, Vols. 8 and 9.)

Works on Georg Hegel

To obtain a more general view of current Hegelian studies, the reader is referred to the *Hegel-Studien* [Hegel Studies] which are published annually, together with their appendices (Bonn, 1961–); particular mention should be made here of the report by Albert Reble on published literature (*Hegel-Studien*, Vol. 3, pp. 320 et seq., Bonn, 1965) because he provides a great deal of information which remains valid today on the present state of Hegelian research on pedagogics. Also the *Hegel-Jahrbücher* [Hegel Yearbooks] published on behalf of the Hegel-Gesellschaft eV by Wilhelm Raimund Beyer, the year 1972 being particularly relevant for our purposes here (pp. 280–324). Among the many collections that have appeared, the following four publications contain valuable information on present interests and the present state of knowledge:

- Negt, O. (ed.). *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels* [Actualities and Consequencies of Hegel's Philosophy]. Frankfurt/Main, 1970.
- Fetscher, I. (ed.). *Hegel in der Sicht der neueren Forschung* [Hegel in the Light of Recent Research]. Detmold, 1973.
- Heerde, R.; Ritter, J. (eds.). *Hegel-Bilanz: zur Aktualität und Inaktualität der Philosophie Hegels* [Hegel Balance Sheet: Actualities and Inactualities of Hegel's Philosophy]. Frankfurt/Main, 1973.
- Heidtmann, B. (ed.). *Hegel: Perspektiven seiner Philosophie heute* [Hegel: Perspectives of His Philosophy Today]. Cologne, 1981. (Dialektik, 2.)

A convenient and accessible introduction to the study of Hegel will be found in the collection edited by Otto Pöggeler (*Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie* [Hegel: An Introduction to His Philosophy], Freiburg/Munich, 1977) which includes an extensive bibliography; also the equally accessible monographs by Franz Wiedmann (*Hegel*, Reinbek, 1965) and Christoph Helferich (G. W. Fr. *Hegel*, Stuttgart, 1979) with comparable appendices and the extensive study of Hegel by Charles Taylor (Cambridge, 1975), which contains much relevant information. Finally, reference might also be made to the extensive collection of titles published by Kurt Steinhauer (*Hegel: eine Internationale Bibliographie* [Hegel: An International Bibliography], Munich, 1980), which is detailed enough to provide references on specialized research topics. For further comments on the phenomenology and philosophy of justice and on specific chapters, we recommend the following publications by Friedrich Fulda, Dieter Henrich and Manfred Riedel: *Materialien zu Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes'* [Elements for Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Mind*], Frankfurt, 1973; and *Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* [Elements for Hegel's Philosophy of Justice], Frankfurt, 1975, 2 vols. The principal German and international interpretations of Hegel's theory of education are mentioned by the author in his introduction to the first volume of the collection *Hegels Theorie der Bildung* [Hegel's Theory of Education] (see above, pp. vii–xxxvi), some being the subject of indirect discussion.

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART

(1776–1841)

Norbert Hilgenheger

In German-speaking countries, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi had two famous successors: Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Fröbel. To begin with, both of them followed the attractive example of the Swiss humanist with youthful enthusiasm. In their own different ways, they both later succeeded in moving beyond Pestalozzi's work and opened up new paths of prudent educational action.

Pestalozzi has gone down in educational history as the father of the Orphans of Stans (Switzerland) and as the founder of the New Elementary School. Fröbel not only gave the world his romantic philosophy of education, but also the word 'kindergarten'. Our profile of the educator and educational thinker, J. F. Herbart, can also set out from a particular focal point, i.e. the concept of educational teaching. Herbart not only made a major contribution to the reform of educational and teaching practice, but also revolutionized educational thinking. He has rightly been described as the founder of scientific pedagogics in the history of educational theory.

Herbart's personal experience as a teacher and educator led him on to this central idea of his educational theory. At the same time, the concept of educational teaching represents the transition from Herbart's philosophical system to his 'pedagogics'.

Herbart as a philosopher

Johann Friedrich Herbart was born on 4 May 1776 in the north German town of Oldenburg and died on 11 August 1841 in the university city of Göttingen. Between 1794 and 1797, he was a pupil of the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) at Jena University. However, the young Herbart soon distanced himself from the 'scientific theory' and practical philosophy of his mentor. He used the contradictions inherent in idealistic philosophy as a fruitful point of departure for the development of his own realistic philosophy. Nevertheless, Herbart remained true throughout his life to the rigorous style of thinking of his teacher Fichte. He too attempted to present the main elements of his philosophical writings as 'deductions'.

Herbart's principal philosophical works are *Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik* [Main Points of Metaphysics] written in 1806; *Allgemeine Praktische Philosophie* [General Practical Philosophy] dating from 1808; *Psychologie als Wissenschaft: neugegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik* [Psychology as a Science: On the New Foundations of Experience, Metaphysics and Mathematics] from 1824/25; and his *Allgemeine Metaphysik nebst den Anfängen der Philosophischen Naturlehre* [General Metaphysics, together with the First Principles of a Philosophical Theory of Nature], written in 1828/29.

In his metaphysic, Herbart draws heavily on the theory of monads of Leibniz. Taking account of the problems raised by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Herbart attempts to grasp reality through concepts in his metaphysical deductions. Herbart's metaphysic comprises, in particular, a carefully thought-out psychology which is a milestone in the history of this branch of knowledge. Herbart was the first to use, with rigorous logic, the methods of modern infinitesimal calculus to solve problems of psychological research. In his view, psychology is rooted in experience, metaphysics and mathematics. His intention was to rival, in the new discipline of psychology, the discoveries made by Isaac Newton in physics. Admittedly, nineteenth-century empirical psychological research did not follow in his footsteps. Herbart's psychology did have an unmistakable influence, however, on the empirical psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and on the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud.

Herbart's practical philosophy is characterized by the fact that moral judgements are interpreted as a special form of aesthetic judgement. Moral judgements adopt an approving or reproving position on states of volition. Ethical ideas are nothing other than aesthetic judgements on elementary states of volition. The moral judgements of daily life can be corrected in the light of the ethical ideas of perfection, inner freedom, goodwill, justice and equity.

Herbart's working career began in the canton of Bern, Switzerland, between 1797 and 1800, and continued at Bremen from 1800 to 1802, at Göttingen from 1802 to 1809, at Königsberg from 1809 to 1833, and finally at Göttingen again from 1833 to 1841. In Switzerland he worked as a private tutor, in Bremen as an independent scholar and unofficial tutor, and in Göttingen and Königsberg as a professor of philosophy and pedagogics. In early 1809, he was appointed to take over the Chair of Philosophy at Königsberg University from Immanuel Kant's immediate successor. The authorities in Königsberg were looking for a philosopher with a high scientific ranking who also had an understanding of education. In that spirit, the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III, approved Herbart's nomination to Königsberg in the following terms:

I... approve the appointment of Professor Herbart from Göttingen to teach philosophy at our university here, and I do so all the more readily as Herbart can play a particularly useful role in the improvement of our education system following the principles of Pestalozzi [Kehrbach et al., 1897–1912, K 14, p. 13].

The concept of educational teaching

In the years between 1802 and 1809, Herbart already succeeded in making a name for himself not only as a philosopher, but also as an educational specialist through his many publications. His work entitled *Pestalozzi's Idee eines ABC der Anschauung* [Pestalozzi's Idea of an ABC of Perception] was published in 1802. This was followed by *Über die ästhetische Darstellung der Welt als das Hauptgeschäft der Erziehung* [On the Aesthetic Representation of the World as the Principal Function of Education] (1804), and *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet* [General Pedagogics Derived from the Purpose of Education] (1806). The idea of educational teaching is central to Herbart's theory of education, which is founded on experience and on philosophical reflection. Like practical and theoretical educationalists before him, Herbart also makes a distinction between education (Latin: *educatio*) and teaching (Latin: *instructio*). 'Education' means shaping the development of character with a view to the improvement of man. 'Teaching' represents the world, conveys fresh knowledge, develops existing aptitudes and imparts useful skills. Herbart's reforming pedagogics revolutionized the relationship between education and teaching. A new paradigm of educational thinking and educational action was thus created.

Before Herbart, questions pertaining to education and teaching were initially pursued independently. Only at a second stage was an attempt made to determine how teaching could be supported by education and education by teaching. Herbart, on the contrary, took the bold step of 'subordinating' the concept of 'teaching' to that of 'education' in his educational theory. As he saw it, external influences, such as the punishment or shaming of pupils, were not the most important instruments of education. On the contrary, appropriate teaching was the only sure means of promoting education that was bound to prove successful.

In Herbart's own words, teaching is the 'central activity of education'. His own thinking, personal experience and experimentation convinced Herbart of the astonishing effects of educational teaching: the individual who acquires a 'versatile range of interests' through teaching will 'be capable' of doing with inner ease everything that he 'wishes' to do after 'mature reflection'. He will always keep his ethical ideal clearly in mind and, in his progress towards the attainment of that ideal, he will be able to rely on his own pleasure in further learning and on the dependable 'strength of his own character'.

Herbart's activity as a private tutor in Bern, an educational adviser in Bremen, professor of philosophy and pedagogics at the Universities of Göttingen and Königsberg, and as the head of an experimental pedagogical institute attached to the University of Königsberg, was guided at all times by the concept of educational teaching.

We shall now examine the process by which Herbart gradually developed the notion of educational teaching and see how this central concept of his educational philosophy has survived to the present day. The different biographical, theoretical and practical/educational aspects that we shall be following up will gradually fuse together into a 'profile' that will reveal Herbart's contribution to the progress of educational thinking and to the reform of educational action.

Herbart's concept of educational science

A Swiss student friend from Herbart's Jena study days found him a post as a private tutor in Switzerland in the year 1797. Here, Herbart joined up with a circle of like-minded friends for whom Pestalozzi's educational ideas met with an enthusiastic audience. Personal contacts with Pestalozzi were also established. In a publication dating from 1802, Herbart recalls his personal experience of Pestalozzi for the benefit of his readers:

A dozen children between the ages of 5 and 8 were summoned to school at an unusual hour in the evening. I was afraid that I might find them ill-disposed and so witness the failure of the experiment which I wanted to observe. But the children came with no trace of reluctance and lively activity continued unabated to the end [Herbart, 1982a, p. 65].

Herbart goes on to describe how Pestalozzi encouraged the children to occupy their mouths and their hands simultaneously; how he used repetition as a technique of speech training and, at the same time, gave the children materials to hold which were intended to make it easier for them to learn the skill of writing.

The experience which the young private tutor brought back with him from Switzerland was not the only root of his educational theory. He was also stimulated by the educational ideas of Fichte and Pestalozzi, which were soon to assume an original personal character in a thinker of Herbart's stature.

Herbart described two contrasting routes of educational reflection. The first – that of analytical-educational thought – begins with his own experience and experimentation. It leads initially to empirical pedagogics and then on to a philosophical theory of education. This route enables the concepts that dominate the range of experience of the person who starts out as a layman to be 'explained' in increasing depth and to be 'made clear' through an ongoing process of philosophical reflection. This route of educational thinking makes philosophy dependent, if only partially, on pedagogics.

The second route, that of speculative thinking establishing a synthesis, starts out from the principles of a philosophical system that already exists and develops a theoretical and practical doctrine of education from them. In this way, pedagogics become dependent on philosophy, and, in particular, on psychology and ethics.

In his educational publications, the young Herbart preferred, with few exceptions, the analytical-educational mode of thought. However, once he had developed his philosophical system in the middle years of his life and given it comprehensive expression, he allowed the speculative mode of thought which establishes syntheses to take priority. However, Herbart was thereafter unable to present an overall and conclusive view of his educational philosophy.

In the two routes, the 'ends' and the 'means' of education are both discussed. The investigation of the ends is co-ordinated with ethics, while the study of the means has a psychological slant. In his *General Pedagogics*, his central educational work published in 1806, Herbart described this duplication of content, which is encountered in both modes of thought, in the following terms:

The intention with which the educator is to approach his work, this practical reflection, provisionally detailed down to the measures which our present state of knowledge suggests we should choose, is to my mind the first half of pedagogics. But there must be a second in which the possibility of education is theoretically explained and presented with its limitations in the light of changing circumstances [Herbart, 1982b, p. 22].

Herbart's complete education system would accordingly seem to consist of two sections, linked with ethics and psychology respectively. Both sections can be investigated analytically (starting out from teaching experience) and by synthesis (based on philosophical principles). The analytical and synthetic modes are contrasting types of thinking.

The genesis of 'educational teaching'

The theory of educational teaching also contains these two separate sections and can be presented in two different ways. The aims of educational teaching are discussed in the section that falls under the heading of ethics. The key text on this is the *General Pedagogics Derived from the Purpose of Education* written in 1806.

The means of education and, in particular, the use of teaching as one such means are the subject of the psychological section. Fundamental texts in this area are the early publication, *On the Aesthetic Representation of the World as the Principal Function of Education*, and the *Letters on the Application of Psychology to Pedagogics*, dating from 1832 (but published posthumously).

Ethics enables the initially confused purposes of education to be corrected in the light of moral ideas. Virtue ('the strength of moral character') is the *supreme purpose of education* in Herbart's view. Psychology points the way to a solution of the problem as to how education with its paradoxical task of generating 'autonomous' action in the pupil through the external intervention of a 'third party' can be possible. Herbart's answer to this question about the fundamental basis of education can be couched in the following terms: education is only possible as the training of the mind which is by its very nature capable of such training, that is, through suitable teaching.

Herbart's analytical mode of thought begins with experience and experimentation. The experience acquired by the young tutor in the family of Provincial Governor Steiger in the Canton of Bern led him to think through the purpose of education in the light of ethical ideas. He also found himself obliged to approach the question of the possibility of education not simply as a theoretical problem but also through practical attempts to prove that it really is possible to 'educate by teaching'.

As a private tutor, Herbart was confronted with the task of 'teaching' three boys, aged 14, 10 and 8, in the subjects of classical languages, history, mathematics and the natural sciences, while at the same time 'educating' them. The *Reports to Mr Karl Friedrich Steiger* (Herbart, 1982a, p. 19 et seq.) show the extent to which Herbart's dealings with his pupils contributed to the development of his concept of 'educational teaching'.

To begin with, Herbart had tried to exert a direct influence on the development of the character of his pupils. However, he soon found that the hoped-for

success was not achieved, at least in the case of Ludwig who was already 14 years old. Herbart concluded from this that hope must in future be founded on 'Ludwig's reason' (Herbart, 1982a, p. 23). That was the only way of averting the risk that Ludwig's character, which was certainly not bad, would mature into a 'clever, deliberate and rational egoism'. A formulation then follows which may be described as the earliest definition of the concept of educational teaching. The only remaining mainspring of Ludwig's character development was 'his reason as the *suffering* ability to absorb ideas which were presented to him slowly and after careful preparation, and the hope that one day this small spark would ignite into *active* personal thinking and an endeavour to live according to his own *insights*' (Herbart, 1982a, p. 23).

Educational teaching which the young private tutor directed at the reasoning ability of his pupils had two guiding threads: an aesthetic/literary aspect and a mathematical/natural scientific side ('poetry and mathematics' as he also sometimes stated in simpler terms). Herbart imparted astonishing linguistic skills and an excellent knowledge of history and classical literature to his pupils. He gave them a deep mathematical training and even introduced them – a fact that must seem surprising for the year 1800 – to the new natural sciences on an experimental basis. However, this teaching was not merely educational in so far as Herbart always subordinated the manifold purposes of aesthetic/literary and mathematical/natural scientific teaching to the underlying purpose of character development. In fact, he sought to educate his pupils by deploying his teaching deliberately as the most important means of moral education.

Teaching leads in the first instance to a correct 'grasp of the world' and of men. The 'grasp' of the world acquired through teaching does not, however, serve solely to impart knowledge and shape aptitudes and skills, but is intended first and foremost to develop a 'moral insight' and to 'strengthen character'. Teaching must influence the process of character development. Herbart makes a distinction between four phases of moral education which lead from a grasp of the world to ethical action: 'Sensations are developed out of thoughts, and principles and patterns of action are then derived from these sensations' (Herbart, 1982b, p. 23). In a later passage in his *General Pedagogics*, Herbart speaks of the four stages of 'ethical judgement', 'ethical warmth', 'ethical resolve' and 'ethical self-discipline' (Herbart, 1982b, p. 108).

The assumption of this sequence of phases in moral education is founded on Herbart's psychology which went beyond the earlier psychology centred on character attributes. Herbart no longer understands cognition, feeling and will as separate attributes or forces. On the contrary, in his scheme of things, the will and feelings are rooted in the mind. The strength of will and the regularity of action are seen as phenomena that are explained by the stability of cognitive structures. By corollary, unreliability and impulsive action originate from the fact that situations in which identical action is appropriate are interpreted differently. The stable orientation of the human will is therefore a function of the cognitively structured approach.

Against the background of this psychological theory, teaching appears to be the only means of permanently strengthening character which is likely to succeed.

Educational teaching can, however, only be expected to prove successful if its 'methods' do not encroach upon the individuality of the pupil. It follows that the highest possible demands must be placed on teaching methods. A wealth of useful knowledge, abilities and skills must be imparted in such a way that virtue is generated by and through these qualifications.

Herbart solved the problem of teaching methods on the basis of his psychological theory of 'interest'. Like desire, interest is understood as a form of mental activity, even though interest is much less intense than desire. Interest enables the first links to be created between the subject and the object and so determines the 'viewpoint' of individuals about all the aspects of the world which they either grasp or fail to grasp. Unlike desire, through which interest may be heightened, interest does not yet have any particular objects on which to focus.

The ideal structure of interest is defined by Herbart through the concept of 'versatility'. Interest is formed when the individual subject deals 'in depth' with 'many different' objects and relates recollections of these many in-depth examinations to each other in an all-embracing 'communion'. An interest in which no particular aspect is developed can only be unrefined. An interest in which isolated aspects are developed will remain 'one-sided'. Through the versatility of interest, on the other hand, the different sides are linked together in a well-proportioned and unified whole. However, this unity must not differ from one individual to another. On the contrary, the interest of different individuals must be co-ordinated in such a way that each of them is receptive to each of the modes of activity that characterize man as a spiritual being.

Thus, Herbart follows up the concept of humanism which was current in his day with his own notion of the versatility of interest. Training to acquire versatile interest is training in humanism. Herbart names six orientations of the human mind (or of humanism): in the sphere of *cognition*, he makes a distinction between empirical, speculative and aesthetic interest; in the area of *interhuman relations* ('participation'), societal and religious interests contrast with the interest of the individual. Herbart used his portmanteau formula of 'versatile interest' to translate the idea of 'harmonious training of human forces' which was current in his day into the language of his own psychology.

Interest is of central importance to educational teaching from two different angles. First of all, 'versatile' interest is a vitally important intermediate objective of educational teaching. Only a versatile interest can give the necessary inner ease to the will, without which an educated person would be incapable of taking the action which his correct insight requires him to take. However, interest does not have a function solely as an end, but also as a means: it is the only permitted motive force of educational teaching. Only a continuous interest can constantly and effortlessly expand the circle of thought, give access to the world and encourage individuals to participate sincerely in the destiny of their fellow humans. Therefore, the 'worst sin of teaching' is boredom.

We saw earlier that educational teaching encompasses 'poetry and mathematics'. The purpose of teaching literature is to stimulate a lively interest in the feelings of others. In particular, the teaching of young children must make them aware of

simple interpersonal relations on the basis of poetry. Provided that his pupils showed a sufficient interest in the classical languages, Herbart began his aesthetic and literary training with a reading of Homer's *Odyssey*. However, his initial teaching of the classical languages was designed primarily as an introduction to interhuman relations and only secondarily to impart a knowledge of the languages concerned.

Initial teaching of mathematics also helped to shape the character, although that was by no means its sole function. In his publication entitled *Pestalozzi's Idea of an ABC of Perception*, written in 1802, Herbart not only laid out a course of initial mathematical teaching which was unusually modern for its day, but also answered the question as to the contribution which the 'teaching' of mathematics must make to 'education'. Mathematics should not be included in the teaching syllabus solely because of its practical value or technological significance, but essentially as a means of training the mind to concentrate. After all, ethical behaviour in particular required an attentive consideration of the feelings of others. This concentration could not, however, be acquired through the study of literary and aesthetic subjects. Exercises in concentration which dealt with human relations would destroy the sympathetic interest in the persons presented so that religious teaching, for example, was not a suitable framework for such exercises.

In 1804, Herbart appended a text on the *Aesthetic Representation of the World as the Principal Function of Education* to the second edition of *Pestalozzi's Idea of an ABC of Perception*. The title of this new publication in itself shows that it focuses once again on the problem of educational teaching: the main purpose of education is the 'aesthetic representation of the world', namely, teaching in literature, art and history. This representational teaching must present its contents in such a way that thoughts, feelings, principles and modes of action are interlinked. While the teaching of mathematics creates a predisposition to a theoretical understanding of the world, the teaching of literature, art and history are intended to impart an aesthetic grasp of the world:

That representation of the world, of the *whole* world and of *all* known ages, in order to nullify where necessary the bad impressions of an unfavourable environment, must surely be the main task of education; severe discipline which arouses and at the same time bridles questioning cannot be a necessary preparation for this [Herbart, 1982a, p. 115].

The view of educational teaching which Herbart set out in his *General Pedagogics* of 1806 is *complementary* to that of 'aesthetic representation'. Herbart does not preclude the possibility that teaching that does *not* educate is possible or may even be expedient. However, in his *General Pedagogics* he states: 'I confess . . . that I have no notion of education *without teaching* just as, by corollary, at least for the purposes of this publication, I recognize no teaching which does not educate' (Herbart, 1982b, p. 22).

In his *Aesthetic Representation*, Herbart demonstrates that education without teaching cannot as a rule succeed. In his *General Pedagogics*, he paints a more precise picture of teaching which enables the aims of character formation to be achieved with certainty. Educational teaching is based on the natural liveliness of the child, that is, on its interest in the world and its fellow human beings. He draws

on the fruits of the earlier learning which the child brings with it to the teaching stage. Teaching in effect only supplements knowledge already present: sometimes it sets out to complete the pre-existing material through 'simple' representations ('purely representational teaching'). However, teaching also has the task of analysing the elements already present ('analytical teaching') and then, above all, the function of constructing new thought patterns step by step ('synthetic teaching') on the foundation of those elements.

In a minor educational text published in 1818, *Pedagogical Opinion on School Classes*, Herbart once again provides us with an admirable definition of the specific features of educational teaching. Educational teaching differs from traditional teaching both in the choice of its purposes and in that of its means. Traditional teaching was designed to impart as much useful knowledge and as many skills to the pupil as possible. 'The practice and skills of the pupil' (Herbart, 1982c, p. 91) were the main focus of this teaching. In contrast, he centres his educational teaching on an aspect which had hitherto at best been taken into account as the motivating force of learning, namely, interest:

It is of course a familiar precept that the teacher must try to arouse the interest of his pupils in all that he teaches. However, this precept is generally meant and understood to denote the idea that learning is the end and interest the means to attain it. I wish to reverse that relationship. Learning must *serve the purpose* of creating interest. Learning is transient, but interest must be lifelong [Herbart, 1982c, p. 97].

The interest that remains present throughout life is a means to something even higher: it is not merely a grounding for the acquisition of particular skills and abilities, but serves above all to 'strengthen moral character' (Herbart, 1982c, p. 99), which is the ultimate purpose of education.

The structure of interest which is the purpose of teaching is, as we have seen, described by Herbart as the 'versatility of interest'. Training in humanism is tantamount to training in a rich spiritual life accompanied by versatile interests:

Versatile training is rooted in constant interest. This versatile training does not mean that an individual must have travelled the world or experienced its every facet. He might then be weary of it; and disgust with all things and all occupations, in short spleen, is the very rot which is the opposite of education, a total loss of interest. A healthy mental life demands peace and receptiveness to stimuli, but both of these reside in interest, and the more versatile and sustained that interest is, the greater will be the sum of mental life. Anyone who understands the word 'training' differently can of course retain his own linguistic usage, but his ideas must be banished from pedagogics [Herbart, 1982c, p. 99].

Although interest in educational teaching is seen as the purpose of learning, it retains its function as a means and that function is even enhanced. Teaching must itself be interesting if it is to contribute to the development of interest. Practice and the imparting of skills may be founded on discipline or self-discipline, but the creation of a versatile interest must of necessity stem from an inner motivation. The interest of the pupil is the thread along which educational teaching constantly progresses:

At every moment, the mind of the pupil progresses in a particular direction and at a particular speed in that same direction. That is the effect of the teaching given up to this juncture and that is the pointer which tells the teacher where he must now go and how quickly he should proceed [Herbart, 1982c, p. 101].

The Königsberg educational seminar

If Herbart's educational reflections gained such a lively following, this was due not least to the fact that he constantly sought references to experience. The *General Pedagogics*, dating from the year 1806, are founded on the experience of the private tutor who went on to continue his experiments in private teaching even after his departure from Switzerland. However, the attitude of a private tutor is different from that of a schoolteacher. Educational teaching might perhaps succeed admirably in the home environment but still prove a failure under the more difficult conditions of formal school life. Was it not too adventurous to place the idea of educational teaching at the centre of a 'general' system of pedagogics? There could only be one way out from this difficulty: experimentation must show whether educational 'school' teaching can also prove successful.

When Herbart accepted his appointment at Königsberg University in 1809, he expressed a wish not simply to give philosophical and educational lectures but also to be able to set up a small experimental school:

Among my other occupations, the teaching of educational theory is particularly dear to my heart. But this teaching is not a matter of mere scholarship; it must also be demonstrated and practised. I also wish to extend my range of experience (acquired over a period of nearly ten years) in this area. I have therefore long since had the idea of giving lessons myself to a small number of chosen boys for one hour a day in the presence of young men who are familiar with my pedagogics and will attempt, step by step, to continue under my supervision the work which I have myself begun. In that way, teachers will gradually be trained and their methods perfected by mutual observation and communication. However, since a syllabus is as nothing without teachers, i.e. teachers who are penetrated by the spirit of the syllabus and have perfected the exercise of the method, a small experimental school, of the kind which I have in mind, might well be the best preparation for future establishments on a larger scale. As Kant put it: first experimental schools and then ordinary schools [Herbart, 1982c, p. 11].

Herbart's proposal met with a receptive audience in the Prussia of 1809: the reform of education was seen as an integral part of the reform of the whole state education system which had been put in hand. Internal reforms were perceived as a means of compensating for the losses suffered by Prussia after its defeat by Napoleon's army at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806.

The Prussian educational reform was advanced energetically by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1809/10. Herbart was accordingly expected to make a significant contribution in Königsberg to the training of the teachers who were so urgently needed. Herbart himself, however, hoped to gain a much wider audience there: he understood his experimentation as a possible foundation for 'future establishments on a larger scale'. He believed that the idea of educational training must become

the guiding principle of a 'true and lasting reform of public teaching' (Herbart, 1982c, p. 89).

In Königsberg Herbart was given the opportunity of setting up a teaching institute, initially on a very modest scale. The purpose of this institute was to contribute to the training of grammar-school teachers through teaching exercises based on Herbart's own pedagogics. Herbart would have liked to attach a small boarding school to his institute from the outset. However, financial resources were limited and he had to be content for several years with a teaching institute which lacked a fixed body of pupils.

This infrastructure did not improve until 1818: Herbart was then able to acquire, with state support, a house large enough to accommodate a small number of children as boarders. Teaching took place in the experimental school attached to this house. Herbart wanted to prove that the pupils who boarded with him might not simply be taught, but at the same time 'educated' by his method.

Teaching in the experimental school essentially followed the same syllabus that had been adopted by Herbart in his days as a private tutor: educational teaching covered the two main branches of poetic and mathematical learning. As before, the poetic branch started out from Homer's *Odyssey* and involved a study first of Greek and later of Latin literature. The mathematical/natural scientific branch was based on exercises in perception. These were followed by geometry, algebra, logarithms and finally differential and integral calculus. Religion, historical narratives, the study of languages, geography and natural science were ranged around this central core.

On 19 May 1823, Herbart wrote to Berlin that he considered 'his method now to have taken its definitive shape' (Kehrbach et al., 1897-1912, K1, p. 200). He had continued to develop his method 'in the hope that it might one day be generally used in grammar schools'. It was admittedly designed in the first instance for the more gifted pupils, but nevertheless promised to improve the 'wrong teaching methods practised in our grammar schools'. This teaching was wrong in Herbart's view primarily because it failed to use the interest of pupils either as a motivating force or as the purpose of progress in learning, since teaching of the classical languages concentrated excessively on formal linguistic aspects and paid too little attention to the contents that were imparted, and, last but not least, because insufficient importance was attached to mathematical and natural scientific teaching. All in all, Herbart believed he had proved that his method could be used by others under the more intricate conditions prevailing in the public education system, even after its reform.

The method that he developed was specifically designed for grammar schools. However, Herbart also turned his attention to the construction of the entire education system. He was the constant advocate of a vertically structured system of education with three pillars. The high school (or lower secondary school) and the elementary (or primary) school must exist alongside the grammar school. These three pillars together formed a unified system because educational teaching was given in each of the three branches. Virtue, as the purpose of education, guaranteed the unity of the school system. The three branches of the school system did, how-

ever, differ significantly in respect of the demands made on pupils. While the elementary school was confined to essentials, the lower secondary school required particularly high standards of mathematical and natural scientific teaching.

The teaching of literature in Herbart's system of lower secondary schools differed from that followed in the grammar school in that the classical languages had no place here. Herbart believed that educational training that starts out from a classical language takes a roundabout route which is, however, strongly recommended for the more gifted pupils. The grammar-school syllabus does not simply educate; it is also intended to impart an excellent philological training. The selective slant of Herbart's concept of the grammar school is unmistakable. However, he attached great importance to highly flexible transitions between the different school branches so that it would be wrong to view him as the theoretician of a school system founded on social caste.

Herbart's reforming ideas did not gain acceptance in the Prussia of his day. The reforming vigour of the years between 1809 and 1813 petered out with the restoration following the Napoleonic Wars. The authorities were willing to recruit the grammar-school teachers to whose training Herbart had contributed. But these teachers had to conform to a syllabus which was designed with different aims in mind. There was no longer a willingness to reform the school syllabus in the spirit of educational teaching, if indeed such a willingness had ever existed. The method of grammar-school teaching developed by Herbart was therefore never introduced nationwide.

An incomplete system

After Herbart had completed the main philosophical works to which we referred earlier, he believed that he had attained a state of scientific knowledge from which the fundamental problems of pedagogics could be dealt with fully. On 1 May 1831, he reported to Berlin:

My pedagogics represent a short compendium which is in part not fully comprehensible. Had pedagogics been the central feature of my official activity, I should long since have set down my ideas on the subject in more detail. However, I have always seen pedagogics as no more than an application of philosophy. I was not able to develop them more fully in written form until my broader speculative works had been completed and published [Kehrbach et al., 1897-1912, K15, p. 36].

The late *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen* [Sketch of Some Lectures on Pedagogics] dating from 1835 (second edition 1841) reverts to the two views of educational teaching developed by Herbart in his *Aesthetic Representation* and in the *General Pedagogics*, and rounds them off. In his *Aesthetic Representation*, the problem of educational teaching was dealt with in a 'theoretical' frame, while the *General Pedagogics* discussed the 'practical' background. The *Sketch of Some Lectures on Pedagogics* is not merely confined to the presentation of individual viewpoints which necessarily require completion, but also puts forward the whole concept of pedagogics which Herbart developed in the introduction to his *General Pedagogics*, but

only partly set out in that important early publication. Herbart's *Sketch* follows on from his *General Pedagogics* by comparing the educational teaching that he advocates with a different form of teaching:

When things are learnt for professional reasons, to make progress in a career or as a dilettante, nobody is interested in whether this makes the individual better or worse. Just as he already is, he intends, for good, bad or indifferent purposes, to acquire particular pieces of knowledge; for him, the right teacher is the one who imparts to him *tuto, cito, iucunde*, the desired skills. I am not referring here to that kind of teaching but rather to educational teaching [Herbart, 1982c, p. 180].

The text goes on to identify the fundamentals of educational teaching with which we are already familiar from the *General Pedagogics* and describes the versatility of interest and strength of moral character as integral parts of the educational purpose (Herbart, 1982c, pp. 180 et seq.). In addition, the *Sketch* deals with methodological problems which are encountered in the treatment of certain types of subject matter and with the obstacles that stand in the way of educational teaching (Herbart, 1982c, pp. 245 et seq.).

The *Sketch of Some Lectures on Pedagogics* covers all the content areas of the 'Science of the Educator' which was defined by Herbart in the introduction to his *General Pedagogics* (Herbart, 1982b, p. 22). He even examines the problems of teaching methods applied to the individual subjects on the syllabus (the 'Science of Communication'). These were to be dealt with in more detail in the monographs on specific instruments of education (Herbart, 1982b, p. 23). However, the *Sketch* does no more than its carefully chosen title promises: problems and possible solutions are merely sketched in without the necessary detailed discussion. Herbart would have needed to move beyond this stage and set out a detailed presentation of pedagogics by developing the plan contained in the introduction to his *General Pedagogics*. However, he was not destined to have an opportunity to do so.

How Herbart's work was received

When Herbart died, on 14 August 1841, he had not yet attained what he saw as the most important goals of his scientific life's work. Admittedly, he had succeeded in presenting his philosophical system and developing his educational method in both theoretical and practical terms. But his main philosophical works had not gained as wide an audience as he would have liked. Herbart particularly regretted the fact that his mathematical psychology was almost completely disregarded by his philosophical colleagues.

In his own lifetime, Herbart seems to have failed as an educationist and in gaining a wide audience for his pedagogics. He certainly had many grateful pupils. But he was unable to exercise a determining influence on the reform of the education system. He had not succeeded in gaining broad public recognition for his theory of educational teaching and no attempt had been made to reform the syllabus of a particular type of school, let alone a nationwide school system, on his principles of educational teaching.

It is therefore all the more surprising that, after his death, Herbart's pedagogics conditioned the views of an educational movement which had a broad impact and came to be known as Herbartianism. Centres for Herbartian teaching grew up at the Universities of Leipzig, Jena and Vienna. Important work was done here to train a growing body of elementary-school teachers. Associations and journals dedicated to Herbartian pedagogics were founded. Particular mention might be made here of the Association for Scientific Pedagogics set up in Leipzig in 1868 and the *Yearbook of the Association for Scientific Pedagogics*.

Published literature on Herbart's philosophy and pedagogics soon acquired vast proportions. Herbartianism also spread to other countries. A French translation of the *General Pedagogics* was published in Paris in 1895, and an English edition in London and Boston in 1898.

With the reforming pedagogics of the early twentieth century, Herbartianism was gradually relegated to the background and his educational theory seemed likely to be all but forgotten. Admittedly, Herbart and the Herbartians did have a distinct influence on some of the early proponents of the reforming educational movement. But the school concept of the reforming educationists stood in sharp contrast, both in Germany and elsewhere, to the concept of the Herbartians. The original writings of Herbart were no longer read and he was seen as the proponent of a 'book school' in which pupils swore by the words of their teacher and were denied access to their own experience. Herbart was accused of trying to shape the mind through external influences and of wanting to impose the teaching material needed for this purpose (see, for example, John Dewey, in Chapter 6 of his *Democracy and Education*). Herbart was said to have denied the existence of active functions in man.

Criticisms of this kind, which were rightly levelled against the excesses of Herbartianism, seemed likely to bring Herbart himself into disrepute. His theory of educational teaching was no longer properly understood. The critics forgot that the pupil's own experience enjoyed a central function in educational teaching and that interest, which implied independent mental activity on the part of the pupil, had not only been the end, but also the principal means of educational teaching.

The true differences between Herbart's reforming pedagogics and the reforming pedagogics of the years between 1900 and 1950 lie much deeper than over-hasty criticism of Herbart would have us believe. The understanding of experience and personal activity had in the meantime changed completely and the relationship between the individual, the community and society had also undergone a sea change. To that extent, the pedagogics of John Dewey, for example, are indeed poles apart from the educational theory of Herbart in some respects.

Since 1950, a renaissance of interest in Herbart has appeared in Germany and in some neighbouring countries. Students of Herbart have now distanced themselves from the Herbartians' own image of him which distorted his original work. Instead, they tried to find their way back to the 'living Herbart' (Nohl, 1948). This new route involved abandoning Herbart's philosophy as the basis from which his pedagogics were deduced. Instead, his pedagogics were to be presented as a science that was relatively independent of philosophy. It was now believed that Herbart himself had been in favour of that concept.

The most recent Herbartian research rejects as untenable the distinction between Herbart as a living educationist and a philosopher who has long since had his day. It sets out to reappraise Herbart's pedagogics as an integral part of his philosophy from the angle of the history of the moral sciences and so to learn from Herbart. In this reappraisal, the topicality of Herbart's pedagogics has become clear. For example, people today must learn to reshape their behaviour patterns in relation to themselves and to nature around them on the basis of a correct insight. This problem can be described admirably using Herbart's concepts. The gulf which separates our contemporary world from the decades following the French Revolution means that there is no possibility of solving today's problems in the spirit of a renewed Herbartianism. Herbart wanted to improve the individual through teaching, that is, through a representation of the world. Even under the conditions prevailing in his own day, the route of education, passing from ideas to feelings and from feelings to principles and forms of action, was constantly in jeopardy.

People today can learn from Herbart by examining why the path of character development suggested by him is no longer accessible under the conditions prevailing in our modern world.

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WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT

(1767–1835)

Gerd Hohendorf

With his brother, Alexander, who was two years younger, Wilhelm von Humboldt belonged to a generation that witnessed the collapse of absolute monarchies in the wake of the French Revolution and helped to shape the construction of a new Europe. The two brothers were both educated in the spirit of Rousseau and of the philanthropic school; in their youth, they adopted the ideas of the Enlightenment, lived through the *Sturm und Drang* (storm and stress) period and went on to join the Weimar circle of poets where they enjoyed the friendship of Schiller and Goethe. While Alexander travelled the world and guided natural science into new paths, Wilhelm paved the way for the development of the modern moral sciences.

Wilhelm von Humboldt joined the circle of reformers who took the destiny of the Prussian state into their own hands after the Napoleonic occupation. The administrative reform is associated with the names of Stein and Hardenberg and the reform of the armed forces with those of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Wilhelm von Humboldt's appointed task was to lay the foundations of a new education system in Prussia. Although he only served for sixteen months at the head of the Prussian educational administration, his actions gave a fresh impetus to educational policy, whose effects have been felt right down to the present day; his ideas on a modern educational theory have been attracting increasing attention of late.

Educational influences

Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt were the sons of the Prussian gentleman-in-waiting, Alexander Georg von Humboldt, by his second marriage. Their father had served at the court of Friedrich II in Potsdam and his second marriage was with the widowed Baroness von Holwede, whose son by a first marriage had been tutored by Johann Heinrich Campe. Campe, who was later to become a representative of the German philanthropic school, was now appointed tutor to the two brothers, first in Potsdam and, after their father had resigned from his official duties, at Tegel near Berlin.

In a letter to Mrs Campe, Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote very much later (on

12 September 1801) that he owed a debt of gratitude to Campe for much of his own education (*Letters*, p. 403). He was not referring solely to his Tegel years, but also to the journey made by Campe, accompanied by his former pupil, to Paris immediately after the storming of the Bastille.

The fact that the brothers must have enjoyed a very liberal education emerges from the judgement which the private tutors who took over from Campe are reported to have voiced: they expressed the view that something might perhaps still be made of 12-year-old Wilhelm, but that Alexander was a lost cause. Mistaken verdicts by educators are not uncommon, but a conclusion that was so manifestly wrong as the opinion on Alexander, who later became Grand Master of the Society of Natural Scientists, does seem curiously wide of the mark.

The fact that the two brothers were very different emerges from a letter written by a lady friend of their mother after a visit in 1785: 'As to your sons, I can only say that Wilhelm is anything but a pedant, despite his erudition. On the contrary, he always has *le mot pour rire*. . . . Alexander on the other hand is a shrewd little fellow – *un petit esprit malin*. What is more, he is extraordinarily talented' (*Letters*, pp. 33–4). Wilhelm himself explained their differences in a letter written to his wife on 9 October 1804: 'Since our childhood, we have moved poles apart although we have always remained fond of each other. . . . From an early age, his inclination has been to the outside world, while I preferred the inner life, even when I was very young' (*Letters*, p. 531).

Wilhelm von Humboldt must surely have had Campe's personality in mind when he described the qualities of a good tutor in the letter to Campe's wife referred to earlier, written in 1801 at the time when he was on the lookout for a teacher for his own children: the tutor must be a man 'who takes pleasure in contacts with young children and has the necessary skills, who not only manages to find the right teaching methods but at the same time makes sure to take them out walking, to organize and familiarize the children with concepts that are right and appropriate'. He need not be an 'accomplished scholar', but he must have 'a thorough knowledge of all that he teaches and insist on the same thoroughness in his pupils'. The remark which followed implies criticism of the philanthropic method of education: 'Without this desire for thoroughness, everything remains a game and nothing good can come of it in theoretical or practical life' (*Letters*, p. 422). This already makes it abundantly clear that Humboldt's idea of general education has nothing in common with a mere superficial knowledge of a great many subjects.

The premature death of their father in 1779 – he was described as 'a man of understanding and good taste', a 'great friend to other men, sociable and a benefactor' – proved a traumatic experience for the boys; Wilhelm in particular found it particularly hard to come to terms with his loss. Responsibility for the further intellectual development of the brothers now lay with Christian Kunth who was employed as a house tutor to the Humboldts in 1777/78, and remained a friend to the family afterwards when he was appointed to a civil service position in Berlin. (Wilhelm von Humboldt granted his wish to be buried in the grounds of Tegel Castle in 1829.) He also proved to be an outstanding educational organizer and knew how to impart a constant desire for learning in his pupils. Prominent repre-

sentatives of Berlin intellectual life were also called upon to give tuition in some subjects. The scholars who were invited to give lectures at Tegel included Johann Jakob Engel, a teacher at the Joachimsthal Grammar School, who enjoyed a high reputation at the time as a philosophical author (*Der Philosoph für die Welt*, Leipzig, 1775–77, 2 vols.). ‘Engel gave me my first education of real quality. He has a very astute and lucid mind; he may not be particularly profound, but he has a quicker grasp of facts and a better ability to put them across than I have encountered in anyone else,’ he wrote from Berlin on 12 November 1790 to Karoline who was later to become his wife (*Letters*, p. 143).

From an early age, the brothers took part in the cultural life of the nearby Prussian metropolis; they attended the Berlin salons in which the spirit of enlightenment prevailed. The *Tugendbund* (Virtuous Circle) used to meet in the house of the Jewish doctor, Dr Herz; the focal point of the circle was his wife, Henriette, whom Wilhelm referred to by the endearing diminutive of ‘Jettchen’ in many of his letters. She did much to shape Wilhelm von Humboldt’s emancipatory view of women, which was apparent in his later work. His unprejudiced attitude to Jewish members of society was also influenced by these ties with the Herz family.

In the family tradition, the brothers were destined for a civil-service career. Wilhelm was expected to study law and Alexander the art of finance, known at the time as ‘cameralistics’. Kunth accompanied the brothers to the University of Brandenburg in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder in the autumn of 1787. However, this university was already in a state of decline and was soon to be wound up after the foundation of the University of Berlin. (A new university is being built today in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder and is intended to resume the old tradition as a centre for European education.) The Humboldts only stayed in Frankfurt for one semester; they moved to Göttingen University, which was locked in a struggle for pre-eminence with the *alma mater* in Halle in this era of neo-humanist renewal of university education. Immediately after his arrival in May 1788, Alexander called Göttingen ‘Our German Athens! My brother is quite at home here because he has found ample nourishment for his mind’ (*Letters*, p. 46). In his *Bruchstück einer Selbstbiographie* [Fragment of an Autobiography] (1816), Wilhelm von Humboldt stated his intention to ‘study on my own and in the greatest detail and depth everything which can broaden my view of the world and of man’ (GS, XV, pp. 452 et seq.).

The French Revolution

In the course of the journey mentioned earlier, Johann Heinrich Campe and his young friend reached Paris in July 1789. The news of the storming of the Bastille had reached them in Aachen. This journey, which had been planned as an educational visit, turned into a personal experience of world-shaking events. Humboldt did not share the unbridled enthusiasm of his tutor, but he was well aware of the historical importance of this revolution. In a letter dated 17 August, he complained that he was ‘rather tired of Paris and France’, but said that ‘the political situation [is] now vitally important and had created a state of ferment among the people and in men’s minds’ (*Letters*, p. 93).

Just how durable the ideas of the French Revolution were to prove is apparent from a letter written years later to his wife Karoline (20 August 1814) in which he expressed his conviction that 'all the dynamism, all the life, all the vigour and freshness of the nation . . . can only reside in the people' (*Letters*, p. 734). A letter written to a friend in August 1791 – known under the title of 'Ideas on the Organization of the State Brought about by the New French Constitution' – later reflected the experience and changed political views acquired in Paris: 'The nobility joined forces with the Regent in an endeavour to repress the people; that was the beginning of the end for the nobility' (GS, I, p. 82). 'Mankind had suffered from an extreme and was obliged to seek salvation in another extreme.' Admittedly, Humboldt doubted whether the new constitution would last, but he did believe that it would 'throw a new light on ideas, help to foster every active virtue again and so spread its blessings far beyond the frontiers of France' (GS, I, p. 84).

On the limits of state action

In January 1789, Wilhelm von Humboldt joined the Prussian civil service as a law clerk to the Supreme Court of Berlin, but left this post after only a year. His impending marriage to Karoline von Dacheröden, the daughter of the President of the Prussian Council in Erfurt, was certainly not the only motive for his departure; in fact, the reason lay much deeper and can be traced to Humboldt's sceptical view of the exercise of state power in general and not merely of rule by an absolute monarch. Since 1790 he had been working on a publication entitled *Ideas for an Endeavour to Define the Limits of State Action*, which was completed in 1792 but not published in full until long after his death. The section dealing with education was already published in the December 1792 issue of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* under the title 'On Public State Education'. Humboldt thus took part in the discussion on the shaping of national education which was in progress in Germany, as elsewhere after the French Revolution.

In this publication, tight limits are placed on the state; its action should be confined to protection of the citizen within its frontiers and against attacks from outside. Humboldt advocated the greatest possible freedom for the individual in an environment in which 'each individual, depending on his own needs and inclinations and bounded only by the limits of his own energy' must be allowed to develop according to his own innate personality (GS, I, p. 111). He was afraid that state influence on education would 'always favour one particular form'; this was particularly deleterious if it 'relates to man as a moral being . . . and ceases altogether to have any beneficial action if the individual is sacrificed to the citizen' (GS, I, p. 143). 'Without regard to certain civic forms which must be imparted to men, the sole purpose of education must be to shape man himself' (GS, I, p. 145). Humboldt reversed the role of the state: 'Education of the individual must everywhere be as free as possible, taking the least possible account of civic circumstances. Man educated in that way must then join the state and, as it were, test the Constitution of the state against his individuality' (GS, I, p. 144). In Humboldt's view, man is not

the object of the state but must be a subject who himself helps to shape conditions within society.

Humboldt subscribed to the educational policy notions of Count Mirabeau in calling for public education to 'take place entirely outside the limits . . . within which the state must confine its own activities' (GS, I, p. 146). He made repeated reference to Mirabeau's *Discourse on National Education* and quoted him in a footnote: 'Education will be good to the extent that it suffers no outside intervention; it will be all the more effective, the greater the latitude left to the diligence of the teachers and the emulation of their pupils' (GS, I, p. 146). Elsewhere in this treatise on constitutional theory, Humboldt expressed his views on the duties of parents and on their responsibility 'to raise children . . . to complete maturity' (GS, I, p. 225). He even called upon the state to 'safeguard the rights of children *against* their parents' so that 'parental authority does not exceed normal bounds' (GS, I, p. 226). This emphasis on the rights of the child reveals the influence of Rousseau and the expressly formulated goal of the harmonious general education of each individual. The 'true purpose of man' can only be 'the highest and best proportioned development of his abilities into a harmonious entity'. To attain that goal, human development requires freedom but also a confrontation with 'manifold situations' since 'however free and independent a man may be, he will develop less satisfactorily if his only experience is of monotonous situations' (GS, I, p. 106).

Humboldt adhered to this educational goal in his own lifetime, but his views on the influence of the state on education underwent a fundamental change during the period in which he headed the Prussian educational administration.

After his resignation from the civil service, Wilhelm von Humboldt resided mostly on estates in Thuringia which belonged to his parents-in-law and also in Erfurt or Jena. Both the Humboldts established close contacts with the Weimar circle of poets. Wilhelm became a particular friend of Friedrich von Schiller. This friendship found its literary reflection in an active correspondence.

After the death of their mother in 1796, Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt were left with substantial properties which provided them with the resources to undertake extensive travel for educational research. Many scientific works were the outcome of these journeys. Alexander was always bent on acquiring a better knowledge of the world, while Wilhelm sought a deeper understanding of man and his inner nature.

In the last decade of the eighteenth century Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote several of his most important publications. He made 'the search for the laws governing the development of human energies on earth' (GS, I, p. 93) the focal point of his scientific endeavours. He constantly inquired into the purpose of human life and asked which type of education was necessary to attain that purpose. In his study of classical antiquity, he debated the 'indispensable need for knowledge' in classical antiquity because 'it is a precondition for focusing individual endeavour on a more general purpose, namely, the unity of the most noble purpose which is to shape man within the finest possible proportions' (GS, I, p. 261).

The educational administrator

In 1802, Wilhelm von Humboldt rejoined the Prussian civil service and became envoy to the Vatican in Rome. This appointment enabled him to become even more familiar with the history and culture of classical Greece and Rome. But when 'Germany suffered its deep humiliation' – in the words of a contemporary publication – after the battle of Jena-Auerstadt, Humboldt obeyed a call from Baron vom und zum Stein to return to Berlin and play a leading role in the regeneration of the Prussian state. In 1807, Stein had issued an edict which abolished hereditary subjection, put an end to villeinage and was intended to terminate the whole caste system within society. A regulation permitting self-administration of the towns followed in November 1808. But the intentions of the reformers often proved unsuccessful, not simply because of resistance from conservative elements but also because of the citizens' inadequate level of education. The men around Stein saw Wilhelm von Humboldt as a figure capable of bringing about a complete reform of the Prussian education system. 'Their idea was to strengthen and elevate the nation by removing the burdens weighing on it and also through education. They endorsed a proposal made by the great Swiss thinker and, after regaining their freedom, took action by setting up teacher training establishments' (Diesterweg, 1961–79, Vol. 14, p. 41).

Two colleagues in the Prussian educational administration had already worked on a reform of the education system based on Pestalozzi's ideas in 1808: Johann Heinrich Ludwig Nicolovius and Johann Wilhelm Süvern. They granted scholarships to young teachers and sent them to study Pestalozzi's methods at Yverdon. In a letter, Süvern urged these 'Prussian pupils' not just to acquire the mechanical forms of the method but to penetrate to its 'innermost heart' and to 'warm themselves at the sacred fire' which was spread by Pestalozzi (see Diesterweg, 1961–79, Vol. 5, p. 155). Following their return, the intention was that they should help to disseminate Pestalozzi's pedagogical ideas as the heads of teacher training seminars or members of their teaching staff. To begin with, Humboldt felt some reservations over Pestalozzi's teaching methods, but these were probably dispersed under the influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*. In two of these addresses, Fichte had taken Pestalozzi's ideas as the foundation of his plan for German national education. Even before Humboldt met Nicolovius, he wrote to him on 25 March 1809 that 'the introduction of Pestalozzi's method has my undivided support . . . provided that it is put into effect correctly' (*Letters*, p. 593). In Nicolovius and Süvern, Humboldt had particularly able colleagues who were bent on reform of the Prussian education system.

On 28 February 1809, Wilhelm von Humboldt became head of the culture and education section at the Ministry of the Interior, but Stein had left office by then. Napoleon had called for his dismissal and the King of Prussia had acceded to that request. This section was answerable to the Minister of the Interior, Count von Dohna, with whom Humboldt did not enjoy particularly good relations. To underline the importance of the education system for the Prussian reform programme, Humboldt advocated from the outset its separation from the Ministry of the Inter-

ior; he urged both the Minister of the Interior and also the King to set up a Ministry of Education in its own right. But this only came about many years later under Altenstein in 1817.

Humboldt's view on the way in which government business should be transacted differed greatly from those of von Dohna and Finance Minister von Bülow. Humboldt wanted to see more collegiality, but was unable to persuade either the Minister or the King of the need to set up a State Council.

As head of his own section, he adopted a distinctly collegial style of management. In a letter to the famous neo-humanist, Christian Friedrich Wolf, whom he called to Berlin and wanted to join his own department, he wrote on 31 July 1809 that 'the joint reflection by several heads' had his preference, as did 'a collective opinion rather than that of an individual, even my own' (*Letters*, p. 610). He was the instigator of a scientific delegation which was to bring the spirit of science to administrative functions. But in 1815 the responsibilities of this scientific council, whose membership included leading scholars, among them Schleiermacher, were confined to the organization of examinations.

The exchange of correspondence between Wilhelm von Humboldt and his wife, who had stayed behind in Rome where she was expecting her ninth child, enables us to reconstruct with some accuracy the ideas and thoughts that motivated him during his civil-service career. Just a few days after taking up his duties in Berlin, he informed his wife on 4 March 1809 of his plan to arrange 'for schools to be paid for by the nation alone' (*Letters*, p. 591); he wanted a fund to be set up to enable schools to be run and their teachers paid independently of the government and external circumstances. He took that idea further in a letter to Nicolovius: 'Education is a matter for the nation and we are preparing (admittedly with great caution) to diminish the powers of the state and win the nation over to our own interests' (*Letters*, p. 594).

Humboldt never advocated a system of national education that was predominantly Prussian; he always looked beyond the frontiers of the Kingdom of Prussia and saw himself as a spokesman of the whole German people; in his scientific works, his thinking always had in mind the interests of all mankind.

In early April 1809, Humboldt left Berlin to travel to the seat of government which had been transferred to Königsberg (now Kaliningrad). He devoted himself to his new duties with extraordinary zeal; he visited schools in Königsberg, often unannounced, and set out on an extended series of visits in September/October which took him to Gumbinnen and Memel and in the course of which he refined in still greater detail the school plan which he had drawn up in Königsberg.

Because the education process consists of 'three natural stages', Humboldt advocated three different types of schools: establishments for elementary schooling, for secondary schooling, and for university education.

The elementary school was to lay the foundations for the subsequent levels of education. If pupils were excluded from further courses of education from the outset, the elementary schools would become nothing other than 'people's schools in the most derogatory meaning of the term' (quoted by Spranger, 1910, p. 138). In his *Guiding Ideas on a Plan for the Establishment of the Lithuanian Municipal*

School System (1809), Humboldt explained that 'this whole education system therefore rests on one and the same foundation. The commonest jobbing worker and the finest graduate must at the outset be given the same mental training, unless human dignity is to be disregarded in the former and the latter allowed to fall victim to unworthy sentimentality and chimera' (GS, XIII, p. 278). Humboldt advocated 'complete training of the human personality' even for the poorest members of society in the elementary schools (GS, XIII, p. 266) and naturally also the possibility for pupils who lacked resources of their own to be able to attend higher educational establishments by drawing on a newly created national fund. This idea of a uniform educational structure with three successive stages did not gain acceptance in the nineteenth century and has not even been put completely in place in the twentieth.

The importance attached by Humboldt to a democratic school constitution emerges from a letter written to his wife from Vienna on 20 August 1814: elementary schooling must be organized in such a way 'that it becomes a general foundation which no one can disparage without disparaging himself; it must be the basis on which all subsequent education can be built' (*Letters*, p. 735). At that time he was again employed in the foreign service. Diesterweg (1961-75, Vol. 13, p. 75) reports that 'Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was as imaginative as he was scholarly, found time during the Congress of Vienna to think his way into the ideas of Pestalozzi's popular education and showed the same energetic support for the creation of elementary schools as he had previously for the foundation of Berlin University.'

The Königsberg period had given Humboldt a deeper insight into Pestalozzi's ideas on teaching. Carl August Zeller, who taught after 1803 at Pestalozzi's establishments, first at Burgdorf and then at Yverdon, was summoned to Königsberg in 1809 and placed in charge of the orphanage and an affiliated teacher-training seminary; the graduates of this seminary would, it was hoped, reform the East Prussian school system according to the principles of Pestalozzi. In October 1809, the royal family visited the orphanage headed by Zeller, and Humboldt presumably accompanied them.

The death of his father-in-law obliged Humboldt to interrupt his school-reform activities. In November 1809 he took extended leave in order to settle the estate for his wife who was still living with their children in Rome. The desire to be reunited with his family and the realization that he would never be able to gain acceptance for his school plan or for his ideas of effective educational administration under the government of the day led to his resignation in the spring of 1810, which the King accepted on 25 May. This step was greatly regretted by the reformers, but his departure was a source of some satisfaction to his opponents, especially Minister von Dohna, who was extremely dissatisfied with Humboldt's 'lack of religious understanding'. On 23 June 1810, Nicolovius took over his duties with one exception - Humboldt remained chairman of the founding committee of Berlin University.

How difficult he found it to leave the educational administration and rejoin the foreign service is apparent from a letter that he wrote to his wife on 28 July 1810: 'The internal administration of a country is beyond doubt far more impor-

tant overall than its external relations; but the education of a nation over which I presided and which went ahead successfully under my administration is of incomparably greater importance still.' He went on to explain once again what his intentions were: 'I had drawn up a general plan which covered everything from the smallest school to the university and in which all the component parts fitted together; I was at home with all these parts. I took on the smallest and largest tasks without any preference and with the same energy. I was put off by no difficulties' (*Letters*, pp. 662 et seq.).

The foundation of Berlin University

Plans to set up a university in Berlin had already existed since the beginning of the Prussian reform era (See Fichte's *Deduced Plan for a Higher Educational Establishment to be Set Up in Berlin*, 1807, and Schleiermacher's *Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense, with an Annex Dealing with a New University Establishment*, 1808), but we owe their implementation to Wilhelm von Humboldt. His university model is characterized by the unity of teaching and research. It was to be 'a special feature of the higher scientific establishments that they treated science as a problem that is never completely solved and therefore engaged in constant research' (GS, X, p. 251).

The university was also to be an establishment of general education, an alma mater which taught all the sciences and did not concentrate on occupational training. A visit to the Hohe Karlsschule in Stuttgart in 1789 on his return journey from Paris had already consolidated his distaste for an early vocational orientation of education. He had not yet met Schiller who had spent seven years of torment in that establishment when he wrote in his diary that this type of education seemed not only 'flawed, but altogether harmful' to him. He wondered: 'What bias must be the consequence of such regulated education forced on to pupils from tender childhood to mature youth?' (*Letters*, p. 98). After he took over responsibility for the educational department, these impressions led him to decide on the closure of the Prussian cadet corps, another reason being the caste spirit which prevailed in it.

University education must in his view continue and complete the general education imparted in the previous school years. University education must, however, differ from teaching in elementary and secondary schools and have a special nature of its own. Without teachers there can be no elementary education but their role is not central in university training: 'The university teacher is therefore no longer a teacher and the student no longer someone merely engaged in the learning process but a person who undertakes his own research, while the professor directs his research and supports him in it' (GS, XIII, p. 261). Close contact with their teachers should enable students to undertake their own independent scientific work.

The freedom of science and autonomy of the teaching staff are the premisses on which Humboldt's university model is based. From our modern vantage point, it may be thought that this model tended to be too remote from politics, but Humboldt himself had reservations on this matter and did not want to allow science to be misused by politics. Neither should his idea that the university must

grant 'solitude' to the scholar be interpreted as an attempt to lock science away in an ivory tower.

Heinrich Deiters, for many years Dean of the Pedagogical Faculty at the Humboldt University in Berlin, refutes the idea that Humboldt's university model is historically outmoded because of the tendency of universities nowadays to become establishments of mass academic training with a strong professional orientation. On the contrary, he points out that 'Humboldt's thinking may well be a starting point to facilitate a more profound analysis of the problems of the university' (Deiters, 1960, p. 39).

Humboldt organized the foundation of Berlin University; he found the necessary resources and a building, the former palace of Prince Heinrich on the Unter den Linden, in which it is still housed today. He himself attended lectures by the newly appointed professors and in particular those of the first rector, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. On 10 February 1810, he wrote to Goethe: 'Here everything proceeds at a quiet pace which I am trying to the best of my ability to accelerate. The lectures by Wolf and Fichte are warmly applauded, and I attend both whenever I can' (*Letters*, p. 638). On either side of the entrance to the main building of Berlin University, which is now named after Wilhelm von Humboldt, monuments to the Humboldt brothers still stand today. Each in his own right, they represent the moral and natural sciences in nineteenth-century Germany.

Wilhelm von Humboldt's educational policy concept failed to gain general acceptance, but then neither did the Prussian reforms associated with the names of Stein and Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Not even the reform of the grammar schools, which Humboldt saw as part of a uniform education system, was implemented. Philological courses were separated from theological training and a body of grammar-school teachers constituted, but the grammar school itself became an élitist educational establishment bearing the stamp of the Prussian state. At the lower educational level, Humboldt's colleague Süvern did continue his efforts to enact a law on education, but following many drafts the last attempt foundered in 1819 after the Karlsbad decisions.

A young Prussian diplomat, Varnhagen von Ense, who accompanied Prussian Minister of State von Hardenberg to the Vienna Congress, gives us a telling personal character portrait of Humboldt: 'He is inspired by elevated ideas of world education, but their effective implementation is ruled out by the condition of our states and the world as it is today. Therefore, his qualities as a thinker are of little use to him as a statesman' (*Letters*, p. 740).

During his period as a representative of the Prussian Government to the Congress of Vienna and later at the Aachen Congress, Wilhelm von Humboldt always had in mind the interest of the German people and was never content to pursue a strictly Prussian policy. In 1819, he was appointed Minister of Estates in the Prussian Government, but resigned again after only a few months because he wanted no part in the increasingly harsh persecution of 'demagogues' following the attack on Kotzebue. Humboldt described the Karlsbad decisions as 'shameful, unnatural and unworthy of a thinking people' (quoted in Spranger, 1910, p. 38).

He went on to live mostly at Tegel, near Berlin, and busied himself with scien-

tific work; only once, in 1829, did he play any further role in public affairs as Chairman of the Commission on the Foundation and Interior Design of the new Berlin Museum.

An educational theorist

Humboldt's school plans were not published until long after his death, together with his fragment of a treatise on the 'Theory of Human Education' which had been written in about 1793. Here Humboldt states that 'the ultimate task of our existence is to give the fullest possible content to the concept of humanity in our own person . . . through the impact of actions in our own lives'. This task 'can only be implemented through the links established between ourselves as individuals and the world around us' (GS, I, p. 283). Humboldt's concept of education does not lend itself solely to individualistic interpretation. It is true that he always recognized the importance of the organization of individual life and the 'development of a wealth of individual forms' (GS, III, p. 358), but he stressed the fact that 'self-education can only be continued . . . in the wider context of development of the world' (GS, VII, p. 33). In other words, the individual is not only entitled, but also obliged, to play his part in shaping the world around him.

Humboldt's educational ideal is entirely coloured by social considerations. He never believed that the 'human race could culminate in the attainment of a general perfection conceived in abstract terms'. In 1789, he already wrote in his diary that 'the education of the individual requires his incorporation into society and involves his links with society at large' (GS, XIV, p. 155).

In his essay on the 'Theory of Human Education', he answered the question as to the 'demands which must be made of a nation, of an age and of the human race'. 'Education, truth and virtue' must be disseminated to such an extent that the 'concept of mankind' takes on a great and dignified form in each individual (GS, I, p. 284). However, this shall be achieved personally by each individual who must 'absorb the great mass of material offered to him by the world around him and by his inner existence, using all the possibilities of his receptiveness; he must then reshape that material with all the energies of his own activity and appropriate it to himself so as to create an interaction between his own personality and nature in a most general, active and harmonious form' (GS, II, p. 117).

Close attention was not paid to the work of Humboldt from the angle of educational policy and educational theory until this century. In two books, Eduard Spranger was the first to 'recognize the true value of Humboldt's contribution to educational development at the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century' (Benner, 1990, pp. 5 et seq.). In recent decades, the one-sided concentration on intellectual history has given way to an emancipatory interpretation of his pedagogical thinking in a series of works, most recently by Dietrich Benner who sees the possibility that 'the study of Humboldt's work . . . will help to clarify the central problems and questions of recent educational theory as matters concerning all of us, and also help to resolve issues which require further theoretical and practical analysis' (Benner, 1990, p. 210).

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T O R S T E N H U S É N

(1916-)

T. Neville Postlethwaite

Torsten Husén is eminent in the world of education. In 1994 he is typically mentioned together with such names as Ralph Tyler of the United States and C. E. Beeby of New Zealand when conversation centres on the greatest living educators. Who is he? How has his career developed? What are his contributions to education?

Towards a 'Weltanschauung'

Torsten Husén was born on 1 March 1916 in Lund, Sweden. His mother, Betty Prawitz, the daughter of a primary-school teacher, had completed secondary school and had been trained as a telegraphist. Torsten Husén's father had received 500 days of half-time primary schooling, which was the equivalent of about six years of education. This arrangement was typical in rural areas at that time. He later became the manager of a sawmill which was subsequently burned down. His father then opened his own timber agency.

When Husén was about 5 years old he was sent on holiday to his grandfather's home in Stockholm. He was the headmaster of a special-education school for the deaf and dumb. The school and his grandfather's home were situated in a very large park called Djurgården. On one of my walks through this park with Husén, I recall him telling me of his visit to his grandfather's and how, at the time, he thought that Stockholm consisted of just a big park.

At the age of 6 – one year ahead of the official age for school entry in Sweden – he started primary school. He had learned to use a typewriter and told the teacher that he did not need to learn to write by longhand! He then proceeded to the municipal middle school at Alvesta to which he commuted daily for four years before entering the *gymnasium* at Växjö where he enrolled in the mathematics/natural sciences stream.

As was required at that time, he had to learn three foreign languages, beginning with German, then English, and finally French. These languages were mandatory for those who planned to enter the university. But in the middle school he disliked the

teacher of French and therefore skipped that language for two years. This resulted in his having to spend a summer taking private lessons in French before being admitted to the *gymnasium*. After six years of learning German and one summer as an exchange student in Germany, he became fluent in German and accompanied his father on business trips to Germany where he served as his interpreter.

He had studied English in school for almost as many years as German but did not have any opportunity of practising it in conversation until he first went to the United Kingdom in 1946. At university nearly all of the assigned reading was in one or the other of the three languages mentioned. At that time much of the assigned reading in the social sciences was in English, this field beginning to be dominated by American scholars. As can be seen from his bibliography, he later wrote several of his books and most of his articles in English – his third language.

As opposed to many eminent public figures who reminisce about the influence of a particular teacher on their formation, there is little to be found in Husén's writings about the influence of any one person on him, with the exception of the history and mother-tongue teacher at the *gymnasium* – a Mr Rundquist. His influence can be seen in the subjects Husén selected to study at the university.

There are several behavioural traits which Torsten Husén possesses which, it is tempting to think, were part and parcel of his personality before he entered the university. The first was *nulla dies sine linea* (no day shall pass without some lines being written). The second was 'nothing is impossible', in the sense of not being deterred by what appear to be high bureaucratic or administrative hurdles. The third was his ability to concentrate even for short periods of time on a single task. (I once spent five days at an international meeting that Husén was chairing. The work schedule was tough. Each day began with a breakfast meeting and rarely ended before 11 p.m. At some juncture the possibility arose of antagonistic views – and personalities – reaching the point where a joint international venture was put in jeopardy. The strain on Husén as chairman was enormous. And yet, on each of those five days, he sat down for thirty minutes – typically between 6.30 and 7 p.m. – and wrote the draft of academic articles the content of which had nothing to do with the meeting.)

Another trait is his voracious reading. He has clearly read very, very widely and is, in the positive sense of the word, a polyhistor.

In 1935 at the age of 19, after military service, he entered the University of Lund. He has often made the point that he regarded the university (and would still like all students to have a similar perception) as a *smörgåsbord* from which to make a choice in order to satisfy one's intellectual curiosity and taste. He studied mathematics for his first academic credits, then switched to literature and history, and finally to psychology and education.

His first publication appeared in 1940 in a literary journal and dealt with the influence of French psychiatry and clinical psychology on Strindberg in the 1880s. By the end of 1941 one book and ten articles were in print, all on the subject of military psychology, which he was dealing with during his service in the army staff headquarters in Stockholm.

He undertook his graduate studies in psychology, but it could just as well

have been in history or in literature. In the School of Psychology and Education he came under the tutelage of Professor John Landquist, who had become well known for his seminars at the University of Lund in the 1930s and 1940s. His inspired teaching attracted several graduate students who later became professors in that field in Sweden.

In 1938 and 1939 Husén attended summer courses at the University of Marburg, Germany, where he listened to lectures by Professor Ernst Kretschmer. At Marburg he met Ingrid, who was attending a course in German. They married in 1940. They would not return to Germany until 1952 when they were invited to the Hochschule für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung in Frankfurt-am-Main with their three children.

In the meantime, in 1938/39, he became involved in a major longitudinal study to carry out psychological tests on all 10-year-olds who had been born in the city of Malmö in 1928, a project aimed at elucidating the social influences of the intelligence quotient (IQ). This was his introduction to tests and measurements, as well as differential psychology.

His thesis for his first advanced degree (licentiate) in 1941 was on eidetic imagery, its origin and phenomenology. His doctoral dissertation, a 500-page book entitled *Adolescence* (Husén, 1944), dealt with the psychology of the age-span 16 to 20 years and was based on an analysis of the responses to questionnaires from a sample of 1,000 young persons applying for enlistment into the Swedish army. Each aspect of adolescence covered in the questionnaire was accompanied by the relevant literature from Austrian, German and even French sources. As will be seen later, it was from his work with the military that he used data collected for one purpose to serve quite a different end. The 'disputation' (i.e. the defence of the thesis) lasted more than six hours and was used by competing factions within the university to further their own favourites for promotion. It should be pointed out that, at that time, the oral defence of a doctoral thesis in Sweden was a daunting experience even in the best of conditions. The candidate had to be dressed in tails and white tie, as had the three opponents. The 'oral' was public so that there might be hundreds of persons in the auditorium. Any member of the public, referred to as opponents *extra ordinem*, could ask questions. In Torsten Husén's case there were four or five of them, representing a faction wanting to use the occasion to attack Landquist indirectly. Landquist was due to retire two years later and his chair had to be filled, preferably not by Husén but by a favourite son of some other faculty member. The knives were out!

By the age of 28 he was a person skilled in foreign languages, versed in literacy criticism and historical methods, who had studied psychology in the tradition of Wundt and Ernst Meumann, as well as philosophy in the tradition of the Vienna Circle. His methodological training in psychology had taken place in experiments on memory, perception and psychophysics. By the end of 1944, he had published three books and some sixty articles. Above all, he was a person with a very broad view of academic life and an insatiable curiosity – a curiosity that was of an intellectual nature and not one that was politically motivated. He had achieved a true *Weltanschauung*.

From psychology to education

In 1942, while still writing his doctoral thesis, the General Staff of the Swedish army had observed Husén's other writings and hired him as an expert to build up a system of psychological testing. He had quickly to improve his competence in psychometrics. From 1942 to 1944 he commuted between Lund and Stockholm, but in 1944, having received his Ph.D. from the University of Lund, he moved to Stockholm.

He and Gösta Ekman – later Professor of Psychology at Stockholm University – became the first two military psychologists in Sweden. Their task was to devise tests and interviews for military selection and specialization. At the same time, the task involved collecting data on other problems. From these applied research studies came publications on psychological warfare, attitude surveys among conscripts and studies of soldiers with adjustment problems. At that time he and his co-workers also developed and standardized an individual intelligence test for adults. It was also possible to use the data from these applied studies to tackle theoretical problems. For example, he and Ekman launched studies on test reliability, scaling and validity.

He continued to write prodigiously. In 1948 he published a book reporting on the relationships between ability and social background, occupation, length of schooling and school performance. In 1950 there was another book using data from the long-term Malmö study reporting the relationships between ability test scores at 10 and 20 years of age, and estimating the influence of formal schooling on changes in ability over a ten-year period.

Both of these books brought to the fore the notion that, under a selective system of education, much talent existing within society was not developed. With the onset of the democratization of education systems, was it possible for this dormant 'reserve of talent' to be tapped and used for the joint good of the society and the individual? One of the major questions was whether or not it was possible to identify people with a more academic bent and those with practical skills (or in more frivolous terms, whether it was possible to separate the 'academic goats' from the 'practical sheep'). If so, at approximately what age would it be possible to undertake this diagnosis?

None of the studies carried out by Husén and his colleagues could confirm the popular (mis)conception that there were two kinds of relatively independent abilities or that they could be diagnosed at around the age of 10, 11 or 12. In other studies Husén examined the social consequences of differentiating the 'bookish' from the 'practical' students. It could be shown that the earlier this differentiation took place, the more social bias (higher social class being over-represented in the higher levels of education) and the less equality of opportunity there was. These findings had an impact on policy-making in Sweden and other countries and awakened in Torsten Husén an interest in the interplay between research and policy-making, a topic to which he was to return at a later period in his life.

The results of these and other studies prompted the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to organize a conference in 1961

in Sweden on 'Ability and Educational Opportunity'. The impact of this type of thinking stimulated many systems of education to question their own selective procedures. This, coupled with the political trend towards democratization, was one determining force in the onslaught of comprehensive school systems in many European countries.

Twin research

One of the eternal problems of human behaviour is the extent to which it is influenced by 'nature' and 'nurture'. Husén used the military induction data for psychological research on twins. All twins among the army recruits in the period 1948–52 (about 600 pairs) were categorized as identical or fraternal. The distributions and the intra-pair differences were compared between identical (monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic) twins for ability, school achievement, height and weight, handedness and handwriting. By 1950 this was one of the largest twin studies ever carried out. It was another way of examining individual differences in behaviour in terms of environmental influences (Husén, 1953).

At that time, it was regarded as insufficient for a professor to be specialized in only developmental and differential psychology. One also needed to have demonstrated competence in the philosophical and historical aspects of education. Thus, still working on the principle of 'Never let a day go by without writing', Husén prepared three books (in the evening hours) on the history of education in Sweden and, as his subject, chose the pioneering work of the educators Fridtjov and Anders Berg. The Bergs had been particularly interested in promoting a unified compulsory school and also in conducting a spelling reform. It is therefore not entirely coincidental that Husén published another book in 1950 presenting the results of an empirical study on the psychology of spelling.

The Malmö longitudinal study

No longitudinal study is easy to conduct. The study on the whole age-group of those born in 1928 in the city of Malmö is still being followed up. The Malmö study has elucidated problems of the relative effects of home and school on later careers, as well as the influence of schooling upon IQ. It has been able to examine the effects of recurrent education on the future lives of those having undergone it. Indeed, in an analysis of a subset of these data by one of his graduate students, Albert Tuijnman, the large effect of adult/recurrent education on the earnings and well-being of those in the sample was demonstrated.

The Malmö Study continued with various graduate students working on several aspects of the study, especially a follow-up of those who had been in remedial classes at school, and the relationship between failure at school and criminality. These results were presented in *Talent, Opportunity and Career* (Husén, 1969).

Later follow-up studies, through multivariate modelling, were able to show the direct and indirect effects of home background, formal schooling and recurrent education on changes in earnings and social status.

Both of these were, and are, enormous enterprises. Most university professors would flinch from entering such studies. There are few who, even seeing the necessity and advantages of undertaking these studies, would have the courage to begin them. The fact that Torsten Husén not only took them on but saw them through to the end and ensured that the results were published, together with their implications for policy changes, puts the educational world in his debt.

The role of research in educational reform

In 1953 he became Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Stockholm. These were productive years and it is at this point that another of Torsten Husén's abilities became apparent. In building up an entirely new department, Husén recruited and held together a good team of co-workers.

In 1956 he moved to the new School of Education and became Sweden's first professor of applied educational research. In 1957 a governmental School Commission on Education began to require research on the content and methods of education in connection with drawing up the final blueprint for Sweden's nine-year comprehensive school. It was at this point that Husén's role partly changed from that of being a researcher to that of becoming a leader and co-ordinator of research.

Teams had to be formed. In each of five subject areas – Swedish, mathematics, physics, chemistry and social studies – analytic (including empirical) studies were undertaken on: (a) the content being taught in grades 7 to 9; (b) the requirements of the upper-secondary and vocational schools receiving students from these grades; and (c) an assessment of the retained knowledge and skills several years later. All of these studies had an impact on the curriculum planning of the School Commission and, thus, on the curriculum of the comprehensive school which was implemented from 1962 onwards.

One of these studies, which was to have an impact on the methodology employed in the often unreported work of curriculum centres in many countries, was a needs assessment survey conducted by one of Husén's graduate students, Urban Dahllöf.

It was also at this time that two other graduate students, Nils Eric Svensson and Sixten Marklund, undertook studies that were to become internationally famous. The first compared achievement in selective and comprehensive schools in the Stockholm area, while the second compared achievement in classes of different size and homogeneity. Both also influenced the recommendations of the School Commission.

At the end of the 1950s and increasingly during the 1960s there was growing governmental recognition in many countries of the advantages of using educational research as one important basis for determining policy decisions on educational reform. Funding for educational research increased dramatically.

Husén began to examine in a critical way the utility of educational research. He became convinced that, in many cases, much research was useful for elucidating macro problems in education but was of little use in solving micro problems,

such as how the teacher should optimally go about his or her tasks in the classroom. He studied the extent to which research was used (and how it was used) in Sweden, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Two books emerged from this work: *Educational Research and Educational Change: The Case of Sweden* (with Gunnar Boalt) in 1967; and *Educational Research and Policy: How Do They Relate?* (with Maurice Kogan) in 1984.

It was in 1971 that the Swedish Parliament created a special Chair of International Education for him at Stockholm University. This, again, required creating a new team of co-workers. The International Institute of Education was slowly built up in terms of both academic faculty members and research teams. This was not an easy task.

International leadership

In 1952 Husén had been invited by the United States High Commissioner to serve as a consultant at a workshop in Frankfurt-am-Main on the role of psychological research in dealing with problems in German education. The workshop was the first major project of the German Institute for International Educational Research. It was attended by some twenty German professors of education and a dozen consultants from abroad. It was a massive attempt to map out what research might do in tackling various educational problems.

In 1954 he first visited the United States. This proved to be the beginning of an intensive interaction with many outstanding American educators and psychologists – an interaction that has continued up to the present. In 1959 he was Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago, and later on he was twice (1965/66 and 1973/74) a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. He became a Foreign Associate of the United States National Academy of Education in 1967, and an Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1982.

At the end of the 1950s, Husén was one of a small group of researchers that met at the UNESCO Institute for Education in Hamburg. This group decided that national systems of education were worthy of investigation using empirical methods. Until that time, the outcomes of education were measured in terms of the number of pupils graduating from different levels of a school system. However, it seems that what had been learned by the students in different subjects in different systems could well vary considerably. There were certain differences between school systems in terms of age of entry to school, the structure of the system, the curriculum content, teaching methods, teacher training and the like. Would it be possible, they asked themselves, to conduct international (or intersystem) studies on a comparative basis which would yield results from which each system could learn about improving itself?

Again, this was a formidable challenge and an onerous task. It was this group that later formed itself into the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). With his vision and intellectual curiosity, his disregard for bureaucratic hurdles and his ability to cohere groups of researchers,

Husén was a self-evident candidate to be the chairman of the IEA. Despite managerial, funding and technical problems, it succeeded and its results were used as one input for policy formulation by nearly all of the education systems that had been involved in its research.

Torsten Husén was chairman of this group from 1962 to 1978, during which time the IEA grew from twelve countries conducting a feasibility study to the point where it had undertaken and published the results of seven large-scale studies in over twenty countries.

In the 1960s Husén was increasingly requested by ministries of education, by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and by the UNESCO Institute for Education in Hamburg to act as an expert consultant on different aspects of education, and by the OECD to participate in their country reviews of educational policy.

It was Torsten Husén who suggested the English phrase 'recurrent education' to Olof Palme, at that time Minister of Education and later to become Prime Minister of Sweden. This phrase was used by Palme in UNESCO and OECD meetings and eventually entered the international jargon.

In the mid-1960s he was invited by Anthony Crosland, the British Minister of Education, to come to London and discuss comprehensive schooling with him and his co-workers.

Further to this, he became interested in the attempt to predict the likely future trends of education. 'Plan Europe 2000' was launched by the European Cultural Foundation and it was for them that he began some work on what are referred to as 'futurological studies'. In the aftermath of President Johnson's 'Williamsberg Conference' in 1967, Husén became a Trustee of the International Council for Educational Development (ICED) and in 1971 Chairman of the Governing Board of the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris.

While still chairman of the IEA, Husén took on more work as a member of various national and international commissions. For instance, he was called upon to participate in Aspen, Colorado, at seminars sponsored by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies bringing together leading figures from many nations. Meanwhile, he took on the co-editorship of the ten-volume *International Encyclopedia of Education* (Husén and Postlethwaite, 1985), and he still supervised several doctoral students.

In 1982 he became an emeritus professor, but maintained an office at his university. His committee work, his travel abroad, his expert advice to governments continued, and he was still producing books and articles at a prodigious rate. The writing and editing of the second *International Encyclopedia of Education* began in 1991.

He became the founding President of the International Academy of Education (1986-93). In 1990, together with Albert Tuijnman of the Netherlands and W. D. Halls of the United Kingdom, he wrote a report, *Schooling in Modern European Society*, to the Academia Europaea discussing issues in European education (Husén et al., 1992).

The training of others

Torsten Husén had thirty-eight doctoral students, from Jon Naeslund in 1956 with a doctoral dissertation on 'Methods of Teaching Reading: A Survey and Some Experimental Contributions' to Roland Duberg in 1982 with his thesis on 'Schooling, Work Experience and Earnings: A Study of Determinants of Earnings in a Third World Corporate Setting'. Up to about 1971, the doctoral dissertation in Sweden was of a very high standard (somewhat akin to the *Doctorat d'État* in France or the *Habilitation* in Germany) and after that it was formally equated to about the same level as a doctorate in other European and American universities.

Thirty-eight doctoral dissertations is an enormous number by any standard. However, it must also be said that Torsten Husén had, for the most part, the great ability to attract good doctoral candidates so that the work load, though great, was perhaps not quite as heavy as it would seem.

Further to this, Husén played a major role in the training of international researchers through the setting up in Europe of several seminars on 'Learning and the Educational Process' and in the training of curriculum teams at the 1971 Gränna six-week seminar where 123 curriculum workers from twenty-three countries were trained.

It can be seen that Torsten Husén moved from being a researcher himself to the leadership of large research enterprises, both nationally and internationally. His work covered the psychological, sociological and historical aspects of education. He has been adept in both the philosophical and empirical approaches to scholarship in education, and his networks of educational researchers cover the whole world. The enterprises were overlapping, his knowledge eclectic, his writing colossal.

He has been honoured by universities in Amsterdam, Chicago, Glasgow, Joensuu, Liège, New York, Rhode Island and Shanghai, as well as by many national educational societies.

The writing and running of large projects is time-consuming and stressful. It was his wife Ingrid who was the support behind the scenes, ensuring that his life was made as smooth as possible to allow him the strength and peace of mind to undertake his work. She often travelled with him, especially on longer journeys. In 1991 she died after a four-year illness.

Torsten Husén's personal and avuncular disposition, which have done much to pour oil on troubled waters, should also be mentioned. His clarity of exposition and ability to pull information from related fields together to deal with specific educational problems all combine to form a great educator.

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T Ā H Ā H U S S E I N

(1889–1973)

Abdel Fattah Galāl

Yes, in the darkness and tranquillity of the night, I allow myself the indulgence of a beautiful dream. I see an Egypt which has done all I have ever asked, now devoting its wholehearted care and attention to education. I see an Egypt which has achieved all I have ever promised. I see an Egypt from which the mists of ignorance have been lifted, now bathed in the light of knowledge and learning. I see an Egypt in which education embraces all the people, rich and poor, strong and weak, bright and dull, young and old. I see an Egypt steeped in the sweetness of education, an Egypt in which the light of education brightens hovel and palace alike.¹

This, then, was the beautiful dream of Tāhā Hussein, one of Egypt's greatest thinkers. It was the summation of his experiences in life, drawing together the strands of Egypt's immemorial past, its modest present and its glittering future. His thinking, which grew out of the very soil of Egypt, was combined with his experiences of Egypt and the Arab world, of Islam and Europe. It was a declaration of war on backwardness and a proposal of alternatives drawn from modern civilization, which he had experienced in Europe, above all in France, his second home. Regardless of the controversy that these views generated, the result was a new vision which remains valid to the present day, and a programme capable of solving the problems faced by education in developing countries and, more particularly, in the Arab world.

This was a dream of democracy and equality, under whose twin banners no one would be excluded from knowledge and education. Together, all would play an active part in the building of a society which was free and democratic, independent and strong. This was the framework of Tāhā Hussein's philosophy of education.

In this dream, knowledge was not a luxury but a necessity. It was essential to eradicate illiteracy and provide free primary education for all. Everyone is entitled to education and no one must be neglected, neither the gifted nor the less fortunate. Education is an ongoing process, one that continues throughout life, from youth to old age.

Tāhā Hussein expressed his dream not in the dry jargon of pedagogical science but in the language of poetry, a language understood by people at every level of educational attainment. Though his dream is shared to this day by all Egyptians –

and, indeed, by all humanity – it still remains a dream. It is that dream of education for all which international organizations – with UNESCO in the vanguard – are seeking to translate into reality in every country, so that all children will receive at the very least a primary education, and adult illiteracy will be consigned to history.

The life and thought of Tāhā Hussein

This dream took shape through many different stages of development: at times Tāhā Hussein experienced disappointments and faced difficulties, yet he also achieved considerable success, occupying prominent positions in politics and education, and enjoying celebrity as a scholar, not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world and the West. The phases of disappointment and success which marked the life of Tāhā Hussein were paralleled by the development of Egyptian society itself.

Tāhā Hussein was born in 1889 during the period of demoralization which followed the failure of the Arab revolution and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. He was born and lived his childhood in a small community in the Governorate of Minya in the south of the country. In this environment, poverty and ignorance, disease and destitution were endemic, and there was no provision whatever of preventive medicine or medical care. For this, Tāhā Hussein would pay dearly, losing his sight at the age of 6.² His father, a minor civil servant weighed down by the burdens of keeping a large family, could do nothing but enrol him in the village school to learn the Koran. There the child mingled with graduates from al-Azhar and acquired popular culture by listening to storytellers recounting the lives of Antar bin Shadad, Sayf bin Dhi Yazan and other Arab folk heroes. Despite all the difficulties facing him, an intense desire arose in the boy to travel to Cairo and study at al-Azhar.

In 1902, Tāhā Hussein left for Cairo with his older brother Ahmad and enrolled at al-Azhar, where he continued his studies until 1912.³ This was a time when the Arab national revolt against the British was growing in intensity under the leadership of Mustafa Kamila and would be heightened by the Denshawī incident in 1906. One of the fruits of this period was the creation of the National University, which opened its doors to students in 1908. Tāhā Hussein took this opportunity and enrolled, since he found the traditional teaching methods employed in al-Azhar at the time too restricted. At the National University he found new ideas, discovering the history and civilization of ancient Egypt and studying Islamic philosophy within an intellectual framework unknown at al-Azhar. He studied under Egyptian and foreign teachers, taking courses in Islamic civilization, the civilization of ancient Egypt, Semitic languages, French, Arabic literature, Islamic philosophy and Oriental history.⁴ This offered a window onto a new world of thought and culture very different from the one to which he had been accustomed at al-Azhar. He continued his studies until May 1914 when he obtained his doctorate from the National University for a thesis on the life of Abi al-Ala' al-Ma'arri.⁵

In view of his academic excellence, the National University sent Tāhā Hussein on a scholarship to the Sorbonne in France. There, he became a fluent writer of

French and studied sociology. He gained a doctorate from the Sorbonne on the philosophy of Ibn Khaldun in 1918 and a postgraduate diploma in the history of civil law in 1919. During his time as a student in France, Tāhā Hussein studied the new sciences of psychology and sociology, and Émile Durkheim supervised part of his doctoral thesis. He also studied French literature and modern history, learned Greek and Latin and read classical history.⁶

The pressure of the Egyptian revolt at the time led to the appointment of a new governor and to a slight loosening of the iron grip of British occupation. This gave some glimpse of hope to the National University and to the scholars who had been sent abroad. These included the young Tāhā Hussein who had absorbed a whole range of cultures – Egyptian, Arab, Islamic, Semitic, Greek, Roman and French. He was adept in taking what was best from his own heritage and combining it with the best in modern European culture. He returned with high hopes of developing education in Egypt.

He arrived back in 1919, the year of the Egyptian revolt against British occupation which resulted in the end of the British Protectorate in 1922. Independence was declared, a constitution was drafted in 1923 and the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution were held in 1924.

Tāhā Hussein began to teach Greek and Roman history at the National University. He took part in a cultural life vibrant with nationalism and jealously devoted to independence. When the National University was taken over by the state in 1925, Tāhā Hussein was first appointed professor of Arabic literature and then dean of the Faculty of Arts in 1928.

As an active participant in politics and culture, Tāhā Hussein could not escape the vicissitudes of this life; for example, he was at one time dismissed from his post in the Faculty of Arts. However, he was to be reappointed later and from then on was known simply as 'the Dean'. Political and cultural life also had its rewards; in 1942, he was appointed adviser on the arts to the Ministry of Education and, at the same time, was seconded to act as president of the University of Alexandria. He held these two posts until 1944. The pinnacle of his career was his appointment as Minister of Education from January 1950 to January 1952.

Tāhā Hussein's activity was not confined to the academic world and educational administration. For example, during the period from 1939 to 1942, he was an observer on cultural matters for the Ministry of Education. In addition, he both edited and wrote for newspapers and magazines. He was appointed first as a member and then as president of the Arabic Language Academy, and took part in the intellectual, cultural and political controversies of the day. He attended numerous academic conferences at home and abroad.⁷ From 1952 until his death in 1973, he lived the life of an ordinary university professor of Arabic literature in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Cairo (formerly the Egyptian University).

The bulk of Tāhā Hussein's considerable body of works are concerned with Arabic literature. On education, he wrote just one book, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fi Misr* [The Future of Education in Egypt], and translated Gustave Le Bon's *Psychologie de l'éducation* in 1921. Even so, he continued to write articles and give lectures on the subject from 1938 almost up to the time of his death.

The experience of administration, public service, politics and culture all helped to form and strengthen Tāhā Hussein's thought and add depth to his vision. He was not content to confine himself to the world of theory but combined his intellectual pursuits with the needs and aspirations of a nation striving for complete independence and freedom and, as Egypt has done throughout its long history, to make an effective contribution to human civilization.

Against this background of nationalism Tāhā Hussein, drawing on a wealth of sources, wrote *The Future of Education in Egypt*.⁸ Although he would continue to publish articles on education and to give public lectures after the publication of this book, analysis of his later work reveals no new, comprehensive vision or intellectual framework, but rather commentary on various aspects, defence of one position or another, or attacks on opposing viewpoints.

The general framework of education

When a society has come through a major crisis, such as military subjection to a foreign power, domination by a hostile culture or abrasive contact with other cultures, it is faced with the need to seek and redefine its identity. It has to decide what constitutes its national character. It has to examine its culture and distinguish between the enduring and the ephemeral, between old and new values, between tradition and modernity.

Developing countries in general and, more particularly, those that were subject to colonialism in one form or another, were almost all obliged to search for their identity, questioning the basis and the manifestations of their culture. Egypt itself was no stranger to this question of identity. With the French occupation in 1798, Egypt discovered that its culture had become stagnant and that it had been overtaken by other countries in areas which enabled them to impose their sovereignty. Thus, it began to question its attitude towards its own culture. The result was an opening up to Europe and modern civilization which gave rise to a debate over tradition versus modernity.

Opinion was divided between those who clung to tradition and those who asserted that Egypt should follow Europe. It was to be expected that an intellectual like Tāhā Hussein would make his own contribution to this debate, which formed the general framework for education and defined its aims.

The starting point for Tāhā Hussein's definition of Egyptian identity was his study of classical, medieval and modern history: 'The new Egypt will be inventive or creative only in so far as it is founded on the eternal Egypt of its past . . . For this reason, I can think of the future of education in Egypt only in the light of its remote antiquity.'⁹ Thus, Egypt's ancient past was taken to be one pillar of the country's cultural future and one of the main features of its national character. A second pillar of Egyptian culture taken from history was its civilization:

It is a waste of time and effort to try to separate the relations between Egypt and the ancient Aegean civilization, the relations between Egypt and the first ages of Greek civilization and the relations between Egypt and Greek civilization which blossomed in the sixth century B.C. and flourished up to the days of Alexander.¹⁰

Tāhā Hussein stressed the importance of this element:

The exchange of ideas between Egypt and Greece in ancient times was something which the Greeks honoured in both poetry and prose. Egypt is spoken of in the highest terms in Greek epics, in dramatic poetry, in the works of Herodotus and the writers and philosophers who came after him.¹¹

The third pillar of Egyptian culture was Islam and the Arabic language: 'Islam, which came and spread throughout the world, was warmly received in Egypt where it was swiftly embraced as the national religion and Arabic, the language of Islam, was adopted as the national language.'¹²

The selection of these pillars of Egyptian culture clearly demonstrated the influence of Tāhā Hussein's varied background and a mind formed, as we have seen, by al-Azhar, the National University and the Sorbonne. The same influence may be seen in his intellectual and administrative efforts to develop Egyptian education. He concluded from these pillars of culture that the Egyptian and the European mind are alike: 'From the earliest times, if the Egyptian mind was influenced by anything, it was by the Mediterranean; if benefits were exchanged, they were exchanged with the peoples of the Mediterranean.'¹³ This influence acted on the Egyptian mind no less than on the European mind; it was simply circumstances which affected one or the other of them in disparate and contrary ways. Just as the European mind played its role in human civilization, so too did the Egyptian mind in ancient times and in the Middle Ages. Egypt had safeguarded the heritage of human thought in two ways: first by giving a home to Greek philosophy and civilization for more than ten centuries, and again by fostering and protecting Islamic civilization up to modern times. He concluded by saying:

Thus, everything goes to show that there is no such thing as a European mind distinct from the oriental mind of Egypt and the neighbouring countries of the Near East. On the contrary, there is a single mind which varies because of disparate and contrary circumstances, the effects of which are disparate and contrary influences. In essence, it is one and the same mind, without distinction or difference.¹⁴

Tāhā Hussein demonstrated that from the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt, like Europe, adopted the amenities of modern life wholeheartedly and without any sense of unease. All aspects of Egyptian life, whether material or moral, became Europeanized. He cited many examples of this in Egypt, from the building of railways and the laying of telegraph and telephone lines to the introduction of cabinet government and the parliamentary system. And it was the same with the modern education system:

It is beyond doubt or dispute that our education system – no matter what we do with the structures or with the curriculum and syllabus – has been purely European since the last century. Our children in primary, secondary and tertiary education are being formed to an entirely European pattern.¹⁵

Tāhā Hussein came very close to rejecting Islamic and Arab nationalism, proclaiming an Egyptian nationalism and patriotism within the framework of Mediterranean civilization and from a European perspective:

However, there is a new form of nationalism and patriotism which has arisen in this modern age and which underpins the life and relations of nations. It has been introduced into Egypt together with the products of modern civilization.¹⁶

He argued that politics is different from religion and that the system of government and the structure of the state are founded on utilitarian concerns.

In defending the necessity for strong and open ties with Europe, Tāhā Hussein saw no threat to the Egyptian character: 'There is no difference between us and the Europeans, whether in essence, character or temperament'.¹⁷ Thus, Egypt had nothing to fear from being assimilated completely into Europe.

In this context, Tāhā Hussein defined the traits of the Egyptian character as being shaped by geography, religion, the Arabic language, the artistic and literary heritage, and a long and glorious history.¹⁸

Among these traits, he singled out the qualities that distinguish Egyptian culture from that of other countries. He saw them embodied in national unity and deeply and intimately linked with the spirit and existence of both ancient and modern Egypt.¹⁹ Finally, they may be seen in the adoption of Arabic as the language of Egypt – an Arabic which differs from that spoken anywhere else: 'That the Arabic language is common to Egypt and the other Arab countries is certainly true. Yet, the Egyptian mode of expression is as individual as the Egyptian mode of thinking.'²⁰

Thus, Tāhā Hussein believed that the characteristics of Egypt were unique, though they might resemble those of certain other Arab and non-Arab societies. This reaffirmed his position on Egyptian nationalism and the individuality of its culture: on the one hand, he rejected the call to Islamic nationalism which he had backed before he had dictated *The Future of Education in Egypt*; on the other, he implicitly rejected pan-Arab nationalism, though this call would not become powerful until after the Revolution of July 1952. At the same time, however, he did not regard opening up to and borrowing from Europe as a danger to Egyptian culture, the primordial elements of which are to be found in Egypt's ancient art, the Arabic-Islamic heritage and modern European life.

There is in this country an Egyptian humanist culture. It partakes at once of the character of Egypt, ancient, peaceful and eternally enduring, and, at the same time, of a humanity which is capable of winning hearts and minds, of bringing people out of darkness into light and of giving them a pleasure and enjoyment which they may or may not be able to find in their own culture. This culture has educated and given pleasure to many non-Egyptian Arabs and the little of it which has been translated into other languages has surprised and delighted the European reader.²¹

Therefore, the distinctive traits of this culture arise from the ancient history of Egypt, from Islam and the Arab heritage, and from the civilization of modern Europe. To Tāhā Hussein's mind, therefore, it was essential that the goals of education and the content of the curriculum should preserve this Egyptian identity and its characteristic traits, within the framework which he had conceived for the future of education in Egypt and the formation of future generations. In this regard, we do not wish to dwell on the politics of those who supported Tāhā Hussein in his

conception of Egyptian cultural identity and characteristics, or those who opposed him fiercely or considered that he had gone to extremes in his idea of linking Egypt with Europe.²² What is put forward here is the idea that the identity of any society must be defined by its own people. They must be aware of the traits of their own culture and, while accepting the amenities of the modern age, they must take care to preserve the eternal aspects of their national character. Equally, they must be aware of the changing world around them and be ready to adopt attitudes with regard to the changes. Finally, every society must be aware of the repercussions of all this on education and curricula at the various levels.

The goals of education

Everywhere, the objectives of education spring from higher goals laid down by society. When Tāhā Hussein set out his view of an Egypt of the future, it was in keeping with his own conception of Egyptian identity and of the Egyptian mind as being similar to the European mind. This picture stemmed from the influences of French culture, the principles of the French Revolution and from the Islamic heritage, as well as from the suffering he had endured in a childhood of relative poverty in the Egyptian countryside. In those days rural Egypt lacked both education and health care. He believed that the goal of education should be to achieve equality between all Egyptians:

Aristotle was guilty of a grievous error when he asserted that some are born to command and others to obey. Never! We are all born to be equal in rights and duties and to receive the benefits and burdens which fall to our lot in this life. When oppressors rise above the people, it is we ourselves who must cast them down; and when tyrants emerge, it is we ourselves who must remove them.²³

Although Tāhā Hussein focuses on equality as an educational goal *per se*, it is one derived from democracy:

If we seek to summarize the fundamentals which democracy should provide the people, we will find nothing more succinct, nothing more comprehensive, nothing truer than the words proclaimed by French democracy two years ago, namely that the democratic system must provide all the people with life, freedom and peace. I do not believe that democracy can provide the people with these fundamentals if it fails to provide a system of universal primary education which is accepted by all the people, whether voluntarily or compulsorily.²⁴

Tāhā Hussein did not confine himself to primary education but demanded that public provision should be expanded to cover secondary and higher education. This, he believed, would ensure the achievement of democracy in Egypt. He affirmed that any democracy which went hand-in-hand with ignorance would be based on lies and deception; any parliamentary system which went hand-in-hand with ignorance could be no more than pretence and delusion. If the people are the source of power, they must be given the opportunity of education, for power should never spring from ignorance. It is only natural that education, in a democratic system, should seek to achieve freedom for everyone. As far as Tāhā Hussein was

concerned, freedom and ignorance were mutually incompatible. Real freedom arose when education imbued the individual with a public spirit, and made him aware of his rights and duties, as well as the rights and duties of his fellow citizens.²⁵

A democratic system which gives freedom to its citizens will ensure an education which provides and promotes peace among them, instead of leading them down the paths of tyranny and aggression:

A man who has no freedom is incapable by his very nature of creating and defending peace. Indeed, he is incapable by nature of even conceiving of such a peace. He is capable only of living under oppression and, given the opportunity, will more often than not become an oppressor himself. Democracy will not be able to provide people with life or freedom or peace unless it gives them an education which enables them to enjoy life, freedom and peace.²⁶

According to Tāhā Hussein, education should aim at creating social justice; this is the counterpart of equality and both of them are rights which everyone should enjoy. He rejected out of hand any suggestion that charity has a role to play in matters of social justice, such as the right to education. He believed that the people have an absolute and sacred right to see equality and justice prevail among them, without distinction:

Though the circumstances of history may have divided them into rich and poor, and though nature may have divided them again in terms of capacity and ability, yet, there is one thing that they share and is the same for all of them: in the saying of the Prophet, they are human beings; from dust they have been created and to dust they shall return. Therefore, leaders and rulers, lords and masters must rid themselves of any notion that they are superior to the people; they must rid themselves of any sense that they are doing a work of charity, for such charity is but one facet of superiority. These notions must be replaced by a belief in equality and justice among the people.²⁷

These feelings must become part of Egypt's way of seeing and judging the world, and a basic component of its sense of nationhood. All Egyptians will then share in the belief that they have a right to a decent and dignified life, and that education and culture in all their various forms are the means by which to attain this decent and dignified life. All Egyptians will believe that education is as important and valuable as life itself.

Within the framework of this democratic society, it will be possible to preserve the independence for which citizens have willingly shed their blood and to build a society which is strong militarily, economically, socially and culturally. Yet nothing can be achieved without knowledge and learning. Freedom and independence are but the means to an end, namely the building of a civilization 'which is founded on education and culture, owing its strength to education and culture, and deriving its prosperity from education and culture'.²⁸ This, in turn, can only come about by raising a proud, strong army, by establishing a progressive national economy and by achieving independence in science, art and literature. 'There is one way to achieve all this and one way only, namely to found education on a solid basis'.²⁹

Objectives at various stages of education

Displaying either originality in terms of organization or familiarity with developments in Europe, Tāhā Hussein took the main objectives of education and subdivided them into subsidiary objectives for each stage.

Primary education (or 'elementary' as it was called then) should have four objectives: (a) to achieve national unity; (b) to unify the national heritage; (c) to prepare the student for work; and (d) to train young people so that they are capable of developing and becoming useful to themselves and to the nation. He believed that the democratic state had a duty to provide primary education for a number of aims:

Firstly, primary education is the easiest means to enable the individual to earn a living. Secondly, primary education is the easiest means to enable the state itself to achieve national unity and to make the nation aware of its right to a free and independent existence which it has a duty to defend. Thirdly, primary education is the only means available to the state to enable the nation to survive and maintain its existence. Through primary education, the state can guarantee the basic unified national heritage which has to be transmitted from one generation to the next and which must be taught to and learned by all individuals in every generation.³⁰

To this list, he added the student's ability to develop and the capacity to be of benefit both to himself and to the nation.³¹ But Tāhā Hussein did not wish to see the notion of development confined to the development of the body or the mind; he extended it to include morality and ethics: 'They are developed in mind and body; they are pure in heart; they are sound in morals.'³² Moreover, development leads to the formation of 'responsible citizens who are of benefit to the society in which they live, who are worthy of the nation's trust . . . who are trained to defend the nation and to establish security and justice, who are enabled to prosper and to aspire to a better life'.³³

Thus, Tāhā Hussein was among the first to appreciate the role of education in the full development of the child, both as an individual and as a member of society. At a time when mental development was held to be of utmost importance, he stressed every aspect of development: physical, mental, emotional, social and economic. With regard to the mental aspects, furthermore, he was not content to stop at mere 'knowledge' but insisted that children should also have 'good understanding, judgement and appreciation'. He summed this up as the ability to understand life and development, together with all the resulting implications for themselves, their families, their country and people as a whole.³⁴

His concern for national unity arose because of the diversity of elementary schools, which included government, private, religious and foreign institutions. Realizing the threat this posed to national unity and social cohesion, he called for all types of primary education to be standardized – a statement which is now taken for granted in the world of education. He linked this aim with the unity of the national heritage and its transmission from one generation to the next. This was tantamount to saying that in order to attain cultural development, individuals must be allowed to

prosper and aspire to a better life. He thus stressed the dual function of education in relation to culture, namely to preserve culture by transmitting it to the next generation and to develop its component parts by addition and innovation.

Let us now turn to the aim of preparing the individual for work or, as Tāhā Hussein would say, 'enabling him to live'. This is still a subject of controversy among educationists. The majority view is that primary education could – but does not – prepare the child for work. However, when education is extended to the next stage (preparatory, intermediate or lower secondary), the child is often better prepared.

In general, the aims which Tāhā Hussein put forward for primary education are still valid for basic or compulsory education in many countries. He recognized this when he spoke about children whose education would stop at the end of the elementary stage and who would then enter the world of work. He believed that the state owed them something: 'they should not be ignorant of what they need to know, they should not forget what they have learned and they should not be restricted to what primary school has taught them'.³⁵ It is as if he were calling for compulsory education to be extended to the following stage, although what he proposed was adult or extra-curricular education in which the state would organize 'simple evening classes which such people could attend after they had finished work. This would be neither purely compulsory, like elementary education, nor would it be purely voluntary and left entirely to their own volition'.³⁶

As far as secondary education is concerned, Tāhā Hussein proposed three objectives: to prepare young people for a decent and productive life;³⁷ to prepare pupils for higher and university education;³⁸ and, as an extension to the objective proposed for elementary education, to achieve national unity based on independence in relation to the outside world and freedom at home.³⁹

The goals of both primary and secondary general education were to achieve national unity, to educate the individual in order to adapt him/her to the material and spiritual environment, and to promote a sense of belonging to one's community and nation. Tāhā Hussein believed that primary education represented an introduction to later stages. For this reason, he must be prepared simply and gradually with the utmost care and attention.⁴⁰

Primary education, therefore, is a preparation for secondary education which, in turn, is a preparation for higher and university education. In this way, the social and cultural goals of general education are perpetuated.

With regard to higher education, Tāhā Hussein defined the objectives as preparing students for work in high public office and training their minds so that they become cultivated individuals. When laying down the aims of third-level education, he rejected the view that 'higher education is something sacred . . . the quest for knowledge for its own sake and the preparation of young people for this pure and sacred quest unhindered by the necessities of practical life'.⁴¹ He believed that higher education meant a superior degree of culture and that it was a necessity for anyone wishing to earn a living by entering a particular post or employment.⁴² Higher education, therefore, provided 'a route to the practical world and not to some state of Platonic happiness'.⁴³

Nevertheless, his proposed aims for higher education did not neglect pure academic research. He believed that

it is right and appropriate that higher education should combine academic research into both the pure and the applied sciences, for, without the former, the latter could not exist, produce, survive or provide people with the amenities and luxuries of civilization.⁴⁴

For Tāhā Hussein, 'the university must be a seat of learning, not only by its own standards but by comparison with other environments as well'.⁴⁵ Equally,

it must be a seat of the highest civilization and excellence, the influence of which is seen not so much in academic or practical results as in a life of purity and rectitude in human relations, in love and mutual respect, in putting obligations before rights, in asking what we owe others rather than what they owe us; it is rising above the self and transcending the petty and the worldly to a refined aesthetic sense which turns towards beauty when it is perceived and which turns away from ugliness when it is perceived.⁴⁶

Tāhā Hussein returned to the topic of the general objectives of education, insisting that:

We must not look upon the universities and educational institutions in general as schools which simply impart knowledge and form minds. Knowledge by itself is not everything. It is high time that we believed and became convinced that educational institutions are not simply schools but are, above all, environments for culture and civilization in the widest sense.⁴⁷

By this definition, all educational institutions – primary and secondary schools, institutes of higher education, university faculties – serve to form individuals capable of preserving independence and ensuring equality, freedom and social justice for all members of the nation. These individuals will construct a modern civilization in a democratic society founded on culture and learning.⁴⁸

Education, national defence and the judiciary

If education is the means by which to establish a democratic society and civilization, it must be given the highest priority by decision-makers. Tāhā Hussein, with his customary acuity, was one of the first thinkers of his age to insist that education was a basic need rather than a luxury and that government expenditure on education was no less essential than spending on national defence. Education and national security are one and the same:

When we demand that education be fostered and made universally available, we are not asking that the people should be pampered and given something they could abstain from or do without. No, what we are asking for is that they should be given the most basic of their rights, the very least that they deserve. The people's need for a proper education is no less a necessity than the nation's need for strong defence. The people are threatened not only from without by the incursions of predatory foreign powers but also from within by an ignorance which undermines their moral and material environment and places them in bondage to the superior knowledge of the foreigner. The fact that Egypt has a mighty army to protect her territory and boundaries will not ensure true independence if the people behind the lines to

the rear are ignorant and unlettered, incapable of exploiting their land and all its resources, incapable of managing their own amenities, incapable of winning the respect of the foreigner by their contributions to human progress in science and philosophy and in literature and art.⁴⁹

If Tāhā Hussein felt – as indeed he did – that education was so important, so valuable and of such high priority, then knowledge and education were to be held sacred and the teacher was to be honoured and respected in every way, academically, socially and materially. For this reason, Tāhā Hussein held that education should be put on a par with the judiciary, and the teacher should be placed on the same footing as a judge. He felt that those whose task it is to spread knowledge among the people must be honoured in the same way as those whose task it is to ensure justice.⁵⁰

The question of educational expenditure and the priority which it deserves continues to occupy an important place in educational thinking throughout the world. Ever since the recommendation of the International Governmental Conference held in 1966 by UNESCO and the International Labour Organisation, the question of improving teachers' status has remained a matter of concern for those seeking to achieve the objectives to which Tāhā Hussein aspired.

The need for state supervision

Tāhā Hussein raised the issue of state supervision thirty years before Egypt's 1971 constitution stipulated that the state must oversee education of every kind and at every level. He called on the state to supervise not only foreign and private institutions but even religious education. At the same time, he called for the elimination of differences in curricula and programmes, particularly where such divergences were prejudicial to national unity, social harmony and the sense of Egyptian identity. His opinion was that only the state must designate and implement the curricula and programmes of education, and it must supervise them closely to ensure that education does not stray from its intended path and pursue other objectives.⁵¹

In a pioneering step, Tāhā Hussein called for the teaching of religion, the Arabic language, and Egyptian history and geography in the foreign schools established on Egyptian soil and for the state to ensure that these subjects were actually taught by means of monitoring, inspection and testing. At a time when the Ministry of the Interior had responsibility for overseeing education within local administrative boundaries, he called for the Ministry of Education to be the sole state institution responsible for the supervision of education in terms of curricula, inspection and examinations.

In another pioneering initiative, he called for state supervision of private schools to ensure that the educational objectives achieved were those set by the state. He also called for variety and diversity among schools, provided that this did not affect the development of the national character in every pupil. He even went so far as to demand that general education in al-Azhar, within the framework of variety and diversity, should be placed under the Ministry of Education in order to ensure that it remained consistent with the subjects taught in state schools. He was careful not

to confuse state supervision of private education with measures which might hinder participation by individuals, organizations and the private sector in establishing schools and financing education. On the contrary, he was eager to see this partnership continue, viewing it as necessary if education were to be provided to all citizens. When Tāhā Hussein became Minister of Education, he was able to put some of these ideas into practice. For example, Law No. 108 of 1950 removed local municipal schools from the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and placed them under the control of the Ministry of Education.⁵²

Free education

The question of free education occupied an important place in Tāhā Hussein's thinking and practice. It was only logical that he should insist on free education, since he himself had experienced material hardship in his childhood and had been prevented from enrolling in a state school through the fees imposed by the British administration. These constituted a heavy burden for the great majority of Egyptians and denied children their right to enter primary education. The only alternative open to Tāhā Hussein was a pale shadow of education far beneath his ambitions, namely the blind alley of the *kuttab* or Koranic school and an elementary education which led nowhere, save for the gifted few who were able to join al-Azhar. While this might be easy enough for those living in Cairo, it entailed great sacrifices for rural families. His experiences impelled him to uphold the principle of free education, a system which he had known in France and the benefits of which he wanted his fellow countrymen to enjoy.

Tāhā Hussein's position with regard to free education stemmed from two sources: the constitution of 1923 which made primary education compulsory; and the principles of democracy:

There is no need to dwell overly long on the fact that compulsory primary education is a fundamental pillar not only of true democratic life but of social life whatever the system of government . . . Egypt has adopted this position in full since the promulgation of the constitution, which imposed compulsory education and required the state to uphold it and compelled parents to send their children to school.⁵³

Tāhā Hussein conceded that since secondary education was not compulsory, it would not be given to everyone free.⁵⁴ However, he insisted that it should be provided free to the poor:

Firstly, they have a right to secondary and higher education; secondly, this is in the national interest; thirdly, this serves to achieve democracy. To deny education to the poor because they are poor and to prevent them from advancing, from bettering themselves and from aspiring to the best is but to strengthen the class system, to lend credence to the power of money, to kneel before its power and to perish with it. There is not one iota of democracy in any of this.⁵⁵

The right to a free education should be allowed to anyone who can show that he is truly ready to benefit from it.⁵⁶

At first, Tāhā Hussein was ambivalent about the right of everyone to free secondary education. At times, he said that it should be restricted to poor pupils who had demonstrated their aptitude; there would, of course, also be those children of the well-off whose parents would pay for them. At other times, he was inclined to reduce school fees so that the poor could enjoy this opportunity. He gave qualified approval to the experience of France, which had adopted the principle of free secondary education: 'The path which French democracy has followed is righteous and does justice to the needs of the poor, but it is a course which is not without extravagance.'⁵⁷

As soon as Tāhā Hussein found that free primary education had become a reality, he promptly called for free secondary education.⁵⁸ He then went even further, saying that it was as natural to provide people with education as to allow them the light of the sun, the air they breathe and the water of the Nile. This image made such an impression that, when Tāhā Hussein was appointed Minister of Education in 1950, he was popularly known as 'the Minister of Air and Water'.⁵⁹ The principle that general secondary and technical education should be free was reinforced when Tāhā Hussein promulgated laws on them in 1950 and 1951. The only exception was for pupils who had repeated two years at secondary level or who were over 21.⁶⁰ Tāhā Hussein's success in giving Egypt free primary and secondary education was completed by the Revolution of 23 July 1952 and by the 1971 constitution which enshrined the principle of free education at every level of general, higher and university education and in every state school, institute and faculty.

The expansion of education

True to the logic of his thought and beliefs, it was only natural that he should call for an expansion of general and higher education.

Tāhā Hussein discussed the relationship between the expansion of education and graduate unemployment, a question which remains a matter of controversy to this day in developing countries, including Egypt. Some argue that the opportunity for higher and university education should be restricted because expansion in this area leads to graduate unemployment and has negative social and economic consequences. He strongly opposed anyone advocating that the expansion of education should be restricted in a democratic society. He argued that to do so would be to espouse ignorance as a basis for national policy; it would mean creating a class system in which an aristocracy would enjoy education and monopolize power and government, while holding the ignorant majority in subjection. In this way, Tāhā Hussein defended the expansion of education both on the grounds of democracy and on the grounds of improving the level of education. He pointed out that primary education alone (i.e. low-level education) was insufficient for a citizenry which is not easily duped. As he said: 'Education and education alone – provided that it is sound and well guided in its methods – will ensure that Egyptians are treated with justice and equality at home and abroad.'⁶¹

The truth is that an education which is sound and well guided in its methods will create opportunities for work, overcome the problem of unemployment and,

most important of all, create human beings who cannot in any circumstances be duped. Such citizens know how to get at the sources of truth and reality, are concerned for the security and stability of their country, for the peace and safety of all humanity, and for progress and prosperity; they cannot be led astray by factions, extremism and bigotry. Even if, for the sake of argument, it was conceded that graduate unemployment was inevitable, the answer to the problem does not lie in ignorance because 'ignorance is an evil *per se* and one evil can never serve to cure another'.⁶² Instead, Tāhā Hussein drew on the experience of European countries in dealing with the problem of graduate unemployment, and proposed a number of practical solutions which remain valid to the present day:

Education itself is being diversified in such a way that not all students are poured into the same mould or forged to the same pattern. On the contrary, an element of diversity is being introduced and encouragement afforded to competition, personal endeavour and originality, so that education gives students a good preparation and enables them to face life without any feelings of inadequacy, worry or despair.⁶³

Tāhā Hussein raised the whole issue of how obtaining educational qualifications relates to finding employment, a matter which remains contentious, particularly in countries like Egypt. In this context, Tāhā Hussein said: 'This means that university degrees and diplomas are not enough to qualify those who hold them for posts of any kind. Instead, positions should always be awarded on the basis of competition'.⁶⁴

Tāhā Hussein believed that there was an enormous difference between passing academic examinations and seeking a livelihood, and he rejected the idea that the two should be linked:

Examinations are the means to obtain a university degree and nothing more. It is virtually impossible for the student to complete them successfully until he has been prepared for a far more serious competition which will influence his life and it is this which will lead him to find a post.⁶⁵

Nowadays, the trend is to award posts not on the basis of the degree which a candidate has obtained but rather in accordance with a specific profile of abilities, skills and experience needed for that type of work.

Financing education

Any expansion of education is faced with obstacles in terms of financial, material and human resources, i.e. the necessary financing must be available. Here again, some might say that the opportunity for education should be restricted and, once more, this is a view which Tāhā Hussein rejected out of hand:

The state must find the necessary funds, just as it finds the funds needed for national defence. This is not impossible or even difficult in our modern world. The state can shut off many avenues of waste and apply the funds to education and national defence. The state can make savings in many areas and use the proceeds for both education and national defence.⁶⁶

Tāhā Hussein called on the state to impose taxes to pay for education and to levy them on those capable of paying. The state is entitled to see a return on its educational investment from those with the ability to pay.⁶⁷

Tāhā Hussein stated the principle that expenditure on education should be properly directed. For example, he pointed to the extravagant spending on school buildings and called for a more modest approach to reduce costs. The point was to focus attention on to the need for well-directed spending and the possibility of constructing low-cost schools from raw materials readily available in the local environment. As Minister of Education, he himself sought to reduce the cost of free secondary education by excluding pupils who failed two years running. Tāhā Hussein also sought to encourage the private sector to play a role in expanding education: 'I, more than anyone, am eager to encourage private initiatives by individuals and associations, not just for the sake of education but for the public good as a whole.'⁶⁸

Thus, Tāhā Hussein proposed various means of financing education, whether by the state, by individuals and associations in the private sector, or by those who were well-off and able to contribute. He also wanted to impose an education tax and see spending properly managed in order to increase budget allocations for education. At the same time, he suggested ways of structuring educational expenditures – for example, through more appropriate construction or by rationalizing the provision of free education – and, more importantly, he proposed alternative means of finance. Finally, he made the state face up to its responsibilities by giving priority to educational expenditure.

Teacher training and employment conditions

Any democratic society striving to develop its culture and consolidate its civilization on the basis of science and education must pay due attention to the position of the teacher. It is not enough that the curricula and programmes be excellent; they should also be implemented properly and productively. This can only be done by good teachers who understand the curricula and programmes and implement them in the best possible way.⁶⁹

Tāhā Hussein devoted a whole section of *The Future of Education in Egypt* to a defence of the rights of the teacher. He took as his point of departure the example of the educator represented in the Arab-Islamic tradition: a tutor whose task it was to prepare and develop the sons of the ruler to assume the tasks of government, administration and leadership, instilling in them the uprightness befitting an exemplar who must direct and manage the affairs of the people:

If we ask the teacher to serve as an educator in the old sense of the word, his task is not merely to fill the pupil's head with knowledge but more importantly, on the one hand, to train and discipline his mind, to make him upright and to prepare him for practical life and, on the other, to raise his intellectual level. The first duty that we owe to this tutor is to trust and have confidence in him and to make him aware of our trust and confidence.⁷⁰

When we give the teacher our confidence in this way, it follows that he will look upon the child as a pledge entrusted to him and placed under his protection, to be

developed and looked after with the utmost care. Thus, he must look upon himself as being *in loco parentis*, as being the guardian of the young people he is called on to train; he must not look upon the child as raw material with which he has to work in order to make his living. If the teacher treats the child as a mere object, he himself becomes no more than an instrument, losing confidence in himself, losing the love that he should feel for his profession and losing his belief in the respect due to this profession. 'Yes, the teacher becomes a tool, the school a factory and the pupils raw material. And education and teaching are devoid of the life, love and activity which should be their essential components.'⁷¹ This viewpoint is an early criticism of the ideas put forward by economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx that education represents 'investment in human resources'.

During the 1950s arose the new science of educational economics, which borrowed a variety of concepts from industrial economics and applied them to education. While it is true that mankind has gained a great deal from all this, something of great value has been almost entirely lost, namely, the idea of education as a 'vocation'. The materialist notions of economics are far removed from moral concepts and cannot subject them to its criteria. Though educational economics may be required for finance, for seeing that money is well spent and for laying down the criteria of internal and external efficiency and other important matters, it is a science which is redundant when discussing the moral aspect of the teaching vocation. Tāhā Hussein was ahead of his time when he rejected the idea that education could be assimilated in the production process and said that, if education were no more than that, then it would lose the vital ingredients of life and love, activity and ambition.

Tāhā Hussein was a forceful defender of the respect due to teachers and the teaching profession. He argued that teachers' salaries should be increased in order to enable them to meet all their material needs without having to rely on other sources. Only when they are content and confident in themselves can they instil contentment and confidence in their pupils:

A teacher who is reduced to begging in order to feed and educate his own children cannot inspire respect in his pupils. Honour and respect can never be won through servility; a man who is scorned by himself and others cannot win the esteem of his pupils.⁷²

In defending the honour of teachers and their right to higher salaries, Tāhā Hussein did not confine himself to words. When he became Minister of Education, he established the first ever teachers' union in 1951, the first article of which stipulated that the objects of the union included efforts to raise the standards of the profession and to promote the moral and material interests of its members.⁷³

In addition to his positive attitude with regard to the rights of teachers, Tāhā Hussein clearly insisted that proper attention must be paid to primary-school teachers. Their salary should reflect the importance of their work and they should be honoured and respected by people at large:

If the state feels concern about primary education, it must pay proper heed to the primary-school teacher. No matter what the level or grade, sound education is impossible without

competent teachers *but the competence of the primary teacher is of greater consequence than that of any other group of teachers.*⁷⁴

If this were true, then Tāhā Hussein felt that it was essential for the state to 'concern itself with the schools and institutes which provide graduates for elementary education'.⁷⁵ He called for attention to be paid to training, to budget allocations and to the provision of social, economic and health care for student teachers. He was also ahead of his time when he insisted that the training of primary-school teachers should be at the same level as that of teachers in higher education, and that successful completion of secondary-school studies should be a prerequisite for enrolment in the colleges and institutes for the training of primary-school teachers:

Some people thought that I had gone too far when I made secondary-school matriculation a precondition for entry into teacher training college. However, this is what modern democracy requires and it is required no less by us if we are serious and determined in our wish to form future generations.⁷⁶

In other words, Tāhā Hussein was arguing that elementary education should not be made the province of mediocrity. Moreover, he was propounding this view at a time when it was widely believed that anyone capable of learning a textbook by heart was capable of working as a primary-school teacher, and when people with no academic qualifications could be issued with a so-called 'licence to teach'. His conclusion was that primary teachers and their supervisors should be drawn from the cream of the teaching profession.⁷⁷

If we applied Tāhā Hussein's views to the present-day situation, a Master's degree, if not a doctorate, would be required of primary-school teachers and their supervisors. These conceptions did not represent a great leap forward but drew on the training concepts which prevailed in Europe at that time and were in keeping with current systems for training elementary teachers. The important thing is the general concept, which reflected all that was best in teacher training in the advanced countries.

With regard to secondary education, Tāhā Hussein believed that teachers should attend a university to obtain all the academic subjects needed for their first degree, and then carry on to gain a diploma in education from a specialized university institute. It was the dream of Tāhā Hussein that teachers would have to pass their Master's degree before being allowed to teach in secondary education.⁷⁸ The advantage of this system of training is the depth which it gives to the teacher in his special field of study.⁷⁹

Tāhā Hussein rejected the notion of a system of faculties of education in which teachers would combine academic study in a special field with pedagogical studies, a system which, according to him, 'prevented the student from achieving mastery of either'.⁸⁰

Another of Tāhā Hussein's innovatory ideas was his proposal to adopt the probationary system followed in medical faculties:

They are appointed to do practical work in schools on a modest salary for the first year while they continue to study and attend some lectures at the institute. If they complete the year and obtain certification from the institute, they are confirmed in their post and put on full pay.⁸¹

Tāhā Hussein was well aware of the importance of in-service training. He insisted that teachers should remain in close contact with the university and go on to obtain higher degrees: 'This would enable teachers to master their subjects and, in exceptional cases, might even permit successful specialists to become academics and teach in the university itself.'⁸² He also called for the establishment of a special university degree to follow the teaching diploma. For this purpose, teachers should be allowed to engage in full-time study or, at the very least, their teaching load should be reduced.⁸³

Issues in education

Tāhā Hussein's interests extended beyond mere theory to a number of practical considerations. Some of these were specific issues confined to their own particular time and place, such as the diversity of primary and junior schools and the differences between schools run by the state, religious establishments controlled by al-Azhar, and private-sector institutions teaching in English, French, Italian, Greek, German, etc. He called for all of them to be brought under state supervision and for them to teach Arabic, religious studies and the history and geography of Egypt.⁸⁴ He was to achieve this objective and it is now universally accepted that the state has the right to control education within its territorial boundaries.

Other issues, however, transcended the confines of time and place and were of concern to the whole world of education. For example, he held that elementary education had to cover reading, writing, arithmetic, national history and geography, civics and religious studies. Referring to the ways in which religious education was viewed in different countries, he argued that it could not be omitted from elementary education in Egypt.⁸⁵

Another important issue was the eradication of illiteracy, which was prevalent at the time. Tāhā Hussein believed that young people in the villages had to be taught more than just reading, writing and arithmetic. To confine education in this way was to endanger social stability, curtail talents and run the risk of a return to illiteracy.⁸⁶ Here again, he was in advance of his time, calling then, as we do now, for quality and functionality in programmes to eradicate illiteracy and for continuing education. Furthermore, cultural resources should be made available to those who emerge successfully from literacy programmes.

A further problem was that elementary education was too short and it was necessary to extend the compulsory period. Tāhā Hussein devoted a chapter of his book to the reality of this problem. He proposed a number of alternatives, both formal and informal, one of the most important features of which was his stress on physical education.⁸⁷

Other issues dealt with by Tāhā Hussein included: a review of the different levels of the general education system, which he proposed should be divided into three levels – primary, preparatory and secondary;⁸⁸ the problem of overcrowding and large class sizes, which reduced the quality of the educational process;⁸⁹ reform and decentralization of the administration of education;⁹⁰ improvement of the schools inspectorate;⁹¹ and reform of the examination system.⁹²

It is fair to say that Tāhā Hussein was a true pioneer in educational matters and that many developing countries, including Egypt, have yet to adopt his proposals. For example, he advocated that, from elementary education upwards, pupils should be given guidance and counselling, that their aptitudes should be defined and their performance monitored, and that their parents should be advised on the most suitable type of education.⁹³ He also favoured what would nowadays be called 'individualized' teaching, particularly in languages and the experimental sciences. He felt that these are 'subjects which are taught not to groups but to individuals, that is, the teacher is obliged to direct his attention to the individual pupil to ensure that he is benefitting from language study'. And Tāhā Hussein would soon come to see that all secondary-school subjects should be directed at the individual rather than the group, at the pupil rather than the class.⁹⁴ He also believed that greater attention should be paid to more extensive reading rather than simply to the school textbooks.⁹⁵ Equally, he felt that the Ministry of Education should confine itself to drawing up curricula and approving textbooks used in schools. It should not itself engage in a commercial activity for which it was unqualified by writing and commissioning such works or purchasing their copyright. There were educational advantages in a system of competition for the writing of textbooks and in authorizing a number of books for each subject instead of just one.⁹⁶

One of the educational issues which remains controversial and a subject for debate even in the developed countries is the teaching of foreign languages. Here, Tāhā Hussein insisted that it was first of all essential to pay attention to the national language – in Egypt, Arabic – during elementary education and that it should not face competition from any other language during this period. In answer to the question as to when foreign-language teaching should begin, Tāhā Hussein's reply was as follows: 'It is perfectly clear that foreign languages should not be studied at this stage of general education [elementary school]: not in the first year, nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth.'⁹⁷ His justification for this was the pupil's need to study Arabic full time, particularly in view of the major differences between the standardized language and the dialects used in everyday life. Moreover, there are great differences in grammar and pronunciation between Arabic and European languages. Tāhā Hussein considered that, apart from English and French, Egyptian pupils should also be able to study at least Italian and German. They would then choose one of the four as their main foreign language and another as a subsidiary.⁹⁸ He also called for secondary school pupils to be taught Latin and Greek if they so desired.⁹⁹ Moreover, pupils specializing in Arabic should be allowed to elect another related oriental language, particularly Farsi or Hebrew.¹⁰⁰

Finally, Tāhā Hussein dealt with cultural questions, arguing that society should be converted to a written culture and that the instruments of this culture – libraries, press, media – should be promoted. He also dealt with Egypt's cultural role in the Arab world.

Although Tāhā Hussein was not a specialist in education, he brought fresh ideas to this field which keep their value to the present day, while the solutions he proposed for existing educational problems were applicable not only to Egypt but to many other countries as well. That this should be so is attributable to the breadth

of his experience, to his many sources of inspiration and to his involvement in public life, politics and culture in the widest sense. It is also attributable above all to his belief that education is a necessity for every human being, and to his faith in the value of knowledge and education in the life of peoples and in the building of civilizations:

The state must realize that education is as necessary to life as food and drink. Though the difference between the two is plain and simple, it is one we seldom stop to ponder. On the one hand, food and drink and everything connected with health and the body are necessities which enable man to enjoy life in just the same way as the horse, the mule, the donkey and the chicken; on the other, education is a necessity which distinguishes man from the rest of the animal world and enables him to control the rest of nature on land, in the sea and in the skies.¹⁰¹

Notes

1. Tāhā Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fi Misr* [The Future of Education in Egypt] (Vol. 9 of *The Complete Works of Tāhā Hussein*), pp. 395–6, Beirut, Dar al-Kitāb al-Lubnāni wa Maktab al-Madrasa, 1982. This work is regarded as the primary source for Tāhā Hussein's thought on education.
2. Tāhā Hussein, *al-Ayyām* [The Days], Part 1, p. 120, Cairo, Dar al-Ma'ārif, 1949.
3. His teachers included Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, one of the great innovators in Islamic thought in modern times, Sheikh Muhammad Bākhīt, who was to become Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghī, who would become the Sheikh of al-Azhar, and Sheikh Sayyid al-Marsafī, who was one of the greatest influences on the boy's personality and thought and who led him to specialize in the study of Arabic literature. Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad Rajab, *The Educational Thought of Tāhā Hussein in Theory and Practice*, pp. 5–58, Faculty of Education at Suhag, University of Assiut, 1982 (unpublished M.A. thesis – in Arabic).
4. Abdulrahman Badawī et al., *To Tāhā Hussein on his Seventieth Birthday*, p. 10, Cairo, Dar al-Ma'ārif, 1962 (in Arabic).
5. Hamdī al-Sukut and Marsden Jones, 'Tāhā Hussein', *Arabic Literature in Egypt*, p. 8, Vol. 1 of the series issued by the Publications Department of the American University, Cairo, 1975.
6. Badawī et al., op. cit., pp. 12–16.
7. Rajab, op. cit., pp. 19–62.
8. *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa* . . . , op. cit., p. 11.
9. Ibid., p. 16.
10. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
11. Ibid., p. 22.
12. Ibid., p. 31.
13. Ibid., p. 21.
14. Ibid., pp. 38–9.
15. Ibid., pp. 46–7.
16. Ibid., p. 99.
17. Ibid., p. 72.
18. Ibid., pp. 72–3.
19. Ibid., p. 490.

20. Ibid., p. 492.
21. Ibid., p. 493.
22. Al-Sukut and Jones, op. cit., p. 53.
23. Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa* . . . , op. cit., p. 51.
24. Ibid., p. 101.
25. Ibid., p. 104.
26. Ibid., p. 105.
27. Ibid., pp. 237–8.
28. Ibid., p. 12.
29. Ibid., p. 60.
30. Ibid., pp. 103–4.
31. Ibid., p. 109.
32. Ibid., p. 110.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 124.
35. Ibid., p. 122.
36. Ibid., p. 123.
37. Ibid., p. 241.
38. Ibid., p. 187.
39. Ibid., p. 241.
40. Ibid., p. 243.
41. Ibid., p. 388.
42. Ibid., p. 389.
43. Ibid., p. 390.
44. Ibid., p. 393.
45. Ibid., p. 413.
46. Ibid., pp. 414–15.
47. Ibid., pp. 411–12.
48. Ibid., p. 12.
49. Ibid., pp. 162–3.
50. Ibid., p. 239.
51. Ibid., pp. 81–2.
52. Rajab, op. cit., pp. 19–62.
53. Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa* . . . , op. cit., p. 101.
54. Ibid., p. 138.
55. Ibid., p. 139.
56. Ibid., p. 140.
57. Ibid., pp. 142–3.
58. Tāhā Hussein, 'The Bitter Truth', article in *al-Ahrām*, Cairo, 28 October 1949, quoted in an unpublished M.A. thesis by Kamāl Hamid Ahmad Mughith, Faculty of Education, al-Azhar University, 1985, p. 201 (in Arabic).
59. Mughith, op. cit., p. 196.
60. Rajab, op. cit., pp. 159–61.
61. Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa* . . . , op. cit., p. 151.
62. Ibid., p. 153.
63. Ibid., p. 154.
64. Ibid., p. 432.
65. Ibid., pp. 433–4.
66. Ibid., p. 164.
67. Ibid., p. 139.

68. Ibid., p. 92.
69. Ibid., p. 109.
70. Ibid., p. 169.
71. Ibid., p. 170.
72. Tāhā Hussein, 'Teachers', newspaper article in *al-Jumhūriya*, Cairo, 4 December 1954, quoted in Mughith, op. cit., p. 256 (in Arabic).
73. Rajab, op. cit., p. 191.
74. Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa* . . . , op. cit., p. 109.
75. Ibid., p. 111.
76. Ibid., p. 114.
77. Ibid., p. 127.
78. Ibid., p. 380.
79. Ibid., p. 329.
80. Ibid., p. 335.
81. Ibid., pp. 344–5.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 384.
84. Ibid., pp. 75–100.
85. Ibid., pp. 101–8.
86. Ibid., pp. 113–14.
87. Ibid., pp. 120–4.
88. Ibid., pp. 128–35.
89. Ibid., p. 158.
90. Ibid., pp. 174–93.
91. Ibid., pp. 193–9.
92. Ibid., pp. 200–9.
93. Ibid., pp. 155–7.
94. Ibid., p. 160.
95. Ibid., pp. 210–15.
96. Ibid., pp. 216–21.
97. Ibid., pp. 245–6.
98. Ibid., pp. 251–61.
99. Ibid., pp. 262–86.
100. Ibid., pp. 287–96.
101. Ibid., pp. 234–5.

Early life and vocation

Ivan Illich was born in Vienna in 1926 and received a religious education in 1941. After being expelled from the school for being Jewish in 1941, he completed his secondary education in the University of Florence in Italy and then worked as a teacher and philosopher in the University of Rome. He was also a member of the Society for the Study of Religion.

Although converted to the Catholic Church, Illich was not a devout Catholic. He was a personalist and a humanist, and he was a member of the Society for the Study of Religion. He was a member of the Society for the Study of Religion.

I V A N I L L I C H

(1926-)

Marcela Gajardo

To write a profile of an educator like Ivan Illich is not an easy task. Here, first of all, is a thinker set in a specific historical context – that of the 1960s – a period characterized by radical criticism of capitalist society and its institutions, among them the school.

Furthermore, the personality we are dealing with is a complex one. In those years it was said of Ivan Illich that he was an intelligent man who liked to surround himself with gifted people and did not suffer fools gladly. He could be the most cordial of men, but was also capable of the most devastating ridicule of those who questioned his ideas. He was an indefatigable worker and a multilingual, cosmopolitan man whose ideas, whether on the Church and its reform, culture and education, medicine or transport in modern societies ignited controversies that made him one of the outstanding figures of our time.

But those controversies were also triggered partly by Illich himself: by his personality, his style, his working methods and the radical nature of his ideas. For educators, in fact, Ivan Illich, once a priest, is the father of 'deschooled' education, the writer who condemns out of hand the school system and the schools, excoriating them, along with many other public institutions, for exercising anachronistic functions that fail to keep pace with change, serving only to maintain the *status quo* and protect the structure of the society that produced them.

Early life and vocation

Ivan Illich was born in Vienna in 1926 and attended a religious school from 1931 to 1941. After being expelled under the anti-Semitic laws because of his Jewish maternal ancestry, he completed his secondary studies at the University of Florence in Italy and then studied theology and philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome, later obtaining his doctorate in history at the University of Salzburg.

Although earmarked by the Vatican for its diplomatic service, Illich opted for a pastoral ministry and was appointed assistant parish priest to a New York church with an Irish and Puerto Rican congregation. He worked there from 1951 to 1956,

when he left to take up the post of Vice-Rector of the Catholic University of Ponce in Puerto Rico. His interest in furthering the spread of what he called 'intercultural sensibility' led him to found, soon after his appointment, the Centre for Intercultural Communication.

The centre, which was open only in the summer, at first only taught Spanish to American church and lay missionaries who were intending to return to work among the Puerto Ricans who had migrated in large numbers to cities in the United States. Although language teaching formed a large part of the institute's activities, Illich insisted that the essence of the programme lay in developing the ability to see things through the eyes of people of different cultures.

His relations with the University of Ponce came to an end in 1960 following a disagreement with the bishop of the diocese, who had forbidden Catholics in his jurisdiction to vote for a candidate favouring birth control. Back in New York, he accepted a professorship at Fordham University. In 1961, as a means of furthering and strengthening intercultural relations, he founded the Centre for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) in the city of Cuernavaca, Mexico.

The purpose of CIDOC was to train American missionaries for work in Latin America. Over the years, however, it became a para-academic centre in which Ivan Illich's ideas on 'deschooled' education were put into practice.

From its foundation until the middle 1970s, CIDOC was a meeting-place for many American and Latin American intellectuals wishing to reflect on education and culture. Spanish-language courses and workshops on social and political themes were held there. The centre's library was highly regarded, and Illich himself directed seminars on institutional alternatives in the technological society. This was also the period of the famous, vigorously argued debates between Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich on education, schooling and the awakening of awareness, and of dialogues between Illich and other educational thinkers involved in the search for ways of transforming every moment of life into a learning experience, usually outside the school system.

This was a time when Illich began to be widely known. His notoreity began with his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church as an institution, which he described as a huge business training and employing religious professionals in order to perpetuate itself. He then extrapolated that concept to the institution of the school and formulated the criticism that was to lead him to work for a number of years on a proposal to 'deschool' society. His opinions on liberating the Church from democracy in the future and the 'deschooling' of society soon made CIDOC a centre of ecclesiastical controversy, and it was for that reason that Illich dissociated it from the Church in 1968 and left the priesthood in 1969.

During this time Illich developed what might be called his educational thinking. It was between the late 1960s and the middle 1970s that he published his principal works in the field. Later he altered his focus, shifting from analysis of the effects of schooling on society to that of the institutional problems of modern societies.

Towards the middle of the 1970s, although he still lived in Mexico, Illich addressed his writings to the international academic community and gradually dis-

tanced himself from Latin America. By the end of the decade he had left Mexico for good to settle in Europe.

Ivan Illich's work in education

CRITICISM OF THE SCHOOL, AND THE 'DESCHOOLING' OF SOCIETY

Ivan Illich's writings on education are made up of collections of articles and public speeches reproduced in various languages, as well as books, also distributed internationally, on subjects such as education, health and transport, and on ways in which the society of the future might be organized.

His now famous paper 'School: The Sacred Cow' (CIDOC, 1968) is the first of a series of works in the field of education. In it Illich fiercely criticizes public schooling for its centralization, its internal bureaucracy, its rigidity and, above all, for the inequalities it harbours. Those ideas would later be further developed and published in his book *En América Latina ¿para qué sirve la escuela?* [What Purpose Does the School Serve in Latin America?] (1973).

These two writings fuse into what is considered to be one of Illich's most important works, *Deschooling Society*, published first in English (1970) and later in Spanish (1973). He presents the four central ideas that suffuse the whole of his work on education:

Universal education through schooling is not feasible. It would be more feasible if it were attempted by means of alternative institutions built on the style of present schools.

Neither new attitudes of teachers towards their pupils nor the proliferation of educational hardware or software . . . , nor finally the attempt to expand the teachers' responsibility until it engulfs the pupils' lifetimes will deliver universal education.

The current search for new educational funnels must be reversed into the search for their institutional inverse: educational webs which heighten the opportunity for learning, sharing and caring.

The ethos, not just the institutions, of society ought to be 'deschooled'.
Illich's interest in the school and the processes of schooling, then, stemmed from his educational work in Puerto Rico, more specifically his work with American educators concerned about the direction they saw the public schools of their country taking. Illich himself acknowledges this when he says, in the introduction to *Deschooling Society*, that it is to Everett Reimer that he owes his interest in public education, adding that 'until we first met in Puerto Rico in 1958 I had never questioned the value of extending obligatory schooling to all people. Together we have come to realize that for most men the right to learn is curtailed by the obligation to attend school.'¹

From then on schooling and education become diametrically opposed concepts for Illich. He begins by denouncing institutionalized education and the institution of the school as producers of merchandise with a specific exchange value in

a society where those who already possess a certain cultural capital derive the most benefit.

On these general premises, Illich maintains that the prestige of the school as a supplier of good-quality educational services for the population as a whole rests on a series of myths, which he describes as follows.

THE MYTH OF INSTITUTIONALIZED VALUES

This myth, according to Illich, is grounded in the belief that the process of schooling produces something of value. That belief generates a demand. It is assumed that the school produces learning. The existence of schools produces the demand for schooling. Thus the school suggests that valuable learning is the result of attendance, that the value of learning increases with the amount of this attendance, and that this value can be measured and documented by grades and certificates. Illich takes the opposite view: that learning is the human activity that least needs manipulation by others; that most learning is the result not of instruction but of participation by learners in meaningful settings. School, however, makes them identify their personal, cognitive growth with elaborate planning and manipulation.

THE MYTH OF MEASUREMENT OF VALUES

According to Illich, the institutionalized values school instils are quantified ones. For him personal growth cannot be measured by the yardstick of schooling but, once people have the idea schooled into them that values can be produced and measured, they tend to accept all kinds of rankings.

People who submit to the standard of others for the measure of their own personal growth soon apply the same standard to themselves. They no longer have to be put in their place but put themselves into their assigned slots, squeeze themselves into the niche which they have been taught to seek, and in the very process, put their fellows into their places, too, until everybody and everything fits.²

THE MYTH OF PACKAGING VALUES

The school sells the curriculum, says Illich, and the result of the curriculum production process looks like any other modern staple product. The distributor/teacher delivers the finished product to the consumer/pupil, whose reactions are carefully studied and charted to provide research data for the preparation of the next model, which may be 'ungraded', 'student-designed', 'visually-aided', or 'issue-centred'.

THE MYTH OF SELF-PERPETUATING PROGRESS

Illich talks not only about consumption but about production and growth. He links these with the race for degrees, diplomas and certificates, since the greater one's share of educational qualifications the greater one's chances of a good job. For Illich the working of consumer societies is founded to a great extent on this myth, and its perpetuation is an important part of the game of permanent regimen-

tation. To smash it, says Illich, 'would endanger the survival not only of the economic order built on the co-production of goods and demands, but equally of the political order built on the nation-state into which students are delivered by the school.'³ Consumers/pupils are taught to adjust their desires to marketable values, even though this cycle of eternal progress can never lead to maturity.

In conclusion Illich points out that the school is not the only modern institution whose main purpose is to shape people's view of reality. Other factors contribute to this, factors related to social origins and family surroundings, the media and informal socialization networks. These, among others, are key elements in moulding behaviour and values. But he considers that it is the school that is most deeply and systematically enslaving, since it alone is entrusted with the task of forming critical judgement, a task that, paradoxically, it tries to carry out by ensuring that learning, whether about oneself, about others or about nature, follows a predetermined pattern.

Illich defends these opinions in his polemical and provocative style, affirming that, in his judgement, 'school impinges so intimately upon us that no one can hope to be freed from it by any external means'.⁴ And he adds:

Schooling – the production of knowledge, the marketing of knowledge, which is what the school amounts to – draws society into the trap of thinking that knowledge is hygienic, pure, respectable, deodorized, produced by human heads and amassed in a stock. I see no difference between rich and poor countries in the development of these attitudes to knowledge. There is a difference of degree, of course; but I find it much more interesting to analyse the hidden impact of the school structure on a society; and I see that this impact is equal or, to be more precise, tends to be equal. It doesn't matter what the overt structure of the curriculum is, whether the school is public, whether it exists in a state that has the monopoly of public schools, or in a state where private schools are tolerated or even encouraged. It is the same in rich as in poor countries, and might be described as follows: if this ritual that I consider schooling to be is defined by a society as education . . . then the members of that society, by making schooling compulsory, are schooled to believe that the self-taught individual is to be discriminated against; that learning and the growth of cognitive capacity, require a process of consumption of services presented in an industrial, a planned, a professional form; . . . that learning is a thing rather than an activity. A thing that can be amassed and-measured, the possession of which is a measure of the productivity of the individual within the society. That is, of his social value.⁵

Out of this analysis grew the strategies Ivan Illich proposes for 'deschooling' education and teaching. He himself tested these strategies on young people and adults taking part in the workshops and activities of CIDOC in Cuernavaca. We shall return to them later.

'CONVIVIALITY'

The works that followed *Deschooling Society* go beyond education to focus more broadly on the reorganization of society and work, in accordance with human needs. This is the message of *Tools for Conviviality* (1973), *Energy and Equity* (1974) and *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (1982).

In the last two works Illich asserts that, just as the school 'de-educates', institutionalized medicine has become a serious health problem. He also uses the example of transport to illustrate his view of the way continuing progress and increasing comfort, especially in the industrialized countries, lead to waste and the inability to make proper use of any energy source. His thinking on these subjects is to be found in *Medical Nemesis* and *Energy and Equity*. In these works, too, Illich leaves education and the school to take up the analysis of political and institutional problems that affect modern societies, with their high degree of technology and stratification, problems inescapable for countries that pursue their development on the pattern of today's industrialized countries.

In *Tools for Conviviality* Illich proposes a rival strategy calling for limits to the growth of industrialized societies and suggests a new kind of organization for them, to be achieved through, among other means, a new concept of work and the 'deprofessionalization' of social relations, not excluding education and the school.

'Convivial' institutions, as Illich defines them, are characterized by their vocation of service to society, by spontaneous use of and voluntary participation in them by all members of society. Illich therefore attributes the word 'convivial' to a society in which 'modern technologies serve politically interrelated individuals rather than managers'. And he adds: 'a "convivial" society is one in which people control the tools'.⁶

What is fundamental to a 'convivial' society is not the total absence of those institutions which Illich calls manipulative, or of addiction to specific goods and services. What he proposes is a balance between institutions that create the specific demands they are specialized to satisfy and those that foster self-realization.

A 'convivial' society, Illich insists,

does not exclude all schools. It does exclude a school system which has been perverted into a compulsory tool, denying privileges to the drop-out. I am using the school as an example of a phenomenon to be found elsewhere in the industrial world . . . this claim is analogous to my observation on the two types of institutionalization of society. . . . In every society there are two ways of achieving specific ends, such as locomotion, communication among people, health, learning. One I call autonomous, the other heteronomous. In the autonomous mode I move myself. In the heteronomous mode I am strapped into a seat and carried. In the autonomous mode I heal myself, and you help me in my paralysis, and I help you in your childbearing. . . . In every society and in every sector, the efficiency with which the goal of the sector is achieved depends on an interaction between the autonomous and the heteronomous modes.⁷

It is important to emphasize that Ivan Illich does not attack any specific political system or regime but rather the entire industrial mode of production and its consequences for humankind. His central thesis in this regard is that 'the means of production have technical characteristics that make them impossible to control by a political process. Only a society that accepts the need to agree on a ceiling for certain technical dimensions of its means of production enjoys political alternatives'.⁸ He calls the attention of developing countries to these dimensions and, in so doing, he throws down challenges to education.

All these ideas find expression in Illich's thesis of 'conviviality', the main thrust of which is to call the attention of developing countries to the advantages and drawbacks of adopting the same style of development as the industrialized countries. At the time that he was putting forward these ideas the majority of these countries, especially in Latin America, had not reached the same stage of development as the industrialized countries and, in Illich's view, still had time to reverse the trend, to redefine their goals and priorities and select development styles that were more equitable, participatory and conducive to the preservation of natural balance and 'convivial' relations.

Reconstruction for poor countries means adopting a set of negative criteria within which their tools are kept, in order to advance directly into a post-industrial era of conviviality. The limits to choose are of the same order as those which hyperindustrialized countries will have to adopt for the sake of survival. . . . Conviviality, which will be immediately accessible to the 'underdeveloped', will have to be bought by the 'developed' at an exorbitant price.⁹

These words of Illich's, written in the mid-1970s, are very similar to those being used now to show that, less than ten years from the end of the century, the countries of North and South, of East and West, are at last realizing that they form a universal whole and that they have more in common than they thought. Environmental problems and ecological imbalances impinge equally on all; a declining standard of living does not distinguish between developed countries and those still in search of sustainable development. All are equally concerned for the quality and effectiveness of learning inside or outside the school system, and no one can ignore that school and education are far from having adapted themselves to the pace of scientific and technological change or to the most immediate needs of those who look to them for their self-realization in the world of today. It is a fact that the search for solutions to these problems is no longer solely in the hands of developed countries, and here Illich's opinions contain a great deal of truth.

Developing countries now not only form part of world problems but are also bound up with the solutions to those problems. The 'convivial' society may not be the answer. But it must be recognized that Illich dealt with these themes almost three decades ago. Whether because of the ideological context in which the ideas were born and developed, whether because of a lack of theoretical foundation to sustain them, or because of Illich's own personality, the themes of 'deschooling' society and building a 'convivial' society did not receive the attention they deserved, and there was no further development of a line of thinking that might have borne better fruit.

Alternatives

If, decades later, we separate Illich's thought from its emotional context, it is interesting to realize how thought-provoking some of his suggestions and proposals are. The themes seen by Illich in terms of changed perspectives, changed motivation and changes in what he calls the tools, the structure and the material means of production are recurrent themes today in the debate on progress in science and

technology, the impact of computers on daily life, and the privatization of public services, including health, education and transport.

Let us return to the question of strategies and the historical context in which Illich developed them. He maintained that

without prejudice to discussion of good motivations and correct viewpoints, the debate that must be encouraged at this moment in history is the communal and political analysis of the materials of production. For me society's alternative is to be found in the conscious limitation of technology to those uses that are truly efficient. I mean the limitation of vehicle speeds to levels at which they do not create more distance than they eliminate. The limitation of medical intervention to those procedures that . . . do not damage health more than they improve it. The limitation of the tools of communication to sizes at which they do not produce, by definition, more noise than signal, a signal that is usable for the act of life that I call understanding. I do not see, therefore, why the institution of school for all, which is an institution that became necessary about 80 years ago, should continue to exist and to trouble us.¹⁰

What troubles Illich in this case, as it does other educators of the period, is not educational practice in itself but the impact of schooling on society, and how a type of education that 'asks itself in what conditions people's curiosity might flourish' might be achieved.¹¹

His reply to this question is that a good education system should have three purposes: to provide all who want to learn with access to available resources at any time in their lives; to make it possible for all who want to share what they know to find those who want to learn it from them; to furnish all who want to present a debatable issue to the public with the opportunity to make their arguments known.

He thinks that no more than four, and possibly three, webs or networks of exchange might contain all the necessary resources for effective learning.

The first he calls 'reference services to educational objects'. The purpose of these is to facilitate access to things or processes used for formal learning. Some of the examples he gives are libraries, laboratories and display places such as museums and theatres, together with things that may be in daily use in factories, airports or public places but are made available to would-be students, whether as apprentices – at their place of work – or as people taking advantage of their leisure time.

The second he calls 'skill exchanges', which allow people to list their skills and abilities, the conditions under which they are willing to serve as models for others who want to learn these skills, and how they can be reached for this purpose.

The third network is what Illich calls 'peer-matching', a network that permits persons to describe the learning activity in which they wish to engage, in the hope of finding a partner for their inquiry.

Finally, Illich proposes a fourth network, which he calls 'reference services to educators-at-large' consisting of a directory giving addresses and self-descriptions of professionals, paraprofessionals and freelancers, along with the conditions of access to their services. Such educators could be chosen by polling or consulting their former clients.

Today this educational proposal, if it has not found its way into the school system, has come into effect, under a variety of labels, in the non-formal education of young people and adults, in lifelong education and in other fields that admit 'deschooled' education. And, in practice, we hear more and more often of the existence of networks composed of people who want to share generally useful knowledge, forge links to exchange experiences and create and strengthen the capacity for autonomous development – to innovate and to learn from accumulated experience.

A glance around us will show that there exist today innumerable data banks, that more and more research and information-exchange networks are being set up, and that increasingly the major problems of humankind are being tackled by teams of people bringing together multiple skills.

Paradoxically, only the school seems to be keeping up at an undiminished pace the ritual and routine that were denounced by Illich and other educators of his generation. To change it will require a real revolution, sparked off perhaps by the changes taking place in society as a whole in the spheres of economics, agriculture, energy, data processing, health, standards of living and conditions of work. Here we must include overpopulation, unemployment, poverty and the lessons that should be learned from them in the struggle to achieve a harmonious style of development in which human survival will depend on the creativity, freedom and enthusiasm that each and every human being can bring to the task.

Closing remarks

Much of this is to be found in Illich's work and writings. His mistake, perhaps, was to condemn the school out of hand. The radical nature of his denunciation prevented him from constructing a realistic strategy for those educators and researchers who might have associated themselves with his protest. In addition, Illich's writings were founded essentially on intuition, without any appreciable reference to the results of socio-educational or learning research. His criticism evolves in a theoretical vacuum, which may explain the limited acceptance his educational theories and proposals find today.

Indeed, Illich is widely accused of being a utopian thinker and is further criticized for his early withdrawal from the wider educational debate. A deeper involvement and the development of viable strategies for putting his ideas into practice, plus a solid theoretical foundation to sustain them, might have led him along different paths.

Notwithstanding all this, Ivan Illich must be recognized as one of the educational thinkers who helped to give life to the educational debate of the 1970s and laid the groundwork for the conception of a school more attentive to the needs of its environment, to the realities of its pupils' lives and to the efficient acquisition of socially relevant knowledge. Even if the radical nature of his criticisms made it impossible to put them into practice, many of his ideas have universal validity, both for the school system and for other institutions of public utility. And it can never be denied that these ideas influenced a considerable number of educators and extended

the movement for 'deschooling' education beyond the historical context in which it was generated, to be manifested in policies and programmes aimed at mitigating the endemic crisis of formal and non-formal education as a whole.

Notes

1. I. Illich, *Deschooling Society*, p. vii, London, Calder & Boyers, 1971.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
4. 'Conversando con I. Illich', *Cuadernos de pedagogía* (Barcelona), Vol. 1, July/August 1975, pp. 16–22 (Dossier Freire/Illich).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.
8. I. Illich, *Tools for Conviviality*, p. 56, New York, Harper & Row, 1973.
9. 'Dossier Freire/Illich', *Cuadernos de pedagogía*, op. cit., pp. 19, 17.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 60–1.
11. Quoted in R. D. de Oliveira et al., 'Pedagogía de los oprimidos. Oposición de la pedagogía' [Education of the Oppressed. Oppression of Education], in *Cuadernos de pedagogía*, op. cit., pp. 4–15.

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K A R L J A S P E R S

(1883-1969)

Hermann Horn

Karl Jaspers lived in an age that witnessed far-reaching political changes. He grew up in the sheltered environment of a prosperous family with a democratic, liberal and conservative bent. His objections to the authoritarian, militaristic state and a society with a caste structure, which typified the German Empire, are rooted in that background.

Jaspers interpreted the outbreak of the First World War as a great fault line in the Western tradition. He believed that the Weimar Republic was threatened: politically by communism and fascism; socially by the mass consumption which was made possible by technology and machinery; and spiritually by the biased statements on man embodied in Marxism, psychoanalysis and racial theory.

His life and work were at risk during the Hitler dictatorship. He was compulsorily retired in 1937. Publication of his works was banned in 1938. The entry of American troops into Heidelberg on 1 April 1945 saved him and his Jewish wife from deportation to a concentration camp. Hope and concern mingled in his critical appraisal of the reconstruction and political process in the new Federal Republic of Germany. When he moved to Basle in Switzerland in 1948, he found a new home in a traditional European centre of liberty.

No understanding of Jaspers' philosophy is possible without recognition of the fact that his route to philosophy led through science.

After graduating as a doctor of medicine in 1908, Jaspers worked as a volunteer assistant in the Heidelberg Psychiatric Clinic until 1915. In contact with his patients, in his critical reading of medical literature and in his extensive research into the complex reality of patients suffering from psychological disorders, he gradually acquired a realization which was destined to have far-reaching consequences, namely that known facts and explanatory theories do not reside on the same plane since they remain dependent on the way in which the question is posed and on assumptions and methods which give access to only one particular segment of reality.

General Psychopathology, with which Jaspers graduated in psychology in 1913, points to the various routes to an understanding of certain aspects of the ultimately impenetrable reality of the mentally ill patient. The perception of individual cir-

cumstances, research into the relationships between them and understanding of the corresponding totality are mutually conditioning and complementary factors. Explanation and understanding are essential methods which, in their manifold facets, reflect the multidimensionality of man. Only a multiplicity of theories can do justice to the totality of man. As concrete research and critical reflection progress, so the possibilities and limits of science become apparent; the furtherance of such knowledge was experienced by Jaspers as an ongoing and vital task to which he remained dedicated throughout his life. However, it was only at the age of 40 that he took up philosophy as his life's work and as a means of approaching those questions to which science could provide no suitable answer.

Jaspers gives a particularly impressive analysis of the relationship between science and philosophy in the third edition of *The Idea of the University* in 1961 (see Jaspers, 1923). To bring out the essence of science, he highlights three basic principles:

1. Scientific knowledge is methodical knowledge, i.e. we know by what means it was arrived at and in what sense and within what limits it holds good; it is the exact opposite of unmethodical opinions and unquestioning belief.
2. Scientific knowledge is absolutely certain, i.e. it stands the test of any reasoning; it must be distinguished from the convictions by which man may live and be prepared to risk his life.
3. Scientific knowledge has general validity, i.e. it is recognized without limitation by everyone who understands it; it stands in contrast to any other form of knowledge in which man may place unlimited faith.

Jaspers goes on to investigate the limits of science by pointing out that: 'Objective scientific knowledge is not synonymous with *existential* knowledge' (1923 (1961), p. 45). It is concerned with the particular and not with the general. 'Scientific knowledge cannot *set goals* for life' (p. 45). It proclaims no valid values. 'Science is also unable to give any answer to the question as to its *own meaning*' (p. 45). Its motives cannot be scientifically proved.

Finally, Jaspers comments on the relationship between science and philosophy, which do not coincide but 'differ by nature in their origins, methods and understanding of truth' (p. 59); nevertheless they are interrelated.

Science rejects any possible confusion with philosophy but still concedes the existence of the former's 'complete freedom in its own sphere' (p. 60) and adopts a critical approach to unfounded assertions and purported proofs. 'The substantive sciences are, as it were, a concrete form of philosophy' (p. 60) if ideas help to make them transparent to 'that which is rationally unknowable' at their extreme boundaries.

Philosophy establishes a relationship with science when it recognizes the incapable nature of the latter and binds itself to science in an infinite desire to know what really exists and is necessarily knowable. 'It perceives preservation of the scientific way of thinking as a precondition for human dignity' (p. 61).

When we consider Jaspers' philosophical work in its entirety, the phases and forms of his thinking are seen to constitute a differentiated whole, fraught with inherent tensions.

His particular philosophy acquired a sustained impetus from his experience of the fact that general psychopathology, as a science of the mentally ill, is capable only of recognizing the phenomena of reality. That idea is taken up again in his *Psychology of Conceptions of the World* (1919) and reinforced when – in his clarification of world views, world images and mental types – the purely psychological viewpoint comes into conflict, in certain extreme situations (suffering, combat, guilt, death, chance), with the antinomic structure of a world which is not closed upon itself.

The notion that man not only exists but wishes to be himself was developed by Jaspers in 1932 in his three-volume *Philosophy*, which is structured as follows: a worldly orientation as research into objective reality; the explanation of existence as an appeal for the individual to be himself; metaphysics in relation to the transcendental. Overriding priority is attributed by Jaspers to man as one possible form of existence which cannot be explained through concepts derived from research, but can only be elucidated through philosophical 'signs'. Only indirect attention is drawn to the selfness of man which is never in itself a subject, but tends rather to be revealed and become reality in 'communication' with others; a selfness which assumes its 'historical' shape and preserves 'freedom' through unconditional resolve, is aroused in 'extreme situations', acquires certainty in 'unconditional actions' and is fulfilled as an 'absolute consciousness'. However, existence is not in itself everything but remains related to the 'transcendental' which speaks in 'ciphers'.

Jaspers set a new emphasis in his 1935 lectures on *Reason and Existence* when the question of 'being' was transformed into the question of the 'all-embracing', which he describes as that which is never itself visible as a horizon but from which all new horizons tend to emerge. This 'all-embracing' is structured in the process of reflection, firstly, as 'being' itself which is everything in which and through which we have our existence and which Jaspers defines as the 'world and the transcendental' and, secondly, as the 'being' which we ourselves are and in which we experience every particular form of existence. Jaspers represents the 'all-embracing' as 'being', pure consciousness, spirit and possible existence.

One point is of particular importance for the purpose of this study: Jaspers now establishes an inextricable link between existence and reason as the 'bond between all the manifestations of the all-embracing'. 'Reason provides the only explanation of existence; reason only acquires content through existence' (1935, p. 48).

Jaspers went on to develop this rich network of relationships in his most comprehensive work entitled *On Truth* (1947).

A surprising new perspective of Jaspers' philosophy was opened up when the philosopher of existence and reason turned his attention to the world in his later works after 1957, at the same time as he conceived a world history of philosophy in which India, China and the Near East are investigated, alongside the West, as original routes of philosophical thinking and their significance revealed. The world as the space in which existence and reason move now acquires an inescapable importance. Democracy, peace and the just world order are the problems around which Jaspers' philosophy revolves.

To acquire a perception of the unique nature of Jaspers' philosophy, the essential link which he establishes between science, existence, reason and the world must be recognized. Any isolated consideration of one of these factors seen as an absolute in itself will inevitably fail to perceive the totality of this thinking which is oriented towards the world that it nevertheless surpasses. These very links hold the key to the fruitful nature of Jaspers' philosophy.

Jaspers on education

Jaspers made few systematic comments on education in a specifically pedagogical work. But it is surprising to note the expertise and conviction with which he explains the multifaceted phenomenon of education when he deals incidentally and aphoristically or coherently, and on many different dimensions, with the problems and tasks, possibilities and limits of education in many of his published works.

EDUCATION AS ACTION

Jaspers discovered the special nature of education as distinct from making, shaping, tending and ruling. By the process of 'making', something usable is manufactured from a material on the basis of a rational calculation; by 'shaping', man creates a work whose form is infinite and impossible to calculate in advance. In our modern technical world, 'tending' or 'rearing' have acquired an uncanny resemblance with 'making'; nevertheless, they can only succeed by listening to the living being which remains incalculable as an organism. The process of 'ruling' means subjecting the other, be it nature or a human being, to an extraneous will and purpose.

In 1947, Jaspers drew a clear distinction between these forms of active conduct in relation to the world and education. 'At the level of interhuman relations (in particular between the older and the younger generations), education consists of everything that is imparted to young people by communicating contents, allowing them to share the substance of things and disciplining their conduct in such a way that this knowledge continues to grow within them and enables them to become free' (1947, p. 364). The process by which knowledge is imparted should lead young people 'imperceptibly to the origins, the genuine, the true foundations' (p. 364). This presupposes that young people will themselves come to terms with the surrounding reality whose many different facets they may experience through play, work and practical activities. The list of this experimental practice ranges from skills in methods of work through physical training, clear speech and disciplined discussion to the intellectual grasp of original contents in poetry, the Bible and art, and also to an understanding of history and familiarity with the basic techniques of the natural sciences.

Education is not a uniform process. It changes in the course of history and assumes different forms in different societies. Jaspers perceives three recurrent basic forms. Scholastic education of the kind which prevailed in the Middle Ages is confined to the transmission of subject-matter which is fixed once and for all, com-

pressed into formulae and simply dictated with an accompanying commentary. Education by a master is a different form in which a dominant personality is honoured as an unimpeachable authority by students who are totally submitted to him. Socratic education contains the deepest meaning since it involves 'no fixed doctrine, but an infinity of questions and absolute unknowing' (1947, p. 85). The teacher and his pupil are on the same level in relation to ideas. 'Education is maieutic, that is, it helps to bring the student's latent ideas into clear consciousness; the potential which exists within him is stimulated, but nothing is forced upon him from outside' (p. 85). Here education is understood as 'the element through which human beings come into their own through interpersonal contact by revealing the truth that is latent in them' (1957, p. 107).

Jaspers, of course, breaks out from the framework of rationalistic, excessively psychological and sociological definitions of education when he notes with deep concern that organization and its apparatus are like a net threatening to trap and control all human life. The delusion that everything is feasible is then extended to include the idea of a perfect society and the possibility of planning human beings. Jaspers therefore draws a distinction between the need for rational, particular planning and the evil which is wrought by total planning that extends to the most intimate corners of life, human existence and truth and ultimately ruins them. The fact that human freedom and responsibility lie outside the domain which lends itself to making and planning acquires heightened pedagogical significance. Jaspers comments on this in his essay 'On the Limits of Educational Planning', reprinted in his *Philosophy and the World* (1958).

Jaspers does not deny all merit in planning but criticizes a misguided spirit of planning which seeks to include things that are ungraspable. He clarifies this point by citing three examples:

1. 'Children must acquire skills and learn knowledge' (1958, p. 30) which is made available in its pure form by the sciences. However, Jaspers enters a vigorous objection to the programme of total scientific orientation in all subjects and at all levels: 'The planning of scientific teaching cannot be decisively determined by science itself or by an understanding of the specific scientific disciplines, but is originally subordinated to an altogether different understanding, i.e. knowledge of the essence of things' (p. 31). Here, pedagogical and didactic responsibility is respected in its own right and attention focused on young people who must, in the first instance, observe the world with their own eyes, creating their own categories before becoming self-sufficient enough to acquire the scientific mode of thought as an element of reason.
2. 'Children must be educated according to their own inclinations and abilities' (p. 32). Here Jaspers objects to the idea that psychology as a science should be the 'foundation of pedagogical planning and decisions' (p. 32). However, he does concede that it has an 'ancillary role to play under the guiding hand of the educator' (p. 33).
3. 'The essential role of the school in training children to become useful members of the community has two implications' (p. 33). Jaspers defines the first task as 'arousing the historical spirit of the community and of life through the

symbols of that community' (p. 33). This may be done through consideration of the previous history of such a community and through contact between young people and their educators, although this aim cannot be a deliberate and reasoned intention. The second task, on the other hand, is to 'learn and practise everything which is necessary for work and a profession' (p. 33). This is a matter for deliberate planning. Both tasks are indispensable. Jaspers complains that so much emphasis has been placed on plannable performance that responsibility for the spirit of the whole has receded into the background. He emphasizes that 'the decisive action is taken by the individual teacher between the four walls of his classroom where he is free to assume his own responsibility. This is the venue of a real life which sometimes seems abhorrent . . . to bureaucratic planners. Here we find the sympathetic human approach combined with responsibility for intellectual content' (p. 37).

Jaspers believes that education takes place at the intersection of tension between the past, present and future and that unilateral preference must not be given to any one of these time horizons. He calls repeated attention to the fact that the substance of the present is rooted in the acquired tradition which forms part of human memory and that the path into the future runs through continuity with the past. Education must not be abandoned to tradition, to the passing moment or to some form of utopia as the only ultimate yardsticks. It is only through concentration on the present moment accepted with a spirit of responsibility that the past and future can come truly into their own.

The question as to the substance of education arises when intense activity serves merely to hide the vacuity of endless learning. Jaspers takes it for granted that all conscious education presupposes real substance. 'Without faith, there can be no education but a mere technique of teaching' (1923; 1961, p. 86). In an intermediate (1946) version of this book, Jaspers recognizes that 'awe is the substance of all education. Without the pathos of an absolute, man cannot exist, else all would be meaningless' (p. 49). This absolute which creates meaning may assume a variety of forms. Jaspers quotes as examples caste, the state, religion or truth, independence, responsibility and freedom. Clearly the absolute cannot simply be proclaimed but must be the subject of testimony in practical life. It can never be decreed but must be freely accepted. Moreover, it cannot be denied that in a pluralistic society majority decisions cannot be taken on a generally valid absolute; the creation of a consensus must remain a serious objective.

Education lapses into crisis when the 'substance of the whole becomes questionable and begins to fall apart' (1931, p. 93); such was Jaspers' diagnosis in 1931. Education is failing to help children to discover an all-embracing whole. 'Experiments are made and contents, objectives and methods changed at short intervals' (p. 93). Education has become dispersed 'because of the fragmentation of traditional historical substance in those individuals who bear responsibility in their mature age' (p. 93). Jaspers enumerates facts which are of extraordinary topicality as symptoms of this uncertainty: 'The intensity of educational endeavour with no unifying idea, an endless flood of new publications, the enhancement of the didactic art, the personal devotion of individual teachers on a scale which has scarcely even been

experienced 'before' (p. 94). Substantive education runs the risk of taking second place to endless experimentation, fragmentation into a profusion of possibilities and an absurd attempt to convey the unknowable.

Jaspers frequently posed the question of the meaning and role of education. He touches on the decisive dimension of education when he defines it as 'helping the individual to come into his own in a spirit of freedom and not like a trained animal' (1966, p. 202). 'Education is accomplished when contents are freely acquired; but it fails when it is authoritarian' (p. 202). Hence it follows that 'from an early age, children must be called upon to act of their own free volition; they must learn through personal insight into the need for learning and not out of mere obedience' (p. 202). However, intellectual discipline remains indispensable. Constant practice is vital if 'the great meaning is to be made visible and brought home effectively' (p. 202).

Jaspers makes a sober attempt to define the potential and limits of education. He sees confidence in man and in the way in which he can come into his own through personal endeavour as a fundamental condition. He believes that a bold effort to educate others and oneself is justified by the fact that man is never totally conditioned by inheritance or by his environment. On the contrary, he has a vast hidden potential, which can only be revealed by experimentation, hard work and firm resolve. In 1958, Jaspers expressed the view that a limit resided in the fact that 'man must not in any way calculate his dealings with others' (1958, p. 245). The unique nature of Jaspers' reflection on education becomes remarkably clear when he speaks of love as the driving force and true authority as the source of genuine education. He does not believe that these two factors are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are inseparable. Love protects education from the will to dominate and shape pupils for finite purposes, and makes it a personal encounter instead: 'Loving communication between individuals embraces all love of things, of the world and of God. To the extent that communication integrates these shared contents, it will unfurl effectively. Communication can only be truly effective through its material content. Objective facts only acquire significance through loving people' (1947, p. 1011).

Jaspers does not equate authority with violence and compulsion, but places it on a different level without a complete detachment from these other aspects. It is a reality, a problem and a task. It assumes different forms in the course of history with different explanations and limitations; it is in conflict with deviant forms and exists in a field of tension with freedom; it is endangered in itself and by others and undergoes constant change. Authority is an indispensable element of all life in society. 'At all times, man is only able to live under some form of authority' (1957, p. 749). However, he does have the choice as to 'which content is to become the basis of his own life' (p. 749). The following concept is all-important: 'The authority of an individual can be exercised only if personal authority allows expression to be given to the all-embracing which is also obeyed by the person who gives commands' (p. 782). Authority cannot be rationally planned, technically implemented and deliberately sought.

Particular importance attaches to emphasis on the polar tension between au-

thority and freedom which must remain essentially related if they are not to place their own essence at risk under a despotic or arbitrary system. Jaspers recalls forgotten and repressed facts when he outlines the process by which freedom is acquired in authority:

Believed authority is the source of a genuine education which concerns the essence of the individual. The individual human being starts his finite progression from the very beginning. As he develops, he is dependent on authority to appropriate the substantive content which is capable of being transmitted . . . The substance of authority takes on vitality to the extent that he appropriates it to himself. Freedom which was created by seizing authority can then resist authority (in its particularly rigid objective manifestations) [1957, pp. 797 et seq.].

Jaspers does not conceal the fact 'that authority must at some point and without specific intention take *unperceived priority*'. 'Philosophical faith which is incomprehensible to itself calls at some point for uncomprehended authority, which will not, however, become exclusive in its worldly manifestations but must be subject to deep scrutiny before consent is given to it. Authority must remain a source of trust which cannot be transgressed' (p. 866).

EDUCATION AND THE FAMILY

From personal experience and conviction, Jaspers ascribes to the family the task of laying the groundwork for all education. It is in the family that children experience, through the love of their parents and the constant concern for their welfare, that 'humanity' which helps them to master the difficulties of daily life and gives the next generation courage to pursue a responsible life in future, strengthened by all that is handed on to them. Here children experience solidarity and piety, faith and dependability in which all provide support for each other. Here the growing child receives impressions which shape his/her life, impressions of an order which is not constricting but grants freedom to everyone. Jaspers remembers his own mother and father with gratitude; they differed in their character and treatment of their children but nevertheless together created a sensation of 'safety and security' and, through their love, imparted a 'certainty in the reasons for life' (1967, p. 17) which was not even destroyed by the terrible events which took place after 1933. Education was completed by setting an unintentional example.

Jaspers' father exercised unquestioned authority. He introduced him to nature on long walks and made him familiar with the infinity of the sea, the broad marsh landscape with its 'uninterrupted horizon' (p. 16), the solitary moors and the mysterious forests. He introduced him to his immediate and wider home and to its history when he showed him monuments and buildings 'with no particular plan and simply in passing' but with an 'effective impact on his mind' (p. 41). His father comforted him over failures at school, encouraged him to acquire knowledge as the path to truth and warned him against prejudices against other people.

Jaspers praises his mother for the confidence and love which she radiated. She created a 'sensation of security which was threatened by no mistrust or fear' (p. 75). She allowed her children to follow their own paths and strengthened Jaspers' will

to live when he was faced with an illness which afflicted him in his infancy; he learned to live with this medical condition through exceptional self-discipline. He managed to do so because his parents gave him to understand that he was 'not a burden but a joy to them' (p. 47).

The substance of education was centred on a humanity experienced in everyday life. 'On occasion, brief statements were made about all that is important to man: truth, frankness, fidelity, reason and nature, diligence and performance' (pp. 85 et seq.). A sense of dignity and rank, moderation and form was aroused and cultivated. Absolute obedience was never demanded. The child's will was not broken, but strengthened and guided.

FORMAL AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Jaspers does not set out a programme for the design of an education system, but focuses instead on a few basic principles. He emphasizes the exceptionally important role of the primary school, which lays the moral, intellectual and political foundations for the entire population. The intellectual renewal imparted by teachers is the determining factor if the population at large and those in government are to recognize the justification of the necessary financial resources. Decisive importance attaches to the educational content which must be based on the great traditions of the human mind. Jaspers advocates the need for a moral content in all teaching; reading and writing will then cease to be mere technical attainments and become instead a spiritual act – a miracle. When that spirit is alive, effort and hard work, practice and repetition, which are often experienced as a burden, will acquire new meaning and become a real pleasure. Secondary schools, in all their different forms, must also pursue the same goal.

Jaspers was in no doubt about the fact that the value of a school is directly bound up with the quality of its teachers who can only perform their task of educating young people through lifelong self-education and training. 'The only true educator is the one who is permanently engaged in a process of self-education through communication. Education can only be correct if its addressees acquire the ability to educate themselves through stringent and tenacious learning' (1958, p. 445).

Throughout his life, Jaspers remained committed to the idea that the university does not have a mere teaching function; the student must also 'learn from his professors to engage in personal research and therefore acquire a scientific mode of thought which will colour his whole existence' (1923 (1961), p. 1).

Jaspers paints a broad canvas of the tasks of the university: research; teaching and education; training; communication; the whole world of the sciences. This internal cohesion is apparent in a number of statements made by Jaspers:

1. To the extent that the university seeks truth through science, research is its fundamental task. Since that task presupposes the passing on of knowledge, research is bound up with teaching. Teaching means allowing students to take part in the research process.
2. The correct method of imparting knowledge and skills in itself contributes to the intellectual training of the whole being.

3. Performance of this task is bound up with communication between thinking beings, i.e. between researchers, between teachers and pupils, between pupils and, in some circumstances, between all of them.
4. Science is essentially a whole. . . . The structure of the university must be such that all the different sciences are represented [1923 (1961), pp. 64–5].

The university can only create the preconditions and foundations required for specific vocational training if its aim is not to 'impart a self-contained body of knowledge but to train and develop scientific modes of thought' (p. 70). 'The techniques of questioning must have been practised. A thorough grounding must have been acquired in a particular discipline, but there is no need for the student to memorize all kinds of specialized facts as is demanded by foolish examinations' (p. 70). The emphasis must rather be placed on the sense of judgement which is gained through research, proves its worth in the everyday practice of a profession, directs the gaze towards all that is knowable and opens out onto the broadest horizon.

As Jaspers emphasizes, university education is 'by nature Socratic' (p. 86) because the student's sense of responsibility and freedom come into play. 'It is only through freedom that we can acquire experience of the original desire for knowledge and hence of human independence which is the gift of God and bound up with God' (p. 86). The freedom of learning has as its counterpart the freedom of teaching.

Communication with the researcher and participation in the research process can stimulate a scientific attitude in the student himself which Jaspers characterizes as 'objectivity, a devotion to the subject, reasoned balance, investigation of contrasting possibilities, self-criticism' (p. 79). It is 'education in reason' (p. 80) which takes place without deliberate intent or planning.

EDUCATION AND TRADITION

Jaspers was convinced of the fact that man can only come into his own by appropriating the traditions which, as far as the West is concerned, assumed their classical shape in the Bible and antiquity. The roots in the tradition of any one particular people can only prove fertile if an open attitude is adopted to the other major traditions of mankind.

Jaspers believes that man places himself at risk if he confines tradition to those matters which are essential for existence or have some practical technical value, or alternatively makes a radical break with tradition so as to place all life on a totally planned new basis. In that menacing situation, the question arises as to the existence of a historical memory which outlives the polar tension between continuity and change.

Referring in 1931 to the different forms of memory, Jaspers drew a distinction between mere knowledge of the past, and understanding perception and assimilation which are essential to create 'the reality of the selfness of contemporary man, first in awe and then in an awareness of his own feelings and action leading on ultimately to participation in eternal existence' (1931, p. 106). In his preface to the periodical *Die Wandlung* [Change], Jaspers warned in 1945: 'What and how

we remember and those aspects of memory which we allow to come into play, will help to decide what becomes of us' (1965, p. 29).

For Jaspers himself the existential appropriation of tradition was given lasting encouragement through his personal encounter with Max Weber, as a result of which he came to recognize the fundamental role of the past and its consequences for education. 'Education through the study of great men has the purpose of permitting the individual's own existence to be rediscovered in them, to enable him to come to fruition through them until the human being which has become genuine and original in itself moves on to acquire objectivity and reach decisions without the detour of a hypothetical identification with the other person' (1947, p. 1006). The following maxim was often confirmed for Jaspers: 'He who sees greatness, experiences a desire to become great himself' (1957, p. 35).

Jaspers considered that the assimilation of German history was one of the most vital tasks which called above all for 'faithfulness to the facts and a judgement of the most recent past' (1966, p. 204). The most pressing command here is a rejection of the 'way of thinking which made Hitler's domination possible' (p. 205) – a command which has once again acquired extraordinary topicality against the background of the excesses of the right-wing extremists in our reunited Germany.

EDUCATION AND THE STATE

Looking back on his life, Jaspers described his denigration of the state without conceiving anything better to replace it as 'youthful folly'. He returned inevitably to the problem of the state when he saw the Weimar Republic threatened by the two extremes of fascism and communism.

In 1931 he approved of the state which guaranteed a particular form of general order through its power. He described two possible extreme attitudes of the state's attitude to education. 'Either it leaves education free . . . or else the state takes over education which it goes on to shape in quietude or violence to serve its own ends' (1931, pp. 96 et seq.).

In the first assumption, the state rules 'without continuity through its policy guided by individuals' belonging to established parties (p. 96). Diversity of the teaching syllabuses and experimentation may lead to total fragmentation. There is no continuity due to constant changes. Great and true knowledge, which might have an unforgettable impact on their lives, is withheld from children. Instead, their energies are taken up by stringent criteria placed on the learning process itself, without shaping their true being. 'Pulled hither and thither, the child encounters the ruins of a tradition but no world into which he may enter with confidence' (p. 97).

In the second instance, uniform education is imposed and paralyzes intellectual freedom. 'Basic attitudes are fixed as articles of faith and drummed into the pupil with the acquisition of knowledge and skills as modes of feeling and value judgements' (p. 97). Although Bolshevism and fascism differ, they have in common the fact that they assign people to particular categories. Jaspers does not conceal the fact that politics involves the 'use of violence' (1958, p. 57), but stresses the

essential link between politics and freedom, and states that the morally founded right only becomes reality when it is imposed by force. He calls for a new system of politics guided by morality, justice and reason which must be aroused and embodied in the individual, in whom they may be supposed to be inherent, so as to become permanently effective in the community made up of individuals. For Jaspers, the following maxim is true and might be rich in educational consequences: 'Only if reason is expected, can it be encountered. . . . No organization can elicit reason and a conscious awareness of reason. On the contrary, it presupposes their existence' (p. 302).

In his parents' home, Jaspers already acquired a positive attitude to democracy which brought him into conflict with the authoritarian positions adopted in the schools and society of his day. It therefore comes as no surprise that, after the suffering and disaster of Hitler's dictatorship, he became a vigorous advocate of democracy because it 'is the only necessary, if infinitely difficult, path by which men can attain their potential degree of freedom and organize the world to enhance that freedom' (1965, p. 22). He does not succumb to the illusion that the different forms of democracy might themselves guarantee and bring to perfection the very idea of democracy, but he does firmly believe in the need to make constant use of the opportunities held out by democracy as the sole route to freedom.

Jaspers remains concerned at the fact that a democracy which is totally formal may itself generate total domination. He therefore constantly reminds us that confidence in the people is essential and that democracy presupposes an attitude of reason on the part of the people which it must itself take care to foster. Here Jaspers refuses to idealize, or at the other extreme defame, the people. He considers the people to be sovereign, but in need of self-education to attain that sovereignty. A people becomes ripe for democracy by becoming politically active and by accepting responsibility for the solution of concrete problems.

Jaspers considers it self-evident that democracy demands the education of the entire people. 'Democracy, freedom and reason all hang by that education. Only through such education is it possible to preserve the historical content of our existence and deploy it as a generative force underpinning our life in the new world situation' (1958, p. 444). It may seem surprising when Jaspers writes: 'In the idea of democracy, politics themselves are education' (p. 447). However, this can only hold good for a type of politics which is guided by principles that lie above mere politics.

Turning to democratic education, Jaspers develops two interrelated concepts.

The political education of young people comprises many different tasks, among which he lists the imparting of constitutional knowledge and an acceptance of authority, the generation of images and ideas, practical exercises in the solution of common problems, practice in ordered forms of debate, familiarization with thinking and the ability to see through mere slogans. This political education presupposes 'constant self-education of adult citizens in their democratic attitudes' (1965, p. 283), a process which is played out in the keen debate on topical issues. This self-education begins by 'thinning out the undergrowth of unclarity'. It always endeavours to ensure that the constitution is firmly rooted in the hearts of citizens. It

is continued when, despite this basic recognition of the constitution, ways must still be found of making legal amendments to it in critical situations. It is safeguarded when the politics of ruse give way to public debate. And it is completed when, despite all the affirmation of the state, an inner distance is maintained which preserves us against total identification with a particular form of state. 'In all this, the vital need is to arouse an awareness in each individual that he bears responsibility for himself' (p. 52). This will be attained through self-education.

The idea of the 'all-embracing'

After identifying the unique nature of Jaspers' philosophy and presenting his thoughts on education in an open system, we shall now endeavour to present the central philosophical concept of the 'all-embracing' and highlight its importance for education. Scientific thinking runs up against the frontiers of knowledge which only covers objects; it must then broaden into philosophical thought which seeks certainty about being. But the totality of being remains inaccessible. Understanding, the intellect and reason will always fall short of the mark. Being is never mastered by human thought, but man is able to acquire certainty over this being through the modalities of the world around him in which it is manifested; at the same time, being escapes complete understanding.

As we have already seen, Jaspers uses an image to describe the 'all-embracing' in terms of an invisible horizon from which all new horizons emerge rather than as something which is itself directly perceptible. Jaspers draws a distinction between this 'all-embracing' phenomenon of the world and transcendental essence and specifically human phenomena which he divides into being, pure consciousness, intellect and possible existence.

Therefore, this basic philosophical operation does not enlarge our knowledge but changes its nature. The concept of the 'all-embracing' protects us from concentration on a particular type of being and leaves us open to the whole. This conceptual structure must not be confused with the categorization of forms of being; on the contrary, the characteristics of the 'all-embracing' only come into their own and retain their meaning when they are seen in their general context. Human thought, however, runs the constant risk of isolating one particular category of this 'all-embracing' and of according it formal status as an absolute. In that case, the inherent links between all its aspects are broken and the complete reality is deflected from its true purpose. Jaspers describes this error concisely in the following terms in his book entitled *Philosophical Faith in the Face of Revelation* (1962):

Being is given absolute form in pragmatism, biologism, psychologism and sociologism, the *pure consciousness* in rationalism, the *spirit* in education, the *existence* in existentialism (which becomes nihilism), the *world* in materialism, naturalism, idealism and pantheism, and the *transcendental* in acosmism [p. 141].

The notion of the 'all-embracing' proves particularly fertile when it is applied to man and an attempt is made to assess its significance for understanding and for the process of education; after all, understanding of education is necessarily bound up

with an understanding of man whose full and true humanity is to be developed, aroused, fostered and created through education. The understanding of man represents, as it were, the framework within which statements on education become possible, necessary, meaningful and clear.

The many different dimensions of man can be defined conceptually as being, pure consciousness, intellect and possible existence, without losing sight of his essential unity.

Man as a being. This is the man who is conceived and born, grows up, achieves maturity and dies as a living being, an individual. The individual is characterized personally by the specific form of his animated body which is able to function through the complex interplay of chemical and physical processes. Man is determined by his inclinations and the environment and each individual differs from all others. He shares this characteristic with animals, but this vital reality still does not define his true human nature. He is in fact something other than an animal. He differs from animals in that he combines, at one and the same time, nature and history, while inheritance and tradition play a large part in determining his characteristics. This qualitative difference between man and animals is underscored by other forms of the 'all-embracing' which characterize the living nature of man.

Man as pure consciousness. This term denotes man with the unique possibility of moving beyond his consciousness as an individual living creature and focusing that consciousness on the nature of being as such, which is made the subject of critical perception and enjoys general validity. This consciousness is the 'locus of valid thinking' (1947, p. 67) of which only man is capable. Understanding refers to objective existence and grasps this objective world through its categories. This general consciousness is necessarily specific to each particular living being in which it must exist.

Man as intellect. This is man with the ability to 'generate ideas' which create order among the confusing profusion of disparate knowledge that can be extended at will, which highlight the relationship between individual factors and whose aim is to establish unity among the diversity of phenomena. Intellectual understanding is more than mere logical thinking. The mind is understood as the force of understanding which seeks to perfect the totality of its interiority and to shape the world as a whole. This mind is objectively perceptible through science, poetry, art, the legal order and moral life. The mind needs the intellect which is rooted in the living being, but the intellect is not everything.

Man as existence. This is man in the irreplaceable historicity of his unique origin, in his unconditional resolve to become himself. Existence is the sign that being, pure consciousness and the mind cannot be understood on their own and do not have their own reason, that man is not confined to immanence but remains essentially dependent on the transcendental. However, existence is impossible without being, pure consciousness and the mind. These are essential conditions if existence is to come into its own and become reality. 'It is embodied in being, made clear by the pure consciousness and its content is revealed in the mind' (1947, p. 134).

Like these three other manifestations of the 'all-embracing', existence too cannot be understood on its own but is rooted in the transcendental world. Man as a form of existence experiences his own freedom as a gift of the transcendental on which he remains dependent. This representation of man as an 'all-embracing' being is only made possible by reason, which Jaspers understands as the 'bond between all the modes of the "all-embracing"'. The purpose of reason is to bring together all these different aspects of the 'all-embracing'. It penetrates beyond each individual facet to the essential unity of this 'all-embracing'. It seeks unity in the one which is all. It reveals the relations between the modes of the 'all-embracing' as a network which Jaspers summarizes in the following words:

Our all-embracing nature is no mere juxtaposition. We are being, pure consciousness and the mind and we are all three things which have, as it were, *coalesced*. We are existence and reason and these two categories are *related* like opposite poles. We are existence and being at one and the same time, but in such a way that existence is not immediately the same as being; it *is manifested* in being, through the separation between existence and being, and is not one with being, but becomes one by assimilating that being [1947, p. 131].

In a different formulation: 'Existing man is not merely a vital being, an abstract rational being nor yet a perfectible intellectual; he is all these things, but in all this he remains himself' (p. 648).

Education, as an aid to becoming a total human being, takes place by allowing for the existence of the whole man. But just as man by his very nature escapes any clear definition and specific moments, basic forces, abilities and dimensions of his being are isolated but still belong together in any consideration of him, so the concept of education also forms part of a wider structure. The changing ways by which man is observed each form a particular concept of education which emphasizes just one feature of the reality of education and highlights a partial circumstance. Those aspects which are isolated in reflection in reality form part of a whole. Education as a reality is always something more than we can perceive with our conceptual structures and links, more than we can empirically ascertain or determine by speculative thought. Education which is directed at the indivisible human being is conceptually articulated into different modes when it concerns man as a being, man as pure consciousness, man as intellect and man as possible existence. Particular items of knowledge must be brought together within a conceptual unity. Education has the supreme task of helping man to achieve his selfness. The other aims of education must necessarily be integrated into that task within their own limits. Setting out from this highest goal, the indispensable nature of the individual 'phases' becomes apparent in their own relative right and according to their own limited laws.

If man is understood as being, education appears to consist of concern for, and protection of, growing life which is to be developed, enhanced and brought to maturity. Education seeks to consolidate physical strength and mental health. It enhances vital energy through competition, encourages the individual to attain ever-higher levels of performance, arouses pleasure in aesthetics and secures the frame for natural enjoyment of life. It takes care of weak and endangered life, tends and

cures illness. But education is not confined to the preservation, enhancement and safeguarding of vitality as such. Education is more than mere biological upbringing.

Since man as a being always lives with other beings, education involves a process of integration into the forms and structures, groups and institutions of society. Individuality is enhanced through this integration into the social structure. Education imparts familiarity with forms of social intercourse, with morals and customs, with rules and laws. It associates the ability to adapt with the courage to resist. Education seeks to safeguard the individual citizen in his profession and in politics, but it is not confined to imparting familiarity with forms of public behaviour, to the acquisition of professional expertise and to the generation of an understanding of politics. Education extends beyond integration into society.

If man is understood as pure consciousness, education means leading him on to clear perceptions, imparting usable knowledge, training in vital thinking and disciplining him to take part in an orderly dialogue with others. It puts across modes of thought which help to gain a conceptual mastery of the world in its manifold manifestations. It seeks restrained speech, clear reasoned thinking, accurate judgements and acute conclusions. Education facilitates critical thinking, using methods skilfully and reliably to guide objective action. It sharpens the ability to distinguish and creates a potential for objectivity which does not preclude personal involvement. However, education is more than the creation of an ability to behave rationally.

In appealing to man's mind, education guides him on to assimilate the products and values created, preserved and handed down by the human spirit. It imparts new life to tradition, represents contents and brings them up to date. It frees man from relegation to mere being and understanding, which lacks a binding ethic, and enables him to take part in the all-embracing spiritual life which safeguards his existence and can be guided and understood through ideas. It fights for understanding and endeavours to reveal hidden meanings through a clear realization that the individual himself must be made aware of the reality of the spirit in order to safeguard dignity and beauty. It is confined to making the sources accessible and smoothing the path to individual apprehension of original contents.

Education of this kind overcomes the constrictions of pure consciousness and leads on to a broad, open horizon. It teaches us to see the particular as part of a relative whole; it encourages us to look incessantly beyond all the component parts to find the underlying oneness. It seeks to make man at home in the cosmos of the spirit which constantly looks for new perfection in an elegant form. Education in this area means instruction in a spiritual life which appropriates tradition to create a veritable culture that observes with understanding, remains open to everything and expresses itself in its own creation and forms. But once again education is not confined to the position of man in the spiritual world, since man and the world around him do not combine to form a harmonious 'work of art'.

A comparative study of the different views of education defined so far reveals that education can, in the first instance, be interpreted in clear and compact terms, showing how it can be specifically planned and organized, but how, in the last resort, it is directly confronted with an immovable boundary placed on all me-

thodical action. Here we learn that the growing individual must enjoy freedom and that the favour of the moment is needed for the 'spark to leap across the contacts' and for education to prove successful. This discovery acquires still sharper contours if we take man seriously as a possible form of existence, since existence cannot be posited as a given circumstance or as the result of a particular form of behaviour.

If man is taken seriously as a possible form of existence, education is perceived as the path to an unmistakable and irreplaceable selfness which is achieved in dedication to the object, in unprejudiced dealings with other men, in a freely established bond with the transcendental. The very essence of existence prevents that existence from being embarked upon directly and turned into a purpose. Education as an aid to becoming oneself takes the form of an indispensable companion on the road; it comes into its own in indirect communication in which the partner is called upon and encouraged to take his own decisions in a spirit of freedom and responsibility. Education as a pointer to selfness is directly bound up with the educator who dares anew to become himself, to be himself and to remain himself, despite all the levelling tendencies and all the compulsions inherent in the system. The educator takes the decision to communicate by which he remains linked to the person who is being educated, even when conflicts occur between them. He arouses a sense of responsibility by assuming his own responsibility. He shows the courage to achieve and assert true freedom by boldly accepting his own freedom which does not fall prey to the temptation of arbitrary action. This reciprocity is experienced and granted in a dedication to the person who is being educated.

Evidently all forms of direct intervention and total plans have no place here. Excessive emphasis on an attempt to make the individual 'operational' runs aground on the non-availability of existence which is experienced as being in the nature of a gift. Education does not bring the individual to existence, but is only able to create and safeguard the conditions necessary for its attainment. One such condition may be the strengthening of the young person in his original desire to acquire knowledge which experiences the meaning of the failure of human cognition and becomes conscious of the need to become himself through the perception of the antinomic structure of the world and goes on to make infinite endeavours to achieve this goal.

Education to achieve existence can mean only one thing: not hiding the possibilities of becoming oneself, not missing the path towards existence, not overlooking the need to achieve man's highest goal by falling victim to cleverness and fitness. It remains impossible to predict whether and to what extent man will gain mastery of himself in his selfness. The encounter with the transcendental and the meaningful communication with a partner cannot be brought about by force; they remain a gift. Education of this kind cannot be methodically arranged, psychologically based and secured by plans. Education which is seen as reaching its perfection in the attainment of an existence based on responsible action must be perceived in reality as a gift, as a favour despite all the earnest endeavours that may be made on its behalf.

Every different approach tends to throw light on one aspect of education and

places the emphasis on one particular trend which, taken in isolation, distorts the concept of education as such. All the different approaches are intimately bound up with each other. One task involves another, and no 'phase' can represent the whole; each 'form' extends beyond itself and requires the complement of the next phases to attain its own completion. The next 'phases', in turn, remain dependent on those that have gone before and without which they could not exist. The fact that each facet of education acquires particular importance at certain stages of growth and maturity is confirmed by personal observation. It remains of the essence to make sure that individual endeavours do not miss this orientation towards existence. All attempts at an interpretation conceal dissatisfaction which demands fulfilment and attains that fulfilment by making existence possible. It is only in existence which creates oneness that education attains its highest goal.

These observations tend to point to the system of open co-ordinates within which the statements on education find their appropriate place in the overall body of Jaspers' work. Here their deepest meaning is fulfilled. Here the specific possibilities are revealed. Here the frontiers are highlighted. However, there can once again be no overall system, but only an orderly discussion of perspectives. The different aspects do not fuse together to give a total image. Each total image in turn is no more than a concept based on a particular viewpoint. This healthy insight allows us to step out boldly and tranquilly on the endless path of unconstrained questioning, thinking and action.

The concept of the 'all-embracing' is absolutely indispensable if the unlimited breadth and rich differentiation of education are to be focused on something individual, and propagated and exercised, to use a convenient formula, as a patent solution. But only harm can be done if education seeks to be nothing other than mere survival training, a conceptual adjustment to our contemporary society, a conditioning modification of behaviour, an intellectual fitness training programme, an ideological indoctrination, an unparticipating reproduction of tradition or the staking of a religious claim in the young person. The temptation of one-sided theories can and must be resisted if the notion of the 'all-embracing' is to govern the theory and practice of education. This remains a task which can never be completed.

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GASPAR MELCHOR DE JOVELLANOS

(1744–1811)

Angeles Galino Carrillo

Jovellanos and his time¹

A substantial part of Jovellanos' writings consist of judgements, criticisms and legal opinions solicited by the Supreme Council of Castile. Jovellanos, a jurist and magistrate by profession, was well versed in both civil and canon law. His many-sided personality favoured an enlightened monarchy, admired the French Constitution of the Year II (1794), and sought constant contact with innovative legal thinking in England, Italy and France.

However, Jovellanos' reputation as a man of letters is based on his many outstanding contributions to Spanish language and literature. This magistrate wrote some of the finest poetry of his century. His multi-faceted personality allowed him to cultivate a variety of writing styles. Some of Jovellanos' most prominent works are lyric poetry and satire. Yet, it is his literary work, published under the pseudonym 'Jovino', with its elegant and natural prose style that sealed his place in the history of Spanish literature. It was Jovellanos' broad interests coupled with his facility for language that allowed him to transcend genre.

A political reformer, Jovellanos was closely linked with some of the principal movers behind the reforms carried out under Carlos III. He belonged to the Encyclopedist circle of Pablo de Olavide, promoter of the first modern university reform in Spain. He was a member of the Royal Council of Military Orders, a State Councillor, and Minister of Grace and Justice under Carlos IV. During the War of Independence (1808–13) he sat on the Supreme Central Junta and was declared *Padre de la Patria* (Father of the Country) by the Cortes of Cádiz.

Jovellanos was a leader. He did not simply support but enthusiastically promoted progress. A keen student of economics, founder and active member of the Madrid Economic Society of Friends of the Country, and corresponding member of many other economic societies, he was an active promoter of trade, mining and improved communication routes. One of his main works, the *Informe sobre el expediente de la Ley Agraria* [Report on the Agrarian Law File], dealt with the political problems of land tenure. In it he supported the agrarian reforms that the

nation needed and presented an independent and informed opinion on the economic doctrines of the century.

Drawing on his knowledge of history, geography and art, Jovellanos was a wide-ranging writer, and his interest in the customs and mores of human groups made him a forerunner of various branches of science that were not developed until much later.

Jovellanos the educator

Jovellanos made education one of his main concerns. His broad interests always focused ultimately on the crucial question of training. His works on education span three decades of his life (1781–1809), and include the first systematic treatise on the subject. Any history of education has to recognize Jovellanos' position as typifying the educational approach of the Enlightenment whose key players were society-oriented. Jovellanos' reflections on education start with the human being as a member of society. His societal approach gradually broadens to take in personal values and ultimately his pedagogy equally attends to both sides of the individual/society partnership.

His *Diario* [Journal] for 1796 conveys the intensity of a man in his fifties who, having taken stock of what he has done in his life and of what he still wishes to do, takes the future into his hands and makes his decision. Jovellanos writes: 'I am resolved to write a little work on public instruction for which I have prepared some notes and observations.'²

Research on Jovellanos in a variety of fields has opened up different paths of access to his work. As specialized studies, they are absolutely irreplaceable. We now turn to one aspect of his work which, while it does not stand on its own, seems nevertheless to hold a key both to his principal prose works and to some of his poetry: the central role of education in his ideas for reform. His concern for the economic recovery of the nation and his axiomatic belief in instruction as the basis for all social and individual progress are the driving force of Jovellanos' educational theories.

Jovellanos' ideas and his support for reform can be seen in his criticism of universities, the élitist *colegias mayores*, the judiciary, the guilds and the Inquisition. He also criticized social factors such as inherited wealth (primogeniture), the poor quality of the education provided for the aristocracy, the lack of educational provision for the general population, the pseudo-education of women, poverty made worse by political structures, contempt for manual work and the superstitious and miracle-obsessed perversions of religion.

His critique of contemporary education denounces purely speculative – or, as he says, deductive – teaching methods. He abhorred the anachronistic statutes governing educational establishments, the semi-ecclesiastic regimen of universities, the abuse of authority, unfamiliarity with sources (Biblical, humanistic, legal, medical), ignorance and undervaluation of modern sciences, neglect of living languages and the lack of up-to-date training for the working class and technical guilds (Escolano Benito, 1988).

Given the impossibility of carrying out the vast reforms he considered necessary, Jovellanos opted to improve old teaching establishments wherever he could. But he was more interested in creating new facilities corresponding more closely to his ideal.

This much can be deduced from his publications and activities at various stages in his career. When the Economic Societies of Friends of the Country were still active, Jovellanos addressed the Asturian Society on ways to promote the welfare of that region (1781), and on the need to advance study of the natural sciences (1782). In one of his addresses he recommended introducing an element of freedom into the training of craftsmen (1785). He also advocated women's membership of the Madrid Economic Society as active members enjoying full rights (1786). A significant part of his educational thinking is set out in the *Elogio de Carlos III* [In Praise of Charles III] (1788). And during his time as Minister of the Military Orders, he drew up the curriculum for the Colegio de Calatrava in Salamanca (1790). This was his main contribution to university training and a very important educational document (Caso González, 1988).

During the productive years when he was exiled from the capital to Gijón (1790–97) on the pretext of supervising mining operations, he concentrated on giving shape to the Royal Nautical and Mineralogical Institute, which he founded. Long sections of his work on agrarian law are devoted to the education of farmers, landowners and politicians (1794). Although it is said that the *Plan de educación de la nobleza* [Educational Plan for the Nobility] was not written by Jovellanos, there is no doubt that it was directly inspired by him. It was, according to recent research, produced during his brief term as Minister of Grace and Justice (1797–98). There was a second period of exile to Majorca from 1801 to 1808. During this time Jovellanos wrote the first systematic treatise on education in the Spanish Enlightenment without referring to or quoting from his previous works. These two periods of exile were among the most productive periods of his life.

Educational upheavals

There is no need for a full and detailed description of the educational upheavals that took place during the final years of the eighteenth century in Spain, but it is necessary to consider some of the more significant features of the educational context in which Jovellanos lived and worked.

At the beginning of Jovellanos' professional career, a series of reforms were promoted by the ministers of Carlos III. Their clearly subjective conviction that they were involved in the most auspicious turning-point in the history of Spain was reflected in the following package of reforms: the expulsion of the Jesuits from colleges and seminaries, and related legal provisions (1767 and ensuing years); the entrusting of the reform of the University of Seville to Olivares, who made some changes to its curriculum (Aguilar Piñal, 1969), and who also explained how far to extend the reform in the other universities; the series of royal decrees reforming the universities of Salamanca and Alcalá (1769); the creation of university directors, through whom the universities would be made accountable to the Council of Cas-

tile (1769); and the reform of the *colegios mayores* promoted by the *manteístas* in power, in the face of opposition from the *colegiales* who had until then had the upper hand in the civil and ecclesiastic administration (1771-77).³

The obstacles placed in the way of these measures, and which successfully thwarted them, left Jovellanos with a lasting conviction that necessary changes in the studies, methods and organization of teaching would fail if left to the respective corporations and professions. He had no faith in contemporary university education, which he saw as a decadent bastion of the traditional university. Several passages of his works reflect the sadness and frustration accompanying his conclusion that effective renewal would have to come 'from above'.

In the 1760s, when the proponents of the Enlightenment set about reforming education at the level then called 'first letters', reforms were also undertaken at other levels. For instance, awarding a teacher's diploma became the exclusive right of the Council of Castile (1771). Teachers' affairs, previously administered by the Brotherhood of San Casiano, were assigned to the Academic College of First Letters (1780) and later to the Royal Academy of Primary Education (1791), which instituted the first Chair of Education (1797). This period also saw the institution of the 'normal schools', so called because they were expected to serve as a norm for all the others. These schools were modelled after the Parisian 'École Normale' opened by decree of the Revolutionary Convention on 20 January 1795. This was the first appearance of the educational term 'normal' in the context of teacher training in Spain.

A marked feature of the Spanish Enlightenment was its bid to regenerate a country which, after a period of revival, was threatening to sink back into lethargy because there was little support in society at large. The educated class linked with the administration was not sufficiently influential. Its members formed circles of friends or came together to promote specific projects (Viñao Frago, 1982) and can be legitimately described as an intelligentsia. Except for a few years under Carlos III, there was an unbridgeable chasm between their ideas and political life.

Such was the ideological and political context in which Jovellanos developed his ideas on education.

Jovellanos' educational theory

EDUCABILITY

It is never idle to ask questions about the nature of man. Every approach to education is based on an underlying image of man. Human beings' attempts to define themselves and the meaning of their lives provide Jovellanos with three bases for his educational anthropology.

Man is at birth an incomplete being requiring various forms of assistance and particularly communication with other human beings.⁴ Educability is the essential distinguishing feature of human beings, and reason the basis for all instructive communication.⁵ Moral responsibility is peculiar to the human species; the ethical requirement of freedom calls for the constant improvement of the individual receiving education, 'an education for virtue'.⁶

THE ECONOMY

Jovellanos broaches relations between the economy and instruction by confessing to his own change of outlook. He ponders the skills required for the exercise of jurisprudence, his own initial training, and concludes that the most useful subject for legislators is civil and political economics,⁷ 'a science that can be said to be of this century'.

Whatever might be the source of a nation's wealth, be it agriculture, trade and shipping, industry or its population, Jovellanos regarded all as equally important. All these activities are linked by a highly complex network of direct and indirect actions and reactions. This means that all sources of wealth must be encouraged at the same time. Neglect of any one will have a prejudicial effect on the rest.⁸

We must then discover whether there is a prime factor capable of opening paths to national prosperity. For Jovellanos the answer is education. The relationship between labour and wealth is not a simple one. Much depends on how labour is applied to the various fields of production. Nor is there a direct relationship between wealth and population; wealth results from the skill and sophistication with which a given situation is handled, the attitude towards the processes involved, and the quality of the end product.

The first task is to promote information, the flow of ideas, the learning of new technologies and to study new methods that are being devised. 'The chief source of public prosperity should be sought in instruction.'⁹

Curricula must include 'useful sciences'. The question of useful sciences, decisive for curriculum design, is raised by Jovellanos in other contexts, including that of agrarian law.¹⁰ The usefulness of knowledge depends on the framework in which it is applied. When Jovellanos advocates the teaching of 'useful sciences', he is thinking of those that meet human needs. Need is the key to interest. What was required in this period was a complete change in the approach to curricular planning that would introduce the knowledge and skills likely to enhance national prosperity. At the same time, teachers and educators needed to make instruction correspond more closely to interest. These were the two pivotal points in one chapter of the 'enlightened' reforms proposed by Jovellanos.

The exact sciences and the natural sciences are for Jovellanos 'useful sciences'. The former enhance knowledge of the economy itself and of machines and instruments in general, while the latter provide the key to the study and practice of farming and mining, as well as to the many subordinate branches of the 'grand art of agriculture'.¹¹

The *Informe sobre la Ley Agraria* [Report on the Agrarian Law] proposes the creation of establishments teaching 'useful subjects'; in this context, those of use in agriculture. They were to be provided in all cities and towns of consequence, 'those with a numerous and well-to-do propertied class'.¹²

The methods of such education raise a by-no-means trivial matter: they involve bringing down the barrier between those who study and those who work; between theory and practice; between research and action. There is no mistaking which way Jovellanos leans, given that he describes the defects of Spanish culture

as a taste for subtlety in reasoning, the belittling of practical skills and the identification of traditional thinking with one's own, and of anything new with the perilously alien. 'Is there no way of bringing scholars closer to the artists [artisans], and sciences themselves to their prime and most worthy object?'¹³

The role of the intellectual – too inclined to generalize abstract knowledge without checking on its application – must consist, first of all, in investigating useful truths and placing them within the reach of the illiterate, and, equally urgently, in discarding the routines and prejudices that so hamper the progress of the 'necessary arts'. 'Technical primers' were to be prepared which would describe, clearly and simply, the best ways of preparing the land.¹⁴

THE FUNDING OF EDUCATION

In his *Report on the Agrarian Law* Jovellanos recommends that the funds needed to provide free education should come from 'tithes levied by prelates, income accumulated by chapter houses, and other ecclesiastical benefits'.¹⁵

Institutes teaching useful subjects would be financed from three sources: since they were assumed to be in the public interest they could legitimately be endowed by the councils of the respective localities, teachers being paid out of contributions paid by pupils and the government providing and maintaining buildings, instruments, machinery, libraries and other necessary items.¹⁶

THE QUESTION OF VIRTUE

Morality was the central question in the ethics of the Enlightenment. For Jovellanos virtue and courage were the keys to social prosperity. Education is important here, too, as a means of inculcating these qualities. In general, ignorance is the root of all the evils that corrupt society. And moral ignorance is the worst kind of ignorance, since it represents a defect not of understanding but of the heart.¹⁷

Jovellanos clearly sees the subtle relationship between instruction and virtue. To begin with, he examines the origin or prime source of morality. This was an exercise conducted by Plato and Aristotle and, among the moderns, by David Hume and Adam Smith, since it was viewed as an indispensable part of moral philosophy. Jovellanos considered it essential to moral education.

The time he spends presenting and commenting on the opinions of the various philosophers on the foundations of morality, which he identifies from the outset as the crux of the debate, is not wasted: the concept of nature is a vague one, since it stands for a 'universal and complex' idea;¹⁸ human reason is neither the norm nor does it precede it, though it may discern it and determine conduct; the quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain would be acceptable if identified with the desire for good and the rejection of real evil. Nor does Jovellanos accept interest as the foundation of morality; on this plane interest is of secondary importance, being more a psycho-pedagogical factor. He agrees with those who equate happiness with the exercise of virtue but differs with those, like Cicero, one of the authors he read most extensively, who do not manage to ascertain its true origin.¹⁹

The fundamental tension between the individual and society, which increased throughout the century, is of the greatest interest to our author, who makes his profound ethical and political convictions the essential basis of any education. He is in less than full agreement with the contemporary tendency to 'invent' the individual in the abstract, because 'whatever the poets or pseudo-philosophers may say, history and experience never present man otherwise than as forming part of some more or less imperfect association'.²⁰ He accepts them in good part, however, making a distinction between the rights of 'natural man' and those of 'man in society'. He accepts natural obligations and rights, affirming at the same time that they are modified by the social nature of man. This is a qualification that he regards as essential. But this modifying principle must at least have as its aim the preservation and enhancement of those rights and obligations which, by nature, precede social rights and obligations. The more the modifications introduced by this principle of association strengthen the rights belonging by nature to man and the less they diminish them, the better they will be. He concludes with an open recognition that any political society must tend constantly towards such perfection.²¹ This passage expresses a tight cluster of views that set Jovellanos apart as a man of the Enlightenment bent on reform and, of course, an anti-revolutionary.

The great mistake that undermines moral education is that of recognizing rights with neither law nor norm to support them, or rather of recognizing the law without recognizing its legitimizer. These 'opinions' concern the subjects of any education in which they are implicated, and the educator has to take them into account.

Jovellanos for his part is explicit. The prime source of morality lies in the Author of all things. This affirmation is made long before the *Tratado teórico-práctico de enseñanza* [Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Education]: it is extensively developed in the *Introducción al estudio de la economía civil* [Introduction to the Study of the Civic Economy]. The moral norm has to have 'a transcendental origin, to be essentially good and a uniformly active constant force'. The natural duties or obligations that concern man as an individual and the civic obligations of man in society can be extrapolated from this basis.

Moral instruction is necessary, even if moral law is considered to be natural to man and its precepts develop naturally as he develops. It is more necessary for those who desire their morality to be based on reflections and deductions of abstract principles. There is also a 'morality of the heart' in some persons who might not, therefore, require instruction. But even in these cases education would serve to cultivate and improve it.

The general population, who lack any other source of moral grounding, will be in yet greater need of instruction in this area.

A theoretical definition of education

The educational philosophy of Jovellanos is presented systematically in one of his later works, the *Tratado teórico-práctico de enseñanza* [Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Education]. In his many previous works, he had adopted positions on education that were both precise and daring. He had expressed views on literary,

legal, theological, scientific, technical and civic training. An author of such consistency – despite all that is said about the ‘two faces of Jovellanos’ – would not, in the work of his solitary and imprisoned maturity, disorient his readers with a sudden change of direction. What he could do would be to present a well-argued philosophy of education, an intellectual overview made possible only as a result of detailed and comprehensive observation.

He anchors his enterprise on two already familiar axioms that constitute his firmest convictions in this field: ‘education is not only the first but also the most general source of the prosperity of peoples’,²² and ‘the prime root of evil is ignorance’.²³ He devoted his life to demonstrating the truth of those assertions, placing in their service, by his own admission, ‘prolonged meditation’ and an undeniable zeal for the public good.

The relationship between instruction and education is clearly set down in the *Tratado*: instruction is the universal medium of education and virtue the chief purpose of education. This is the conclusion of very lengthy prior discussion and, in our view, it forms the basis of the educational theory of Jovellanos.

This ‘prolonged meditation’ was partly devoted to clarifying the relationship between instruction and morality. Jovellanos had already supported the challenge raised some time before by Rousseau: ‘It will be said that education corrupts, and it is true.’ The objection is too important not to be lingered over. Jovellanos qualifies his attitude. He makes distinctions regarding the quality of instruction, recognizing the existence of a knowledge which embraces corruption, he explains ‘no greater evil can befall men or states’.²⁴ It is not the first time that he notes the existence of perverse education, although he prefers to call it delirium rather than instruction. He sometimes describes moral evil as error.

When the question is put thus, what is under discussion is nothing less than the significance of education, the terms of the question being to determine whether or not education can be the prime source of beneficial instruction.

The answer is not immediate. It is reached by indirect though convergent paths. In the course of the study of sciences that he includes in the *Tratado*, he promises ‘to describe the relationship that each [science] has with the major objects of human reason’,²⁵ and to explain how partial knowledge contributes to human advancement through the exercise of reason. The direct answer is unfolded in the chapter on ethics.

How can instruction contribute to character formation? Jovellanos is not oblivious to the problems stemming from the intrinsic nature of the relationship between the cognitive capacities of the subject and a person’s behaviour. It is a classic question that occupied him on various occasions, and only in the *Tratado* did he reach a conclusion.

In the *Introducción a la economía política* [Introduction to Political Economics] he made the following assertions: man can be materially improved by instruction; instruction improves his ability to reason and to feel and even his will, which ‘with instruction will not be less free but more enlightened’.²⁶

Of one thing he is certain and says so, both in the *Economía civil* [Civil Economics] and in the *Tratado*: ignorance will never be an antidote to knowledge that

does not improve man. He takes the opposite approach: to confront the culture of corruption with well-founded knowledge.²⁷

In the *Tratado*, Jovellanos consistently makes the exercise of reason the basis for all aspects of the educational function. He lays emphasis on the need to guide the young, 'to rectify the heart', and to direct young people in the exercise 'of their feelings and emotions'. Will 'has to be prepared' to comply with the norm, so that it may know and feel that 'in such compliance lies its contentment'.²⁸ This study is conducive to the exercise of virtue.

This 'teaching', he admits, is more a matter of doing than of reasoning, having more to do with practice than with preaching, because 'it should not be forgotten that moral truths are the truths of the heart'.²⁹

Between instruction that opens the doors of science and art, and the purpose of education, which is to make citizens useful and good, there has to be instruction concerned with the shaping of virtue. It is this distinctive *savoir faire*, which has much in common with art and, in a way, comes under the heading of wisdom, that Jovellanos identifies as the domain of education.

For our author, education is the pivot that has to turn instruction towards virtue. At the time of the Enlightenment, it was of the essence that education should guide the universal spreading of knowledge towards the twin challenges of the age: virtue and the wealth of nations.

Happiness as the spur to and goal of education

One key factor in the philosophy of Jovellanos has yet to be mentioned, and that is happiness. Although introduced for the first time at the end of the *Tratado*, its influence is present throughout the entire process. It forms part of a sequence of ideas that subtends the whole work: instruction-education-virtue-happiness. The logical order of exposition in no way implies a chronological succession, since the factors mentioned are all interlinked, both with respect to the pupil and as regards the aims of the agents of his or her education.

The educational approach is to persuade the young that virtue is the road to happiness,³⁰ always on the understanding that rational desires are the fountain-head of virtue.

The anthropological approach is based on the three following affirmations: Men and women aspire to happiness under the impulse of an inherent inclination in human beings.

Happiness lies in a feeling lodged in the innermost reaches of consciousness. It is independent of fortune. External goods help to increase it only when employed virtuously.

Man's natural aspiration for good leads him to the supreme good that is God. Jovellanos thus comes to what he regards as the centre of any moral doctrine, which in turn sets the bearings for education. The educational approach must assist the reason and the heart of the young to enable them to discover that 'the supreme good coincides with the ultimate purpose of man, and the object of virtue, with that of happiness'.³¹

Features of education as viewed by Jovellanos

PUBLIC EDUCATION

General education, as conceived by Jovellanos, must be public, universal, civic, humanistic and aesthetic. He insists that public education is the prime source of national prosperity. This leads to the statement that if education is for all citizens its subject-matter is automatically determined: it must equip the subjects of the state, whatever their class and occupation, to attain personal happiness and contribute in the greatest possible measure to the nation's welfare and prosperity.³² Its purpose will be to improve the physical, intellectual and moral faculties. As to the means of carrying it out, they are the same for both private and public education. The former is not the object of direct government action, but in the *Bases para un Plan General de Instrucción Pública* [Foundations for a General System of Public Instruction] its improvement is seen as dependent on public education.

Education and the corresponding instruction are public inasmuch as they are established and regulated by the civil authorities.³³ The underlying concept of the *Bases* represents an important step in the secularization of education, a milestone on the way from the education policy of the enlightened despot to a liberal policy, which was actually to be promulgated by the constituent assembly of Cádiz.

UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

The universalization of education becomes a recurrent theme with Jovellanos. The universal provision of primary education, which was known in his day as 'first letters', was the chief obligation of the state. It was the due of all citizens. There must be no individual, however poor and helpless, not able to have access to such instruction free of charge. Nor should there be any village, however remote, without a school.³⁴

School education, which the author wishes to be an obligation for government and citizens alike, comprises 'the first letters and the first truths'. These are an initiation into the 'methodical sciences', a term applied by Jovellanos to knowledge that provides an introduction to methods of investigating the truth and receiving instruction. Although he does not develop this point, he felt that the methods of teaching reading and writing needed reviewing. 'First letters' must include, in addition to learning to read and write, a grounding in the basics of natural, civic and moral doctrine, arithmetic and drawing.³⁵ This is the education due to all citizens.

CIVIC EDUCATION

Jovellanos was the first to use the term 'civic education' in Spanish. This discipline is always necessary for all members of society concerning their rights and obligations *vis-à-vis* that society, but Jovellanos lays great emphasis on it in view of the crisis of the old order and his clear awareness of the contemporary political crisis.

This discipline, which offers an introduction to the various obligations of the

citizen, will focus primarily on the origin of all civic virtues, which Jovellanos calls *amor público*,³⁶ or concern for the common good. On it depends civil unity; it governs the rights and duties of the citizen and obtains from individual interest the sacrifices demanded by the common interest. It makes the welfare and prosperity of all a factor in the happiness of each. Civic education has a distinct content that must form part of primary education or popular education. Jovellanos picks out one aspect in particular: the duty of every citizen to secure instruction; no instruction, 'however lofty and sublime', can make up for a lack of knowledge of the civic sciences.³⁷

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

When the founder of the Royal Nautical and Mineralogical Institute presented his objectives, they fell within the compass of a somewhat narrow utilitarianism. He did not suffer from a lack of inspiration, the reading of Locke and Condillac having been almost daily fare for him. The switch towards the humanities was dictated – on the basis of his own firm humanistic upbringing – by the same educational reality. Comparison of the *Discurso inaugural* [Opening Speech] with another delivered three years later throws crucial light on the process of his educational thinking.³⁸

In the first *Discurso*, the cultivation of mathematics and natural science is a clearly stated goal, highlighted particularly towards the end of the speech. Prosperity and wealth would result from the utilitarian slant of the new education he proposes. The second *Discurso*, while maintaining the primacy of the studies for which the institute was founded, developed the idea of the need to introduce literary subjects into the curriculum of future technicians. He had no hesitation in contrasting the humanist with the mere scientist. The latter he claimed to be 'abstract in principles, inflexible in his maxims, importunately obscure in his conversation'. On the other hand, the man of letters is seen as 'affectionate, tender, sympathetic in his feelings. . . . Who better will understand, oblige and reconcile his fellow men?'³⁹

Jovellanos painted an excessively pessimistic picture of the study of science and the human qualities it brings forth. He was two centuries ahead of his time in anticipating the human impact of narrow technological specialization and the supremacy of economism in educational processes. However, anyone taking the entire work of our author into account will find in it an educational humanism rising above these and other antinomies, because for him education must in the last analysis serve the human being.

AESTHETIC EDUCATION

Imagination occupies a special, one might say decisive, place in education for Jovellanos. To be able to understand the language of the fine arts and letters, which is the ideal of a harmonious personality, it is essential to cultivate the imagination. Good taste can be inculcated through education, and this is an explicit opinion of Jovellanos. The process that makes it possible to commune with and derive pleas-

ure from artistic creations is refreshed in contact with those who, owing to their human qualities and gifts of expression, have rightly been called 'masters of humanity'. Education should be the place where contact with artistic achievements of the highest quality opens up 'a new universe full of marvels and enchantment'.⁴⁰

In the history of Spanish education the educational worth of humanistic training has perhaps never been argued as urgently as by Jovellanos.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION

Efforts to provide artisans with more effective education and more up-to-date technical training in some occupations were a feature of the Enlightenment and the period immediately preceding it (Escolano Benito, 1988). The policy of Campomanes represents an important chapter in this movement combining the interests of labour and education. Although he was sometimes at odds with the prevailing ideology, Jovellanos contributed actively through the Economic Societies of Friends of the Country and with various practical activities and publications.

The Royal Nautical and Mineralogical Institute founded by Jovellanos at Gijón (1794)⁴¹ was an exemplary achievement. The institute, openly realist in inspiration, rose above narrowly utilitarian objectives to give attention to general aspects of the education of young pupils, who came to it upon completion of their primary education.⁴²

The curriculum comprised four core subjects: the exact sciences; natural sciences (physics and chemistry); drawing (industrial and technical); and modern languages. The library was well stocked from the outset, with a large contingent of foreign works, mainly on mathematics, physics and chemistry.

The institute may be regarded as the forerunner of the technical colleges that later developed outside the universities. Owing to its orientation towards industrial applications and to inductive methods of learning, it came to be regarded as a sort of anti-university in the contemporary educational scene. The serious difficulties that beset its founder and the vicissitudes of the War of Independence meant that the institute had a short life.

EDUCATION FOR WOMEN

Even education for girls was given fresh impetus by the *Reglamento para el establecimiento de escuelas gratuitas* [Regulations for the Establishment of Non-fee-paying Schools].

Women, with their social function and decisive presence in cultural life, feature in a number of other passages of the works with which we are concerned. The last passage is from the *Bases*. Taking refuge in Seville while the nation was at war, Jovellanos recognized once again the importance of the education of 'this precious half of the nation'. He points out the influence of women both on the domestic education of the young and on their literary, moral and civic education. Women have the potential to contribute to peace among peoples and to more humane social relations.

The Central Junta was to give much thought to ways of mustering the necessary resources in order to establish non-fee-paying general schools for women in the population at large throughout the kingdom.⁴³ Although Jovellanos was not an innovator with regard to the academic content of women's education, he did innovate with regard to the universalization of popular education, 'without distinction as to sex'.⁴⁴

The cultivated woman has in Jovellanos a resolute protector. In the matter of whether or not women should be admitted to the Madrid Economic Society, he clearly defines his stand: they should be admitted subject to the same formalities and with the same rights as other individuals; they should not form a separate class, and the agreement should be adopted by means of a formal statement.⁴⁵

Other aspects of educational thinking in Jovellanos are to be found in Caso González (1988) and in Galino Carrillo (1953).

A critical consciousness

Jovellanos' views were criticized during his time and are still controversial today. He formulated the basis for a secular Christian education in accordance with and relevant to the historical circumstances in which he lived. At the same time, and without contradiction, he tried to establish education on a rational basis. These undertakings were extremely significant. Cosmopolitan and international by choice, culture and character, he is the best exponent of conflicting attitudes and ideas in Spain during this turning-point in history. He gives a lucid account of the personal and ideological drama of one attracted by the ideas of the Enlightenment while aware of new liberal influences, although this awareness was partial rather than total. The same was true of the Cortes of Cádiz, which disregarded his *Bases para un Plan General de Instrucción Pública*. In other respects – as we have seen – Jovellanos set the pattern for the development of education in Spain over the next two centuries.

Notes

1. Original title by the author: 'Jovellanos, an Educator of the Spanish Enlightenment'.
2. 31 December 1796. See: G. M. de Jovellanos, *Diarios* [Journals] 1790–1801 (ed. by Julio Somoza), Oviedo, Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, 1953–55.
3. The term '*manteístas*' comes from *manteo*, the cloak worn by poor students who supported the reforms, as opposed to the *colegiales* who enjoyed the benefit of scholarships and other privileges.
4. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Memoria sobre educación pública o tratado teórico práctico de enseñanza [Memorandum on Public Education or Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Teaching]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas* [Published and Unpublished Works] (edited by Cándido Nocedal), Vol. 46, p. 232, Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 1858.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 252 et seq.

7. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Elogio de Carlos III', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit. (edited by Miguel Artola), Vol. 87, pp. 7 et seq., 1956.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
10. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Informe sobre la Ley Agraria [Report on the Agrarian Law]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit. (edited by Cándido Nocedal), Vol. 50, p. 122, 1858.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-6.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
17. Jovellanos, 'Memoria . . .', op. cit., p. 251.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
22. Jovellanos, 'Elogio de Carlos III', op. cit., p. 10.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
24. Jovellanos, 'Memoria . . .', op. cit., p. 232.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
26. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Discurso sobre el Estudio de la Economía Civil [Speech Concerning the Study of the Civil Economy]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit. (edited by Miguel Artola), Vol. 87, p. 17.
27. Jovellanos, 'Memoria . . .', op. cit., p. 232.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
33. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Bases para un Plan General de Instrucción Pública [The Foundations of a General System of Public Instruction]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit., Vol. 46, p. 268.
34. Jovellanos, 'Informe sobre la Ley Agraria', op. cit., p. 125.
35. Jovellanos, 'Memoria . . .', op. cit., pp. 241-3.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
38. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Discurso Inaugural del Real Instituto de Náutica y Mineralogía [Opening Speech at the Royal Nautical and Mineralogical Institute]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit., Vol. 46, pp. 318-24.
39. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Discurso sobre la necesidad de unir el estudio de la literatura al de ciencias naturales [Speech on the Necessity of Uniting the Study of Literature and the Natural Sciences]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, Vol. 46, op. cit., pp. 330-4.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
41. Jovellanos, 'Discurso Inaugural . . .', op. cit., pp. 318-24.
42. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Ordenanza para la Escuela de matemáticas, física, química, mineralogía y náutica de Gijón [Decree on the School of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Mineralogy and Marine at Gijón]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit., Vol. 50, pp. 399-420.

43. Jovellanos, 'Bases para un Plan General . . .', op. cit., p. 274.
44. Jovellanos, 'Memoria . . .', op. cit., p. 242.
45. G. M. de Jovellanos, 'Memoria sobre si se deben admitir las señoras en la Sociedad Económica Matritense [Memorandum on Whether Women Should Be Admitted to the Madrid Economic Society]', *Obras publicadas e inéditas*, op. cit., Vol. 50, p. 56.

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MARC-ANTOINE JULLIEN ('JULLIEN DE PARIS')

(1775-1848)

Jacqueline Gautherin

From loss of faith in politics to a mystical faith in education?

If ever there was a man whose life story illuminated his work in the field of education, it was Marc-Antoine Jullien.¹ His voluminous correspondence gives a fascinating insight into his character, his keen interests, the trials and doubts he experienced, and the concessions or even compromises he made. His life embodies a collective destiny that transcends it and gives it meaning.

Marc-Antoine Jullien (known as 'Jullien de Paris') was born in 1775 into an educated middle-class family. He was first brought up in the country by his mother according to 'the principles of strict Rousseauism', then in Paris by his father, Marc-Antoine Jullien Senior (Jullien de la Drôme), who was an associate of such people as Mably, Turgot and Condorcet and who became Deputy for the Drôme during the Convention.

While Marc-Antoine Junior was a pupil at the Collège de Navarre, his worldview was shaped by a mingling of the various intellectual currents of the Enlightenment – philosophies firmly convinced of human perfectibility, the inner voice of conscience and the demands of reason, the Encyclopedists' faith in uninterrupted progress and in the virtues of science, and a political philosophy nourished by the ideas of Rousseau, Mably, Condorcet and the study of the authors of antiquity. This mixture of new ideas and classical instruction at the Collège provided him at an early age with models for the interpretation of his social experience and models for action:

Public education caused the seeds of all the republican ideas to germinate within the monarchy. Our schools became little states in which neither rank nor wealth conferred superiority, in which independence and equality were the highest good and in which the pupils, transported constantly towards an imaginary homeland, as outsiders in their own land, studied the eloquence of Demosthenes and Cicero or the love of freedom of Thrasylulus and Brutus.²

In these years just before the French Revolution, Jullien developed, together with a

sense of 'the general interest' and of a meritocratic justice, a deep aversion to the system of absolute monarchy. On the evening of 14 July 1789, he was to be found distributing to passers-by sheets of paper on which he had written: 'It is not enough to have toppled the Bastille, we must topple the Throne!' He was then 14 years old. In the summer of 1791, when he took the Jacobins' oath, 'Live free or die', he was 16. The following year he came out publicly on the side of Robespierre: 'The interest, the salvation of the people, that must be the first and only basis for the decisions of the people's representatives'.³ In 1793, as commissioner to the armed forces, in the Pyrenees, officially delegated by the Committee of Public Safety, he was given virtually discretionary powers in various towns of France by Robespierre. In 1794, he was appointed Secretary of the Comité d'Instruction Publique, which was responsible for drawing up plans for 'public instruction' or 'national education' but, as he was sent to Bordeaux by Robespierre, he took no part in this work, though he was certainly kept informed about it.

Arrested after the ninth of Thermidor, Jullien was imprisoned for fifteen months. He spent this time rethinking his political ideas: although he continued to denounce the division of society into 'classes of citizens' (which explains the sympathy with which he later regarded Pestalozzi's institute, where the children of the poor as well as of the rich were taught), he realized that it was becoming urgent to save the Republic by uniting all republicans and putting a stop to the Revolution, 'an unending struggle, a battle to the death between patricians and plebeians, between the rich and the poor'. It was necessary to do what the revolutionaries had failed to do: to forge an alliance with the people and 'improve the lot of the poor, but by means that are reasonable and feasible'.⁴ The nature of the means for changing society and the actual extent of those changes needed to be reconsidered. In publishing Saint-Just's education plan in *L'Orateur plébéien* [The Plebeian Speaker], Jullien showed where his new interests lay: the education of 'the new man' was emerging as the key to social change.

With accusing fingers pointing at him from all sides, despairing both for his own political future and that of the Revolution, Jullien in 1796 obtained from Bonaparte a post in the Army of Italy. However, after falling out of favour and being rehabilitated several times, he was finally relegated to the supply services for having, among other things, protested against the outlawing of the surviving adherents of Jacobinism and the doctrines of Babeuf.

From 1801 to 1819, he devoted all his energy to matters of education, writing several works on the subject, including his *Essai général d'éducation physique, morale et intellectuelle* [General Essay on Physical, Moral and Intellectual Education] published in 1808.⁵ In 1810 he was given leave to study Pestalozzi's institute at Yverdon. It was a revelation to him: he settled down with his wife and children to spend three months there and returned for several further stays in 1811 and 1812; he took abundant notes and conducted a regular correspondence with Pestalozzi, to whom he entrusted the education of his children.

It was at this time that the idea of a 'science of education' came to him. After two years in prison and another stay at the institute, he turned his attention to spreading the ideas of Pestalozzi and Fellenberg in France and published in the

Journal d'éducation [Educational Journal], which he had helped to found, a series of 'letters' on the educational methods of Pestalozzi and, in 1817, the work on comparative education that made him famous.⁶ Between 1817 and 1818, however, weary of the feuding within the institute and powerless to prevent a bankruptcy that he had tried in vain to avert by setting up a governing board for financial matters, Jullien broke with Pestalozzi, who for his part suspected him of betrayal. His publications on education were reduced to a few articles in the *Revue encyclopédique* [Encyclopedic Review], which he founded in 1819. From then on he turned his attention to the development of the sciences.

As a result of these sidesteps and shifts of interest, his *œuvre* creates a curious impression. It is understandable that, once the ardour of the revolutionary years had worn off, Jullien should have been tempted to shy away from politics, but why did he put so much energy into his 'science of education' scheme and especially into the study and dissemination of Pestalozzi's methods? The answer becomes clearer when we look into the development of his political views and personal commitments. Throughout his life, the guiding principle of his political philosophy was the general interest and that of his revolutionary activity was denunciation of the private interests of the rich and the patricians. Such reference to a political principle demands that one should, as Rousseau remarked, 'consult one's reason before listening to one's inclinations'. Jullien, consulting his inclinations before listening to the voice of his reason, turned reason into a kind of mystique of the people on the march, a mystical conception of the Revolution. As a Jacobin, he had placed all his trust in the general will and in the mythologized forces – the people, the nation, Robespierre the Incorruptible – that were supposed to express it, but soon realized that the voice of the people was in danger of being obfuscated, by an 'idol' in the person of Robespierre,⁷ and that the will of the people was neither as clear nor as unwavering as he had thought. In his writings, the category of the 'general interest' was gradually emptied of its psychological content and of any personal commitment, thus becoming an abstraction; it lost its power to denounce injustices and served to legitimize the 'benefits of the social order', including the Napoleonic order.

De jure equality and the formal freedoms were all that remained in this worldview of political disenchantment. Jullien now moved towards a pragmatic conception of social change, seeking in the rationalization of education the greatest possible effectiveness and the means of perfecting the individual and hence society:

In the long run, education alone is capable of exercising a decisive and radical influence on the regeneration of man, the improvement of societies, true civilization and the prosperity of states. Each generation, if entrusted to teachers worthy of their mission, should be the more perfect continuation of the generation it replaces. Thus would the human race advance with firm and confident step along the broad avenue of progress where the body social, wisely and strongly constituted, would no longer be a prey to the grievous upheavals, periodic crises and fearful disasters that all too often lead to backsliding.⁸

Thus, the spell of politics was broken and Jullien came, for a while, to a mystical faith in education.

The 'science' of education: between empiricism and formalism

Marc-Antoine Jullien was the first person in France to attempt to construct a 'science of education' along the lines of the 'positive' sciences. The use of this term, borrowed from Destutt de Tracy,⁹ marks a change, from 1812 onwards, in his ideas of education. His earlier texts spoke of the 'science whose purpose is to develop and perfect the physical, moral and intellectual faculties of man' or of the 'science of happiness and virtue'. The word 'science' was at that point taken in its etymological sense, the idea that education could be the subject of rational (i.e. essentially philosophical) inquiry having been firmly established since the Enlightenment. His *Essai général d'éducation* of 1808 fits completely into this framework, putting itself forward as a theory of human nature applied to the indeterminate field of educational practices, whence a plan for physical, intellectual and moral education may be deduced. On the other hand, the *Esprit de la méthode d'éducation de Pestalozzi* [Essence of Pestalozzi's Educational Method] (1812) explicitly maps out plans for a 'science of education' understood as a 'positive science'.

Jullien's meeting with Pestalozzi and his contact with the new educational practice thus resulted in an attempt to construct a rational framework for the day-to-day realities of education which was further developed, five years later, in his *Esquisse et vues préliminaires d'un ouvrage sur l'éducation comparée* [Outline and Preliminary Views of a Work on Comparative Education] (1817). To the best of my knowledge, these two works constitute the first attempt to separate an empirical field of observation into its constituent parts, to devise techniques of inquiry and to use formal models of analysis. Their attempt to explain how schools function is something so original as to deserve a closer look.

AT YVERDON

The Yverdon institute was one of those exceptional schools that, precisely because of their ambivalent status, have never failed to attract the interest of educationists. It was the indissoluble combination of an empirical reality and an ideal made flesh, at once a school for boys and girls and a training college for teachers, which both set the standard of education and came up to it, a version of Rabelais' Abbey of Thélème that avoided being utopian by having a real existence in time and place. In the Pestalozzi school, Jullien believed he saw the realization of his hopes: an education respectful of the free development of individuals, and a promise of 'regeneration' for human beings. But instead of being satisfied with the sort of cursory glance that long sufficed as a credo for so many educationists ('We have seen the ideal school and it works'), he decided to take this renowned 'method' seriously and to examine it from close quarters.

Like an 'accomplished spy', as Niederer remarked, he amassed thirty-three exercise books of notes, miscellaneous information, observations and conversations with Pestalozzi, Niederer and other teachers.¹⁰ The *Esprit de la méthode* has usually been interpreted by commentators as an account, distorted to a greater or

lesser extent by Niederer and by Jullien himself, of the educational ideas and achievements of Pestalozzi; but the difference between what we know about the way the institute actually functioned and the way it is depicted in this work is in fact much more revealing of Jullien's own *esprit de la méthode*. In order to set up schools in France and bring in the new methods of teaching and education, Jullien had not only to give a precise description of the 'method' but also to demonstrate its exemplary nature, to dissociate the particular experiments carried out at Yverdon from that singular figure who presided over it, and to give a rational explanation of these practices so as to win over their detractors and disseminate them widely.¹¹

In a foreword to his study, Jullien drew upon the 'intimate analogy' between the military art and the art of teaching. In his view, 'the science of administration' could provide models or 'general principles' useful to the 'science of education', since 'the positive and practical ideas relating to method and analysis are an essential part of the knowledge needed by a good administrator'. At the same time, the two 'spheres' of administration and education offer similarities since the former deals with 'assemblages of human beings considered in turn as individuals and in the mass' while the latter concerns 'a number of children brought together to form a family and a miniature society'. But how is this miniature society to be described and analysed?

Jullien describes it first of all, as Pestalozzi himself had done, in terms of the household, placing emphasis on the close, affectionate and trusting relationships between the members of this 'big family', on their integration into their milieu, on the study of the natural environment and on the pleasures of togetherness. He writes:

The method in itself requires all relations between the teacher and his pupils to be tender and affectionate, like those between a mother and her children. . . . It is only after long consideration, and after lengthy observation of this institute, that I dare to propose it as being the least imperfect outline so far put into effect of a practical plan for education that, by the way it is organized and directs the inner life of the pupils, is such as to combine and produce the loving affections, gentle virtues and innocent pleasures of family and home life, as well as the masculine, powerful and energetic virtues of public life.¹²

In so doing, he tones down considerably the most striking feature of the Yverdon community: attachment to the one and only, irreplaceable Father – Pestalozzi himself – and he says nothing about the means by which this Father tried to unite his 'children', more than by fatherly love or even by religion: unifying love, revealed truth, faith in nature and faith in the divinity incarnate in the heart of man. However, he also describes the 'home' in another way, as an organization that isolates and systematically combines components such as pupils, teachers, 'branches of knowledge', and the means and goals of education. He sets out to show in detail how, in each 'sphere' of education, each action of the teacher is adjusted to each 'faculty' of the children. The *Esprit de la méthode* thus implies a dual concept of social relationships: on the one hand, a line of thought concerned with the interactions between individuals and taking the family as its model, that is, an interpretation of the experiential world still close to its endogenous sense; and, on the other,

a line of thought focused on mechanisms and on action through contact, based on a physico-technical model. This double projection of the original close-knit community, on to the domestic community and on to the actual organization, enabled him to draw a rational picture of the institute's daily life and sketch a model that could be transposed to other places and applied under the authority of other teachers.

In his efforts to explain Pestalozzian practices, Jullien proceeded to a systematic categorization of the 'real subjects of observation'.¹³ He began by 'listing all the things [he] wanted to discuss with the various people connected with the institute so as to get to know all its aspects'; he worked out a corresponding order for these discussions but did not start his inquiries – he states – until 'after having lived as it were in the family of the institute, as one of its members'.¹⁴ The book itself, rather discursive in form, clearly follows two opposite approaches. The first approach moves from the realm of the empirical to a higher plane of generalization: 'the active life' provides 'real subjects of observation and useful meditation', and the institute is taken as a spontaneous experiential given, as an entity with the opaqueness, complexity and obviousness of the real, a place where people live, act, walk about and learn. Jullien paid meticulous attention to all the details of daily life, sometimes describing what he saw like a disciple of Rousseau – the Rousseau of the *Rêveries* rather than of *Emile*:

Happy age! Happy sex! Considered in this haven! Life is gentle and pure; all the sentiments are brought together and merged in the family spirit. There is no hint of or desire for other sources of happiness than the simple, straightforward pleasures that nature itself and the school's organization provide for the young pupils who develop, grow in strength and in knowledge, and profit fully from everything their life may offer. Such is the effect produced on the observer by the institute for girls.¹⁵

These sympathetic observations are then considered from 'five general standpoints' which reflect the manner in which the institute is organized, namely, as an establishment for 'education', 'girls', 'teacher training', 'experimental work' and 'special industrial training'. But Jullien also follows a quite different approach to the arrangement of his material, which moves back down from a deductive outline of conceptions to empirical observations. At times he lists what he regards as the major principles of Pestalozzi's method, such as the free and harmonious development of the faculties, natural aptitudes and individuality of each pupil, the fundamental importance of intuition, or the gradations between, and linkage of, all aspects of education. At other times, calling upon a 'knowledge of human nature', he considers education from the respective standpoints of the physical, intellectual and moral faculties. To this extent, his science of education is anti-empirical. To be more precise, it is a kind of analytical formalism: the principles and general theory of human nature draw attention to certain 'objects' and organize them into 'series of objects', while a formal system is used to decompose the modes of instruction employed at the institute. One can understand why Pestalozzi criticized Jullien for not having seen the method as an organic whole or grasped its spirit: his actual experience of it was set in a framework of abstractions.

COMPARATIVE EDUCATION

The *Esquisse d'un ouvrage sur l'éducation comparée*, published in 1817, has always fascinated its readers by its wide scope and apparent modernity: its aim was nothing less than to compare educational establishments throughout Europe, to set up a 'Special Commission on Education' and an 'Educational Institute', and to found an 'Educational Newsletter'. It was thanks to Jullien that the science of education became comparative. Once again the approach was an original one. At this time several study missions were sent to foreign countries: in 1815, for example, Cuvier visited the Netherlands while Jomard and Jean-Baptiste Say visited the school of Bell and Lancaster in England; all three, like Jullien and Ampère, were members of the *Société pour l'Amélioration de l'Enseignement* and of the governing board of the *Journal d'éducation*, whose aim was to 'make known the best schools'. These studies, empirical in approach and implicitly comparative, were intended to identify aspects of the organization of education that could usefully be imported into France.

Carrying over into education his interest in the philosophy of science and the comparative method (whose heuristic role he probably discovered through his dealings with Cuvier), Jullien proposed 'to advance the science of education' by using the method successfully employed in comparative anatomy to compare schools. His ambition was

to build up, for this science, as has been done for other branches of knowledge, collections of facts and observations arranged in analytical tables so that they can be correlated and compared with a view to deducing therefrom firm principles and specific rules so that education may become virtually a positive science instead of being left to the whims of the narrow-minded, blinkered people in charge of it or diverted from the straight and narrow path by the prejudices of blind routine or by the spirit of system and innovation.¹⁶

Like the natural sciences and following their model, the science of education should establish the laws that govern the observed characteristics of education. With the comparative approach, Jullien thought that he had at last found his own method, not deductive principles of reasoning or formal rules but an instrument for the analysis of observed facts and a procedure for investigation; but he still needed a tool to draw up a 'comparative table of the main educational establishments existing in Europe', of the organization of education and teaching of the 'objects embraced by the course of studies as a whole', and of 'the methods used to form and instruct young people, the gradual improvements that have been attempted and the degree of success achieved'.¹⁷

This tool was provided by the long, standardized questionnaire of 266 questions, part of which was published in the *Journal d'éducation* in 1816 and 1817. The text was preceded by a notice giving the address to which replies could be sent. By this means, Jullien hoped to collect a great many observations which could then be compared by means of 'the common measure to be used for correlating them'; he also hoped to recruit more investigators and set up a working group to centralize and analyse the replies:

The methods and analytical tables employed in the sciences are perfectly analogous to the tools used in the mechanical arts. Their purpose is to make up for the weakness of human beings, to provide leverage, to supplement the strength we are given by nature; they tend to even out, so to speak, disparities in intelligence, raising a mediocre intelligence to a higher level, just as firearms, as it were, even out disparities in physical strength.¹⁸

His vision of a science of education was thus broader in scope than anything known up to that time and for long afterwards. But, even more important, Jullien was looking for practical benefits. It would finally be possible to judge 'which are the branches that offer improvements that can be transposed from one country to another'¹⁹ so as to remedy the 'inherent deficiencies of the systems and methods of education and instruction'.

Before extending his inquiry to the whole of Europe, Jullien suggested that a trial be carried out in Switzerland, which he saw as a microcosm that exactly mirrored the European macrocosm: 'Because of the great variety of climates, languages, religions, political organizations and governments in the twenty-two cantons of the Helvetic Confederation, an infinite variety of educational establishments and systems, reproducing every possible known form is to be found there.'²⁰ Once again, he displayed a sure sense of the specific, rendered more acute by a heightened attention to differences and variations. He expected the survey to produce quantitative and qualitative information on all aspects of schools. As the nature of the questions shows, he wanted to know about administrative arrangements in the schools, about the staff and pupils who attended them, their number, their age, their training, process of appointment, reputation and trustworthiness; about relations within and outside the school, etc.; he wanted to know about the types of instruction in use, the forms of education and the relations between public education and education in the home.

Without going into details about the questionnaire, regarded by Jullien as a first draft in need of validation, it is possible to hazard a few remarks about its preparation. Jullien stated that, in the first place, it stemmed from the 'possible divisions and subdivisions of the subject of our research, which are to serve as our basis' – that is, from a straightforward breakdown into the natural categories of the persons concerned and the nature of the establishments: 'primary and common education' (first series of 120 questions), 'secondary and classical education' (second series of 146 questions), 'higher and scientific education', 'teacher education', 'education for women' and 'legislative aspects of education and its relations with social institutions' (these four series were never published).

As was the case with his work plan for examining the Yverdon institute, however, the questionnaire was also based on certain assumptions: Jullien considered education 'from three points of view', '1: its subject, Man; 2: its goal, Happiness, 3: its instrument, Time'.²¹ The first two points of view were each subdivided into 'three elements' (body, heart, mind; health, morality, instruction) which provided the framework for the survey. The third point of view gave rise to 'three major series of questions for three kinds of public school': for Jullien making profitable use of time meant the proper management of the three periods of 'childhood, adolescence and youth, which form, so to speak, the domain of education, considered

on its three levels – elementary and primary, secondary and classical, higher and scientific – or a special level related to a specific occupation'.²² These latter series, however, were still defined in terms of natural categories, as were the next two series (types of schools existing at the time): the rational justification for this was provided by the recourse to 'periods', i.e. temporal categories.

It would thus be a mistake to distinguish too sharply between the soundly based comparativism of Jullien and the ad hoc comparativism of his contemporaries: his approach was still essentially empirical and his purpose normative. It would be just as unwise to see it as too closely related to the comparativism of the naturalists. Comparative anatomy, a science of resemblances and dissimilarities, studies variations of neophology, structure and function in living creatures; it is, as Cuvier emphasized, a 'tool' with which a secret organization and hidden functions may be brought to light: underlying the variations in form are laws of organization that may be deduced from the permanence of the functions. In Jullien's case, however, the analogy with anatomy is not entirely consistent: educational institutions and establishments are to be studied in the same way as organisms are studied, yet they are not considered as organizations. Jullien does not construct the object of study corresponding to his comparative method. The nature of the entities to be compared is in fact left vague. Are they schools or groups of schools and on what scale? Are they geographical, ethnic, political or administrative entities? Moreover, although it invokes comparative anatomy as a model, Jullien's methodological comparativism is not a form of functionalism, replacing as it does the concept of function by that of value. All educational thought doubtless tends towards the axiological; in the *Esquisse*, however, it is the criterion of value and not that of function which is used to assess and compare institutions and different modes of instruction and their effects. The criterion of value itself lacks precision. Is it the social utility of an education that stimulates the establishment of interpersonal relations and the sense of duty, the economic effectiveness of education (particularly 'special' education), the happiness made possible by a particular form of education, or of all these at once, as the content of the questionnaire would suggest?

This endeavour fizzled out; the questionnaire remained unfinished and it is not known how many replies were received nor whether they were ever processed. It was probably impossible for a single person to process so much data without proper procedures and in the absence of the scientific and administrative facilities Jullien needed. By dint of close epistemological scrutiny it would no doubt be easy to hunt out the weaknesses of the 'science of education', the immaturity of the investigation procedures and the ambiguities regarding the objects of study, but the wealth of anthropological information they contain makes the study of the Yverdon institute and the *Esquisse* important works that have been unjustly neglected.

The contradictions inherent in the 'science of education'

Why was Jullien's work not completed? Were his ideas the half-formed intuitions of a dilettante, was he discouraged by the failure of Pestalozzi's institute, or were

his plans disrupted by events? Perhaps, to judge from what we know at present it would be preferable to look for the reasons in the shaky construction of his 'science of education', which is indeed a curious piece arranged for several voices, that of the *honnête homme* confident of the progress of reason, that of the former revolutionary interested in social and political change, that of the administrator concerned with efficiency and rationality, that of the amateur scientist and that of the traveller curious to observe the minutiae of school life. This 'science of practical utility', which calls upon both the categories of ordinary experience and those of highly formal systems, is not only torn between a concern for specifics and the requirement of universality or between anthropological realities and lofty generalizations, dichotomies such as we find in the study on Pestalozzi's institute and in the *Esquisse*, but also hesitates between disparate formal schemata and cannot make up its mind between 'knowledge, will and action'.²³ These tensions, exacerbated during the Yverdon period, were never resolved.

In Jullien's earlier work, where the question of a positive science of educational facts has not yet been raised, we find him selecting and refining one of the formal schemata on which he was subsequently to base the categorization of educational phenomena and the collection of information. His plan of 1801, for the purpose of 'establishing schools of military theory and practice in various *départements*' in order to reform the state, is organized around two conceptions of education. The first still harks back to the political philosophy which underpinned Saint-Just's plan for education: each school should constitute a society in miniature, founded upon love of work, responsibility and 'principles of equity'; it should prepare its members for life in society and mould future citizens by instructing pupils in 'the rights and duties of the citizen'. The second conception of education corresponds to a logic of economic and military efficiency: each school should 'form robust soldiers and skilful and industrious men', and should be 'based on a productive industry' that provides for its subsistence. Jullien's imaginary edifice thus combined a civic model of political philosophy with a model of technical rationality. At the time, he had a political and immediately practical aim in sight, which he soon had to abandon, that of setting up schools of a new type.

Between 1806 and 1808, he fell back on scientific and technical rationality to prepare his 'general plan of education'. It was in this spirit that he arranged the courses of instruction to be given in schools: he drew up curricula in such a way as to follow, year by year, the order of development of the subjects in the history of science (beginning with mathematics, natural history and physics and finishing with the social sciences), established a hierarchy of subjects of study, from the most elementary to the most complex, and geared instruction to the development of the children.²⁴ This attention to the rational organization of education-related phenomena also marked, as we have seen, his later studies. Between 1812 and 1816, Jullien went on to expand and consolidate his project in the style of the positive sciences: not content to define the 'science of education' by analogy with comparative anatomy, he gave it a place in his taxonomy of the sciences, situating it, like Bacon, Diderot, d'Alembert and Ampère before him and long before Cournot, among the 'practical or applied sciences'.

He did not, however, limit himself to scientific and technical rationality but continued to glean from philosophy suitable ideas for giving a formal structure to his 'science of education', categorizing the phenomena to be observed and organizing his plans of investigation, just as educationists, scholars and academics were doing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. The reason why, despite the schemes for a 'science of education' that were put forward from time to time in France during this period, philosophies of education continued to have such an impact was because they were still considered to be the epitome of rationality. It was also because the distinctive feature of philosophical rationality is that it elaborates 'long chains of reasons', as Descartes put it, that have a strong ordering and generalizing power: unlike scientific chains of reasons, they are not tied to specific objects and so can easily be transposed from one field to another. Thus the philosophic mode of reasoning gave conviction, coherence, generality and the promise of universality to reflections on education.

Jullien's ways of systematizing, however, represent tentative assemblages of disparate schemata. This is obvious from a close look at his conception of education and the child, a syncretic attempt to reconcile heterogeneous elements. It is, to start with, a doctrine that sees human nature and human faculties as a trilogy of body, mind and heart (a conception, that, incidentally, shaped almost all educational thinking from the seventeenth to the beginning of the twentieth century), but it is also a doctrine, inherited from Rousseau's second *Discours*, of the perfectibility and hence educability of human nature. But what does Jullien mean by perfectibility? Depending on whether it means, as he says, 'developing' and 'fortifying' 'the physical, moral and intellectual faculties of man' or, as he also says 'moulding', 'modifying' or 'constructing' those faculties, the nature of the enterprise will differ. In the first case, the educator nurtures, supports and tends the seed with which each person is naturally endowed: the child is seen as a potential adult. In the second case, the educator transforms and shapes, even aspiring to a 'second creation of human nature':²⁵ here the child is regarded as being shapeless or misshapen until it is educated.

Even after his visits to Yverdon, Jullien continued, in both the *Esprit de la méthode* and the *Esquisse*, trying to reconcile the Rousseauist belief in the free development of natural faculties with an instrumental conception of education. It is easy to imagine the contradictory educational implications of these paradigms, which entail both actions to shape the child and an appeal to the child's reason and conscience ('negative education' as it was called at the time). It is also easy to imagine the difficulties thus created for the 'science of education'. To reconcile these opposites, Jullien had to assume the dual nature of the individual, with one part made up of innate aptitudes capable of development and another part resulting from the transforming action of educators.

One of the questions in his questionnaire, for example, asks: 'Is attention paid in teaching to these two essential factors: 1. that which appertains to the natural development and particular aptitudes of the individual; 2. that which relates to modifications that may be effected in him through the outside influences to which he is subjected?'²⁶ But simply to state as a guiding principle that 'All things are

connected' or to express the same idea as an imperative – 'Education must be a single whole' – was not enough to reunite that which opposing dogmas had put asunder. It was, moreover, this very philosophy of childhood and human nature that Pestalozzi criticized in Jullien's theorizing.

This tension between heterogeneous models was compounded by another tension, for Jullien had a higher ambition for his science than a mere 'science of education', even if it were a *scienza nova*: that of a 'science of education' reaching towards a *telos*, the endless perfecting of the individual, society and humanity. For proof of this, one need only take another look at his conception of human perfectibility, a conception that, as we know, was widely shared at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is a supremely optimistic definition of human nature, which comes down to the idea that the nature of man is not to possess a nature, that man's true nature is to be what he becomes: 'the individual, like the species, tends essentially towards perfection';²⁷ the same is true for society, since individual development and history pass through the same stages of childhood, adolescence and maturity. The goal and justification of education, science and politics was to bring the new society and the new man into being.

The 'science of education' is thus vested with its first mission, the social and political mission of planning activities by means of rigorously organized curricula, introducing elementary instruction useful for 'practical life', forming the adults of tomorrow, and contributing to the establishment of a 'good system of education', that is, a system that not only 'reforms morals' and 'roots out abuses' but also prepares individuals to respond to the requirements of economic progress and trains them for the 'destiny' to which they are called from birth. Hence, Jullien began his *Essai général d'éducation* by stating that it was addressed to 'the children of those families most influential by virtue of their wealth, esteem in which they are held, and their rank in society', because 'it is through them that civilization must begin or improve, and that enlightenment must make its appearance in the nation and spread to the other classes'.²⁸ This was his way of attenuating the contradiction between the ideal of equality and the desire to select the best.

But Jullien was not seeking to adapt each individual to his or her social destiny; he ascribed another mission to education and 'science', that of achieving human happiness. Though he subscribed to only a moderate form of eudomonism and did not regard happiness as the ultimate purpose of human life since, for him, the human soul reached out towards a 'higher goal', eternal life, his aim was nevertheless to move mountains. At the same time, he laid down the ultimate purpose of education. He was, thus re-expressing, in this mystique of education, the revolutionary spell cast on him in his younger days, but re-expressing it in a quite different form, emptied of all revolutionary content: from the *Essai général d'éducation* onwards, the social aims he assigned to education bore only a distant relation to his former aspirations to create a new man and regenerate society.

The 'science of education' thus combines in an unprecedented way the demands of a would-be-scientific, philosophical rationalization, the demands of a rational approach to educational practices (adjustment of the means used with a view to improving education), and a highly significant final goal: in short, action

called for knowledge and will. The science of education was primarily normative, and its descriptive, deductive and explanatory functions were secondary.

'A quite forgotten French educationist . . .'

The work of Marc-Antoine Jullien is so full of original ideas that it is hardly surprising its few readers should have been struck by the prophetic nature of certain selected passages, but Jullien is a curiosity among 'precursors'.

When in 1883 a course on the science of education was officially introduced at the Sorbonne, no one seems to have remembered that he was the first person in France to have attempted to construct such a 'science'. Some Third Republic educators did, however, occasionally mention his work in the course of public statements or formal events. Ferdinand Buisson, for example, did so at the inauguration of the Institut Normal Pédagogique in Paris in 1878, and again in the inaugural lecture of his course on the science of education at the Sorbonne in 1896, in which he referred to a 'quite forgotten French educationist but quoted only Jullien's assertion that 'a love of human beings is the most important condition for their education'.²⁹ The Director of the Musée Pédagogique, in an article published on the occasion of the Universal Exposition of 1889, observed that Jullien 'as early as 1817 called for the creation of a teacher-training college'.³⁰ On these very public occasions, at a time when France's defeat at Sedan was fresh in everyone's memory, the work of Jullien proved the native Frenchness of the 'science of education' and educational institutions. Indeed, this kind of piecemeal exhumation of Jullien's remains on some special occasion or in connection with some special research continues to be a feature of educational studies in France. Some have called him the heretical disciple of Pestalozzi, others the precursor of new teaching methods, and yet others the 'father of comparative education' and forebear of the IBE (which commemorated the centenary of his death in 1948 and republished in 1992 his *Esquisse d'un ouvrage sur l'éducation comparée*), while others again credit him with inventing the term 'science of education'.³¹

Despite their foundation-laying character, Jullien's works were read and commented upon by very few people. An article in the *Dictionnaire de pédagogie* [Dictionary of Education] (edited by Buisson) describes the broad outlines of a 'largely forgotten' *œuvre* and his ideas for a 'science of education', and reminds readers that some of Jullien's writings were to be found at the Musée Pédagogique.³² The appointment of Jullien's grandson, Edouard Lockroy, as Minister of Public Instruction in 1888 and 1889 probably had something to do with this rediscovery of the forgotten *œuvre*, but no one thought of examining the path he had taken more closely or of following it themselves.

He has been regarded as a precursor but always in a curious way. In most references to the person whom Canguilhem defined as 'a thinker and researcher who is said to have covered in bygone days part of the road more recently completed by someone else', the underlying intention is to recount the 'legend', but as Canguilhem also remarked in a celebrated study, 'before we join end to end two journeys along a road, we should first make sure it is the same road'.³³ Education

specialists, engrossed by the educational thinking of their own times and their efforts to legitimize it, have never taken this epistemological precaution. Pedro Rosselló's book, *Forerunners of the International Bureau of Education*, provides a remarkable example of this unjustified approach when it contrives to link the proposals and questionnaire in the *Esquisse* with the achievements of the international body established in 1925, claiming that the questions 'show how closely the IBE followed Jullien's programme of research, without having heard of it!'³⁴ The idea of a programme carried out without having been heard of is an astounding one, and the reader is in fact more likely to be impressed by Rosselló's assiduous attempt to present Jullien as having foreshadowed the IBE programme; but it has at least to be allowed that he had read Jullien.

As for the other specialists in education, they have never done more than dip into the texts in which they have claimed to discern the origins of their 'science'. As for the 'part of the road' travelled by Jullien long ago, they have explored only a few short stretches, just enough to lend plausibility to a vague idea of paternity of filiation. It is easier to accept the argument that the issues of today were already issues in the past if one refers solely to fragments taken out of their historical context. Belief in a *scientia perennis*, a belief that underlies the exhuming of 'precursors', is at odds with a desire to recount the history of a discipline, and testifies to a recurrent vision of the past that never pays any attention to the conditions under which ideas take shape. It is also just as much at odds with any claim to breaking new ground, which is why the science or sciences of education, though blithely claiming legitimacy by referring back to the mythical epoch of their 'founding father', have, paradoxically, never ceased to cultivate the idea of a new beginning: the holding up of the 'forerunner' for veneration is the epiphany not of their past but of their present.

Nevertheless, in spite of its immaturity, Jullien's science of education is a landmark, by virtue of its attempt to give order to the minor details of daily life, to reduce their complexity, and to transcend their singularity by applying, in the field of education, interpretative models, and also by virtue of its intuitive grasp of the richness and infinite complexity of the world of 'education'. Its main interest lies in this sense of a daily reality which was for so long lacking among French educationists.

Notes

1. On the life of M.-A. Jullien, see H. Goetz, *Marc-Antoine Jullien de Paris (1775-1848)*, Paris, INP, 1962; V. Daline, 'M.-A. Jullien après le 9 Thermidor [M.-A. Jullien After the ninth of Thermidor]', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* [Historical Annals of the French Revolution], April-June 1964, April-June 1965, July-September 1966; and the biographical novel by P. Gascar, *A l'ombre de Robespierre* [In the Shadow of Robespierre], Paris, Gallimard, 1979. Several foreign authors have studied his work. Apart from H. Goetz, see C. Pancera, *La diffusione del pensiero educativo di Pestalozzi in Italia (l'opera di Marc-Antoine Jullien)* [The Spread of Pestalozzi's Educational Ideas in Italy (The Work of Marc-Antoine Jullien)], Facoltà di Magistero dell'Università di Ferrara, 1977; P. Rosselló, *M.-A. Jullien de Paris: Père de la pédagogie comparée et*

- précurseur du Bureau international d'éducation [M.-A. Jullien de Paris: Father of Comparative Education and Forerunner of the International Bureau of Education], Geneva, Port Noir, 1943; *La pédagogie comparée. Un précurseur: M.-A. Jullien de Paris* [Comparative Education. A Forerunner: M.-A. Jullien de Paris], Paris, SEVPEN, n.d.; *Forerunners of the International Bureau of Education*, Chapter 2, Geneva, IBE, 1943.
2. Cited by Gascar, op. cit., p. 32.
 3. M.-A. Jullien, *Discours d'un jeune citoyen patriote sur les mesures à prendre dans les circonstances actuelles* [Speech by a Young Patriotic Citizen on the Measures to Be Taken in the Present Situation], 22 January 1792 (Year IV), in: *Pièces diverses annotées de sa main* [Various Texts Annotated by Him], Historical Library of the City of Paris.
 4. Letter of 13 Vendémiaire, Year IV (5 October 1795), cited by Daline, op. cit. (1964), p. 164.
 5. M.-A. Jullien, *Appel aux véritables amis de la patrie, de la liberté et de la paix, ou Tableau des principaux résultats de l'Administration des Consuls et des ressources actuelles de la République française* [Call to the True Friends of the Country of Liberty and Peace or Table of the Main Outcomes of the Administration of Consuls and the Present Resources of the French Republic], Paris, Léger, 1801; *Analyse succincte d'un plan général d'éducation qui n'a pas encore été imprimé, contenant un Essai ou une Méthode particulière de régler le bon emploi de tous ses instants, premier et unique moyen d'être heureux* [Concise Analysis of a General Plan of Education Not Yet Printed, Containing an Essay or a Particular Method of Regulating the Sound Use of Each Moment, the First and Only Way of Being Happy], 1806; *Essai sur une méthode qui a pour objet de bien régler l'emploi du temps, premier moyen d'être heureux: à l'usage des jeunes gens de l'âge de 15 à 16 ans: extrait d'un travail plus général, plus étendu, sur l'éducation* [Essay on a Method Designed to Regulate the Use of Time, the First Way of Being Happy: Designed for Young People Aged 15 to 16 Years: Extracted from a More General, Longer Work on Education], Paris, F. Didot, 1808; *Essai général d'éducation physique, morale et intellectuelle: suivi d'un plan d'éducation pratique pour l'enfance, l'adolescence et la jeunesse ou Recherche sur les principes et les bases de l'éducation à donner aux enfants des premières familles d'un Etat, pour accélérer la marche de la nation vers la civilisation et la prospérité* [General Essay on Physical, Moral and Intellectual Education: Followed by a Plan of Practical Education for Childhood, Adolescence and Youth or Research on the Principles and Foundations of Education Intended for Children of the Leading Families in the State to Accelerate the Nation's Progress towards Civilization and Prosperity], Paris, F. Didot, 1808; *Esprit de l'Institut d'éducation d'Yverdon [sic], en Suisse, organisé et dirigé par M. Pestalozzi* [Essence of the Educational Institute at Yverdon in Switzerland, Organized and Directed by Mr Pestalozzi], Milan, Imprimerie Royale, 1812; *Esprit de la méthode d'éducation de M. Pestalozzi, suivie et pratiquée dans l'Institut d'Yverdon [sic] en Suisse* [Essence of Mr Pestalozzi's Educational Method, as Applied and Practised in the Yverdon Institute in Switzerland], Milan, Imprimerie Royale, 1812, 2 vols., republished in 1842.
 6. M.-A. Jullien, 'Lettres de M.-A. Jullien sur la Méthode d'éducation de M. Pestalozzi' [Letters by M.-A. Jullien on Mr Pestalozzi's Educational Method], in *Journal d'éducation*, Paris, L. Colas, June 1816, October 1816, July 1817; *Précis sur les Instituts d'éducation de M. de Fallenberg, établis à Hofwil, auprès de Berne* [Summary of the Educational Institutes of Mr de Fallenberg, Established at Hofwil, near Bern], Paris, L. Colas, 1817; *Esquisse et vues préliminaires d'un ouvrage sur l'éducation comparée entrepris d'abord pour les vingt-deux cantons de la Suisse et pour quelques parties de*

- l'Allemagne et de l'Italie, et qui doit comprendre successivement, d'après le même plan, tous les états d'Europe; et séries de questions sur l'éducation destinées à fournir les matériaux de tables comparatives d'observations, à l'usage des hommes qui, voulant se rendre compte de la situation actuelle de l'éducation et de l'instruction publique dans les différents pays d'Europe, seront disposés à concourir au travail d'ensemble dont on expose ici le plan et le but* [Outline and Preliminary Views for a Work on Comparative Education Initially Undertaken for the Twenty-two Swiss Cantons and for Some Parts of Germany and Italy, that Can Be Subsequently Carried Out in the Same Way for All European States; and a Series of Questions on Education Intended to Provide Material for Comparative Observation Tables for the Use of People Who, Desirous of Understanding the Present Situation of Education and Public Instruction in Different European Countries, Are Willing to Contribute to a Joint Work, the Plan and Objective of Which Are Presented Here], Paris, L. Colas, 1817.
7. M.-A. Jullien, *Membre de la Commission exécutive de l'Instruction publique, à ses Frères et Amis de la Société populaire de La Rochelle* [M.-A. Jullien, Member of the Executive Commission on Public Instruction to his Brothers and Friends of the People's Society of La Rochelle], Historical Library of the City of Paris, 15 Thermidor, Year II.
 8. Cited by Goetz, op. cit., p. 159.
 9. See Nanine Charbonnel, *Pour une critique de la raison éducative* [A Critique of Educational Logic], Bern, Peter Lang, 1988.
 10. Unfortunately we have found no trace of these materials in the French and Swiss archives and libraries.
 11. J. Gautherin, 'Désingularisation d'une expérience éducative: une traduction (trahison?) de l'expérience pestalozzienne' [Desingularization of an Educational Experience: a Translation (Betrayal?) of Pestalozzi's Experience], in D. Hameline, J. Helmchen and J. Oelkers (eds.), *L'Education nouvelle et les enjeux de son histoire* [New Education and the Significance of Its History], Bern, Peter Lang, 1994.
 12. Jullien, *L'Esprit* . . . , op. cit., pp. 127, 131.
 13. Ibid., p. xiii.
 14. Ibid., p. 10.
 15. Ibid., pp. 324-5.
 16. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
 17. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
 18. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
 19. Ibid., p. 9.
 20. Ibid., p. 15.
 21. Ibid., pp. 20-1.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Ibid., p. 6.
 24. Jullien, *Analyse succincte* . . . , op. cit. This text foreshadows the *Essai sur l'emploi du temps* [Essay on the Use of Time] and the *Essai général* of 1808.
 25. Jullien, cited by Goetz, op. cit., p. 160.
 26. Jullien, *Esquisse* . . . , op. cit., p. 51.
 27. Jullien, *Essai sur l'emploi du temps*, op. cit., p. 158.
 28. Jullien, *Essai général d'éducation*, op. cit., pp. 26, 28.
 29. F. Buisson, 'Leçon d'ouverture' [Opening Lesson], *Revue pédagogique*, No. 12, December 1896, p. 584.
 30. A. Beurier, 'Le Musée pédagogique et la Bibliothèque centrale de l'enseignement primaire' [The Educational Museum and the Central Library of Primary Education],

in Ministère de l'Instruction Publique (ed.), *Recueil des monographies pédagogiques publiées à l'occasion de l'Exposition universelle de 1889* [Collection of Educational Monographs Published at the Time of the Universal Exposition of 1889], p. 8.

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32. F. Buisson, *Dictionnaire de pédagogie et d'instruction primaire* [Dictionary of Education and Primary Teaching], Vol. 1, pp. 918-20, Paris, Hachette, 1911.
33. G. Canguilhem, *Études d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences* [Studies of the History and Philosophy of Science], 3rd ed., p. 21, Paris, Vrin, 1975.
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ISAAC LEON KANDEL

(1881-1965)

Erwin Pollack

Isaac Leon Kandel was a leading comparative and international educator for many years. Born in Romania of English parents, he received his early education in Manchester, United Kingdom, along with his Bachelor's and Master's degrees, and his teaching certificate. His revered teacher at the University of Manchester, Sir Michael Sadler, influenced Kandel to go to the United States to study for his Ph.D. degree at Teachers College, Columbia University.

In 1908 Kandel arrived in the United States to study comparative and international education at Teachers College. In 1910, after only two years of study, Kandel received his Ph.D degree. His dissertation, *The Training of Elementary School Teachers in Germany*, was based on scholarly research and his first-hand observations of teacher-training schools in Germany. It was published as a book by Teachers College Press in 1910.

Paradoxically, Kandel saw little to recommend in the practices of German teacher training to educators from the United States. Yet he made it clear with his organized and detailed study that he thought Germany was doing a creditable job in training its elementary-school teachers.

He was able to see the unique strengths which grew out of a nation's historical background and its socio-political and cultural underpinnings. Instead of viewing one nation's education system as superior to another's, he saw each nation as one which uniquely forged its own way. The weaknesses that Kandel often mentioned in a nation's education system were those which were influenced by that nation's political system. This meant the influence exerted by totalitarianism of the left (communism), or of the right (fascism or Nazism).

Kandel tried to be objective, but he often wrote that it was acceptable for any nation to have the type of education systems of democratic nations. This perhaps helps explain the paradox mentioned above. On one hand, he could see the real strengths in the totalitarian German education system of teacher training, but on the other hand, he would not recommend such a system to democratic Americans.

Kandel was a leading proponent of the school of thought in comparative education known as historical-functionalism. The basic idea of this school is that edu-

cation systems do not operate in a vacuum. They are intertwined inextricably with other social and political institutions and very often can best be comprehended by examining the historical, cultural, political, social and economic environments and contexts.

According to Kandel, a comparative educator who truly wants to understand various nations' school systems must not be content with only gathering important factual information pertaining to those systems. The comparativist has to dig deeply to investigate the causes that have produced major problems in education systems worldwide.

Armed with the view that education is not an autonomous enterprise, the comparativist who determines which causes generated these major problems in the first place then must determine which solutions are attempted by each nation, and why these particular solutions were selected.

Buttressing this was Kandel's lifelong use of Sadler's dictum: 'The comparative approach demands first an appreciation of the intangible, impalpable, spiritual and cultural forces which underlie any education system: the factors and forces outside the school matter even more than what goes on inside.'¹ For Kandel, 'Comparative education may be considered a continuation of the study of the history of education into the present'.²

Historical-functionalism

Among the theoretical and methodological ideas in comparative education which offered helpful guidelines for considerable research in the 1960s and well into the 1970s, Kandel's historical-functionalism was perhaps the most widespread.

Kandel's theory of comparative analysis required the researcher to have a working knowledge of two or more foreign languages and a respectable knowledge of political theory and practice, anthropology, economics, sociology and geography. Important as it was to be well grounded in educational theory and practice, it was even more relevant to have a vast storehouse of academic knowledge in preparation for the study of comparative and international education.

The researcher who studied education systems in isolation, without searching for the deeper contexts in the social, political and cultural domains, would not be able to make a meaningful contribution, even if his study highlighted his own country.

Kandel was also one of those early-twentieth-century comparativists who developed the concept of studying a nation's education system in order to understand the society's general make-up. Emphasizing a comprehensive, linguistic, academic and educational approach to the study of comparative education, he believed that learning about a nation's educational thought and practices was a pathway to comprehending its social dynamics. Added to this was the ability to understand the possibilities for change and improvement. Kandel believed the capable researcher could learn how institutions developed and also determine the status of current major ideas which were being embraced globally. Kandel did not support the long-standing practice in comparative education of focusing on the education

system of a particular nation in isolation. Instead, he believed that it was crucial to write about a nation's education system and use it as the unit of comparison between nations. He added to this by advocating the adoption of a process of discovering a nation's political and religious ideology, as well as its values, attitudes and mores. All of this would be unfolded through the study of the nation's school system. These important learnings led to the idea of the uniqueness of each nation's school system.

Kandel relied heavily on qualitative rather than statistical studies in his comparative work. His examination of a nation's education system, political framework, history, sociology and philosophy showed how such extra school forces and factors could lead to either innovation in education or to extreme reliance on traditional practices.

Contemporary comparative educators could find Kandel's ideas on educational borrowing useful. He was able to see the virtues of a particular nation's educational practices and still be reluctant to advocate borrowing from that nation if the cultural and socio-political gulf separating nations was too wide. This was a major contribution to comparative and international education at the time.

As early as 1924 he was saying that one country's solutions cannot be entirely incorporated into the system of another country. He called for the borrower nation to adapt these solutions, fitting them into its own socio-political, cultural and economic framework.

He pointed out that there are many educational improvements which have come about because of successful adaptation of one nation's practices into another nation's education system. He believed that educational failures also occurred when those responsible for education did not study and learn how successful practices in one country could have been adapted to their own country.

Kandel believed that significant progress in the world could be made by an exchange of educational experiences between nations. He had faith in this process just as he did with the exchange of scientific and intellectual experiences which had contributed to mankind's betterment. He wrote, 'Educational systems cannot be transferred from one country to another, but ideas, practice, devices, developed under one set of conditions, can always prove suggestive even where conditions are somewhat different.'³

Kandel's viewpoint of comparative and international education was melioristic. Living through two world wars with their unspeakable horrors heaped upon humanity, he still believed in the doctrine that the world will become a better place and that men and women have the power to assist in its betterment. He demonstrated his meliorism through a lifetime commitment to the improvement of education in the world.

Kandel's research and writings for more than five decades made it possible for educators to learn more about other lands and peoples, other educational theories and practices. His works were frequently translated into other languages. He brought education and educators on to the centre stage in many parts of the world with his emphasis on better ways of educating people and a greater need for public participation.

He was not an armchair educational theorist who issued empty shibboleths on matters pertaining to worldwide education. He travelled, he observed, he wrote profusely, and he spoke eloquently and carefully about different educational topics in many lands. He viewed the improvement of education as being the panacea for mankind. The spirit of his lifelong mission to improve education and civilization can be felt when reflecting upon his voluminous writings in comparative and international education.

Kandel married Jessie Sarah Davis in Manchester, United Kingdom, on 27 July 1915, and he became a United States citizen in 1920. Residing in Westport, Connecticut, the Kandels had two children, Helen Raphael and Alan Davis. In 1987 Helen donated her father's personal papers to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in Stanford, California.

A leading figure in comparative education

Kandel showed an interest in comparative and international education very early in his career. In the summer of 1907 he travelled to Germany to study with the world famous Herbartian educator Wilhelm Rein at the University of Jena.

Kandel was appointed instructor at Columbia University Teachers College in 1913. In 1915 he was appointed associate professor, and he became a full professor in 1923. He was associated with Teachers College for almost four decades, becoming an emeritus professor in 1947.

At the start of his career, Kandel met the United States Commissioner of the Bureau of Education who authorized him to write several monographs on European countries' school systems, especially France, Germany and the United Kingdom. These works, published between 1913 and 1919, were known officially as bulletins. This early work of Kandel helped him begin to establish a reputation as one of the world's foremost authorities on the education systems of these countries.

As a research specialist for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching from 1914 to 1923, Kandel wrote works on such diverse topics as vocational education, teachers' pensions and examination systems. In 1918 he assisted Paul Monroe with a study commissioned by President Woodrow Wilson. The study consisted of translations, to be used by the United States Government, of laws and administrative regulations from foreign schools.

He was a visiting professor at several major universities, including Yale, Johns Hopkins and the University of California, from 1919 to 1940. He also taught at the University of Mexico in 1927. In the early 1930s, Kandel delivered important lectures at the University of London, Harvard and elsewhere. His London and Harvard lectures were published as books entitled respectively *The Outlook in Education* and *The Dilemma of Democracy*. Kandel saw that democracy was weakened considerably when the culture within the particular democratic nation, especially the United States, gave free reign to individualism without teaching people to develop a sense of responsibility. This was a recurring theme in his work.

Kandel's most influential work was in comparative and international education, and he was the leading figure in the field for many years. From 1924 to 1944

he was the editor of the *Education Yearbook* whose focus was on education throughout the world. The publication of the yearbook was sponsored by Columbia University's prestigious International Institute.

His book *Essays in Comparative Education*, published in 1930, was a compilation of articles and addresses he wrote and delivered in the 1920s. It focused on educational problems in Italy, Mexico and several Latin American nations, along with France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

In the 1930s he wrote on his educational work in New Zealand and Australia. In 1933, his landmark work entitled *Comparative Education* was published. This became the bible in the field for many years to come. 'The fact that it has been translated into Spanish, Chinese and Arabic speaks of the universality of its content.'⁴ He revised this work in 1955, renaming it *The New Era in Education: A Comparative Study*.

Kandel was a member of the United States Education Mission to Japan. The mission concerned itself with the post-war reorganization of the Japanese school system, and it issued a report to the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur. While Kandel was lauded for his contribution to the work of the mission, it is a little known fact that he was none too pleased with some aspects of its work. Kandel's criticism relates to the small number of members who were experienced with foreign education systems, causing him to remark, 'Hence the imposition on Japan of the American system of education.'⁵

During the Second World War, the Government of Jamaica invited Kandel to chair a committee which was to survey and help upgrade secondary education in that island country. Kandel was the only citizen of the United States to serve on the committee. The document that Kandel and his committee wrote soon came to be known simply as 'The Kandel Report on Education'.

Throughout his lifetime, Kandel travelled to many countries to study school systems, and he wrote and lectured extensively on what he observed. After his retirement from Columbia University in 1946 he remained productive for years to come. In 1947 he was the first Simon Research Fellow at the University of Manchester. He edited the British journal *Universities Quarterly* from 1947 to 1949, and from 1948 to 1950 he was appointed professor of American Studies and Chairman of the new department at the University of Manchester.

He edited the well-known weekly education journal *School and Society* from 1946 to 1953. He continued writing scholarly articles and books. He became a consultant to UNESCO, and wrote extensively for the Organization. He also served as a consultant to the United Nations. Throughout his long life he advocated world peace and international co-operation.

Kandel's friend, the late William Brickman, himself a noted historian of education as well as a comparative educator, wrote about Kandel's editing and his proficiency in ten foreign languages:

As editor, he was responsible for selecting contributors, planning topics, and other duties customary to the office of directing a periodical publication. In addition he translated contributors' articles from the German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and Norwegian, and he was linguistically prepared to translate from at least four more tongues.⁶

Influences

Kandel was influenced greatly by the British educator Sir Michael Sadler (1861–1943). Sadler was a world famous authority on secondary education and a supporter of the British public school system. Knighted in 1919, Sadler was also an expert in comparative education.

Kandel mentioned Sadler frequently in his writings on comparative education. He learned to look at comparative education through the wide-angled theoretical lens of Sadler's political sociology. Sadler believed that in order effectively to understand education systems, one must realize that studying the societal influences on education was more important than merely studying particular systems in isolation.

Another person who had an important influence on Kandel's thinking was Paul B. Monroe (1869–1947). Monroe was a distinguished American educator. He was director of the School of Education at Teachers College from 1915 to 1923 and director of Columbia's Institute of Education from 1923 to 1928.

Kandel studied with and worked for Monroe on several long-term projects as assistant editor of Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*, and as editor of the Institute of Education's *Education Yearbook*. From Monroe, Kandel learned the importance of studying the history of education, especially as it applied to the developing field of comparative education.

A third person who had a significant influence on the work of Kandel was the noted educator and colleague of Kandel at Columbia University, William Chandler Bagley (1874–1946). Bagley was a leading spokesman for the Essentialist Movement in education. Kandel embraced many of Bagley's ideas: he argued for Bagley's criticisms of progressive education, his emphasis on enhancing civilization through teaching the young their cultural heritage, and his ideas on the importance of the teacher in the process and system of education. Along with Bagley, whenever Kandel sought to improve education, he considered the teacher and his role to be of central importance.

Among Kandel's prolific writings several stand out as major works. In *The Training of Elementary School Teachers in Germany*, Kandel wrote of the evolution of German teachers into a class of professionals. The struggle of elementary teachers was a battle against obscurantism and clerical domination. The 'normal' schools responsible for teacher training were more victimized by tradition than were other institutions, which accounted for the rigidity of German education.

Comparative Education was a study of educational changes and progress in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the USSR, from the end of First World War to the early 1930s. This work included more than mere descriptions of foreign school systems from an educational viewpoint, as was typically the case in earlier comparative-education textbooks. The plan of the book included differences in national environments, and it made comparisons on the basis of general trends and principles. It also conceptualized educational problems of each represented nation, a matter vitally important for the study of comparative education.

In his 1935 book, *The Making of Nazis*, Kandel warned of the dangers of Hitler with his racist platform, and his emphasis on warfare, subjugation and bestiality. The book was an account of how Hitler and his followers gained complete control of the German apparatus of education, formal and informal, so as to mould German youth in ways which would ensure the goals of National Socialism.

In 1955, Kandel produced a follow-up study to his 1933 *Comparative Education*. It was entitled *The New Era in Education: A Comparative Study*. Using the same countries and comparing them, he wrote:

The crisis through which the world has passed since then . . . as well as the challenge to the ideas of democracy from Communist ideology, have intensified the recognition of the important part to be played by education for the fullest development of the individual and the greatest welfare of the nation. But the forces that determine the character of education in any nation have a significance that is of greater importance than the details of its organization and practice.⁷

Kandel thought that international education was not the same as comparative education. The former dealt with the development of particular intellectual and emotional attitudes towards other countries as directed by instruction in the school, while the latter dealt with determining the problems in school systems which are common to all nations, analysing the problems, and the reasons for them, and providing the best solutions.

In 1937, Kandel edited a book entitled *International Understanding Through the Public School Curriculum*. He wrote a chapter in the book entitled 'Intelligent Nationalism in the Curriculum'. He advocated the teaching of international education in all of the world's public schools: in every grade, in every subject, for every student. International education can only grow out of a proper teaching of nationalism. International understanding grows when nations are aware that every single nation among them could contribute to the cause of humanity. Kandel believed each nation could contribute to the building of civilization. This must be taught to students and emphasized at grass-roots level in a nation's local communities until the idea takes a firm hold throughout each nation.

In his book *International Co-operation: National and International*, published in 1944, Kandel outlined the idea of elevating education to an international status through an international organization. Every person must be educated to appreciate the importance of realizing the worth of every human being, regardless of race, colour or creed. He promoted the idea of a world citizenship which would develop from participation in local and national affairs.

Nationalism in Kandel's terms was not a pejorative word. Rather, he saw nationalism as the basis for teaching international education. He would highlight the contributions of scientists, mathematicians, writers, painters, composers, musicians, statesmen and sculptors. He provided specific examples of the contributions of different nations. In mathematics, for example, he cited India for its contribution to our common numerals, Iraq to the multiplication tables and algebra, Egypt to surveying, Greece to the scientific treatment of geometry, Rome to engineering, France to analytic geometry, England to Newtonian calculus and Scotland to logarithms.

Kandel was the editor of Columbia University's International Institute's *Education Yearbook* and of all its yearbooks published from 1924 to 1944. Each yearbook consisted of approximately twelve sections on contemporary education in various countries. The articles were written by noted indigenous educators. In addition to editing the yearbooks, Kandel wrote an introduction to each yearbook and he made other important written contributions as well. The goals of the *Education Yearbook* were to share educational experiences and to set standards.

The international scene

From 1946 to 1962 Kandel worked for both the United Nations and UNESCO as a writer, editor and consultant. Prior to UNESCO's inception, Kandel wrote:

The organization can make an important contribution by means of conferences, by collecting and disseminating accurate information on the developments in education, science and culture, and by directing attention to new areas that need to be explored. It can encourage co-operation between nations in all branches of intellectual activity through the exchange of persons, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information. It can serve in general as a clearing-house of information.⁸

In 1946 Kandel was a member of a special UNESCO committee which issued a report published in 1947 under the title *Fundamental Education: Common Ground for All Peoples*. In 1947, as a consultant to UNESCO, Kandel edited a report entitled *Suggestions for a Study of Education for International Understanding in the Schools of UNESCO Member States*.

As a participant in 1949 in a UNESCO-sponsored human-rights symposium, he wrote a chapter in a book entitled *Human Rights – Comments and Interpretation* in which he suggested that education should become a human right and be recognized as such universally. He emphasized that the right to education was of even greater importance than UNESCO had previously recognized.

In 1951, Kandel wrote the first in a series of six books on compulsory education issued by UNESCO. Entitled *Raising the School-leaving Age*, the book's approach was philosophical, and it described the steps that were taken in countries that had established age 14 as the school-leaving age, and which planned to raise the age limit beyond it.

From March to September 1955, Kandel was a consultant to the United Nations Division of Human Rights. He engaged in a study of discrimination in education undertaken by the Sub-commission of Protection of Minorities.

Lastly, Kandel wrote a book published in Spanish in 1962 by UNESCO's office in Havana, Cuba. Entitled *Hacia una profesión docente* [Towards a Teaching Profession], the book reflected Kandel's lifelong concern with the improvement of teacher preparation and the enhancement of the teaching profession.

Kandel made important contributions to the history of education and the philosophy of education. From 1909 to 1913 he was assistant editor of the well-known *Cyclopedia of Education*. During this period, he wrote many articles on a wide variety of topics on the history of education for the *Cyclopedia*. In addition to

writing these and many other scholarly articles in this field, Kandel wrote such historical works as *An Introduction to the Study of American Education*, *History of the Curriculum*, *History of Secondary Education* and *American Education in the Twentieth Century*.

Progress and tradition

For Kandel, the history of education was a conflict between the ideal of freedom and the ideal of authority and control. He believed that man's quest for freedom had been challenged throughout history by the power of society to reign over the affairs of the individual. He thought freedom was a right which must be won, but obtaining it also implied a corresponding responsibility in its use.

Kandel was highly critical of those educators who denied that anything could be learned from the past. He criticized those who discounted all educational practices up to the present as contributing to a static society, or merely aiming for the transmission of knowledge. While admitting educational inadequacies in the past, he nevertheless discussed the positive steps he saw in previous generations of educational experiences. The goals of education were aimed at benefiting society. "That the world did progress, that it did produce intellectual giants, are facts which cannot be ignored and for which some credit must be given to centuries of forgotten teachers."

The primary characteristics of the philosophy of essentialism, which Kandel embraced, were those which placed an emphasis on student effort, on classroom discipline, on the accumulated knowledge achieved by human beings, on long-range objectives, logical organization of subject matter, and teacher-initiated learning.

He was steeped in what he felt were the best and most constructive aspects of traditionalism, not the punitive or harmful educational traditions, but the essentials. He viewed the traditionalist as one who sees particular ideas and values which are essential for society in order to save itself, and which the school needs to transmit if the latest generation is to be induced to carry on its role in society.

As an essentialist, Kandel often criticized progressive education in his scholarly and satirical articles. He had a vast understanding of the progressive movement in education. He was in agreement with many progressive ideas, especially those that applied more modern psychological principles to teaching; but he felt he could not tolerate what he perceived as the missionary zeal and the lack of tolerance of many of the great progressives of the day.

Modern progressives tried, he thought, to make a clean break with the past, while focusing on the present and looking forward to the future. Educational traditions were founded on social stability and the idea that life was predictable. Modern progressives would begin with unpredictability, find stability to be unacceptable, and they would rebuild society for some unknown future.

For Kandel, the argument was between a cult of change and disorganization, and a culture of permanence: between anomie, alienation and rootlessness, suffering from a lack of authority, and rooted authority which created social stability within a common culture.

The role of the teacher was the pivotal point in Kandel's essentialism. He recognized the need for teachers to have better training worldwide and the need for societies to attract and retain the best and the brightest candidates for teaching. Even towards the end of a long career, he wrestled with the complex issues involved in discussing the crucial role of the teacher.

Kandel's essentialism contended that having an adequate education depended on having mature, experienced and knowledgeable teachers who recognized student needs and interests. However, these teachers would first determine which educational experiences the learners needed in order to become serious and responsible citizens.

Kandel believed in more freedom for the teacher as well as the child. He castigated educational reformers who only saw the child in the educational landscape, without taking notice of the teacher and his vital role in the educational process. Freedom for the teacher needed to be linked to a sense of responsibility, both socially and professionally.

Kandel saw the teacher as having a much greater experiential background than the student. Therefore, the teacher was the right person to impart information and plan for his students. If the student did not receive the teacher's expert advice, he would certainly receive advice from less qualified or unqualified persons elsewhere.

Among the most important honours Kandel received was his election to the prestigious National Academy of Education, an influential American organization. In 1937, the University of Melbourne awarded him a Doctor of Letters degree, and in the same year he was honoured by the French Government as Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. In 1946, the University of North Carolina awarded him an honorary Doctor of Laws degree.

Kandel made many important contributions to the general field of education and to the specialized field of comparative and international education. International education, to be effective, must lead to the development of a worldwide spirit of internationalism based on a realistic idea that all nations contribute to the progress of the world through their systems of education. He said:

Development must begin with the pupil's own environment and branch out to the community, the nation, and the world. It is nothing less than the cultivation in each one of us of the recognition of the worth and dignity of human beings regardless of race, colour or creed.¹⁰

Kandel's injunction against a nation's wholesale educational borrowing from another nation because of cultural and social differences was a major contribution to comparative and international education. He called for careful study before adapting any borrowed ideas. These ideas and practices must be suited to each nation's special culture and unique history.

Kandel's historiography was an additional contribution to education worldwide. His comparisons were valid because he had a historical view of a country's education system, its contemporary situation, and its likely future direction.

Kandel's tenet of having the best possible teachers in public school classrooms is an enormous boon to an insecure profession. He knew that a substitute for

strengthening the role of the teacher was the frequent practice of accepting frivolous innovations that could, in some countries, change the educational focus rapidly. He cautioned against change for change's sake in education.

Kandel's philosophy of putting the teacher at centre stage in the process of education was summed up in a monograph he wrote for UNESCO:

When so much depends on the quality of the teacher, he cannot be considered as an artisan, capable of using the tricks of an occupation learned in a relatively short period of time. Today teaching requires a preparation so complete and varied as in any profession. The public even in those advanced countries should realize that the best guarantee for education is the quality of the teacher, the soul and sustenance of the school.¹¹

Kandel's contribution

The distinguished educator George Z. F. Bereday commented on Kandel's valuable work:

Kandel's contribution to comparative education is widely known. He was the first to chop up the national units and to discuss on a more transnational basis elements such as administration or teacher training, thus paving the way for the problem approach. His precepts about on-the-spot observation of schools have not yet been replaced, even in the age of interdisciplinary teamwork. He advocated meticulous attention to primary documents, a sort of comparative *explication de texte*, which is regrettably becoming rare at present.¹²

The major implications of Kandel's work for today's study of education systems are that we must look outside the educational institution, as well as within, to determine those forces and factors that have influenced such systems. Coupled with this is the idea of regarding the past as an important area of study, something to measure our progress against, instead of calling for continuous educational renewal and reform in a vacuum.

Many of Kandel's ideas are fashionable today. Among these are support for effective parent participation in the public school, lifelong learning, a solid curriculum which promotes the established learnings from the past, and an effective teacher in every classroom. Books such as *The Closing of the American Mind* and *Culture Literacy* and other works of recent vintage have restated many of Kandel's ideas.¹³

Writing in the early 1960s, Kandel discussed education in the newly independent nations, former colonies of the rich industrialized nations. He believed that the types of education systems which had been developed under industrial and technological conditions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were not appropriate for these underdeveloped agrarian nations. He also recognized that a gap had to be closed between the poor and under-educated majority and the affluent minority who had access to much more education in developing countries.

Discussing the need for an appropriate model of education, he called for a different approach in these nations. He knew that the grafting of models used in industrial nations on to the education systems of Third World nations was terribly ineffective.

Searching for appropriate educational models for these countries, he said there was a need first to improve from within the basic conditions of life for people in these nations:

The first need of the underdeveloped areas is not to disseminate literacy but to direct education to the improvement of living – of health and hygiene, nutrition, and methods of agriculture. A program of literacy can be built up after a desire has been created to know more about the methods demonstrated, about care of health and hygiene (personal and public) and about the environment in which the school is located.¹⁴

Kandel wisely set priorities for citizens of developing nations that would enable them to benefit from participating in non-formal education prior to undertaking formal education. For primary education he recommended the need for compulsory education, entry to school at a fixed legal age, and separate classes for infants and pubescent children. Regarding a relevant curriculum for primary students, he said: 'The gradual challenge of new ideas on matters recognized to be of direct concern and relevance should help to stimulate a desire to learn more and to lead to purposeful reading.'¹⁵

The problems of secondary education were more complex. He saw that too many people in developing countries equated secondary education exclusively with academic work, to the point where it caused many to separate themselves from those who did manual labour. Kandel recommended that these poor countries look to countries like the United States and the USSR for successful vocational programmes. He believed that successful programmes geared to promoting marketable skills would thus help the populations in developing nations to overcome their perception of vocational education as being a watered-down curriculum.

It was also important to modify the traditional forces of higher education if people were to receive adequate preparation for leadership roles in the developing countries. Kandel recommended that working under the auspices of UNESCO and the United Nations, students in these countries should be trained as university teachers at universities in advanced countries, in order to set up universities in their own countries. It was important to adjust the number of admissions in the poorer countries so that these numbers related to employment opportunities. This would avoid the danger of cultivating an educated proletariat who would have little opportunity for social mobility.

Summing up the legacy of Kandel's *œuvre*, Philip Foster wrote:

Pride of place must be given to Isaac Kandel whose teaching and research, conducted primarily at Teachers College, Columbia University, spanned a period of some five decades. With due deference to the work of other scholars, it would not be improper to regard Kandel as more responsible (in the English-speaking world at least) than any other scholar for the emergence of comparative education as a respectable teaching area in universities and other tertiary institutions concerned with educational matters.¹⁶

Notes

1. I. L. Kandel, *Comparative Education*, p. xix, Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1933.
2. I. L. Kandel, 'The Methodology of Comparative Education', *International Review of Education* (Dordrecht, Netherlands), Vol. 5, No. 3, 1959, p. 273.
3. I. L. Kandel, *Education Yearbook*, p. 1, New York, Macmillan, 1925.
4. W. Brickman, 'Kandel: International Scholar and Educator', *The Education Forum* (West Lafayette, Ind., Kappa Delta Pi), Vol. 15, No. 4, May 1951, p. 400. Brickman makes the additional point in the same article (p. 404) that Kandel's works were also translated from English into French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Dutch, as well as the Spanish, Chinese and Arabic already mentioned.
5. I. L. Kandel, 'Letter to Mr Edward, 1 May 1950', Stanford, Calif., The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Archives: personal papers).
6. Brickman, op. cit., p. 399.
7. I. L. Kandel, *The New Era in Education: A Comparative Study*, p. ix, Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1955.
8. I. L. Kandel, 'UNESCO' (an unpublished, updated paper), p. 17, Stanford, Calif., The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Archives: personal papers).
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I M M A N U E L K A N T

(1724–1804)

Heinrich Kanz

Kant was born, spent his working life and died in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad). About 90 per cent of the town was destroyed in 1944/45 and neither the house in which he was born nor that in which he died remain standing today. There is a Kant Museum in the university and a well-tended grave behind the ruins of Königsberg cathedral, which may be perceived at one and the same time as a memorial and as a monument to the spirit of reconciliation in the prevailing world situation today. Here the visitor may pay pious tribute to one of the greatest German philosophers since the Age of the Enlightenment. Kant must surely rank among the most eminent proponents of European philosophy writing in the German language since the eighteenth century.

Experts in the history of German education describe the eighteenth century as 'the age of pedagogics'. Kant, like many others, turned his attention to education, but his significance in this particular sector can only be appreciated against the more general background of his philosophy. His true place therefore lies in the history of a 'pedagogical philosophy' or a philosophy of education in all its aspects. Scheuerl's famous portrait of the *Classical Exponents of Pedagogics* therefore omits Kant, though he is mentioned in the introduction¹ along with Luther, Melancthon, Friedrich August Wolf and Schiller. It may well be that this interpretation of the classical exponents of pedagogics draws too sharp a distinction with the underlying science of philosophy. Other educational traditions do, however, make explicit reference to the importance of Kant in this area. 'Kant and pedagogics' was one topic dealt with in 1954 by the well-known existential 'pedagogical' philosopher Bollnow,² who has drawn attention to an unbroken line dating back from twentieth-century education to Kant himself.

One major task facing us today is to create spiritual reconciliation between the continents of the world. But that is only possible by defining the profile and true historical identity of particular groups or regions such as Africa, America, Asia, Australasia and Europe. From the European standpoint, this requirement means that Europeans must make reference to their human responsibility for others and for themselves, and reinterpret their own history in such a way that both its

negative and positive factors are placed in their true perspective. What is more, each continent must make its own pluralistic, individual and concrete contribution to the new world ethic. We must therefore examine Kant's relevant intellectual achievements in Europe in the wider context of equal partnership in a future world society, with particular reference to education. Our profile of Kant as an educator will therefore be structured in five parts: biographical data; his educational statements; methods; the impact of Kant's works; and Kant's lasting achievements, which will also be our conclusion.

Biographical data

From our modern intellectual standpoint, Kant is perceived in three different ways: firstly the Kant of philosophers,³ secondly the Kant of the world scientific audience⁴ and thirdly the Kant of educational experts and scientists.⁵ To provide a clear illustration of Kant's educational qualifications and relevance, it is interesting to consider some aspects of his professional career with a bearing on education.

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg on 22 April 1724.⁶ His parents belonged to the lower middle class. They brought him up in such a way that their son remembered them with a 'feeling of the utmost gratitude' and confirmed that he could have received no better moral education. He acquired the basic skills of reading and writing at the Hospital School in the suburbs of Königsberg. He went on to attend the Collegium Fridericianum Grammar School, where the emphasis was placed on Latin, Greek (The New Testament) and theology or religion, whose constant presence in the teaching syllabus and school life seemed to him oppressive, but at the same time laid the basis for his subsequent personal religiosity, founded on a rational sense of responsibility. In 1740, at the age of 16, Kant was admitted to the University of Königsberg, where he came into close contact with the philosophy of Leibniz. Thereafter he acted as a private tutor to boys under the age of 12. In 1755 he graduated in Königsberg, qualifying in the same year as a university teacher with his dissertation on 'New Light on the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition'. As a *Privatdozent*, or unsalaried lecturer, he analysed the work of Newton, Hume and, above all, Rousseau who, in his own words, had 'put him on the right track' and sparked off 'a revolution in his personal thinking'. His lectureship, partly financed by a post of assistant librarian in the Königsberg Royal Library, ended in 1770 when he was appointed to a full professorship of logic and metaphysics. (The subject of his inaugural dissertation was 'On the Form and Principles of the World of the Senses and Reason'.) Kant's professorial career made him one of the leading German-language intellectuals. In the course of his intensive experience of scholarly life (he was also rector of the university in 1786 and 1788), he wrote the philosophical works which proved to be milestones of his era (see the list of his works on page 806).

In his confrontation with the cultural opinion-shapers in the Europe of his day, he wrote his famous 'Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' in 1784, along with many other lesser contributions. He gave his last lecture in 1796. Kant died in 1804. His last words are reported to have been: 'It is good.' He had previously overcome his fear of death through a theistic religious dimension.

A tentative overview of Kant's intellectual endeavours under a few key headings can best be arrived at by quoting the questions put by him in 1793 which were destined to become world famous: What can I know? What am I to do? What may I hope? What is man? Kant adopted a wide-ranging and critical approach to the problems reflected in those questions on two different planes of thought.

Firstly, through an enlightened positive interpretation of human reason, he made a rational personal assessment of the human potential and limitations of reason. This explains the extraordinary critical 'modesty' and confinement to the potential experiences of all human beings (or phenomena) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which reduces ideological sophisms *ad absurdum* and points out that scientific knowledge of things in themselves (*Noumena*) is unattainable.

Secondly, Kant did not remain content with a somewhat reticent assessment of human reason, but went on to identify possibilities for a moral dimension of freedom, immortality and religious fulfilment for man. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* written in 1781, Kant himself expressed his 'unwavering' belief in the 'existence of God and a future life'.⁷ However, according to Kant, the belief in 'God, freedom and immortality', which brings happiness to man and fosters world peace, cannot be rationalized, indoctrinated and turned into an ideology (or 'dogma'). He therefore issues a critical warning against the supposition that this belief might be proved. Were that the case, man's intellectual freedom could not exist. In that spirit, Kant criticized reason in the Preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1787: 'I therefore found it necessary to abolish knowledge in order to leave room for belief',⁸ that is, to pave the way for corresponding moral certainties in human existence. Pure reason holds out the 'prospects of articles of faith'⁹ – no more and no less.

Kant thus articulated the concept of human freedom in unmistakably clear terms; in his view, human dignity makes the recognition of that freedom an inherently subjective matter. He made that point with particular force in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). The 'conclusion' to that work begins with the words: 'Two things fill my mind with ever-growing wonder and awe, the more often and persistently I turn my thinking to them: the starry firmament above me and the moral law within me.'¹⁰

Kant's pedagogical statements

The emphasis on subjectivity is a fundamental principle of education in the modern world. Applying that principle, the actors involved in the process of education and upbringing are defined as subjects who must not make use of one another as 'instruments'. The fact that all men are subjects who should not exploit each other as means to an end would seem to be the quintessence of Kant's philosophy. For that, modern European education owes him a debt of gratitude in the general world context. If we go on to apply Kant's philosophy to education and inquire into its educational significance, we shall, however, not have to deal solely with the educational statements that are immanent in Kant's philosophy. We shall also need to make reference to his explicit educational statements.

The leading German intellectuals of the eighteenth century had a number of well-known organs of publication at their disposal, such as the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* [Berlin Monthly], in which they engaged in a lively exchange of views on all topics of current interest, including that of education and schooling. In 1776-77, writing in the *Königsberger Gelehrten und Politischen Zeitungen* [Königsberg Scholarly and Political Journal], Kant set out his views on the famous 'Philanthropin' reforming school at Dessau, to which he ascribed a cosmopolitan, revolutionary and continental significance. 'Each ordinary being, each individual citizen of the world, must have an infinite interest in gaining familiarity with an establishment which is laying the foundations for a whole new order of things.' Basedow's Philanthropin School 'must of necessity attract . . . the keen attention of Europe'. In the well-ordered countries of Europe, an 'early revolution' must be put in hand in the shape of school reform. This reform had been set in motion and was admirably exemplified by the 'Dessau Educational Institute [the Philanthropin]'.¹¹

Kant gave verbal expression to the didactic relevance of his university teaching duties. He took great pains to adopt an educational attitude towards his audience. This is made clear by the announcement of the nature and purpose of his lectures in 1765/66. His listeners were to be trained to become comprehending, reasonable and scholarly persons. The young people entrusted to him must be 'taught to acquire a more mature insight of their own in future'.¹²

Kant gave lectures 'on pedagogics'¹³ during the 1776/77 winter semester, the 1780 summer semester and the 1783/84 and 1786/87 winter semesters. He did not himself publish the text of these lectures, though Rink did so at the publishing house of Nicolovius in Königsberg in 1803. It is reasonable to suppose that these texts contain Kant's fundamental thinking on educational topics.

As a professor in the philosophical faculty, he was required to give lectures on education from time to time. For this purpose he was able to draw on the *Handbook of the Art of Education* by Bock, a councillor of the consistory and a former colleague. The extent to which he did so is an academic question which must in part be answered by considering the generality of his thinking. Rink's edition of Kant's *Pedagogics* deals in condensed form with various strata of his presentation. A reading of these texts immediately reveals the problems pertaining to the pre-critical and critical phases. The texts set out in an exemplary fashion the basic views of Kant, the philosopher, on education in the context of the material available to him and of his discussions with contemporary intellectuals.

A comparison of the educational statements contained in the compulsory lectures 'on pedagogics' with other opinions on education put forward in Kant's contemporaneous or later writings is revealing. For this purpose we may draw, in particular, on lengthy and shorter publications with an ethical, aesthetic, historical, anthropological and theological content. Apart from sections of his classical works, (i.e. the three critiques, see references, p. 806), relevant publications include 'The Idea of a General History for the Purpose of a Citizen of the World' (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, 1784), 'The Presumed Beginning of the History of Mankind' (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, 1786), 'What is Enlightenment?' (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, 1784), *Perpetual Peace* (1795) and 'Anthropology from the Prag-

matic Viewpoint' (1798).¹⁴ Interest also attaches to the explanations to be found in his fundamental text on religious philosophy, 'Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason' (1793), for example, his comments on the problem of good and evil in man and on the way in which education responds to this problem.¹⁵ He writes as follows on this point: 'What man is, or may be destined to become, in the moral sense, good or evil, is of *his own* making, both now and in the past.'¹⁶

The literary form of the printed version of the lecture 'On Pedagogics' (1776/77, 1780, 1783/84 and 1786/87) (see Note 5) available to us today differs from that of other works by Kant. Its editor, Rink, arranged for the publication of a series of juxtaposed axioms, aphorisms and ideas rather than a systematically structured text. This accumulation of notes on education and pedagogics can, however, be used as a source from which to derive viewpoints that may be defined constructively today and from which a conflict with the views on education held in Kant's own day emerges.

Some of his educational ideas, assumptions and reflections, from which positive suggestions with a bearing on the global structure of education advocated today can be derived, will now be discussed below. Any endeavour to establish an internal order among these fragments would, however, appear to place excessive demands on the original and must remain more a matter of interpretation. Nevertheless, a number of thematically relevant questions do arise to which answers may be found in the text itself: What is education? For whom is education directed? How can education which leads to enlightened reason as a source of peace be imparted or received?

WHAT IS EDUCATION?

Kant subscribed to the fundamental pedagogical position that education is imperative for the development of mankind. Precisely because all human beings have 'such a strong inclination to freedom', they must be 'accustomed from an early age to accept the dictates of reason' (1963, p. 10). Man (as a collective designation) is that which education makes of him and nothing more. 'It will be noted that man is always educated by other men who have themselves been educated previously' (p. 11). Education may be viewed firstly in empirical terms, that is, in the manner in which the educational process takes place in a given real situation; secondly, it must be considered in its anthropological profundity and with reference to its normative idea. Here it will be noted that 'an idea is nothing other than the concept of a perfection which has not as yet been experienced' (p. 12).

The idea of education is a yardstick for the practice of education. It permits a critique of education and a critique of schools and training. Even if it has not yet been put into practice, or has only been done so in its basic principles by a process of approximation, the 'idea of an education which develops all the natural gifts of man' appears to contain the 'truth'.

The provision of true and good education 'holds the great secret of the true perfection of human nature' (pp. 12 et seq.). Kant finds it 'delightful to imagine that human nature can be increasingly enhanced through education and that edu-

cation can be shaped in a manner which is appropriate to mankind' (p. 12). Educational planning must therefore follow a 'cosmopolitan' (p. 15) spirit with a commitment to all that is 'best in the world' (p. 15).

'Good education is itself the source of all that is good in the world' (p. 15). Therefore we arrive at the conceptual principle that 'children must not be educated simply to achieve the present level but towards a possible better future level of the human race, in other words taking account of the idea of mankind and the universal destiny of man' (p. 14).

One of Kant's objections to the type of education given in his day, for example within the family, was that parents generally only brought up their children to equip them to 'fit in with the world as it is today, however bad it may be' (p. 14). Good education, on the other hand, is capable of bringing about a gradual improvement in the world. It is a task for many successive generations, each of which can take individual steps towards the perfection of mankind, towards a 'better proportioned and expedient development' of all natural human inclinations. Individual happiness and misfortune thus genuinely depend on the individuals themselves. 'Education is therefore the greatest and most difficult problem with which man can be confronted, since insight depends on education and education in its turn depends on insight' (p. 13). Kant assigned educational activity a position among cultural activities, seen as a reflection of the totality of the human being, in such a way as to establish a direct relationship between education and political activity: 'Two inventions of man must surely be viewed as the most difficult: the art of government and the art of education' (p. 14).

Kant names the following as the main tasks for education: (a) disciplined thinking; (b) creation of a cultivated outlook; (c) enhancement of civilization; and (d) imparting moral rectitude (pp. 16 et seq.). He believed that education in his day took care of the first three of these tasks, but complained that 'we are living in an age of discipline, culture and civilization but the age of moral rectitude still lies in the distant future' (p. 17).

Kant's fundamental way of thinking can be perceived in this definition of the fourth main function of education, which is often misunderstood through an incorrect use of the moral concept; it implies a commitment to a future world ethic. Moralization means that the persons who are being educated must develop an attitude so as to choose 'good purposes only'. 'Good purposes are those which necessarily secure universal approval and may at the same time be the purposes of everyone' (p. 17). The educational processes which seek to promote the 'moral character' of children and young people have a moralizing function. This character is indissolubly bound up with the dignity of all human beings and must therefore be interpreted in anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-élitist terms as referring to the 'citizen of the world'. Children must be educated to perform (a) their duties to themselves and (b) their duties to others.

'The duty to oneself, however, resides in the fact that the human being preserves the dignity of mankind in his own person' (p. 51). In all his actions, the child or the person to be educated must have in mind the fact that 'the human being bears within him a certain dignity which makes him more noble than all other

forms of life'. His 'duty' is to 'see to it that this dignity of mankind is not belied in his own person' (p. 50).

The notion of duty to others implies that: 'Respect for, and compliance with, the rights of men must be imparted to the child at a very early age' (p. 51). For example, Kant instructs a richer child to show the same human respect to his poorer coevals as to others like him.

Given the limited space available to us here, we can only mention among Kant's many other significant statements on education the fact that the principle of obedience in education is always applied in the context of enlightened reason. In the final phase of education, duty, obedience and reason are combined as follows: 'Adopting a particular course of action from a sense of duty means obeying the dictates of reason' (p. 46).

FOR WHOM IS EDUCATION INTENDED?

Two levels of statements must be considered here: firstly, statements on human beings in general which are applicable to all age-groups and, secondly, statements relating to children and adolescents who are not yet adults. We shall comment briefly below on these two aspects.

Human beings (in general) bear within them all the necessary attributes for good. 'Man must first develop his attributes for good; providence has not imparted them to him in a definitive form. Man must better himself, improve his level of culture and, if he is bad, acquire morality' (p. 13). A human being may be 'highly cultivated physically . . . and have a highly trained intellect, but his morality may be low and he may still be an evil creature' (pp. 33 et seq.).

The true nature of a man is reflected in certain forces of the mind and understanding. Kant states by way of example that 'understanding means recognition of general principles. Judgement is the application of the universal to the particular. Reason means the ability to perceive the relationship between the universal and the particular' (p. 36).

The nature of the child is manifested in many individual observations and – by deduction – in instructions for education. For example, children must be neither over- nor understretched, depending on their age. 'A child must only be as clever as a child' (p. 47). The essential nature of the child is distorted by precociousness or slavery to fashion: 'Children must also be open-hearted, their gaze as bright as the sun' (p. 47). 'Assuming that the child has a natural inclination to go its own way, which may be assumed to be only most exceptionally what is wanted, the best attitude to adopt is this: if the child does nothing to please us, we in turn shall do nothing to please it' (pp. 42 et seq.). 'Neither should children be intimidated' (p. 41). 'They must not try to reason out everything' (p. 41). 'It is extremely harmful to accustom the child to treat everything as a game' (p. 35).

How can a child be educated to acquire that enlightened universal reason which promotes the cause of peace?

In this context, Kant advocates the 'judicious' further development of the 'art. of education or pedagogics' (p. 14) in order that it may be 'transformed into a

science' (p. 14). In addition, the true problems of education must be recognized, problems which are only apparent, being rejected in a spirit of criticism of ideologies. Kant examines *inter alia* the questions of compulsion in education, learning methods and the notion of duty.

The central issue from the angle of *compulsion in education* is that of deciding how the obedience to legal constraints and those of society, without which life is impossible, can be reconciled with the ability of the individual to 'make use of his personal freedom' (p. 20). Unless the child feels the 'inevitable resistance of society' from an early age, it can know nothing of the difficulty of self-preservation and personal independence. As a solution to this problem, Kant indicates three educational rules of conduct for the progressive development of freedom:

1. The child must be allowed to enjoy every possible freedom from infancy, except in things where it may do harm to itself and provided that it does not inhibit the freedom of others through its actions.
2. The child must be given to understand that it can only achieve its own objectives if it also permits others to achieve theirs.
3. The child must realize that it is under an obligation to make use of its freedom and that it is being educated in such a way that it may one day attain freedom, i.e. it will not be dependent on the care of others (see p. 20).

The nature of the problem of discipline in this context is that the child must always remain aware of its own freedom when disciplinary measures are taken, without obstructing the freedom of others (see p. 29). Children should be accustomed to work without having to abandon play. In brief, 'education must be made obligatory without becoming a form of slavery' (p. 35).

In his discussion of learning methods, Kant reminds us of the following basic concepts: 'The individual learns most thoroughly and best retains those things which he learns, as it were, for himself' (p. 40). 'The principal need is to teach children to think' and not to train them like animals. Learning to think can best be achieved using the Socratic method and not by what may be termed the mechanical-catechetic method. 'The education of the future must be based on the Socratic method.' Although children cannot gain an understanding of the central propositions without external help, 'it must nevertheless be recognized that the perception of reason cannot be drummed into them, but must be arrived at from within themselves' (p. 40). The Socratic method must also be the foundation of the mechanical-catechetic method which is 'exemplary' for the presentation of revealed religion with its historical references.

Many meritorious statements with a practical relevance to education were formulated by Kant in everyday pedagogical language in his lectures. They assume a central position between the extremes which were highlighted in his day, for example, the contrast between play and work, freedom and compulsion, etc. Finally, importance attaches here to the reference to the compulsory character and conscience-forming dimension of education. Duty, action stemming from the centre of consciousness and character stability are not opposing counterparts to the 'joy of the heart', which comes about when the individual has nothing for which to reproach himself (p. 59). Inclination, interest and pleasure are not forbidden in

Kant's scheme of things. However, they must be relativized in relation to the commitment of the individual to love of other human beings and to the well-being of all men.

Kant's theory of duty was deeply rooted in his notion of world citizenship. It is worth dwelling for a moment on a quotation from his work which is thrown into particular relief by the movement towards world peace that we are witnessing today:

An action must seem worthwhile to me not because it corresponds to my own inclinations, but because it reflects my duty of neighbourly love for others and also my awareness of world citizenship. The nature of our own soul requires us to take an interest 1. in ourselves, 2. in others with whom we have grown up and then 3. we must also show an interest in what is best for the world. Children must be familiarized with this interest which will be a source of warmth for their own souls. They must take pleasure in that which is best in the world, even if it does not correspond to the advantage of their own fatherland and does not bring them personal profit [p. 59].

METHODS

The research instruments available to contemporary science are many and varied as a result of a long process of historical development. Their professional orientation in different areas (nature, the intellect, society, etc.) and their modern designations (e.g. phenomenological, empirical, dialectic) cannot readily be extrapolated to earlier periods in history. A few designations, making allowance as far as possible for the self-awareness and method of expression of Kant's own age, therefore seem in order here.

The term 'transcendental-critical' is incontrovertibly the main formula used to define Kant's method of philosophical research.¹⁷ As he himself states, Kant overcame the 'dogmatic sclerosis' of methods and contents of earlier philosophy and discovered his own method of philosophical reflection which made him one of the central figures of world philosophy. The implications of this for education in his own time were indicated by Kant in his explicit educational statements after his critical change of position, and also in the educationally relevant content of his philosophy. Reduced to a brief formula, it might be stated that, by drawing a distinction between ideas and the material of 'empirical' research, Kant paved the way for one fundamental position of modern enlightened educational science which starts out from the principle of the freedom of its subjects. Even if there had been no notion of freedom before him, that freedom has existed as a normative idea since Kant's day, unaffected by all negative empirical factors and realities of repression.

As the founder of German idealism, Kant confined scientific knowledge to its own specific subject area without abandoning the 'non-empirical' ideas inherent in human existence. On the contrary, he sought to provide an intellectual prop for human freedom of thought by critically illustrating, on the one hand, the impossibility of proving the supreme values of mankind by the resources of empirical science since such proof, if it were adduced, would abolish human intellectual free-

dom, while, on the other hand, calling 'transcendental-phenomenological' attention to the dignity which is a characteristic of all human existence and deserving of critical comment.

Beyond the transcendental-critical research method and its universal application in non-philosophical areas, Kant also made use in his pedagogics of traditional means of acquiring knowledge, such as observation, the study of literature and consideration of the opinions of enlightened contemporaries whom he quoted (Basedow, Rousseau). The teaching methods used by Kant in the university study context of his own day made him much sought after as a teacher and counsellor of his own students.

The impact of Kant's works

Our subject here is Kant as an educator; that being so, our description of his impact will be confined to a few areas of educational theory and practice. These can be classified under the headings of basic education, family education, school education, university education, general adult education and education of senior citizens, against the background of the different phases of German and European history.

Kant's educational influence must, of course, be seen in the context of his significance as the founder of German idealism (in the history of philosophy), as the leading critical figure in the Prussian branch of German Enlightenment in the eighteenth century (in the history of the moral sciences) and as a European intellectual of world rank (in the history of education and culture). Without looking into the question here as to which contemporaries and which historical phases or centuries (eighteenth to twentieth) have given a correct interpretation of Kant, it is still possible to highlight the impact of his educational theories from two angles: firstly, from the angle of its positive connotations and, secondly, from that of its negative attributes.

Since we have no specific empirical evidence in the above theoretical and practical subject areas, reference will be made instead to a few key words, such as enlightenment, the individual, the ethic of duty and world peace.

In terms of educational history, Kant is an accepted exponent of enlightenment, who is described, for example, in all the relevant German school textbooks, as the source of the spirit of enlightenment conceived in the international sense. His answer to the question as to the meaning of enlightenment, namely that each individual must find the courage to make use of his own understanding despite the obstacles of cowardice and idleness, also defines the horizon of enlightenment in our reunited Germany today.

The concept of the individual has a history of philosophical, juridical and theological meanings. Moreover, at all stages of German general education since the days of Kant, the term 'person' has reflected the fact that all human beings are an 'end in themselves', that is, that regardless of class, world-view, religion, race, nation, etc., and of all the obstacles standing in the way, each person is from the start of his existence a reality in his own right and with his own dignity. With Rousseau, Shaftesbury and Leibniz, Kant is one of the sources of the idea that has

been present in European teaching syllabuses down the centuries that 'the inclinations and forces dormant in the individual must be allowed to unfurl freely, viewing the individual not as a means but as an end in itself, as a being in whose spontaneity our trust must be placed'.¹⁸

Kant's ethic of duty is the subject of controversy among professional philosophers. However, in Kant's educational statements, for instance, when he posits the idea of a duty to love our fellow men and the need to train the individual to resist selfish consumerism and nationalistic isolation, the aspect of all-round education is particularly prominent. Kant's categorical imperative, which states that all men are obliged to act in such a way that the principles of their actions may be binding on all other men, contains an explicit and implicit reference to a humanity which spans the world and places all men on an equal basis. Modern interpreters of Kant's concept of duty note with astonishment the course taken by the history of the ethic of duty in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, i.e. after his death. More recently, the true nature of Kant's thinking has been reconstructed, while the extraordinarily erroneous nature of the previous interpretation with its formalistic and nationalistic contours is coming increasingly to be recognized.

A positive reconstruction of the Kantian notion of duty from the educational angle was undertaken by a leading expert on education in the days of the Weimar Republic and in the first phase¹⁹ of the creation of the Federal Republic in the years between 1949 and 1959, Eduard Spranger, who detected a Prussian tradition deserving of intellectual recognition dating back to Friedrich II. The latter was said to have done his duty in his own day and expected his successors to do likewise. Spranger finds it impossible to imagine an educational commitment to the good of all men throughout the world against egoism, all kinds of addictions and other negative factors without having regard to the concept of duty which he even uses against Humboldt who 'merely seeks an organic experience of his own innermost inclinations'.²⁰

Another positive assessment of Kant has been made in the area of theoretical and practical peace education, in so far as the latter has taken on board ideas from his philosophical draft 'on eternal peace'.²¹ Here Kant speaks out against those who are 'mouthpieces of the prevailing violence'.²² He envisages a future union of politics, justice and an ethic of peace. 'Justice must remain sacred to man, however great the sacrifices to the prevailing violence which this may entail.'²³ It is a 'duty, even if justified hope also exists' to advocate the notion that 'eternal peace based on what have previously been called peace treaties (which are no more than truces) is not an empty idea but a task which must be gradually attained by moving constantly closer to the underlying objective (because the periods in which such progress is made will, it is to be hoped, follow in more rapid succession)'.²⁴

In many respects, Kant lived on in the theoretical pedagogics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scarcely any 'classical exponent of education' has been able to get by without quoting Kant. What is more, a scientific orientation of the school making direct reference to Kant grew up and became known as the neo-Kantian transcendental philosophical school. This school took Kant's philosophy in its idealistic fundamentals as the yardstick of educational thought processes.

This educational current, incorporating the notions of a subject, I myself, conscience, a dialogue, etc., therefore developed what became known as the normative dimension of education which seeks to preserve human dignity everywhere and at all times. This current of thinking was impressively represented by Alfred Petzelt and his pupils after the Second World War.²⁵

The negative connotations to the name and work of Kant reside in the general context of Prussian militarism, notions of duty which have proved hostile to life itself at different times in German history, the mental perversion of National Socialism, etc. As evidence of this, it is worth quoting the opinion of a student who was executed because of his resistance to Hitler. On 22 August 1942, Hans Scholl wrote the following words which contradict Spranger's interpretation of Friedrich II of Prussia quoted above: 'How small must a people which calls Friedrich II «Great» itself be? That people fought for its freedom against Napoleon only to choose Prussian slavery instead.'²⁶ Hans Scholl's interpretation of Kant follows on from the ideas of his intellectual mentor, Theodor Haecker, who wrote: 'The link between duty and verbiage represents the true dehumanization of man. But it is a feature peculiar to Prussian Germans who were its inventors.'²⁷ Haecker views Kant's German idealism as a 'Prussian matter'. Hans Scholl's letter to Rose Nägele München of 25 January 1942 takes the same line: 'What evil can be traced back to Kant's categorical imperative! Kant, toughness, Prussianhood – the death of all moral life!'²⁸

Kant's lasting achievements

Without reference to the history of the impact of Kant's thinking in the narrower and broader sense and to the existing contradictory images of his work, we shall conclude by attempting to interpret his importance in such a way that his possible contribution to the moral and normative development of a future world society will be demythified from the philosophical and educational perspective in a quasi-ideogrammatic manner, while at the same time highlighting a number of constructive points. Four viewpoints may be taken as the basis for more detailed reflection.

EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT

As one of the major figures of the Age of Enlightenment, he articulated in an impressive and decisive manner its stand against intolerance, indoctrination, cowardice and idleness, so that his philosophy is now available to us as a potential contribution to the contemporary development of a positively structured world society. Let us recall once again Kant's concept of the Enlightenment:

Enlightenment means man's emergence from an immaturity for which he has only himself to blame. Immaturity is man's inability to use his reason without the guidance of others. He is himself to blame for that immaturity if it is attributable not to a lack of understanding but to the absence of sufficient resolve and courage to take charge of himself without guidance by others. *Sapere aude!* Have the courage to use your own understanding – such is the byword of the enlightenment.²⁹

Since that definition was first propounded, the concept of enlightenment has undergone a series of formative phases. Reference has been made to a second, third and fourth enlightenment in European intellectual history. Today it is becoming apparent that the return to Kant and hence the reconstruction of his 'evolutionary' concept of enlightenment is an essential task of contemporary intellectuals who have been confronted with the transformation of Europe since 1989.

Kant's quadruple perception of the main tasks of education (discipline, culture, civilization and moralization) must now be reappraised once again in its original terms after a succession of misinterpretations in German education. Kant himself did not want education to be seen as being in conflict with the religious dimension. Nor did he imply support for the inhuman principle of obedience which has been a constant feature of Prussian history. On the contrary, he sought to give expression to the fact that all educational activities must be shaped with reference to the principle of over- or understretching in the various phases of education, in the closest possible concrete proximity to the axiom of human dignity. In that way a forward-looking reconstruction of moralization might be conceivable as an embodiment of one attainment of the Kantian enlightenment.

THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The fact that each human being all over the world and at all times in history represents an elementary individual existence, which must be defined by the category of individual purpose, has become since Kant, and through his work, an unmistakable and convincing guiding thread underlying all human actions.

The importance of Kant's notion of the individual for education can be understood more clearly in the context of its role in the development of neighbouring sciences. For example, legal philosophy today embodies the following positive assessment of Kant's thinking:

In his theory of the moral autonomy of man, Kant broke entirely new ground. He replaced the objective material and ethical problem which had run through the whole doctrine of the natural law by the problem of subjective morality. The moral autonomy of man is elevated into a principle of the moral world. The moral person, i.e. not the empirical individual as a part of the world of the senses, but rather 'humanity reflected in his person', has become an end in itself and no longer simply a means to attain other ends. Kant answers the question as to the nature of moral conduct with his famous categorical imperative: 'Act in such a way that the maxims of your will may at all times also serve as the principle of a general law.'³⁰

A number of objections have been raised against this argument by Kant which has made an essential contribution to the philosophical foundation of human rights. The principal objection is that it has been deflected from its purpose by deriving the 'what' (i.e. the ethical content) from the 'how' (i.e. the categorical imperative). However, this criticism is unjustified because it is founded on the erroneous assumption that the 'what' can be arrived at without any subjective element (i.e. the 'how'). 'However, the "what" cannot be exclusively derived from the "how" as modern functionalism (N. Luhmann) nevertheless supposes.'³¹ Here it is necessary

once again to underline the consequences of the concept of the individual: 'Act in such a way that you use humanity in your own person and in the person of any third party at all times as an end in itself and never simply as a means to an end.'³²

THE CAUSE OF PEACE

The absolute duty of all men everywhere and at all times to subscribe to the cause of peace can be traced back historically to Kant's theory of the categorical imperative in its effects on activities designed to attain untrammelled human dignity and in the prospect of eternal peace. Kant gave explicit expression to this point in his lecture on education.

The outstanding suitability of the theory of the categorical imperative to lay the groundwork for a solution to the contemporary problem of peace and the peaceful coexistence of all peoples and cultures (without the negative connotations of 'German' thinkers) can be confirmed by other considerations. The categorical imperative must always be viewed in the context of the basic universal norm of ethics. This has been demonstrated in concrete terms by Mikat in his study on the stabilizing factors in modern marriages. Taking over ideas put forward in scientific discussions, he examines the true basic value of the contemporary ethos of mature freedom of responsibility: the dignity of man as a moral subject and as a person, the unimpeachable dignity of the individual who, on the basis of free self-determination, is able to enact laws as part of a general order of human society.³³

However much man may act as a physical and sensual being, he is still not delivered up to arbitrary forces but is responsible for himself on the basis of reason and freedom, being an end in himself. Each reasoning being, the subject of all purposes, is thus characterized by an ultimate self-purposefulness and non-availability which constitute the essence of his moral being.³⁴

The categorical imperative and the recognition of the personal dignity of all men in all human fields of action may be seen as two sides of the same coin. The categorical imperative regards individual human dignity as a general guideline of human action. This is the 'basic dignity of all the natural circumstances which support and surround man and also of all his normative manifestations in the socio-cultural context'. Kant was therefore able to formulate in the famous second version of the categorical imperative (see the section on the concept of the individual above) the basic principle of the moral relationship of individual human beings with themselves and with their fellow men: 'Act in such a way that you use the humanity in your own person and in the person of any third party at all times as an end in itself and never simply as a means to an end.'³⁵

The notion that each man is an end in himself, for which the very name of Kant stands today, has acquired great significance for the cohesion of human beings in society in the view of forward-looking interpreters of his work (such as Reiner and Bärthlein).³⁶ It corresponds to basic anthropological needs and enables co-operation between different cultures to be developed. 'The claim put forward by each reasoning being includes a recognition of the same claim by all other rea-

soning beings, if they are all to be able to coexist simultaneously as such beings'. This is the principle of reciprocity which 'has already left a profound mark on the moral conscience of all peoples in one way or another in the form of the "golden rule"' and is given positive expression in the New Testament in the following terms: 'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them' (Matthew 7.12).

That idea set down in the Christian Bible has universal implications and points of contact with other world religions; it might be formulated as follows in the concepts of European philosophy: 'The constitution of man as a moral subject based on reason and freedom also necessitates the recognition of himself and of all others as a moral object, as an individual person.'³⁷ Anyone who attempts to give practical effect to the categorical imperative and its idea of the individual is bound to touch on problems existing between human beings and nations from the angle of the various legitimate claims of our fellow men.

In the personal moral area, these problems will be offset in that, when the individual fulfils his own needs, he will never use other people as a mere means but will always respect them as meaningful subjects with their own legitimate horizon of demands. The basic ethical norm must therefore always be interpreted as the supreme critical yardstick and moreover permitted to function as a heuristic principle when the concrete necessity arises to orientate human action towards the meaningful success of the individual.³⁸

The fact that these ideas are no mere theory is confirmed by the homage paid to the categorical imperative by Kurt Huber, who was executed by the Nazis and made his last address to the People's Court on 19 April 1943:

What I tried to do was to arouse student circles not through any organization but through the mere force of words, not to perpetrate any act of violence but to gain a moral insight into the serious damage which has been done to political life. A return to clear moral principles, to the constituted state, to mutual confidence between people, is not something illegal but to the contrary the restoration of legality. Applying Kant's categorical imperative, I ask myself what would happen if this subjective maxim of my action were to become a general law. There can be only one answer to that question: order, security and confidence would then return to our constituted state and to our political life.³⁹

UNESCO is currently preparing the draft of a 'universal declaration on tolerance' as a contribution to the United Nations Year for Tolerance - 1995. A plea in favour of such a declaration has been drawn up as a step towards its adoption. The second point of that plea calls upon each and every scientific institution which has at its disposal experts in religious and ethical questions to 'place their joint creative energies, in conjunction with experts drawn from other religious and ethical institutions, in the service of this world ethos'.⁴⁰ It is hard to imagine how such a cause might be attained without a systematic historical foundation in the personality and work of Immanuel Kant.

Notes

1. H. Scheuerl, (ed.), *Klassiker der Pädagogik* [Classical Exponents of Pedagogics], Vol. 1, p. 11, Munich, Beck, 1979.
2. O. F. Bollnow, 'Kant und die Pädagogik [Kant and Pedagogics]', in: *Westermanns Pädagogische Beiträge* [Westermann's Educational Contributions], Vol. 6, 1954, No. 2, pp. 49–55.
3. To be found, for example, in J. Ritter et al. (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* [Historical Dictionary of Philosophy], Vol. 4, pp. 1268–72, Stuttgart/Basle, Schwabe, 1976. (A completely revised new edition of R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*.)
4. Editions published by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft are available. First, I. Kant, *Werke in zehn Bänden* [Works in Ten Volumes] (edited by Wilhelm Weischedel), special edition 1983, in particular Vols. 9 and 10: *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik* [Writings on Anthropology, Historical Philosophy, Politics and Education]. Second, I. Kant, *Werke in sechs Bände* [Works in Six Volumes] (edited by Wilhelm Weischedel), reprinted 1983 (Studienausgabe), in particular Vol. 6: *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik* [Writings on Anthropology, Historical Philosophy, Politics and Education]. Finally, reference may be made to the basic academic editions: I. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* [Collected Writings] (edited by Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vols. 1–22; Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vol. 23; Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Vols. 24 et seq.); offprints and reprints as of 1992, Berlin/New York, de Gruyter.
5. The following edition is a landmark for research into Kant's work for the purposes of the educational sciences: I. Kant, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Pädagogik und ihrer Begründung* [Selected Writings about Education and Its Foundations] (edited by Hans Hermann Groothoff and Edgar Reimers), Paderborn, Schöningh, 1963.
6. The essential work for comprehensive biographical research is F. Gross (ed.), *Immanuel Kant: Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen* [Immanuel Kant: His Life Presented by His Contemporaries], with biographies by L. E. Borowski, R. B. Jachmann and A. C. Wasianski, (reprint of the 1912 edition), Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980. See also: Kant, *Ausgewählte Schriften* . . . , op. cit., pp. 175–91.
7. I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [Critique of Pure Reason], 1781, 2nd improved ed. (edited by Karl Kehrbach), p. 626, Leipzig, Philipp Reclam, 1878. (II: Transcendental Methodology. Second Chapter, third section, 'On Opinion, Knowledge and Beliefs'.) Following German reunification, it now seems appropriate to refer to historically significant unified editions; the relevant Reclam editions of Kant's work are therefore used hereafter.
8. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, op. cit., p. 26.
9. I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* [Critique of Practical Reason], p. 627, 1788.
10. I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (edited by Karl Kehrbach), p. 193, Leipzig, Reclam, 1878.
11. I. Kant, 'Aufsätze des Philanthropin [Essays on the Philanthropists]', between 1776 and 1777, *Ausgewählte Schriften* . . . , op. cit., pp. 61 et seq.
12. I. Kant, 'Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre 1765–66 [Establishment of his Lectures during the Winter Semester of 1765/66]', *Ausgewählte Schriften* . . . , op. cit., p. 69.
13. I. Kant, 'Vorlesung über Pädagogik [Lectures on Education]', *Ausgewählte Schriften* . . . , op. cit., p. 69.

14. I. Kant, 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht [Idea of a General History for the Purpose of a Citizen of the World]', *Berlinische Monatschrift*, 1784; 'Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschheitsgeschichte [Presumed Beginning of the History of Mankind]', *Berlinische Monatschrift*, 1786; 'Was ist Erklärung? [What is Enlightenment?]', *Berlinische Monatschrift*, 1784; *Zum ewigen Frieden* [On Eternal Peace], 1795; *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst* [Anthropology from the Pragmatic Viewpoint], 1798.
15. I. Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* [Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason], p. 46 of the 1793 edition (and including the variations of the 1794 edition), Leipzig, Reclam, 1879. (Karl Kehrbach edition.)
16. Texts from the lecture on Pädagogik [Education] (Kant, *Ausgewählte Schriften* . . . , op. cit.), to which the figures in parentheses in the following pages refer.
17. Ritter, op. cit.
18. J. Dolch, *Lehrplan des Abendlandes: Zweieinhalbjahrtausende seiner Geschichte* [Western Curricula: 2,500 Years of its History], p. 337, Tatingen, Henn, 1965.
19. See also H. Kanz, *Bundesrepublikanische Bildungsgeschichte, 1949–1989* [The History of Education in the Federal Republic, 1949–89], Frankfurt/Main, Lang, 1989; H. Kanz, *Deutsche Erziehungsgeschichte, 1945–1985* [German History of Education, 1945–85], Frankfurt/Main, Lang, 1987.
20. U. Henning, *Eduard Spranger und Berlin: Tradition oder Erbe?* [Eduard Spranger and Berlin: Tradition or Heritage?], p. 5, Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität, 1992.
21. See H. Röhrs, *Frieden: eine pädagogische Aufgabe. Idee und Realität der Friedenspädagogik* [Peace: A Task for Education. Ideas and Realities of Peace Education], Braunschweig, Agentur Pedersen Westermann, 1983.
22. I. Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf* [On Eternal Peace: A Philosophical Essay], p. 75, Königsberg, Nicolovius, 1795.
23. Ibid., p. 91.
24. Ibid., p. 104.
25. To be found, for example, in A. Petzelt's work: 'Kant Das Fürwahrhalten lässt sich nicht mitteilen [Kant: You Cannot Communicate Your Belief]', *Einführung in die pädagogische Fragestellung: Aufsätze zur Theorie der Bildung* [Introduction to Educational Inquiry: Essays about the Theory of Education], Part 2 (edited by Wolfgang Fischer), pp. 9–61, Freiburg, Lambertus-Verlag, 1963. On the concept of dignity in modern German educational philosophy see: H. Kanz, *Einführung in die Erziehungsphilosophie* [Introduction to Educational Philosophy], p. 100, Frankfurt/Main, Lang, 1987.
26. H. Scholl and S. Scholl, *Briefe und Aufzeichnungen* [Letters and Notes] (edited by Inge Jens), Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1984, p. 100.
27. Ibid., p. 266.
28. Ibid., p. 77.
29. Kant, 'Was ist Erklärung?', op. cit.
30. A. Kaufmann, 'Rechtsphilosophie [The Philosophy of Law]', *Staatslexikon Recht, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* [State Dictionary of Law, Economy and Society] (edited by Görres-Gesellschaft), 7th completely rev. ed., Vol. 4, p. 711, Freiburg, Herder, 1988.
31. Ibid.
32. I. Kant, *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* [The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals], 2nd ed., Riga, Hartkoch, 1786. (Stuttgart, Reclam, 1952, p. 81.)
33. P. Mikat, *Ethische Strukturen der Ehe in unserer Zeit* [Ethical Structures of Contemporary Marriage], pp. 35 et seq., Paderborn, Schöningh, 1987.

34. Ibid., p. 35.
35. Kant, *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, op. cit., p. 81.
36. Mikat, op. cit., pp. 36 et seq.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. In *Die Weisse Rose. Ausstellung über den Widerstand von Studenten gegen Hitler, München, 1942–43* [The White Rose: Exhibition about the Student Resistance to Hitler, Munich, 1942–43], p. 63. Organized by the Weissen Rose Stiftung München e.V., Genter Str. 13, 8000 München 40, n.d.
40. *UNESCO heute* [UNESCO Today] (Bonn), Vol. 39, No. 1, 1992, p. 17.

Works by Immanuel Kant

(classified in chronological order)

- 1781 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. 2nd ed. 1787. (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1950.)
- 1783 *Prolegomena zur einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*. (*The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic*, 1951.)
- 1785 *Grundlegen zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. (*The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1969.)
- 1788 *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. (*Critique of Practical Reason*, 1949.)
- 1790 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. 2nd ed. 1793. (Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, 1892, 2nd ed. 1914.)
- 1793 *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. 2nd ed. 1796. (*Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, 1960.)
- 1795 *Zum ewigen Frieden*. 2nd ed. 1796. (*Perpetual Peace*, 1915, reprinted 1972.)
- 1797 *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*. 2nd ed. 1798–1803. (*The Metaphysic of Morals*, 2 vols., 1799, reprinted 1965.)
- 1798 *Der Streit der Fakultäten* [Faculty Disputes].
- 1798 *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst*. Improved ed. 1800. (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Approach*, 1964.)
- 1963 *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Pädagogik und ihrer Begründung* [Selected Writings about Education and Its Foundations]. (Edited by H. H. Groothoft and E. Reimers.) Paderborn, Schöningh.

GEORG KERSCHENSTEINER

(1852–1932)

Hermann Röhrs

An innovatory popular educator

Like Comenius, Pestalozzi and Grundtvig, Georg Kerschensteiner was a popular educator in the true sense of the term. Common to all his various activities as a teacher, director of public schools, politician and university professor was the consistent concern to put the theoretical persuasions he held into practice. For all his originality and even quirkiness as an individual and educationist, he was profoundly aware of the historical roots from which his thinking and his aspirations stemmed, his main touchstones being Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi's educational philosophy, John Dewey's broad sociological view of education and Eduard Spranger's cultural-historical perspective. His achievement rests on three major – and interdependent – concerns: the establishment of vocational education and the inculcation of civic responsibility as the mainstays of general education; deriving from this, the development of a concept of education that stressed the links between education and life; and the attempt to anchor his system of education in the broader context of a philosophy of culture.

When we confer classical status on the life's work of an individual, then surely it is because it succeeds in fashioning and cogently representing a body of ideas that are both a response to the pressing issues of the moment and, at the same time, a display of an unremitting preoccupation with fundamental concerns not limited to that day and age. If this is so, then Kerschensteiner's works must definitely be reckoned as belonging to the classical canon of writings on education (Röhrs, 1991).

Succeeding generations may subscribe to different educational values, but Kerschensteiner's works remain unchallenged in their claim to be regarded as a significant new departure in educational thinking. This applies as much to his reformatory zeal in connection with the principle of popular education as to his ideas on vocational schooling, instruction in manual skills and the role of education in instilling civic awareness. Kerschensteiner's writings are a source of inspiration for each new generation facing the perennial task of accompanying young untutored minds on the path towards intellectual maturity and moral integrity.

As with all great popular educators, Kerschensteiner's ideas are not the property of one nation but have attained universal currency in the educational world. His main works have been translated into nearly all the major languages and continue to inspire lively debate in educational circles. Even in the difficult post-Second World War years and with the atmosphere of anti-German resentment prevailing at that time, the validity and significance of Kerschensteiner's achievement was never the object of serious detraction, as the present author was able to witness on a number of study tours outside Germany. Kerschensteiner's writings are generally regarded as a shining example of the pedagogic will to renew the German education system from a practical vantage.

In the course of his career, Kerschensteiner traversed all the various levels of educational activity. After starting out as an elementary-school teacher, he studied mathematics and physics, thus advancing to the position of teacher at a *Gymnasium* (selective secondary school). From 1895 to 1919, he was director of public schools in Munich, and it was in this capacity that he attained worldwide renown. Here he developed the existing *Fortbildungsschule* (literally: further-education school) into a fully fledged vocational school and encouraged practical work in schools, in the spirit of his espousal of the idea of the *Arbeitsschule* (literally: work school). From 1919 onwards, he held a professorship at the University of Munich.

It was against this practical background that the body of his writings took shape. In his first publication, *Betrachtungen zur Theorie des Lehrplans* [Thoughts on Curriculum Theory] (1899), he criticizes Herbart's education system for what he calls its 'formalism'. It is Kerschensteiner's unswerving conviction that schools must see themselves as productive elements of society. He substantiated this view in his disquisition *Die staatsbürgerliche Erziehung der deutschen Jugend* [The Civic Education of Germany's Youth] (1901), an entry for a competition organized by the Academy of Sciences in Erfurt. This key concept in his understanding of the role of education was later enlarged upon in his treatise on *Der Begriff der staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung* [The Concept of Civic Education] (1907). That year also saw the publication of his closely argued discussion of the organizational problems involved in ensuring that, for young people, attending school means entering an environment reflecting the necessities and realities of life. It was entitled *Grundfragen der Schulorganisation* [Basic Issues in School Organization]. Five years later, in 1912, his study *Der Begriff der Arbeitsschule* [The Concept of the Work School] reviewed the tasks involved in the internal organization of schools and the methodological and didactic reforms required for this to be done properly.

The objectives and methods of teaching scientific subjects, an issue particularly dear to his heart, were analysed in his *Wesen und Wert des naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichts* [Nature and Value of Instruction in the Sciences] (1914). Fundamental questions of internal and external school organization and adolescent education were dealt with in his book *Die Seele des Erziehers und das Problem der Lehrerbildung* [The Soul of the Educator and the Problem of Teacher Training] (1921), at a time when the great post-First World War debate about the reform of teacher training was gathering momentum.

Kerschensteiner's later writings, representing a contribution to the philoso-

phy of education, were also invariably the product of reflection on his own educational activity and its pragmatic implications. First among these was *Das Grundaxiom des Bildungsprozesses* [The Basic Axiom of the Educational Process] (1917). Kerschensteiner systematized his thinking more fully in his major work *Theorie der Bildung* [Theory of Education] (1926), the fruit of profound immersion in works and ideas representing major milestones in educational theory and philosophy, notably those of Pestalozzi, neo-Kantianism, Spranger and Dewey. In its entirety, Kerschensteiner's *œuvre* is the expression of an approach to education which, after proving its potential through the author's own educational activity, then attained a supreme degree of critical and self-critical cogency by dint of profound reflection on the philosophy of education. The measure of international influence that it has achieved is closely bound up with its roots in Kerschensteiner's own highly successful practical experience as an educator.

Herder's suggestive image of a tree's branches providing more generous shade the more deeply rooted it is in its native soil is an eloquent illustration of an essential aspect of Kerschensteiner's nature and work. Kerschensteiner was a Bavarian, and Bavarians are endowed by nature with a species of earthy humour and an affirmative attitude towards life that helped Kerschensteiner to weather the by-no-means-infrequent storms and *contretemps* that beset him in the course of his career. One (unfortunately very rare) ability that he had was that of resolving an apparently hopeless deadlock with a humorous remark that in its straightforward commonsense and irrefutability reconciled the embattled adversaries on the spot. This was an attribute of particular value in negotiating ticklish situations in which the likelihood of umbrage being taken was large. When Kerschensteiner's nephew, Nico Wallner, approached him with the, perhaps, premature resolve to organize a *Festschrift* (commemorative publication) to mark Eduard Spranger's fiftieth birthday, the correspondence between the latter and Kerschensteiner is remarkable in precisely this respect. After a humorous description of Wallner's intentions, Kerschensteiner writes:

Now I don't know what you think of all this, but I don't mind telling you that I'm dead against this new trend. In the old days you had to be 70 to qualify for homages like this, then they dropped it to 60 and these days you only have to hold out till you're 50! If you ask me it's arrant tomfoolery, and you know this has nothing to do with my admiration and affection for you. We all expect you to soldier on in the best of health to celebrate your sixtieth and seventieth birthdays to the greater glory of our beloved fatherland. And what are we supposed to do then? Organize two more *Festschriften*; Heaven preserve us.

The reaction from Spranger, who was sensitive, not to say touchy, by nature, was one of surprising equanimity:

With regard to the planned *Festschrift*, your sentiments are entirely my own. Indeed, it would be a source of very real displeasure to me if this enterprise could not be nipped in the bud. My fiftieth birthday isn't worth so much as a supper-party to me, at the most an outing in the country with friends, if the weather's fine. So please tell them that, if you're any judge of my feelings on the matter, it's a case of 'motion dismissed before the first reading'! [Englert, 1966].

The friendship between these two renowned educationists and the expression it finds in their extensive correspondence is an unusually fortunate instance of the way in which educational theory can mature and achieve a truly human dimension in the course of a personal relationship of this nature. From this point of view, the correspondence is in fact more enlightening than some of the educational theories themselves taken on purely abstract terms. It is indeed significant of Kerschensteiner's concept of education that for him the humanizing aspect of education is at least as important as the theory. He is quite adamant that it is by their contribution to human relations that such theories must stand or fall. The measure of all educational thinking is the extent to which it furthers the development towards, and the consolidation of, true humanity. This development is reflected as much in the faculty of personal judgement as in vocational fulfilment or creative expression in the various fields of art and crafts.

With his artistic bent and cosmopolitan persuasions, Kerschensteiner took a keen interest in the intellectual life of the age. His aesthetic sensibility is impressively documented by the study *Die Entwicklung der zeichnerischen Begabung* [The Development of Drawing Skill] (1905), which, although now methodologically outdated, contains such excellent comparisons and interpretations of several thousand children's drawings as to represent a mine of information and inspiration for art teachers to this day. At the same time, the study is a superb example of the practical orientation of Kerschensteiner's educational approach.

Kerschensteiner gathered his pedagogic insights and experiences not only in the classroom but equally in exchange, debate and encounter away from the cloistered atmosphere of school: on his various extended study trips; in his discussions on philosophy and aesthetics with Adolf von Hildebrand in the latter's house at San Francesco on the slopes of the Apennines, with its uplifting view of Florence and Fiesole, where Kerschensteiner first met Aloys Fischer, later a colleague of his at Munich University; in earnest political debate with his fellow party members Theodor Barth and Friedrich Naumann, when he became a member of the Reichstag for Munich (1912–18); or on his journeys to the United States, where he met John Dewey, albeit only briefly.

In his capacity as director of public schools in Munich, Kerschensteiner embarked on a lecture tour across the United States at the invitation of Charles R. Richards, president of the International Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education. This was in the autumn of 1910. Kerschensteiner set out with the express intention of arranging an encounter with Dewey, to whom he owed much inspiration for his own work. It was on 29 November 1910 that the two prominent educationists met for an exchange of views at the Faculty Club of Columbia University in New York (Knoll, 1993, p. 32).

It is thus a life rich in incident that presents itself to the biographer. Kerschensteiner was as much at home in the aesthetic sphere as in the less rarefied atmosphere of active politics, to mention only the most obvious contrast. Kerschensteiner's career is a rare example of the way in which experience in different walks of life can cohere to form an organic unity. His activities as elementary-school teacher, *Gymnasium* instructor in mathematics and physics, director of public

schools in Munich, member of the Reichstag and, from 1919, professor of education at Munich University are all informed by the guiding principle of popular education, the determination to provide adequate educational care for those broad classes of the working population not fortunate enough to be guided through long years of secondary schooling to true assessment and discovery of the vocations they are best cut out for.

These activities were firmly anchored in an all-encompassing educational ethic that was central to Kerschensteiner's thinking and prompted him to place everything he did – organizationally or politically – in the service of educational objectives. In his 1921 analysis of what it is that characterizes the true educator, *The Soul of the Educator and the Problem of Teacher Training* (1949), Kerschensteiner sees the teacher as belonging to the category of the 'caring' vocations and in this it is surely legitimate to discern elements of a personal profession of faith.

The image of Kerschensteiner that most readily springs to mind is that of the director of public schools in Munich, a popular educator in the Pestalozzian mould, establishing vocational schools, setting up public libraries, championing an extension of minimum school attendance and commemorating Pestalozzi with an epoch-making address of 1908 on the methods of popular education: *Die Schule der Zukunft: eine Arbeitsschule* [The School of the Future: A Work School] (1912).

In the face of all this, the essentially academic criticisms levelled at Kerschensteiner by Gaudig at the first Congress on Youth Research and Youth Education in 1911 in Dresden lose much of their impact, while the limitations of Kerschensteiner's own later theoretical writings also become more apparent. The works by Kerschensteiner that belong to the essential canon of educational thinking stem without exception from his own practical endeavours.

Renewing the education system

It is here that we must look for an answer to the question about the relationship between theory and practice in Kerschensteiner's works. Both are inextricably bound up together, with educational activity invariably providing the material for theoretical reflection and dictating the course it took. It was only after Kerschensteiner had overhauled the elementary school system in Munich and created the vocational school that his first theoretical writings of genuine moment – *Thoughts on Curriculum Theory* (1899, 1931) and *The Civic Education of Germany's Youth* (1901) – were set down. If these writings have retained so much of their original vigour, both in the conduct of the debate and the continued relevance of the issues they address, then it is because they so eloquently reflect the author's immediate and committed engagement with the problems besetting universal and vocational education for the broad masses.

The reader is aware throughout these works of the rich fund of experience in various kinds of educational practice that informs the reflections put forward by the author. These initial theoretical writings adumbrate the major concerns dealt with in greater detail in Kerschensteiner's later extensive *œuvre*. All these later

works are shot through by concern with the problem of organizing national education to centre around the ideal of civic responsibility and a genuine work ethic.

The second phase in Kerschensteiner's activities began with his professorship in Munich in 1919. Inspired by Spranger and the writings of Rickert and Windelband, he set out in search of a philosophical grounding for his educational theories. This culminated in *The Theory of Education* (1926). But even so outwardly theoretical a work as *The Basic Axiom of the Educational Process*, the first fruit of his concern with the philosophy of education written in 1921, is notable for the balance it seeks to achieve between theory and practice, and its advocacy of a species of education that is geared to the interests and gifts of the individual: 'For an element of our cultural heritage to bear educational fruit for the individual, the intellectual make-up of that element must be totally or at least partly compatible with the intellectual make-up of the individual' (Kerschensteiner, 1924, p. 9).

In addition, the distinction Kerschensteiner makes between the potential energy and the kinetic energy of educational materials shows that he retained his allegiance to the scientific bent in his thinking. At the same time it confirms his loyalty to a dynamic conception of education, seeing the value of knowledge exclusively in terms of the extent to which it is able to establish and activate the powers of argumentation and responsible action. Knowledge is only educational to the extent that it attains relevance and formative value in the life of the individual.

Kerschensteiner's central achievement in the eyes of the educational world is the foundation of the vocational school and the concomitant reorganization of the *Volksschule* (primary and junior secondary schools). Civic instruction and schooling in practical skills are the complementary methodical principles, differing only in matters of accentuation at the two levels. A number of different approaches reflecting the spirit of the age are united in this conception, notably the concentration on psychological and sociological issues, and concern with the work ethic.

No other creative educationist has turned the legacy of Pestalozzi to such productive account in his work as Kerschensteiner. And no other educator primarily concerned with the practicalities of education has given the ideas put forward by Pestalozzi such earnest consideration in terms of their relevance to a later age. Spranger was particularly aware of this aspect when writing to Kerschensteiner: 'After your address in Zurich I personally see in you the true inheritor of Pestalozzi's mantle' (Bähr, 1978, p. 55).

The same restless, questing spirit which, in the face of the onset of industrialization, drove Pestalozzi to seek a method of educating the broad mass of the population is present in Kerschensteiner's work. He too acknowledges that the absolute claims of a humanist concept of education must be tempered by a concern to relate educational endeavour to the situation of the individual. Taking a lead from developments in youth psychology in the 1890s, Kerschensteiner attempts to give greater psychological precision to the terms 'individual situation' and 'spontaneity' as they apply to children. His conclusions are that, by instinct, children are motorically inclined and their primary urge is towards the concrete – manual contact with concrete things.

This idea is expounded most cogently in the Zurich address. In the first years of life, the infant at play in its home environment finds there the first 'workshop of the mind'. A multiplicity of impressions and stimuli go together to make up the initial infant image of the world. Accordingly, Kerschensteiner contends that for the older child the schoolroom must become the 'central workshop of the mind'. Fundamental to any furthering of intellectual development is due consideration of this cast of the infant mind and the way in which it progresses from practical interests to theoretical ones. In the 'Pestalozzi Address', Kerschensteiner (1912, p. 106) puts it this way: 'For all our concentration on book-learning in school, 90 per cent of all boys and girls far prefer any kind of practical activity to quiet, abstract thought and reflection. Put them in workshops and kitchens, gardens and fields, stables and fishing boats, and you will always find them willing to work.' His laconic conclusion is: 'The book-learning school must be turned into a work school.'

This persuasion, of course, has a bearing on the principles of teacher training as Kerschensteiner sees them. With Spranger, and against Aloys Fischer and others, Kerschensteiner is vehemently against university study for *Volksschule* teachers (Englert, 1966, p. 268). This has nothing to do with issues of status or fears of a loss of academic quality in higher education. Both Spranger and Kerschensteiner are concerned with the specifics of teacher training and the necessity of anticipating at the training stage the nature of the teacher's later work in school. Education by example is the watchword; and experience of an exemplary, organic blend of theory and practice in action is the only convincing basis for the successful conduct of everyday school life. Kerschensteiner writes: 'The poorest village school run along Pestalozzian lines can be a more valuable educational institution than a superbly equipped, magnificently endowed city school, full of highly qualified doctors of philosophy.' In accordance with his plea for the specific training of elementary-school teachers in the essentially social nature of their later task, his conclusion for the teacher-training curriculum is: 'The guiding light of the *Volksschule* is not Kant or Goethe, but Pestalozzi!' (Kerschensteiner, 1949, p. 155).

Here Kerschensteiner is not advocating any restriction on individual intellectual development but rather a strongly social orientation on the part of the teacher which reveals itself more in his commitment to interpersonal care than on academic qualifications. Academic honours at the expense of a pedagogic ethic is an impoverishment of school life. This is Kerschensteiner's conviction. While it is certainly not least a product of the intellectual climate of the age, it can with equal certainty claim due consideration in the interests of a balanced development both for the teacher and his charges.

The obvious conclusion from this approach is the call for allegiance to the spirit of Pestalozzi as a concrete requirement for educational reform (as opposed to a mere chapter in educational history) with a view to anchoring educational theory more firmly in actual pedagogic practice. Here the three educationists most notable for their concern with the true spirit of the *Volksschule* – Kerschensteiner, Spranger and Fischer – are unanimous, for all their differences about the issue of teacher training. And it is this that establishes them among the founders of modern popular education.

Methods of instruction in work skills

Ever since Kerschensteiner coined the term '*Arbeitsschule*', it has been one of the most frequently quoted and frequently misunderstood elements in the vocabulary of the educational reform movement. As early as 1911 in Dresden, at the congress of the Federation for School Reform, Gaudig accused Kerschensteiner of having 'handicrafted' the intellectual factor out of school. His objections are however one-sided and neglect the specific educational significance that Kerschensteiner attributes to (handicraft) work in school, for example his claim that manual work enhances veracity and that there could be no deception in concrete work as there was nothing for it to conceal. Accordingly, he is not so much concerned with technical skills as a preliminary stage for later vocational training as with the inculcation of honest working methods, care and circumspection, and the arousal of a spirit of responsibility via self-reliant activity.

The encounter with Gaudig, the influence of the German *Wertphilosophie* (philosophy of values), and the thinking of Spranger were not without effect on Kerschensteiner. More and more he sees in the work school an instrument of independent and self-motivated acquisition of knowledge, in the properly educational sense of the term. The importance attributed to the 'manual' and the 'practical' later transcends the plane of pure skill and competence and is incorporated into the educational principle of independent, responsible activity. Emphasis must, however, be placed on the fact that for all the respect Kerschensteiner had for practical work, his work-school idea had never in fact been centred exclusively around it. He was neither the one-sided 'champion of the practical' nor did he later advocate a one-sided 'spiritualization of the concept of work'. He was much too familiar with the actual requirements of practice, which are invariably both practical and theoretical. The spiritualization of his concept of work was a 'gradual' development, as Wilhelm (1957, p. 39) convincingly shows.

The interesting question of the relationship between innovation and philosophical reflection has frequently been posed. Felix von Cube (1960, p. 18) was one of those to take it up. His theory that the clarity and *élan* of the early reformer Kerschensteiner was vitiated by his later philosophical phase is rejected by Wehle (1956, p. 178). While it is undeniable that the early reformatory concepts of vocational school, work school and civic education were not significantly enlarged upon in Kerschensteiner's later works, there can be no doubt that they form a very essential part of the practical substance underlying Kerschensteiner's philosophical thinking (Wilhelm, 1957, p. 161).

Ultimately, it is a fact of all human life and intellectual endeavour that in phases of profound reflection the urge for practical activity tends to be held in abeyance. In the case of Pestalozzi, the Neuhof estate and Stans also formed the background for his philosophical study *Meine Nachforschungen über den Gang der Natur in der Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts* [Inquiries into the Course of Nature in the Development of Humankind]. As a thinker, Kerschensteiner was a true Pestalozzian and it was Pestalozzi who was most instrumental in providing him with an access to philosophy (Niklis, 1960).

These considerations retain their validity in connection with the idea of the work school. Properly undertaken, manual work will develop a faculty for logical thought that is applicable to any other kind of activity and can be deepened at a later stage. There is such a thing as manual intelligence – this is Kerschensteiner's first major insight – and this needs to be nurtured in school as it is an integral part of every individual child's character. It represents an important aspect of what it means to be human and must not be allowed to wither and decay.

But in Kerschensteiner's view, manual work without intellectual effort will be mechanical, indeed 'it can only become work in the pedagogic sense of the term if it stems from intellectual effort that has been invested beforehand and is taken up anew throughout the course of its performance' (Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 55). Thus, the essential feature of manual work in the pedagogic sense is its planning and independent performance in accordance with the nature of the task, and the possibility of self-review. There is in Kerschensteiner's view only one thing that can make a school a work school in the proper sense of the term and this is 'the growing adequacy of the pupil's attitude to the task in hand, that growth being rooted in the possibility of self-review' (Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 55). Of greater importance than the subject matter – be it practical or theoretical – is thus the way in which the work ethic determines the pupil's attitude. It is concern for the adequacy to the task in hand, coupled with the freedom to perform that task as the pupil sees fit.

Seen thus, the idea of the work school reveals itself as a methodological principle, and that is Kerschensteiner's second major insight, evident already in his earlier writings. It is applicable at all levels, as in demonstrated in *The Concept of the Work School* (1957) with reference to the birdhouse, the village fire-alarm and the Horatian ode as examples of manual, moral and academic subjects respectively.

What do these examples show? The essential thing is not the subject-matter but the spirit and mentality of independent, responsible work, for 'adequacy to the task in hand is synonymous with morality'. The ultimate cementing of this ethical attitude towards work is the organization of independent individual work within a working community, where the teacher assists the pupils with advice and practical help, like a master craftsman supervising the work of his apprentices.

All the elements of Kerschensteiner's conception are attuned to one another. At the centre we have education seen both as a process and as an end in itself (albeit not a final end but a temporary conclusion of a given stage of development). 'Education is a sense of value, of individually determined breadth and depth, awakened by the subject-matter and organized differently by each individual' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 15). This is the broad definition provided in *The Theory of Education* from an axiological point of view (and in analogy to Spranger's concept of the 'personal educative centre').

In this sense, education is both a reactivation of the cultural potential immanent in the subject matter and a function of the progressive culture of the individual's personality. And although this process is never-ending, it invariably displays a structure all of its own: 'Education is that functioning of the mind that remains when everything by which it was engendered has been forgotten', as Kerschensteiner puts it later in *The Theory of Education*.

Education is a dynamic process, which is dependent upon the procedures of work instruction capable of triggering most effectively the cultural reactivation referred to above. Self-reliant activity as an individual form of this 'acquisition principle' is the most effective way of ensuring that the 'potential educational energy' is transformed into 'kinetic educational energy'. In short, the educational potential undergoes a process of activation.

The proper social setting for the pedagogic implementation of these ideas is the working group, as here the basic rules of communal life and the central civic virtues can best be instilled and practised. It is this combination between inculcation of a genuine work ethic and of civic responsibility, with the attendant reciprocal influence between the individual and the collective in the interests of greater moral maturity, which justifies Kerschensteiner's proclamation that the ultimate objective of the educative process is to establish a state based on culture and the rule of law. Self-evaluation in the framework of work instruction culminates in a degree of personal integrity that helps to transform into true formative education the training of civic virtues in the work setting. This 'consummation', as Kerschensteiner used to write the word, is somewhat reminiscent of the streak of asceticism characteristic of Aloys Fischer's approach, a point on which Kerschensteiner himself, however, had a number of reservations.

Civic education

Kerschensteiner's most genuinely original achievement is the establishment of the vocational school, a cross between apprenticeship and formal education. He advocated instruction in practical skills at the workplace itself, coupled with theoretical consolidation in the school environment, in conscious preference to the *écoles professionnelles d'apprentissage* to be found in France and elsewhere, where vocational education takes place exclusively in the schools. Here, Kerschensteiner was able to draw upon approaches developed in the nineteenth century, his objective being to achieve a symbiosis between the more general instruction provided by the Sunday schools – largely run by primary-school teachers – and the more specialized instruction in specific skills.

The quest for the correct relationship between general knowledge and vocational education is central to this conception. Kerschensteiner saw this against the sociological background of the industrial society in which each individual's life centres around work, while meditation and contemplation only have their deeper significance as pointers through life within the framework of an existence largely determined by work. The 'ideal individual', Kerschensteiner insists, can only be formed by way of the 'useful individual'. It is only in the context of vocational activity that general knowledge can attain its true significance as formation of the personality, formation of the individual in the community. The objective was to ensure that individuals should achieve maturity by way of proving their worth in the area of activity that their personal fate had destined them for. Here and here alone is true humanity attainable.

This is the real reason for Kerschensteiner's scepticism about general knowl-

edge for its own sake. Accordingly, his advocacy of a prolongation of instruction beyond the ninth year of schooling was conditional upon such instruction being vocationally oriented, ideally at a vocational school. Life in a working community oriented towards a constantly renewed striving for active fellowship and charity towards others, and the ability to subordinate oneself to the overall good, was more important to him than theoretical instruction. Thus, he regarded civic education less as an instrument for drumming knowledge about the workings of a democratic community into the heads of the pupils than as a vehicle for the inculcation of a political mentality that must first of all assert itself at the most basic level, in joint work within the group and through responsible participation in the communal life of the school.

According to Kerschensteiner's idea of civic education, instruction in the citizen's 'duties' takes precedence over instruction in the citizens' 'rights'. These duties need to be practised in everyday life. School must thus be a microcosm of the state and confront the pupils with an abundance of social tasks: 'The only way to prepare young people for life in the community is to have them participate fully in the life of a society from the outset' (Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 49). In complete accord with his mentor Dewey, he stresses the necessity of active, responsible work within a working community and voluntary self-subordination to the pupils' elected representatives in the school administration as a *conditio sine qua non* of civic education.

Kerschensteiner's one-sided interpretation of Dewey has frequently been criticized, most notably by Wilhelm. The latter objects that political maturity as an aim of education does not necessarily follow naturally out of social maturity. Tensions and conflicts may arise, originating from differences of social status and the consequent differences in political objectives. Seen thus, Kerschensteiner's rendering of Dewey's term 'embryonic community life' as *Staatsleben im Kleinen* (literally: the life of the state in microcosm) (Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 18) is an over-simplification. He overlooks the fact that Dewey's perspective here extends from the pioneering spirit of the colonial epoch and the cohesive style of community life in that context to cover differences between rich and poor, and black and white. Even at this preliminary stage in school, civic instruction must reflect the political dimension in a way that becomes more systematic and more apparent the older the pupils are.

The major difference between Kerschensteiner and Dewey, despite their mutual admiration and the similarities of their views on the practicalities and the philosophy of education, is clearest in the controversy about vocational education. Kerschensteiner advocates a school of continuing education that provides theoretical knowledge alongside, and as a complement to, the practicalities of vocational education and apprenticeship. Dewey, by contrast, emphasizes the significance of school as the foundation of later vocational activity, forming the faculty of judgement in young people and thus equipping them for their vocational lives (Knoll, 1993). Kerschensteiner's perspective on education as an appeal to the natural egoism of young people and their desire for personal advancement and his insistence that general education must continue in close combination with vocational instruc-

tion, albeit under conditions analogous to those of everyday life, represents an area of disagreement between the two educators. Dewey, however, failed to appreciate this point.

Kerschensteiner emphasizes what he calls the 'law of the proliferation of interests', which makes it possible for practical work to enhance an appreciation of theoretical concerns common to both the natural sciences and the humanities. He sees the advantage of this procedure in the fact that everything is located in a practical context, ensuring the full attention of the participants because their natural selfish desire for vocational success is thus activated. From this he derives his 1911 statement on the 'fundamental law of all mental development, which invariably moves from practical interests to the theoretical plane' (Kerschensteiner, 1957, p. 28). Dewey on the other hand advocates vocational education in the school framework as one option among many to be provided by schools of an adequately flexible and differentiated nature. This stems from his experience of William Wirth's Gary System, to which he devotes the chapter 'The Relation of the School to the Community', notable for its educational verve, in *Schools of Tomorrow* (Dewey and Dewey, 1915, pp. 167–206; Röhrs, 1977, pp. 88–92).

There is little justification for the accusation of national one-sidedness frequently levelled at Kerschensteiner's concept of civic education. For Kerschensteiner, a firm grounding in the national sphere is necessary for the transition to a more international attitude, again in line with Herder's image of the way in which a tree firmly rooted in its native soil is better equipped to spread its branches across the fence and into neighbouring gardens. The firmer the foundation at the national level, the less likelihood there is that the cosmopolitan attitude will waver. Rickert's dictum that 'the path to things not subject to historical change' will invariably lead 'through things historical' (Rickert, 1910/11) is to be found in various guises in the thinking of Kerschensteiner, who was familiar with Rickert's works. In the context of civic education he writes: 'The path to the stalwart cosmopolitan invariably leads via the stalwart citizen' (Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 34).

The life of the individual is marked by contest and conflict, and the same is true of the coexistence of nations. Entirely in line with Kant's thinking in his 'Concept of a Form of History Promoting a Cosmopolitan Attitude' and 'Of Eternal Peace', Kerschensteiner sees in historical development a process of humanization that can lead to a genuinely cosmopolitan attitude:

If history taught us nothing else, there is one truth that we find on almost every page of it: human life is a constant sequence of conflicts and reconciliations. It is in these conflicts and reconciliations that culture, and above all political civilization is fashioned. Eternal peace can only supervene when there is only one human being left in the world. The objective of civic education is none other than to make conflict more humane and reconciliation more voluntary [Kerschensteiner, 1950, p. 42].

Kerschensteiner explicitly refutes the fallacy that his version of civic education is nothing more than instruction in political lore or the inculcation of civic duties (1950, p. 15). While it is true that his perspective is primarily oriented towards the obligations incumbent upon a responsible citizen, he in no way advocates a dog-

matic or formalist approach, seeing an awareness of civic obligations as the result of a form of schooling that consciously instils both awareness of the necessity of a work ethic and the indispensability of genuine civic-mindedness.

Of course, the choice of a perspective concentrating on citizens' duties is bound to appear formalistic if it fails to reflect the aspect of the immediate relevance of these duties to life in a community. But there can be no doubt that a democracy cannot function without a reasoned catalogue of civic duties and obligations, and the attendant social virtues that spring from them. The operative word here is 'reasoned'. In order to be accepted and internalized, duties must be shown to be a living part of the functioning of a community. The same applies to the inculcation of the work ethic. In short, these methodic principles have lost none of their relevance and are certainly anything but a remote chapter in the history of education. It is here that Kerschensteiner, with his sound, practical attitude, can serve today as an exemplary figure worthy of emulation.

Thus the close affinity between the idea of the work school and the idea of civic education becomes apparent. It is impossible to instil a sense of social responsibility if the ground has not been prepared in early infancy. Thus, the method of independent, responsible work is the very precondition of any kind of civic education, and this in its turn will derive its most fruitful educational impulses from action and reflection in the social context of everyday school life.

After a promising start in the 1920s, civic education in German schools was quickly declared 'bankrupt'. At the same time, critical voices were heard to suggest that the idea of work instruction only encouraged a species of activity that mirrored the restlessness of a hectic age and was entirely devoid of any truly educational import. Both these judgements only go to show how poorly Kerschensteiner was understood even in his own day.

Kerschensteiner was in fact at pains to demonstrate his critical attitude towards the 'apostles of spontaneity', as he called them disparagingly. This is borne out by his statement that 'the idea of the work school is to use a minimum of subject matter to spark off a maximum of skill, ability and enthusiasm for work, all in the service of civic-mindedness' (Kerschensteiner, 1957, p. 99). Here Kerschensteiner once again stresses the direct reciprocal links between the work school and civic education. Work performed independently and responsibly within a working community and representing the fruit of a concerted effort at the planning, execution and evaluation stage is inevitably civic in character. Organized in this way, it enhances the social aspect of the work being done and, as such, is an establishing and consolidating factor in the constitution of the community, enriching the concept of the state with a more profound moral dimension.

The formation of personality

Any analysis of Kerschensteiner's work will invariably lead to contemplation of the personality of this exemplary educator, for almost all his theoretical utterances are reflections of his own lifestyle. Kerschensteiner represents that rare species, the practically minded, experienced, imaginative educationist. The two favourite mottos

he regularly quoted as epitomizing his attitude to life are: 'For the diligent the world is not mute' and 'Despair is a lack of trust in God.'

This optimism is mirrored in the characteristics that he discusses at length as qualifying a good teacher, in his book *The Soul of the Educator and the Problem of Teacher Training* (1949): an understanding nature; the ability to be emotionally stirred to the depths; sensitivity and tact as the precondition of empathy with others; in short, true humanity rather than encyclopedic knowledge. The parallels to Spranger's characterization of his friend Kerschensteiner in his preface to the latter's *The Soul of the Educator and the Problem of Teacher Training* are striking:

Pessimism in whatever form was entirely alien to him, but certainly not because there was any dearth of profound sorrow in his own life. From the most mundane, everyday distresses to the depths of religious doubt and conflict, he ran the whole gamut of human suffering and pain. But this suffering was visited upon a man of a sound and robust constitution who had never set out with the intention of taking life away from its enjoyable and pleasurable side. He was one of the old generation, who knew that life means struggle and conflict, that life is harsh and unfeeling. If young people are to be guided towards a genuinely life-affirming attitude and the ability to cope with vicissitudes, then they must be shown that this can only be achieved by drawing upon a certain wealth of spirit. There is no easier alternative [Kerschensteiner, 1949].

Knowledge for its own sake, isolated, undigested fact, will always remain an external additive. Only when it is placed in relation to the individual can it enrich the fund of acquired experience and thus become part of the central powerhouse of the personality.

This development of the personality is the central task of the educational process. In the last resort, Kerschensteiner is aiming at an educational transformation of Goethe's axiom 'Personality is the supreme human treasure', taking the term 'treasure' and translating it into the willingness and capacity to assume responsibility as the pillars of a truly human community.

In Kerschensteiner's view, three features determine personality. First, an 'especial one-ness of the spiritual self' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 84). For all its activity, the personality is not submerged by a multiplicity of uncoordinated tasks and does not lose itself in the work it performs, but rather puts its unmistakable stamp on everything it does. Secondly, personality is expressed in a 'constant, independent response to its environment' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 84). It represents a source of equanimity and order in its environment by virtue of the personal and political responsibility of its actions within that environment. The third feature is the 'conscious striving for inner self-improvement' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 84). The will to self-perfection (though never at the expense of social and political responsibility) is the living centre of the personality. This alone is the true motor of development. Of fundamental significance for all three criteria is that they should be geared to the values ensuring the integrity of the moral profile of the personality, thus guaranteeing the continuity of the effect it has on the environment and also on its own internal development. Here the traditional virtues of strength of character, diligence and judgement play a fundamental role.

The ultimate objective is the 'moral improvement of the community' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 189) via the effect of the personality. An important step towards this goal is 'vocational education', for the 'road to education leads through work' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 189). Here we find two essential aspects united, first the fundamental significance that Kerschensteiner attributes to work in the educational process, and secondly the socio-political nature of the task facing the individual personality and awareness of this as a general aim of education, seeking to effect a viable foundation for human society via the improvement of the individual. The success (or otherwise) of this reciprocal process is a function of the wealth of personal spirit, which is why confrontation with established values, reliable value judgements and faith in a system of values play such an essential role. The aim is the achievement of a 'value-oriented mentality' (Kerschensteiner, 1926, p. 80).

It is from this 'wealth of spirit' that Kerschensteiner's humour springs. As an example, we may recall the 'May sermons', delivered by Kerschensteiner in the guise of 'Pater Hilaricus' on the annual May outings of a club named the Gesellschaft der Niederländer to the residence of Count Pappenheim. The very titles convey Kerschensteiner's whimsicality, his readiness to treat earnest topics in a lighter vein: *de Stultitiae Beneficio* [The Blessings of Stupidity]; *de Pulcibus Mentalibus* [On Mental Fleas]; *de Nincompoopitate Generis Humani*. Kerschensteiner the mathematician characterizes mathematics as the 'science of the point', going on to define the standpoint as a 'perspective with a radius of zero' (M. Kerschensteiner, 1954, p. 220).

This form of humour permits a more detached perspective on everyday matters and also fuels Kerschensteiner's uninhibited verve in tackling the solution of important tasks. 'Humour as the very foundation of the spirit' (1949, p. 74) is an important element in pedagogic success. Weniger (1979, p. 211) describes this feature as follows: 'The finest thing about Kerschensteiner is his humour, a productive combination of realist scepticism and idealist faith, the humour of true wisdom, without which the existence of an educator would be intolerable.'

Kerschensteiner could display his humour most freely at the social evenings at his house in the Bogenhausen district of Munich. On these occasions music also played an important role. Kerschensteiner was an accomplished pianist and greatly loved making music with friends, notably Aloys Fischer's wife, the violinist Paula Fischer-Thalmann, later to be murdered as a Jewess in Theresienstadt concentration camp. These gatherings frequently ended in lively discussions of philosophical and educational subjects with Kerschensteiner's 'neighbour and friend' Fischer (M. Kerschensteiner, 1954, p. 222).

Is this the attitude of a pedagogic *grand seigneur*, divorced from the petty concerns of everyday life and hence at liberty to meditate on them from a 'higher' vantage? Not at all. Even in his theoretical work, Kerschensteiner remained a practitioner. All his life he strove to find the right answers to everyday problems, for these were the ones that beset him most obstinately even when he became director of public schools and later a university professor. Kerschensteiner regarded the challenges of teaching and education as a source of inspiration sparking off the

inventiveness characteristic of any educationist worthy of the name. He was a personality who embodied in practical terms what he advocated in theory: strength of character in the pursuit of one's objectives, trenchancy in thought and action, and political responsibility. These features are to be found throughout his works. And it is here that Kerschensteiner's relevance for the future becomes most evident and makes the concern with his legacy an imperative for the present.

Works by Georg Kerschensteiner

(classified in chronological order)

- 1912 *Die Schule der Zukunft: eine Arbeitsschule* [The School of the Future: A Work School]. *Grundfragen der Schulorganisation* [Fundamental Issues in School Organization]. Leipzig/Berlin.
- 1923 *Begriff der staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung* [Concept of Civic Education]. Leipzig/Berlin.
- 1924 *Das Grundaxiom des Bildungsprozesses und seine Folgerungen für die Schulorganisation* [The Basic Axiom of the Educational Process and its Consequences for School Organization]. Berlin.
- 1926 *Theorie der Bildung* [Theory of Education]. Leipzig/Berlin, 1926.
- 1949 *Die Seele des Erziehers und das Problem der Lehrerbildung* [The Soul of the Educator and the Problem of Teacher Training]. Munich.
- 1950 *Der Begriff der staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung* [The Concept of Civic Education]. Munich.
- 1957 *Der Begriff der Arbeitsschule* [The Concept of the Work School]. Munich.
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Thorbjörn Langvén

Ellen Key is one of the rare Swedish writers on educational subjects who have won a true international reputation. Her impact on the European movement is probably results from the vividness of her style, the strength of her opinions, her personal involvement, her enthusiasm and her convincing power.

Ellen Key was not only interested in education, but also in other fields of human life: literature and art, religion and politics, history, psychology, marriage, love, and so on. Her considerable personal library included many journals, as well as books and charts, both for her own use and for her pupils.

Her profile is divided into five parts. In the first part, the most important of her works are dealt with, and a short sketch of her personal and family background describes her social and intellectual portrait. The next part contains a list of the main influences influencing her writing on education. The third and fourth sections consist of 'Thoughts on Education' and 'Conclusions'. In the 'Conclusions', Ellen Key's educational philosophy and the international influence of her work is assessed.

The writings of Ellen Key

Ellen Key started her career as a writer towards the middle of the 1870s with a couple of literary essays. She became known to a large public through the book *On Freedom of Speech and Publishing* (1887). Her name and her books became known due to the topic of lively discussions. Among her larger works which contain what we could mention individualism and socialism (1891-93), *Human Science* (1898), *Human Science* (1899), *Lifelines*, Vols. 1-3 (1902), *Thoughts of the Soul* (1916).

The contents of these works prepare the reader for the main ideas with which Ellen Key's subsequent work was concerned: the individual, the personal freedom and on the importance of education.

ELLEN KEY

(1849-1926)

Thorbjörn Lengborn

Ellen Key is one of the rare Swedish writers on educational subjects who has achieved a true international reputation. Her impact on the international community probably results from the vividness of her style, the sharpness of her criticism, her personal involvement, her enthusiasm and her sometimes prophetic vision.

Ellen Key was not only interested in education. As a writer she covered a wide field: literature and art, religion and politics, women's suffrage, the question of marriage, peace, and so on. Her considerable production is made up of essays and reviews, as well as books and shorter articles on these subjects.

This profile is divided into five parts. In 'The Writings of Ellen Key', the most important of her works are dealt with, concentrating on her educational publications. 'Biographical Background' describes her origins, as well as sketching an 'intellectual portrait' of Ellen Key. The most important contemporary sources of inspiration influencing her writing on education are also mentioned. The two other main sections consist of 'Thoughts on Education' and 'The School of the Future'. In the 'Conclusions', Ellen Key's educational writings are evaluated and the international influence of her work is assessed.

The writings of Ellen Key

Ellen Key started her career as a writer towards the middle of the 1870s with a couple of literary essays. She became known to a large public through the pamphlet *On Freedom of Speech and Publishing* (1889). Her name and her books then became the topic of lively discussions. Among her larger works with more general contents we could mention: *Individualism and Socialism* (1896a); *Images of Thought* (1898); *Human Beings* (1899a); 'Lifelines', Vols. 1-3 (1903-06); and *Neutrality of the Souls* (1916b).

The contents of these works prepare the terrain for, or are closely connected with, Ellen Key's subsequent views on education. This is especially true of her stress on personal freedom and on the independent development of the individual, at the

same time pointing out the importance of taking other people's interests into consideration.

Regarding Ellen Key's writing on education, her earliest article seems to be 'Teachers for Infants at Home and in School' in *Tidskrift för hemmet* (1876). Her first more widely read essay, 'Books versus Coursebooks', was published in the journal *Verdandi* (1884a). Later, in the same journal, she published, among others, the articles 'A Statement on Co-educational Schools' (1888) and 'Murdering the Soul in Schools' (1891). Later she published the works *Education* (1897) and *Beauty for All* (1899b). In 1906 came *Popular Education with Special Consideration for the Development of Aesthetic Sense*. In the last two books a new and interesting idea is brought forward: Ellen Key views aesthetics, beauty and art as a means for the moral elevation and education of humanity.

Ellen Key's most important and best-known work on education is *Barnets århundrade* (Vols. 1 and 2, 1900), translated into English as *The Century of the Child* (1909).

Biographical background

Ellen Key was born in the manor house of Sundsholm in the southern Swedish province of Småland. She received a rather rigid education at home. Her father, Emil Key, was a supporter of liberalism and political radicalism, but had no conception of a free system of education. The treatment his children received at home could be described as harsh; this was particularly true for the sons of the family. Ellen Key wrote herself about education at home in her book *Memories of Emil Key* (1915). Corporal punishment was in this – as in other homes of the time – a routine matter. However, 'the result was predictable: not familiarity but fear; this coloured relations with the parents – bitterness grew and false confessions were enforced' (p. 375).

In spite of this tough educational climate, Ellen Key undoubtedly developed strong sentiments for her native home, the beautiful manor of Sundsholm. In letters and diaries this deep affection often emerged. Her birthplace and the surrounding countryside were often favourably compared with Stockholm, where Ellen Key – as an adult, as well as during several periods in her youth – spent a great deal of time. Home was to become a central idea in her thoughts on education. Consequently, it was a hard blow at the beginning of the 1880s when financial reasons forced Emil Key to give up Sundsholm.

Ellen Key's education was acquired haphazardly. She was educated at home first by her mother, later by governesses; part of the time a German and part of the time a French one. Preparation for 'confirmation' into the Church took place in 1865 and 1866 when she attended a private school in Stockholm. The only other school Ellen Key attended was Jenny Rossander's Educational Course for Adult Women. This took place in the period 1868–72, but only during winter terms, since she had to devote herself to other tasks, among which was that of secretary to her father. Beside that, she studied extensively in private.

Her studies thus could be said to be non-formal. It is presumably not by chance,

therefore, that later in life, as in the book *The Century of the Child*, she stressed the importance of a free education in personal development.

Ellen Key's interest was awakened early by the idea of the 'people's high school'. She saw it as an aim in life to set up and manage a people's high school for women in her home district. However, she was unable to bring these plans to fruition. Instead, in 1880, she had to accept a modest post as teacher at a private girls' school in Stockholm, which had originally been set up at the end of the 1870s with seven pupils. However, she would soon convert her interest in 'the education of the people' into another field other than that of the people's high school: in 1883 she began to lecture at the Workers' Institute in Stockholm. She continued with these lectures, which dealt with history, literature, art and contemporary ideas, until 1903, at which time she gave up all teaching activities and earned her living thereafter as a freelance writer.

As a child Ellen Key was brought up as a Christian. As she grew up, she gradually departed from this belief. When she finally gave up Christianity altogether, the doctrine of evolution became of vital importance. From 1879 onwards, she studied Darwin, Spencer and Huxley. In the autumn of that year she met both Huxley and Haeckel, the German biologist and philosopher, in London. The principle of evolution which Ellen Key had come to believe in was also to have an influence on her educational views.

Ellen Key had grown up in an atmosphere of liberalism. During the 1870s her political beliefs were radically liberal. She was republican-minded and the idea of freedom was of great importance to her. As the 1880s advanced, her thinking became even more radical, first affecting her religious beliefs and then gradually her views on life in society in general. This was the outcome of extensive reading. Among others, she read positivistic authors as well as, to begin with, Spencer. During the latter part of the 1880s and particularly in the 1890s she began to read socialist literature and turned increasingly towards socialism.

The authors who were to have the greatest impact on Ellen Key's educational views were Rousseau, Goethe, Nietzsche, Comte, Mill and Spencer.

How did she first come into contact with Rousseau? His name appears in her diaries (called *Tankeböckerna* – 'Books of Thoughts') as early as 1870. By this time, however, she had not yet herself studied Rousseau and had only indirectly become acquainted with his train of thought. The first known direct contact with Rousseau's writings was in 1874. In a letter of 28 September of that year she mentions that she has just read *La nouvelle Héloïse*. She was not to read *Émile* until later, in 1884. There is an element of education in *La nouvelle Héloïse*: the importance of the home, the mother and the family is emphasized. In *Émile* the accent is on the need for developing individuality, while at the same time stressing the need to learn to be considerate towards others. The relationship between Ellen Key's principles of education in *The Century of the Child* and Rousseau's *Émile* is quite obvious.

Ellen Key learned about the neo-humanistic cultural ideal principally from Johann Wolfgang Goethe. The cultural aim advocated by the neo-humanist Herder was 'humanity', by which he meant a harmonious cultivation of both physical and

spiritual qualities. Goethe stresses both the individuality and the harmonious development of everyone's particular gifts. Goethe is important to Ellen Key regarding both her general outlook on life and the development of her views on education. For her, he represents an attitude to life prevalent during antiquity which she contrasts with Christianity. Goethe was one of the authors she had read since childhood. In *The Century of the Child* she mentions that she had read Goethe quite extensively before the age of 12 (i.e. before 1861). His name appears in her diaries from about 1870. Goethe's ideas on education played a not unimportant role in the writing of *The Century of the Child*. Thus, Ellen Key introduces the second part of that book (the chapter 'Education') with a summary of Goethe's views on the development of individuality. Ellen Key's other references to Goethe emphasize the need for harmony, that is, a balance between the development of body and soul.

Among the nineteenth-century philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche occupied a very special place in Ellen Key's thinking. In the 1890s she studied Nietzsche intensively. In her writings it is common to encounter thoughts and expressions which are very close to his thoughts and his superhuman idea – without his name being mentioned. Elsewhere, however, Nietzsche's name is mentioned or his texts actually quoted. Ellen Key says that she heard of Nietzsche for the first time in 1889. In her work *Individualism and Socialism* (1896a), Ellen Key contrasts egoism with co-operation as expressed by Nietzsche and Tolstoy respectively. On Nietzsche she writes that he 'has glorified individualism and the great personality' (p. 6). Further on, she limits this statement:

Nietzsche's great importance could be recognized without at the same time considering one of the traits he mentions in the superhuman personality as something good: without compassion to tread the ordinary 'herd' of human beings down recklessly [1896a, p. 32].

Her own – most individualistic – view was clearly defined before coming into contact with Nietzsche. There is, however, no doubt that Nietzsche inspired her. Even so, it is important that she recognized the weakness in his system: its complete recklessness. She agreed with Nietzsche's strong emphasis on the rights of the individual and of the personality. But at the same time she alienates herself from his lack of feeling and consideration for others.

Here Ellen Key relates with another line of ideas during the nineteenth century, namely the one represented by Comte, Mill and Spencer. From Auguste Comte and the positivists she drew the link between egoism and altruism. Already in her diaries from 1876 Ellen Key discussed Comte and his philosophy against the background of her then Christian faith. Comte stresses the importance of co-operation and altruism, and confronted it with egoism, i.e. the animal drive. In Comte's writings she met for the first time a question regarding human nature, a question which she finds most important. In the natural consideration for others, her individualism found a compensating element.

In 1878 Key mentions in letters that she is studying John Stuart Mill and his work *On Freedom*. She also refers to this work in her diary for October of that year. Mill's writings were to become important to her from the point of view of

religion and politics, as well as of education. Mill was a disciple of Comte. In the book *On Freedom*, he discusses the questions of egoism and altruism. Proceeding from the concept of freedom, Mill (1859, p. 27) writes, among other things: 'The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it.'

Spencer, too, was influenced by Comte. Ellen Key had already studied his book *Education* in 1870 in a Danish translation. After that, she read several of Spencer's works. In *The Century of the Child* Spencer's importance for her thinking on education is acknowledged. But Ellen Key maintains, as already mentioned, that Spencer is 'indebted to Rousseau'. This, however, 'does in no way diminish the merit of Spencer'. Spencer dwells to a great extent on punishments. If a child, through its own actions, is physically hurt, that is a 'punishment' – 'the inevitable consequences of prior actions'. If a child (more than 2 years old) loses or destroys its toys, the 'natural punishment' is the uneasiness following the loss. One should not protect the child from minor suffering. Thus, for instance, a child should learn what fire is. In this respect we find a close similarity between Spencer and Ellen Key.

Ellen Key was well read. To a certain degree it is understandable that some critics called her views on education 'the fruits of reading'. Against such a standpoint one should, however, keep in mind the consistency and stability of her views. In her diaries she had already formed her principal views on education at the beginning and middle of the 1870s. Essential parts were thus formed well before being confronted with the ideas of Rousseau and Spencer. It is interesting to compare the views Ellen Key puts forward in her 'Books of Thoughts' with those in *The Century of the Child* twenty-five to thirty years later. Consistency and similarity are striking.

Naturally, Ellen Key obtained ideas from different sources. As a rule, however, she adopted an independent position. Her views did develop as a result of influences from different sources and resulted in a synthesis whose core was most original. As seen above, when reading, for instance, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Spencer she assumed her own critical standpoint.

Thoughts on education

In *The Century of the Child* Ellen Key put forward a comprehensive and rather final view on education. We meet this general approach in several places in the book: in the chapters 'Homelessness' and 'Education' in Part 2, as well as in diverse places in Part 1 of the book. It should be noted, however, that the chapter 'Homelessness' is a reprint of a paper with the same title already published in 1887.

As an introduction to her thoughts on education, a couple of aspects of 'homelessness' could be discussed. When Ellen Key talks about 'homelessness' she is pointing out that homes do not fulfil the purpose that they ought to. She is obviously thinking of life in the larger cities, in her case Stockholm. Here, women do not devote their time to home-making to the same extent as in the past.

Ellen Key then discusses the relations between parents and children. She is of the opinion that there has been great progress – witnessed by the fact that relations

between them have become more intimate. Furthermore, she confronts simplicity with luxury: the latter is detrimental, the former useful for the child. She also suggests that, even when financial circumstances would allow luxury in the home, the parents should refrain from it for the good of the children.

Could one, in fact, find an ideal home? Ellen Key's answer is 'Yes'. She then gives a thorough description of such a home. The parents are partners in work and are equals. The relations between brothers and sisters are similar. The parents in such homes help the children to develop into real human beings by always treating them as human beings. The children shall not receive anything for nothing: they ought, according to their ability, take part in household tasks and they should learn to respect their parents and each other. Ellen Key states: 'They have duties and rights that are just as firmly established as those of their parents' (1900, p. 199).

Ellen Key emphasizes the importance of exposing children to the 'realities' of each day. They learn to be of use around the home, to create their own pleasures and also to accept their own punishments. The parents should never stop them from suffering the natural consequences of their own acts. Children should learn responsibility from an early age. Restrictions should be few but resolute.

In the work *Female Psychology and Female Logic* (1896b) Ellen Key strongly underlines the role of the mother. She says, among other things, that the mother/child relationship is a very important point of departure for altruistic impulses in society. In *The Century of the Child* the motherly aspect receives even greater emphasis. Motherly love and care is an indispensable tool for realizing the future aims of the child. A new conception of the vocation of the mother should be created. This necessitates a tremendous effort and a continuous inspiration:

It does mean that our soul is to be filled by the child, just as the man of science is possessed by his investigations and the artist by his work. The child should be in one's thoughts when one is sitting at home or walking along the road, when one is lying down or when one is standing up [1900, p. 102].

During the 1890s, social problems played an even more important role for Ellen Key. She demands that society be changed and that mothers and children should be protected by legislation from certain types of work, especially in industry.

Key rejects a proposition about collective child welfare. She hopes that man's inclination to individualism will defeat the tendency towards mass anonymity and monotony regarding life at home. She hopes that a rich home life will still be regarded as a basis for personal development.

Ellen Key assumes that men and women have different qualities, determined by their nature. She speaks of the 'female principle', which ought to play a special role in the future aims of society. By this she means that society cannot neglect the female principle. This principle is necessary for the creation of favourable conditions for the individual's development towards freedom and happiness. At the same time, she supports suffrage for women. Even here, she insists on equality between men and women.

The central points in Ellen Key's thinking on education can be found in the chapter 'Education' in *The Century of the Child*. The starting point is an individu-

alistic view of education. Ellen Key quotes Goethe, who maintains that in every child there is something good from birth. She shares this opinion. She expresses her views on education in this way: 'Allowing nature quietly and slowly to help itself, taking care only that the surrounding conditions help the work of nature; this is education' (1900, p. 107).

Ellen Key's aim for education is that each child will develop into a free and independent individual. But this is only one side of her system. There is another aspect: consideration for others. Already in the introduction to the chapter 'Education' she explains that egoism on the part of the child is justified to a certain extent, but that it must be balanced by consideration for others. She says, among other things: 'The right balance must be kept between Spencer's definition of life as an adaptation to surrounding conditions, and Nietzsche's definition of it as the will to secure power' (1900, p. 119). Reflections on this problem of balance are the essential question in Ellen Key's system of education.

Ellen Key means that all education requires an element of obedience. To obtain this, reward and punishment are two important elements. How does she see them? She rejects the idea that a child will receive praise if an adventurous feat is successful but will be punished if it fails. The effort, the work, the struggle should be a goal in itself. She discusses in this connection school and marks. Ellen Key protests against competition encouraged by giving marks and opposes the use of prizes and rewards. She says that she has been fighting against examinations for twenty years.

Thus Ellen Key is definitely against rewards in education. What, then, is her attitude towards punishment? One kind she most definitely opposes is corporal punishment. That is, in effect, the most important message of the chapter on 'Education'. On this matter her attitude is completely consistent. With reference to Quintilianus and Comenius, among others, she criticizes corporal punishment very sharply. She demands that it shall be legally forbidden to strike a child in any school or in any home. She believes that corporal discipline gives rise to irremediable damage.

There is, however, one form of punishment which she accepts and considers as correct: 'natural punishment'. Ellen Key states that children may have to endure the severity of the consequences resulting from their acts. She has one reservation, however: if the child is running the risk of 'irremediable damage', the educator must come to the rescue and halt proceedings. Ellen Key maintains that the child should not be frightened of danger: 'But let him burn himself with the flame, then he is certain to leave it alone' (1900, p. 63).

For Key the example is important in education. The educator must become someone the children can imitate.

Obedience is also indispensable in education. But how does one make a child obey if punishments – with the exception of 'natural punishments' – are excluded? Ellen Key's recipe is that, instead of being punished, the child shall be persuaded to accept 'voluntary obedience'. This must be impressed during childhood. But on what is this voluntary obedience based? The essential of this case, as Ellen Key sees it, is to create habitual behaviour within a child. She believes that the first three

years in a child's life are particularly important. This is when good habits should be inculcated.

The most important ideas on education are, however, mentioned only towards the end of the chapter on 'Education' where Ellen Key again speaks of the home. She says that the strongest constructive factor in the education of a human being is 'the settled, quiet order of home, its peace, and its duty' (1900, p. 162). For this it is necessary for mothers to be spared from outside work so as to devote themselves to the home and the children.

The views on education put forward in *The Century of the Child* could be traced back to the years of Ellen Key's youth, that is, towards the end of the 1860s. In the diaries or the so-called 'Books of Thoughts' there are notes from the years 1868 to 1875. Specially important is a notation from February 1870. In seven points Ellen Key gives a summary of her views on education at this time.

1. Never let children get anything through crying.
2. Do not mention rewards, bribes or consent to make them do their duty.
3. Never lie to the children or frighten them.
4. Never strike them.
5. Let them help themselves.
6. Few orders but unconditional obedience; few threats but always fulfilled.
7. Punishment as a means of education only strengthens the animal, ignoble nature which is to be eradicated.

If one compares the ideas in the 'Books of Thoughts', written when Ellen Key was in her twenties, with what can be read in *The Century of the Child*, the similarities are striking. The words egoism/altruism are not found in these early notes, however. Only during the second half of the 1870s did Ellen Key encounter this theme through positivism, which was to occupy her until the turn of the century.

The first time Key mentions egoism/altruism in her writings is in the article 'Björnstjerne Björnson: The Flags Are Flying in the Town and in the Harbour' (1884b) in the journal *Verdandi*. In 1886 she published an article entitled 'On the Limits of Self-sacrifice' in the magazine *Fri forskning*, where the question of egoism versus altruism is described as 'the most profound question of this time'.

During the 1890s Ellen Key worked intensively on the problem of achieving a balance between egoism and altruism. Thus she discusses the matter in the article 'Unselfishness or Selfishness?' in the Christmas number of the magazine *Idun* (1893). She confronts two philosophies of life: 'Self-sacrifice' versus 'the reckless, complete and free development of one's own personality' (1893, p. 408). Ellen Key regards both of these attitudes as extreme. She advocates 'the ideal of harmony'. She continues: 'Peaceful harmony is the balance between unselfishness and selfishness' (1893, p. 410).

In the work *Individualism and Socialism* Ellen Key confronts self-confidence and consideration for others. In a society based on an idealistic and reformist socialism, the right balance must be achieved between these two tendencies.

After having thoroughly examined egoism/altruism over a period of twenty-five years, she is finally ready in *The Century of the Child* – while waiting for a

better society – to present a practical solution to the problem of a harmonious balance between egoism and altruism: this is to be achieved through natural education in the home. Thus, in *The Century of the Child*, we come into contact with the final result of a long development, the start of which we first saw in the diaries dating from about 1870.

The school of the future

In two chapters of *The Century of the Child* Ellen Key discusses the problems of the school and teaching: partly in 'The School of the Future' and partly in 'Murdering the Soul in Schools'. The last chapter is a summary of two earlier articles published in two periodicals in 1888 and 1891.

Let us begin with some comments on the chapter 'Murdering the Soul in Schools'. Ellen Key draws a dark picture of the Swedish school of that epoch. Among other things, such qualities as imagination and reflection were in no way being developed. She required a system of schooling alternating individual tuition with pauses and self-study. The school should have only one aim: to give to each individual as much self-development and happiness as possible. She emphasizes the importance of co-operation between school and home.

Ellen Key then goes on to discuss the question of school reorganization. Infant school ought to disappear and be replaced by 'home courses'. The elementary or primary school should start at the age of 9 or 10 and should be a common school for everybody. At the same time she maintains the individuality of both sexes. The school should teach girls and boys to co-operate. The mixed school applies not only to both sexes but also to the relations between different socio-economic classes of society. In this way the walls between men and women in society and between upper and lower classes can be pulled down.

Further, Ellen Key stresses the importance of concentration in teaching and criticizes the splitting up of school subjects. She wants different subjects to be integrated. Separation can be avoided by grouping the subjects into fairly large units: thus history should comprise also the history of literature, Church history and the history of art.

No classes should have more than twelve pupils. There will be a common fundamental course plus time for 'selective self-instruction'. Homework should be moved back to the school. As far as possible, teaching should be aimed at the pupils, their search for knowledge and in shaping their own opinions. She declares:

Our age cries for personality, but it will ask in vain, until we allow them to have their own will, think their own thoughts, work out their own knowledge, form their own judgements; or, to put the matter briefly, until we cease to suppress the raw material of personality in schools, vainly hoping later on in life to revive it again [1900, p. 232].

Ellen Key introduces the chapter on 'The School of the Future' with a discussion of the kindergarten or nursery school. She is critical of this form of school. She is afraid of the collectivity and the influence of the mass. As a school, kindergarten is

inferior to the home. She wants the children to start school at different ages. Home is the natural society.

As regards schooling following on after 'the home school', Ellen Key does not present any systematic programme. Until the age of 15 there is a common mixed school with both theoretical and practical teaching. Then follows 'application schools', some sort of high school with different programmes. She criticizes the existing division into different classes. She wants individual adaptation to theoretical and practical subjects.

She would get rid of classrooms as such and have instead separate rooms for each school subject. She also wants special study rooms, where the pupils have their own places for self-instruction. Ellen Key recommends a limited compulsory course, containing, for instance, reading aloud, correct spelling, the four rules of arithmetic, etc. In language teaching the use of grammar is to be limited. Above all it is necessary to be familiar with literature. She lays stress on the method 'to speak the language'. Practical subjects could be taught in parallel with theoretical ones. Singing should be practised daily.

In vocational schools the principle is self-activity. Certain positive qualities should be developed: courage, the capacity to discover new things and to explore unfamiliar avenues.

Ellen Key also discusses the social question. 'Common schools for cultural education', where common training is given to all, must be built. Through these schools natural circulation among all classes of society will be furthered. She wishes to protect the right and possibility for rural children to receive their instruction in the countryside. She talks of the contemporary anxiety 'to become something'; this should disappear with the school of the future. The important thing is not what one person does but that all people should be able to fulfil their personalities. All must do themselves justice: those who have an aptitude for studies and those who have practical skills.

Ellen Key looks forward to an educational revolution which will break down the existing school system. She dreams of a 'deluge' of pedagogy giving Montaigne, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Spencer and the then new child psychology the influence they deserve.

The way in which *The Century of the Child* dissociates itself from the kindergarten can be traced a long way back in Ellen Key's thinking. Already in 1873 she had stated: 'Nursery schools are madness; organized play becomes forced and one kills fantasy' (*Tankeböcker*, VIII, p. 18). In a letter to her mother from Amsterdam in 1879 she was even more critical. Thus the principle of her views was already formed at this time.

Ellen Key wished to replace kindergarten and junior school with home schools. In this respect she could link up with a well-established tradition of ideas in Sweden during the nineteenth century. In the article 'Homelessness' (1887) Ellen Key suggests that mothers could teach children in certain simple subjects. In 'Murdering the Soul in Schools' (1891) her comments are more exhaustive. With the central place in her thinking occupied by the home, inevitably it became more and more natural for her that the home should take over the primary teaching role.

In 1888 Ellen Key's article 'A Statement on Co-educational Schools' was published. In fact, Ellen Key had already formulated certain views on this question long beforehand. In one of her 'Books of Thoughts' (1877) is found the following note (Tankeböcker, VIII, p. 63): 'I want common elementary schools for children of all classes, boys and girls together.'

In her article 'Björnstjerne Björnson: The Flags Are Flying in the Town and in the Harbour' (1884*b*), Ellen Key for the first time publicly takes up the question of common teaching. In two articles in *Verdandi* in 1887 and 1891, Ellen Key returns to the matter. She stands alone in this respect: she emphasizes the social view. Her standpoint here can be traced back to the 1870s.

In the work *Female Psychology and Female Logic* (1896*b*), Ellen Key discusses in depth the question of common teaching and its advantages. Like Spencer, she accepts that there are psychological differences between men and women. As in *Misused Female Power* (1896*c*), the female role as a mother is the main reason for the mental differences between men and women. The differences between the sexes must be taken into consideration.

These views reappear in *The Century of the Child*. Ellen Key's thoughts on common schools reflect the core of her educational deliberations. The sexes shall influence each other in a positive way. According to Ellen Key, self-realization and at the same time consideration for others should, in this case as in other respects, be quite possible.

Conclusions

Ellen Key's ideas on the role of woman, marriage, culture, religion and politics became the subject of lively discussions in Sweden. Her radical ideas often encountered strong resistance. From time to time she was even the object of persecution. Her ideas on education, however, went largely unnoticed in contemporary Sweden and caused little debate. It was only a long time later that her ideas began to be put into effect in Swedish schools.

If we – with a perspective of nearly 100 years – look at her ideas on education, we find that development in certain respects has taken completely the opposite path to the one favoured by Ellen Key. She wanted a revival of the home in taking care of the children. In her native country the importance of the home in this respect has diminished and mothers have become involved in work outside the home to a far greater extent. Ellen Key furthermore argued that early education should take place in the home, with children beginning school at a later age. Quite the contrary has occurred.

However, in a lot of other respects her ideas have been implemented, although again this has taken quite some time in her native Sweden. She emphasized the freedom and individuality of the child; she argued for equality in the home; she was opposed to corporal punishment; she fought for coeducation and common schools for all children, regardless of social class; she saw the activity of the child as central; she wanted the different teaching subjects to be co-ordinated into a comprehensive system with special classrooms for special subjects.

Outside her native country, her ideas on education had a much stronger impact. This was particularly true in Germany, especially during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The German version of *The Century of the Child* had been printed in thirty-six editions by 1926. Both before and after the Second World War Ellen Key's works received great attention in German-speaking countries.

Ellen Key's books and ideas also drew attention in several other countries. Already in 1909, *The Century of the Child* had been translated into nine European languages. In the United States, her ideas played an important role in the Child-Study-Movement. Less known, perhaps, is the fact that Key was also discussed in the early Soviet debate on education, side by side with Dewey and Montessori. A Russian educator, K. N. Ventcel, considered *The Century of the Child* to be a central work in education.

In Japan, the interest in Ellen Key's ideas on education has grown strongly in recent decades. *The Century of the Child* was translated into Japanese in 1916, a second edition followed in 1960 and a third edition in 1970. *Love and Marriage* – a part of *Lifelines* – was translated for the first time in 1914 and was published in two editions in 1973. Other articles were translated in 1974. Further evidence of this interest is that Louise Hamilton's work on Ellen Key – first translated into Japanese in 1922 – was brought out in a new edition in 1966. It could perhaps also be mentioned that this same author's dissertation *A Study of Ellen Key's Educational Thought – with Particular Reference to 'The Century of the Child'* was translated into Japanese in 1982.

Apart from Hamilton's text, there are two other dissertations on the subject of Ellen Key published in Swedish: Wittrock (1953) and Ambjörnsson (1974).

Works by Ellen Key

(classified in chronological order)

- 1868–78 *Tankeböcker* [Books of Thoughts]. Stockholm, The Royal Library. 10 vols. (Manuscript.)
- 1876 *Om småbarnslärarinnor för hem och skola* [Teachers for Infants at Home and in School]. *Tidskrift för hemmet* (Stockholm), pp. 290–8.
- 1884a *Böckerna mot läseböckerna* [Books Versus Coursebooks]. *Verdandi* (Stockholm), No. 2, pp. 56–66.
- 1884b *Björnstjerne Björnson: 'Det flager i byen og paa havne'* [Björnstjerne Björnson: The Flags are Flying in the Town and in the Harbour]. *Verdandi* (Stockholm), No. 516, pp. 243–54.
- 1886 *Om gränsen för själfuppoffring* [On the Limits of Self-sacrifice]. *Fri forskning* (Stockholm), No. 1, pp. 123–9.
- 1887 *Hemlöshet* [Homelessness]. *Verdandi* (Stockholm), No. 1, pp. 21–8.
- 1888 *Ett uttalande i samskolefrågan* [A Statement on Co-educational Schools]. *Verdandi* (Stockholm), No. 3, pp. 120–7.
- 1889 *Om yttrande- och tryckfrihet* [On Freedom of Speech and Publishing]. Stockholm, 1889.
- 1891 *Själamorden i skolorna* [Murdering the Soul in Schools]. *Verdandi* (Stockholm), No. 2, pp. 86–98.
- 1893 *Osjälfviskhet eller själfviskhet?* [Unselfishness or Selfishness?]. *Idun* (Stockholm), pp. 408–11.

- 1896a *Individualism och socialism. Några tankar om de få och de många* [Individualism and Socialism]. Stockholm.
- 1896b *Kvinno-psykologi och kvinnlig logik. En studie och ett försvar* [Female Psychology and Female Logic]. Stockholm.
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- 1899a *Människor* [Human Beings]. Stockholm.
- 1899b *Skönhet för alla* [Beauty for All]. Stockholm.
- 1900 *Barnets århundrade* [The Century of the Child]. Stockholm. 2 vols.
- 1903–06 *Lifslinjer* [Lifelines]. Stockholm. 3 vols.
- 1906 *Folkbildningsarbetet särskildt med hänsyn till skönhetssinnets odling* [Popular Education with Special Consideration for the Development of Aesthetic Sense]. Uppsala.
1915. 1916a. 1917. *Minnen av och om Emil Key* [Memories of Emil Key]. Stockholm. 3 vols.
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- Mill, J. S. 1859. *On Freedom*. London.
- Rousseau, J.-J. 1761. *Julie ou La nouvelle Héloïse*. Paris.
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200 years (1900)

and National Institute of Education, Beijing (China)

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Too often, when people speak of the 'founders of education' they have in mind or thinkers and pedagogues who, in the West and elsewhere, have devoted themselves to education to the exclusion of all else: in short, education as a game preserve of a few. Yet philosophers, politicians, sociologists, scientists, theologians, novelists, historians, poets and essayists, of every period and culture, have had much to say on the subject of education.

How is one then to understand in depth, through its successive strata, the philosophy that underlies a particular system of education if, beyond the play of fashion, the surface eddies and the ups and downs of politics, one knows little or nothing about the thinkers who inspired it?

Clearly, there is a need to fill a gap by bringing together in a single work monographs presenting and appraising, in our own terms and with the tools available to us today, the great figures who, in one way or another, have left their mark on educational thought.

Here then, to fill that gap, are 100 essays written by internationally, regionally or nationally recognized specialists. If they are not always of the same mother tongue as the thinker they are writing about, they nevertheless master that language and thus are perfectly familiar with and have direct access to his or her work.

Far off, in terms of time, the most ancient of the thinkers studied is Confucius; in our own day, figures still very much alive continue to animate, directly or indirectly, the universal debate on education (Freire, Husén, Illich, etc.). In the intervening period, as we progress through the pages, twenty-five centuries will elapse.

As regards geographical space, the reader will come to know China, Japan, India, the Near and Middle East (Iraq, Persia, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel), the Maghreb, Greece, the Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Croatia), Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, England and then the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Russia and the former USSR. We shall have touched down in Africa and made stopovers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela before reaching the United States.

This search for the universal is aimed at compelling, as it were, the reader to open his or her mind to other cultures, to want to know them, not through clichés or approximately by allusion, but in some depth. Accordingly, while this collection may constitute a forum within which some 100 thinkers hold a dialogue, contradict each other, rebut each other and, ultimately, enrich each other by force of their very differences, it is also in a way, and for this very reason, a cultural provocation.

Zaghloul Morsy (Morocco) is a Director at UNESCO and has been Editor-in-Chief of UNESCO's quarterly review of education, *Prospects*, since 1972. Before joining UNESCO, he held the posts of professor and Director of the Department of Literature and French Civilization at the Faculty of Letters of the Mohamed V University (Rabat). Editor of *Learning and Working* (1979), *Adult Education and Development* (1982, in Arabic), *Media Education* (1984), *La tolérance: Un essai d'anthologie* [Tolerance: Anthological Essay] (1975, 1988 and 1993, in French) and *The Challenge of Illiteracy: From Reflection to Action* (to appear in 1994). Co-editor with P.G. Altbach of *Higher Education in International Perspective: Toward the 21st Century* (1993).

